THE ABUSE OF POLICE AUTHORITY

A National Study of Police Officers' Attitudes

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A National Study of Police Officers' Attitudes

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We expect our police "…to have the wisdom of Solomon, the courage of David, the patience of Job and the leadership of Moses, the kindness of the Good Samaritan, the strategy of Alexander, the faith of Daniel, the diplomacy of Lincoln, the tolerance of the Carpenter of Nazareth, and, finally, an intimate knowledge of every branch of the natural, biological, and social sciences. If he had all these, he might be a good policeman."

—August Vollmer, 1936

Foreword

When the police fail to meet our expectations, we react with dismay, anger, and additional demands. Police corruption and abuse of authority have persisted since the beginning of policing, and were exacerbated late in the twentieth century by America's drug epidemic. Every year, incidents of police abuse of authority cost local communities tens of millions of dollars in legal damages. Tax dollars are wasted. Careers are destroyed. The public trust is compromised.

Virtually every police department has policies prescribing officer conduct and regulating use of force. No police department or police chief should knowingly condone conduct that runs counter to either department policy or constitutional standards. While there is accountability for acts of corruption and other forms of wrongdoing in most police departments, there is little or no accountability for those who tolerate such an environment. How, for example, were a few officers able to brutalize Abner Louima within sound if not sight of first-line supervisors and other department officials in New York's 70th Precinct?

Even good people, placed in the wrong situation, will do the wrong thing. Bad supervision, intense peer pressure, and an organizational culture that sends unclear signals can cause honorable men and women to behave in dishonorable ways. The key moral problem for police departments is the same as it is for corporations, universities, labor unions, and government agencies: how can you create a culture that will induce members to strike the right balance between achieving an organizational goal and observing fundamental principles of decency and fairness?

Values in police agencies come not just from documents that describe them but also from traditional police culture. Too often, there is a disconnect between policies and practices, a failure of police management to monitor behavior and to respond appropriately. If police leadership does not assume an aggressive role in ensuring that the police culture is one of integrity and accountability, officers will continue to cultivate their own culture in their own way.

As this study reaffirms, commitment by the chief and command staff to uphold democratic values and eradicate discriminatory practices is key. Police administrators should proactively institute and enforce strong policies governing conduct, as well as systems to collect and analyze data relative to police-citizen contacts such as complaints, use of force incidents, and traffic stops. Such efforts would inform policy, guide recruitment and training, and build accountability necessary to restore and maintain public trust in the police. It is the lack of internal, systemic controls, and not "a few rotten apples," that perpetuates problems of misconduct and abuse by police. Most of America's police officers are honest, dedicated, hard-working public servants, and it is they, as well as the public they serve, who are victims of the "bad" cop.

Because of the nature of their responsibilities, the police have the power to intervene and become involved at very basic levels within the lives of American citizens. The nature of the police response—the manner in which officers interact with citizens and the methods by which they enforce the law—have critical implications for our democracy and the quality of life of our citizens. As Jerome Skolnick writes in his thoughtful essay, *On Democratic Policing,* "Order achieved through democratic policing is concerned not only with the ends of crime control, but also with the means used to achieve those ends."

Are police abuses inevitable in our efforts to control crime? What are police officers' views on the code of silence, whistle blowing, and the ways in which race or class influence police behavior? What are effective means of preventing abuse of authority by police? This report provides a nationwide portrait of what America's police officers think about these and other important questions of abuse of police authority.

Hubert Williams
President
Police Foundation

Acknowledgments

I

INTRODUCTION

...[P]otential abuse and actual abuse of [police] authority remain both a central problem for police agencies and a central public policy concern.

American society has long entrusted to its police the authority to use force in the pursuit of justice, law, and order. This authority is often glorified in books, television, and movies, where the police are seen as constantly responding to violent felons with equally violent reactions. But the reality of police use of force is much less dramatic and the boundaries of legitimate police use of force are much more constrained than defined in popular culture. The police indeed have discretion to use violence when it is required. However, the potential abuse and actual abuse of such authority remain both a central problem for police agencies and a central public policy concern.

Extreme examples of police abuse often spark major public debate. Videotapes of Rodney King being beaten by Los Angeles police officers, as well as reports of the torture of Abner Louima by New York City police, capture public attention and raise troubling questions about police abuse of force in a democratic society. Are such events isolated aberrations in American policing, or are they extreme examples of a more general problem that plagues American police departments? Does the fact that such events often involve minorities suggest important inequities of law enforcement against particular racial, class, or ethnic groups? What measures can be taken to constrain police abuse, and which are likely to

be most effective? Such questions have been raised and debated in the media, by our politicians, and by police scholars and administrators. However, the voices of rank-and-file police officers and supervisors have not been heard.

This silence is particularly important, given the vast changes in organization, tactics, and philosophy that have occurred in American policing over the past three decades. At the forefront of those changes has been the transition from the use of traditional military and professional models of policing to the creation of innovative models of community policing. While the police had earlier defined professionalization as limiting the role of the community in American policing, today police seek to work closely with the public in defining and responding to problems of crime and disorder. In turn, the military model of police supervision that gave little autonomy or authority to street-level officers has begun to be replaced by more flexible modes of supervision that allow rank-and-file officers the freedom to develop contacts with the public and to define innovative problem-solving strategies. The police and the community are seen as partners in emerging models of community policing. Rank-and-file police— as those closest to the public—have, in turn, become central actors in the movement toward community-oriented policing. The views of rank-and-file police have special significance in this age of community policing, which has

sought to tighten the bonds between police and community and to empower both groups to act effectively against community problems.

With the support of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Police Foundation undertook to conduct a representative national survey that would uncover the attitudes of American police about sensitive questions of police abuse of authority. How do contemporary police view abuses of police authority? Do police see them as an inevitable by-product of increased efforts to control crime and disorder? What forms do they take? How common do police believe them to be? What strategies and tactics do police view as most effective in preventing police abuses of authority? Given the importance of the movement toward community-oriented policing, we sought to define whether community-oriented policing is seen to encourage or constrain the boundaries of acceptable use of police authority. Has community policing enhanced the movement toward police respect for the rights of citizens, or has it fostered new police skepticism about the rule of law in a democratic society?

The following is our report on a telephone survey of a representative sample of more than 900 police officers who were drawn from an estimated population of 350,000 American municipal and county police.[1] Ours is the first national study of this type and,

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therefore, has particular significance for understanding the attitudes of American police toward abuse of authority in the age of community policing. The report examines the questions raised above using the survey responses of police officers, as well as the insights gained from focus groups conducted earlier in the study (see Appendices B, C, and D). The major findings of the study are as follows:

• American police believe that extreme cases of police abuse of authority occur infrequently. However, a substantial minority of officers believe that it is sometimes necessary to use more force than is legally allowable.

• Despite strong support for norms recognizing the boundaries of police authority, officers revealed that it is not unusual for police to ignore improper conduct by their fellow officers.

• American police believe that training and education programs are effective means of preventing police

from abusing authority. They also argue that their own department takes a "tough stand" on the issue of police abuse. Finally, they argue that a department's chief and first-line supervisors can play an important role in preventing abuse of authority.

• Police officers believe that the public and the media are too concerned with police abuses of authority.

• American police officers support core principles of community policing; they generally believe that community policing reduces or has no impact on the potential for police abuse.

• A majority of African-American police officers believe that police treat whites better than African Americans and other minorities, and that police officers are more likely to use physical force against minorities or the poor. Few white police officers, however, share these views.

II

METHODOLOGY

Our findings are based on a telephone survey that was conducted by Mathematica Policy Research Inc. of Princeton, New Jersey, under the direction of the Police Foundation. The survey instrument was developed by the Police Foundation's staff after consulting a wide range of earlier studies and after conducting a series of focus groups composed of police scholars, police managers, and rank-and-file police.[2] The survey itself took an average of 25 minutes to complete and was carried out with careful concern for protecting the anonymity, privacy, and confidentiality of participants.[3]

As the sample design was developed, background research revealed that although a number of studies have randomly sampled police departments, only one previous national survey—a 1985 study of police officers' attitudes toward issues related to rape—used a randomly selected sample of police officers (LeDoux and Hazelwood, 1985). In selecting our sample, we had a basic requirement to obtain a representative sample of police officers nationwide.[4] We designed a two-step process. First, we sought the most accurate listing of police agencies throughout the country. Second, after selecting a sample of participating agencies, we began our task of procuring lists of officers from those agencies.

A recent study by Maguire, Snipes, Uchida, and Townsend (1998) concluded that the sources generally relied upon for national-level information about police agencies are inadequate. Maguire

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The sampling frame… consisted of 5,042 police departments that employ between 91.6 percent and 94.1 percent of all full-time sworn officers who serve in local police agencies in the United States.

et al. explained the limitations of and discrepancies between the FBI Uniform Crime Reports and the 1992 Census of Law Enforcement Agencies that had been compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics with the Census Bureau, as comprehensive lists of all police agencies in the United States. Their study developed a more reliable list of police agencies by combining the information contained in the Uniform Crime Reports, the 1992 Census of Law Enforcement Agencies, and a third list of police departments provided by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. This newly created list, with further corrections by Maguire, served as the universe of police departments for the Police Foundation study.

The Police Foundation, in consultation with several policing experts and statisticians, identified criteria for inclusion in the sampling frame. The criteria established were as follows:

- The police department has primary responsibility for providing police services to a residential population (thus eliminating special police forces).

- The department has a minimum of 10 full-time sworn officers.

- The department is either a municipal or county police agency (state police and sheriff departments, with their wide range of responsibilities that may or may not include policing residential populations, were excluded from the sampling frame).

The sampling frame, as thus defined, consisted of 5,042 police departments that employ between 91.6 percent and 94.1 percent of all full-time sworn officers who serve in local police agencies in the United States. Applying the regional classification system used in the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (FBI, 1994), we see that the officers represented 1,377 departments from the Northeast, 1,547 from the South, 1,383 from the North Central, and 735 from the West.[5] Maguire (1997) estimates the number of officers in these 5,042 departments at about 350,000.

We followed a method of multistage, or clustered, sampling, whereby the sampling frame was divided into sampling units that were based on department size.[6] Those units were then distributed into three strata, or groups, by size of department and organized by geographic region. One stratum (the "certainty" stratum) consisted of the nine largest departments. The second stratum contained 84 randomly selected departments with 25 or more full-time sworn officers (the "midsize" stratum). The third group included 28 randomly selected departments with at least 10, but no more than 24, full-time sworn officers (the "small" stratum).

To draw the random samples of officers of all ranks from each of the 121 departments, and then to contact the officers selected to be interviewed, the Police Foundation contacted the 121 selected departments and requested the following information:

- A roster with the names and ranks of all full-time sworn personnel,

- A badge or employee identification number for each officer,

- A phone number at the department where each officer could be contacted,

- An address at the department where each officer could be contacted, and,

- If possible, the shift each officer is assigned to.

As each department's list became available in the form necessary, the random samples were drawn, advance letters were sent to the selected officers, and the process of phoning and conducting the surveys was carried out.

Of the 121 departments contacted, 113 ultimately agreed to participate, for an overall departmental participation rate of 93.4 percent. The eight departments that declined were from all three strata. Thus, we lost (a) one department (from the nine) in the certainty stratum, for a participation rate of 89 percent; (b) six from the 84 in the midsize stratum, for a participation rate of 93 percent; and (c) one from the 28 in the small stratum, for a participation rate of 96.5 percent. The participating departments cooperated by submitting rosters of all full-time sworn personnel, with rank, contact address, and telephone numbers.[7] From those lists, 1,112 officers were randomly selected. As initial contacts were made, it was determined that 60 officers were ineligible to participate for a number of reasons (i.e., were not full-time sworn officers, were on suspension, were on long-term disability, etc.). They were, therefore, removed from the sample. Their elimination left a final sample size of 1,060.

Response rates in social science research are often used as the benchmark for evaluating the representativeness of the sample and for determining the degree to which one can generalize from the survey results to the survey population. A generally accepted rule of thumb is that response rates of 70 percent or above are viewed as "very good" (see Babbie, 1990; Babbie, 1992; Maxfield and Babbie, 1995). Of the 1,060 eligible officers in the sample, 925 completed the survey, for a completion rate of 87.3 percent. This rate is one of the highest achieved in surveys of police, whether on the national or state level (see, for example, LeDoux and Hazelwood, 1985; Pate and Fridell, 1993; Martin and Bensinger, 1994; McConkey, Huon, and Frank, 1996; and Amendola, Hockman, and Scharf, 1996). Even when we combine the departmental participation rate of 93.4 percent with the officer completion rate of 87.3 percent, the combined overall response rate of 81.5 percent is still well above the accepted standard.

In survey research, it is traditional to report the level of statistical confidence, sometimes referred to as sampling error, that can be applied to the estimates reported. For our study, that level of confidence was very high for percentages

Of the 1,060 eligible officers,… 925 completed the survey…. This rate [87%] is one of the highest… in surveys of police, whether on the national or state level….

relating to the full sample. The 95 percent confidence intervals for responses in the survey were generally between 2 and 4 percent.[8] This figure suggests that we can be very confident that the population characteristics associated with the survey responses were generally within plus or minus 2 to 4 percent of those reported. If we were hypothetically to observe repeated samples like that drawn in our study and to calculate a confidence interval for each, then only about 5 in 100 would fail to include the true population percentage (see Weisburd, 1998). This statistic is sometimes defined as the margin of error or the sampling error of a study. Confidence intervals for subsamples in the study, such as women or minorities, were larger. In those cases, we generally compare subgroups and report significance levels. It should be noted that the standard errors used for calculations of confidence intervals and significance statistics were adjusted according to the sampling procedures we used.[9]

Because of the stratified and clustered sampling procedures used in the study, it is necessary to include a correction when reporting survey responses. This correction is based on weighting each department and police officer according to the proportion of the actual population of American police that each represents.[10] In practice, weighting in the survey does not greatly alter the majority of estimates that we report. Nonetheless, the weighted estimates provide a more accurate picture of the true population of responses than that provided by the raw estimates. We report only weighted percentages in the discussion and tables below.

III

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE

The survey represents a broad population of officers and reflects the diverse composition of American police. For example, 56 percent of the officers surveyed defined themselves as "patrol officers." Another 16 percent were detectives, criminal investigators, and corporals. Sergeants constituted about 15 percent of the sample, and another 13 percent held the rank of lieutenant or above (see Table 3.1).[11] About 3 of 10 officers in the sample noted that they served as "supervisors." While more than 2 of 10 officers were under 30 years old, more than 8 percent were over 50 years old. Officers ranged in age from 22 to 66 years old. Regarding marital status, almost three of four (74 percent) were either married or living with someone as if married.

The length of service of the sworn police officers in the sample ranged from less than 1 year to 35 years, with about 25 percent at 5 years or less. One in five officers had served from 6 to 10 years, almost one in five had served from 11 to 15 years, and more than one-third had served 16 years or more. Most officers had patrol responsibilities (60 percent). Some 30 percent were involved in other field operations such as gang, juvenile, robbery, and homicide, including 7 percent who identified themselves as assigned to community policing. More than 10 percent did not have field assignments, but served in administration, communications, technical support, and other jobs. This proportion is similar to that reported in the 1993 Law Enforcement

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Officers' Current Rank

Rank	Number of Officers	Percentage of Officers
Patrol Officer	514	55.7
Detective/Criminal Investigator	110	12.0
Corporal	36	4.0
Sergeant	142	15.3
Lieutenant	56	6.1
Captain	17	1.7
Inspector	2	0.2
Major	3	0.3
Deputy Chief	6	0.6
Chief	14	1.5
Other	24	2.4

N = 924

This survey reinforces earlier studies that suggest that American policing reflects the racial and ethnic composition of the U.S. population.

Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey of agencies with 100 or more officers, where 11 percent of county police and 9 percent of municipal police did not have field assignments (BJS, 1995).

Many scholars and policy makers have emphasized the importance of education in developing a modern police (see National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1973; Carter and Sapp, 1990; Worden, 1990; Travis, 1995). Almost one-third of the sample had a bachelor's degree or higher (see Table 3.2). Additionally, 52 percent had a two-year degree or some college education, and almost 15 percent had graduated from high school (or had a GED). Only five of the officers surveyed had only some high school education. Reflecting the growth in professional police education, more than half of those who had attended college reported that they had majored in criminology, criminal justice, or police science. Some 15 percent of the weighted sample were continuing their education in pursuit of a degree.

This survey reinforces earlier studies that suggest that American policing reflects the racial and ethnic composition of the U.S. population (see BJS, 1995). In the weighted sample, 80.8 percent of the officers were white, as compared with 80.3 percent of the population (Bureau of the Census, 1991), and 10.7 percent were African American, as compared with 12 percent in the national population (see Table 3.3).[12] Also, 9.6 percent of the weighted sample, compared with

Education Level of Officers

Table 3.2

Highest Level Attained	Number of Officers	Percentage of Officers
Some High School	5	0.5
High School Graduate/GED	133	14.7
Some College	303	33.1
Associate's Degree (2 year)	174	18.6
Bachelor's Degree (4 year)	258	27.6
Some Graduate School	19	2.0
Master's Degree	29	3.2
Doctoral Degree or Law Degree	3	0.3

N = 924

8.8 percent of the U.S. population, identified themselves as of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin (see Table 3.4).

While the racial composition of American policing may reflect the nation from which it is drawn, American policing remains a predominantly male profession. Only 8.5 percent of the sample were women (see Figure 3.1). Other sources provided similar estimates. According to the National Center for Women and Policing (1998), "Women currently make up less than 10 percent of sworn police officers nationwide." This figure was also consistent with the 1993 LEMAS survey, which reported that 8 percent of officers in municipal police departments and 10 percent of officers in county police departments were women (BJS, 1995).

Despite the controversies that surround American policing, our survey shows that American police officers are generally satisfied with their career choice. Indeed, almost all of the officers we surveyed (94 percent) indicated that they were satisfied and over half of those said that they were "extremely" satisfied with their choice of policing as a profession (see Figure 3.2). Only two officers described themselves as extremely dissatisfied with their career choice. Even when asked about their satisfaction with their current assignment, more than 90 percent of the sample indicated that they were satisfied, of whom 40 percent were "extremely" satisfied. Nevertheless, 46 percent of police officers described their work as extremely stressful (16 percent) or quite stressful (30 percent).

While the racial composition of American policing may reflect the nation..., American policing remains a predominantly male profession.

Table 3.3

Racial Background of Officers

Race	Number of Officers	Percentage of Officers
White	748	80.8
African American	94	10.7
American Indian or Alaskan Native	8	0.8
Asian	8	0.8
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	3	0.3
Other	36	4.3
Mixed Race	24	2.4

N = 921

Table 3.4

Hispanic vs. Non-Hispanic Officers

	White Officers	African-American Officers	Other Officers	TOTAL
Hispanic	44 (6.2%)	2 (1.8%)	38 (51.6%)	84 (9.6%)
Non-Hispanic	703 (93.8%)	92 (98.2%)	41 (48.4%)	836 (90.4%)

N = 920

Figure 3.1
Officers' Gender

Female 76 (8.5%)
Male 848 (91.5%)

Figure 3.2
Officers' Satisfaction With Career

Dissatisfied 52 (5.6%)
Satisfied 871 (94.4%)

IV

MAIN SURVEY RESULTS

The survey consisted of more than 80 questions that relate to the problem of abuse of authority (see Appendix A). Below, we summarize the main findings of the study. First, we examine results across the entire sample, focusing on six central concerns: (a) abuse of authority and the use of force, (b) the code of silence, (c) social factors, (d) departmental responses, (e) controlling abuse, and (f) community policing. We then turn to comparisons of subgroup responses according to regional variation, size of department, supervisory status, racial variation, and gender variation. For example, are the perceptions of white officers different from those of African Americans or other minorities? Does it matter if the officer is from the Midwest or the South?

Abuse of Authority and the Use of Force

The use of force may be a relatively rare occurrence in American policing (Worden and Shepard, 1996), but those incidents that do occur escalate too often to the level of excessive force.[13] In trying to understand why, we asked a series of questions that address the attitudes that police officers have toward the use of force and their perceptions of the behavior of their fellow officers.

Our survey shows that most police officers in the United States disapprove of the use of excessive force. Nonetheless, a substantial minority believe that they should be permitted to use more force than the law currently permits, and they consider it acceptable to sometimes

…[M]ost police officers in the United States disapprove of the use of excessive force.

Table 4.1

Officers' Attitudes Toward Limitations on Use of Force

	Police are *not* permitted to use as much force as is often necessary in making arrests. (N=912)	It is sometimes acceptable to use *more* force than is legally allowable to control some- one who physically assaults an officer. (N = 912)	Police department rules about the use of force should *not* be any stricter than required by law. (N = 915)	Police officers should be allowed to use physical force in response to verbal abuse. (N = 920)
	Percent			
Strongly Agree	6.2	3.3	6.7	0.4
Agree	24.9	21.2	58.9	6.6
Disagree	60.5	55.2	32.3	67.6
Strongly Disagree	8.4	20.3	2.1	25.4

…[T]he…majority …did not believe that officers …engage in an excessive use of force on a regular basis.

use more force than permitted by the laws that govern them. The officers revealed this attitude in their responses to several questions that were presented to them. More than 30 percent of the sample expressed the opinion that "police officers are not permitted to use as much force as is often necessary in making arrests" (see Table 4.1). Almost 25 percent felt that it is sometimes acceptable to use more force than legally allowable to control a person who physically assaults an officer. A very substantial minority, more than 4 of 10, told us that always following the rules is not compatible with getting the job done (see Appendix A, a19).

Most officers are not interested in holding themselves to higher standards than

required by law. More than 65 percent of the sample officers were content that police department rules about the use of force not be stricter than required by law. Still, almost 35 percent did feel that departmental rules should be stricter than required by law. And when asked whether police officers should be allowed to use physical force in response to verbal abuse, a very small number, only 7 percent, thought that this clear violation of current norms should be allowed.

Although a substantial minority expressed the view that the police should be permitted to use more force, the overwhelming majority of the sample did not believe that officers do engage in an excessive use of force on a

Officers' Perceptions of Use of Force Behavior in Their Department

	Police officers in [city] use more force than necessary to make an arrest. (N = 922)	Police officers in your department respond to verbal abuse with physical force. (N = 922)
Sometimes, Often, or Always	196 (21.7%)	137 (14.7%)
Seldom	581 (62.4%)	497 (53.5%)
Never	145 (16.0%)	288 (31.8%)

regular basis. A mere 4 percent thought that police officers regularly used more physical force than was necessary in making arrests (see Appendix A, a10). And almost everyone (97 percent) agreed that serious cases of misconduct, such as the Rodney King case in Los Angeles and the Abner Louima case in New York, are "extremely rare" in their departments (see Appendix A, a40).

Still, they did not give their fellow officers a completely clean report. When asked about their perceptions of the behavior of officers in their own departments, almost 22 percent of the weighted sample suggested that officers in their department sometimes (or often, or always) use more force than necessary,

and only 16 percent reported that they never did so (see Table 4.2). Although the large majority of respondents felt that it is inappropriate to respond to verbal abuse with physical force, almost 15 percent thought that officers in their department engaged in such behavior sometimes (or often, or always).

Code of Silence

Some of the most strongly held and varied responses addressed the troubling area of whether officers should tell when they know that misconduct has occurred. The responses suggest the possibility of a large gap between attitudes and behavior. That is, officers do not believe in protecting wrongdoers; nevertheless, they often do not turn them in.

...[O]fficers do not believe in protecting wrongdoers; nevertheless, they often do not turn them in.

The survey shows that more than 80 percent of American police do not accept that the code of silence is an essential part of the mutual trust necessary to achieve good policing (see Table 4.3). However, about a quarter of the sample told us that whistle blowing is not worth it, and more than two-thirds reported that police officers were likely to be given a "cold shoulder" by fellow officers if they reported incidents of misconduct. A majority felt that it was not unusual for police officers to turn a "blind eye" to improper conduct by other officers (see Table 4.4). Even when it came to reporting serious criminal violations, a surprising 6 in 10 report that police officers did not always report serious criminal violations involving abuse of authority by fellow officers.

During the focus groups, officers resisted the notion of a code of silence, but agreed in the end that the code stands except in the case of criminal violations. For instance, one supervisor suggested, "I don't think there's a code of silence at all when we are talking about criminal conduct. And if it is, those people are part of a criminal mind." Another said, "I think that the wall of silence, as far as criminal things, is a thing of the past. I hear a lot of cops saying they are not going to lose their house because of you." However, they admitted that in individual cases, it is very difficult to betray fellow officers even when those officers are involved in criminal matters.

In the survey we presented several scenarios involving misconduct, and we asked the officers a series of questions about the seriousness of the conduct, the consequences that should and would follow that conduct, and whether they or others in the department would report such conduct. In one scenario, "An officer has a handcuffed suspect sitting at his desk while he fills out the necessary paperwork. With no provocation from the officer, the suspect suddenly spits in the face of the officer. The officer immediately pushes the suspect in the face causing the suspect to fall from the chair onto the floor." There was wide variation in perception of the offense's seriousness, from 15 percent of the sample considering it not serious at all to 16 percent considering it very serious (see Table 4.5). But would respondents report an officer who engaged in this behavior? Only 3 in 10 stated that they would definitely report. Even fewer, only 11 percent of the sample, thought that most officers in their agency would definitely report the offense.

Code of Silence: Attitudes

Table 4.3

	The code of silence is an essential part of the mutual trust necessary to good policing. (N = 905)	Whistle blowing is not worth it. (N = 904)	An officer who reports another officer's misconduct is likely to be given the "cold shoulder" by fellow officers. (N = 908)
		Percent	
Strongly Agree	1.2	3.1	11.0
Agree	15.7	21.8	56.4
Disagree	65.6	63.5	30.9
Strongly Disagree	17.5	11.7	1.8

Code of Silence: Perceptions of Behavior

Table 4.4

	It is *not* unusual for a police officer to turn a blind eye to improper conduct by other officers. (N = 908)	Police officers *always* report serious violations involving abuse of authority by fellow officers (N = 899)
		Percent
Strongly Agree	1.8	2.8
Agree	50.6	36.2
Disagree	43.3	58.5
Strongly Disagree	4.4	2.5

Table 4.5

Scenario of an Unruly Suspect: "An officer has a handcuffed suspect at his desk while he fills out the necessary paperwork. With no provocation from the officer, the suspect suddenly spits in the face of the officer. The officer immediately pushes the suspect in the face causing the suspect to fall from the chair onto the floor."

	How serious do you consider the officer's behavior to be? (N = 914)
Very Serious	135 (15.6%)
Quite Serious	188 (20.2%)
Moderately Serious	249 (27.3%)
Not Very Serious	201 (21.7%)
Not Serious at All	141 (15.3%)

	Do you think *you* would report a fellow officer who engaged in this behavior? (N = 914)
Definitely Yes	262 (28.9%)
Possibly Yes	207 (22.6%)
Probably Not	254 (27.7%)
Definitely Not	191 (20.8%)

	Do you think *most* officers in your agency would report a fellow officer who engaged in this behavior? (N = 908)
Definitely Yes	94 (10.8%)
Possibly Yes	270 (29.7%)
Probably Not	378 (41.3%)
Definitely Not	166 (18.3%)

Perceptions of the Effects of Extra-Legal Factors on Police Behavior

Table 4.6

	A police officer is more likely to arrest a person who displays what he or she considers to be a bad attitude. (N=917)	Police officers often treat whites better than they do African Americans and other minorities. (N = 914)	Police officers are more likely to use physical force against African Americans and other minorities than against whites in similar situations. (N = 916)	Police officers are more likely to use physical force against poor people than against middle-class people in similar situations. (N = 918)
	Percent			
Strongly Agree	2.1	1.2	1.7	1.9
Agree	46.7	15.8	9.4	12.2
Disagree	45.1	57.8	55.6	57.9
Strongly Disagree	6.1	25.2	33.3	27.9

Social Factors

The question of the role of extralegal factors in law enforcement has long been a concern among criminologists. Although sociologists since the 1950s (Westley, 1953) have suggested that a citizen's demeanor affects police behavior, recently some authors have called into question the importance of being "in contempt of cop" and have argued for a more precise definition of the term "demeanor," one that limits its meaning to verbal behavior (Klinger, 1994; Lundman, 1994). However, even with a more careful definition of terms, the consensus seems to have returned to the view that a disrespectful or hostile demeanor displayed by a citizen will affect the police-citizen encounter and will increase the likelihood of an arrest (Klinger, 1996; Lundman, 1996; Worden and Shepard, 1996). Our survey shows that police in the U.S. are almost evenly divided in their opinions of whether a police officer is more likely to arrest a person who displays what he or she considers to be a bad attitude. Some 49 percent of the sample thought that a bad attitude could affect the likelihood of arrest, while 51 percent disagreed (see Table 4.6).

Do other extralegal factors, such as whether citizens are African American or white, or poor or middle class, make a difference in the treatment they receive from the police? The criminological literature is split on the extent

...[P]olice...are almost evenly divided in their opinions of whether a police officer is more likely to arrest a person who displays... a bad attitude.

Table 4.7

Police Perceptions of the Public's Attitude Toward the Police

	Most people do not respect the police. (N = 924)	The relationship between the police and citizens in [city] is very good. (N = 923)
	Percent	
Strongly Agree	5.6	18.7
Agree	19.1	69.4
Disagree	65.2	9.9
Strongly Disagree	10.1	2.1

…Eighty-eight percent… described the relationship between the police and the citizens in their locality as very good.

to which race affects everyday policing (Mastrofski, Parks, DeJong, and Worden, 1998), the likelihood of being arrested (Tonry, 1995; Black and Reiss, 1970; Lundman, Sykes, and Clark, 1978; Smith and Visher, 1981; Smith, Visher, and Davidson, 1984; Worden, 1996; Lundman, 1996), and the use of excessive force (Adams, 1996; Worden, 1996; Reiss, 1971; Walker, Spohn, and DeLone, 1996; Ogletree, Prosser, Smith, and Talley, 1995). According to our sample, almost 2 in 10 police officers in the U.S. believe that whites are treated better than African Americans and other minorities (see Table 4.6). More than 1 in 10 said that there is more police violence against African Americans than against whites.[14] Moreover, 14 percent of the sample believed that police use physical force against poor people more often than against middle-class people in similar situations.

What were the police officers' views of how the public perceives the police? More than 75 percent did not feel that "most people do not respect the police" (see Table 4.7). Put more positively, more than 75 percent of officers felt that most people respect the police. Indeed, 88 percent of police in our sample described the relationship between the police and the citizens in their locality as very good. However, more than half of our sample thought that the "public is too concerned with police brutality" (see Table 4.8), and more than 80 percent of police officers told us that the newspapers and TV in this country are too concerned with police brutality (see Table 4.8). As one officer in the focus group of police supervisors noted in regard to the media, "They are absolutely ruthless when it comes to police officers."

Perceptions of Media and Citizens' Concern Toward Police Abuse

Table 4.8

	The public is *too* concerned with police brutality. (N = 918)	The newspapers and TV in this country are *too* concerned with police brutality. (N = 920)
	Percent	
Strongly Agree	13.4	36.0
Agree	41.6	44.2
Disagree	42.5	19.0
Strongly Disagree	2.5	0.8

Supervisors and rank-and-file officers alike complained that they are judged on the sensational misdeeds of officers from cities far away from their own. As one said, "We're judged on Rodney King, Fuhrman." Another officer put it this way, "And as far as the Detroit deal, yeah, we caught heat behind that; L.A., we caught heat behind that; and New York, yeah, we caught heat behind that." Still another presented the minority view that the media do treat them fairly, "Our department has a great deal of credibility and respect from the media."

Departmental Response

We polled the officers for their views of how their departments handle cases of abuse of authority. Officers in the sample overwhelmingly (93 percent) reported that their departments take a very tough stance on improper behav-ior by police (see Table 4.9). And they overwhelmingly (94 percent) disagreed with the suggestion that investigations of police misconduct are usually biased in favor of the police.

When asked about the effectiveness of different institutional procedures for addressing abuses of authority, most people considered internal affairs units effective (79 percent), while a much smaller percentage (38 percent) considered citizen review boards an effective means for preventing police misconduct. This preference for internal review was consistent with views expressed during the focus groups. One rank-and-file officer argued that lawyers and doctors police themselves so why shouldn't police, "Who is on the bar association? Who is on doctors' associations? Doctors judging doctors; doctors policing doctors. We are special[ists]; we've got training; we deal

Supervisors and rank-and file… complained… they are judged on the sensational misdeeds of officers from cities far away from their own.

Table 4.9

Departmental Responses to Abuse of Authority

	Your police department takes a very tough stance on improper behavior by police. (N = 921)	Investiga-tions of police misconduct are usually biased *in favor of* police. (N = 914)	Internal affairs units are *not* effective means for preventing police misconduct. (N = 910)	Citizen review boards are effective means for preventing police misconduct. (N = 872)
	Percent			
Strongly Agree	35.2	0.4	2.4	3.1
Agree	57.4	5.1	19.0	34.7
Disagree	6.6	72.4	66.2	48.4
Strongly Disagree	0.9	22.0	12.4	13.9

Eighty-five percent...said... a police chief's ...strong position against abuses ...can make a big difference in preventing officers from abusing their authority

with other people just like them. Why are we different?" One supervisor suggested, "Internal affairs works. Civilian review authority—as soon as you mention civilian review, the knee-jerk reaction is no way; yadda yadda, they go on and on. If they only knew, civilian review authority is nothing more than a toothless tiger. They're easier on cops than the departments are themselves. Bottom line." Another supervisor agreed, "I think internal affairs is more threatening because we're police officers. We've all been out there. So we know how to play the game."

Controlling Abuse

Can leadership make a difference in preventing police officers' abuse of authority? American police overwhelmingly told us that leadership makes a difference. Eighty-five percent of the officers said that a police chief's taking a strong position against abuses of authority can make a big difference in preventing officers from abusing their authority (see Table 4.10). Policing scholars have long recognized the importance of the chief's role. Skolnick and Fyfe (1993, p. 136) for example argue, "[T]he chief is the main architect of police officers' street behavior. This is so because the strength and direction of street-level police peer pressures ultimately are determined by administrative definitions of good and bad policing and by the general tone that comes down from the top."

The Role of Supervision in Controlling Abuse

	If a police chief takes a strong position against abuses of authority, he or she can make a big difference in preventing officers from abusing their authority. (N = 920)	Good first-line supervisors can help prevent police officers from abusing their authority. (N = 921)	*Most* police abuse of force could be stopped by developing more effective methods of supervision. (N = 913)
	Percent		
Strongly Agree	24.5	22.9	7.3
Agree	60.3	66.9	48.0
Disagree	13.8	9.3	39.5
Strongly Disagree	1.4	0.9	5.2

Elsewhere, Skolnick and Bayley (1986, p. 220) suggest that executive leadership might be even more important in police departments, with their "traditional paramilitary character," than in other organizations: "Police departments are not democratically run organizations. Everyone within them is either aware or attuned to the chief's preferences, demands, and expectations." Skolnick and Bayley (1986, p. 6) argue, "[A]dministrative leadership, an animating philosophy of values, can indeed effect change."

As important as the role of the chief may be in preventing abuse, an even greater majority—90 percent of police in the sample—told us that good first-line su-pervisors can help prevent police officers from abusing their authority (see Table 4.10). As an officer who participated in one of the focus groups expressed it, "The supervisor, the first-line supervisor, the sergeant, is so critically important in how he sets the tone, the expectations. How he says things and supports department programs or doesn't support them. If not by what he says, then by body language and tone of voice. How he sells it or doesn't sell it. That sort of thing, I think, is real." It is the supervisor as "role model" who surfaces as the critical aspect in good first-line leadership. Following this, 55 percent of those surveyed thought that developing more effective means of supervision would prevent abuse of force.

It is the supervisor as "role model" who surfaces as the critical aspect in good first-line leadership.

Table 4.11

Officers' Perceptions of the Effects of Training on Abuse of Authority

	Do you think *ethics in law enforcement* training is effective in preventing abuse of authority? (N = 576)	Do you think *interpersonal skills* or *interpersonal relations* training is effective in preventing abuse of authority? (N = 674)	Do you think *human diversity or cultural awareness* training is effective in preventing abuse of authority? (N = 807)
Yes	472 (82.2%)	544 (80.3%)	603 (74.9%)
No	104 (17.8%)	130 (19.7%)	204 (25.1%)

…[O]fficers who have received training in ethics, in interpersonal skills, and in cultural sensitivity report…such… training can play a role in controlling abuses….

In the focus group of chiefs of police and policing scholars, concern was expressed over the changing role of the supervisor in community policing. Chief Jerry Sanders of San Diego suggested that by creating "teams" and reducing "spans of control all of a sudden we find the sergeants are closer to the team members, the officers, than they are to the department. They are so close to the people on the team that it creates problems."

Commissioner Thomas Frazier of Baltimore and Chief Jerry Sanders agreed that the management dynamics of the department had been changed, and a lieutenant with 24-hour responsibility might not see his or her sergeants for a week or two at a time. Professor Carl Klockars suggested that community policing officers operate independently, almost without supervision, and Professor Alfred Slocum suggested that the lack of supervision was "conducive to corruption." The opinions expressed by the officers in our survey—about the difference that good supervisors can make in controlling abuse of authority—suggest that such concern by police executives and academics is well placed. They believed that good supervision matters.

Contrary to the traditional view that most important policing lessons are obtained through experience in the field and not in the academy (Bayley and Bittner, 1984), scholars and police professionals have recently emphasized the importance of changing models of police training. This has led to a renewal of commitment to training efforts and to exploring vastly different training curricula (e.g., see Grant and Grant, 1996; Scrivner, 1994; Goldstein, 1979; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1994). The good news is that police officers who have received training in ethics, in interpersonal skills, and in

The Community-Police Partnership

Table 4.12

	Citizens can be a vital source of information about the problems in their neighborhood. (N = 924)	Police should work with citizens to try and solve problems on their beat. (N = 924)	Police should make frequent *informal* contact with people on their beat. (N = 921)
		Percent	
Strongly Agree	79.1	65.1	56.4
Agree	20.7	34.3	42.0
Disagree	0.1	0.4	1.2
Strongly Disagree	0.1	0.2	0.3

cultural sensitivity report that such specialized training can play a role in controlling abuses of police authority.

A substantial majority (82 percent) of those officers in the sample who have received training in law enforcement ethics either in the academy or since becoming a police officer told us that such training prevents abuse of authority (see Table 4.11). A similar majority (80 percent) who have received police training in interpersonal skills or interpersonal relations felt that this training prevents abuse of authority. And 75 percent of officers who reported receiving training in human diversity, cultural differences, cultural awareness, or ethnic sensitivity said that this training prevents abuse of authority.

Community-Oriented Policing

The study provides strong evidence of the penetration of the community policing idea into policing in the U.S. The survey shows that police today overwhelmingly support a philosophy that looks to the public for advice and cooperation. Several statements formed a group designed to measure officers' opinions of the police-community partnership that is generally considered a necessary component of community-oriented policing. Respondents overwhelmingly agreed that working with citizens was an important and effective means of solving neighborhood problems. For example, nearly all agreed that "[c]itizens can be a vital source of information about the problems in their neighborhood," that "[p]olice should work with citizens to try and solve problems on their beat," and that "[p]olice should make frequent informal contact with people on their beat" (see Table 4.12).

But what of the relationship between community policing and abuse of au-

…[P]olice today overwhelmingly support a philosophy that looks to the public for advice and cooperation.

Table 4.13

Perceptions of the Effects of Community Policing on Abuse of Authority

	Do you think that community policing increases, decreases, or has no impact on the risk of corrupt behavior (N=883)	Do you think that community policing increases, decreases, or has no impact on the *number* of excessive force incidents? (N = 885)	Do you think that community policing increases, decreases, or has no impact on the *seriousness* of excessive force incidents? (N = 884)
Increases	63 (7.1%)	17 (2.0%)	32 (3.4%)
Decreases	316 (35.8%)	450 (50.9%)	373 (42.2%)
Has no impact	504 (57.1%)	418 (47.1%)	479 (54.4%)

…[A] close relationship with the community does not increase the risk of police corruption.

thority? Police in our sample generally indicated that a close relationship with the community does not increase the risk of police corruption. We asked this question in two ways. Without referring to community policing, we asked all officers whether they agreed that "[f]requent friendly contact with local residents and merchants increases the likelihood that police officers will accept free lunches, discounts, or gifts of appreciation for effective service" (see Appendix A, a34). Although one in five officers agreed with the statement, almost 80 percent disagreed. Almost all the officers in the survey were familiar with the concept of community-oriented policing (98 percent). We asked those officers whether they thought that community policing increases, decreases, or has no impact on the risk of corrupt behavior. Only

7 percent of the officers told us they thought community policing increases the risk of corruption. Over a third thought it decreases the risk of corruption, and another 57 percent thought it had no effect (see Table 4.13).

Some scholars have suggested that community policing may decrease the likelihood of gross forms of corruption, such as extortion, while increasing the temptations toward softer forms of corruption, such as the free lunch, the "professional" discount, or the gift of appreciation for effective service (Weisburd, McElroy, and Hardyman, 1988). Others suggest that community policing has no discernible impact on corrupt behavior (McElroy, Cosgrove, and Sadd, 1990).

In the focus groups, there was consensus among the officers that community

policing does not lead to corrupt behavior, and there was concern among officers that chiefs are inappropriately concerned about this possibility. One supervisor explained why community policing is not a return to the day of the corrupt beat officer:

> But I think we're in a different day and age, and I'm not so sure we're going to get community-oriented policing to lead us into the corruption that we saw back then, and the reason why I think [so] is we've had things like Rodney King and what's happened in Chicago and what happened there and what's described as happening in many cities. I think there is a different emphasis on morality and ethics in law enforcement than we saw back 40, 50 years ago. I don't think even the public has a tolerance for the corruption that was a fact of daily life in New York 50 years ago.

In the panel of police scholars and executives that we convened at the beginning of the study, concern was expressed about the potential for corruption under community policing. As Baltimore's Commissioner Thomas Frazier said, "One of the things that troubles me about community policing is you talk about establishing relationships. The longer the relationship exists, I think the more opportunity for corruption." Professor Klockars pointed out the irony of some situations, "So if you run a McDonald's and you give a cop a free meal, that's corruption. But if you give a whole booth, that's

community policing."

Chief Jerry Sanders of San Diego said,

> I think it's just much more subtle now than it was before. And it's hard to talk in those shades because the officers get invited to dinner at people's houses because they create friendships. The friendships are created, which is what we're trying to do. And when is it not? And when is it a gratuity to go into a friend's business and get a cup of coffee and when is it not? I mean, I just think these are really difficult issues for not only the police officers but for police management. Where do we draw the line? Is it, as O. W. Wilson said, "The first cup of coffee you take for free is the start of corruption," or is it we need to be a little bit more understanding about the motives that we're talking about?

While such concerns are expressed by police scholars and executives, they are not seen as significant by the vast majority of American police.

What do officers think is the relationship between community policing and excessive force? Almost no one told us that community policing would increase the amount (2 percent) or seriousness (3 percent) of excessive force incidents (see Table 4.13). A majority said that community policing decreases the incidents of excessive force (51 percent), and 42 percent thought it would decrease the seriousness of excessive force incidents. Many thought it had no impact on either the amount

…[C]ommunity policing does not lead to corrupt behavior, and… chiefs are inappropriately concerned about this possibility.

of excessive force (47 percent) or the seriousness of excessive force incidents (54 percent).

The community policing partnership can be complicated. Almost all officers (97 percent) told us that "[p]olice officers sometimes have to explain to individuals and groups of citizens that the police are prohibited by law from using some of the tactics that citizens encourage them to use" (see Appendix A, a32). But 21 percent felt that they could use more aggressive tactics than they otherwise would if the community had asked them to do so (see Appendix A, a33). Whether they might sometimes cross the line to tactics prohibited by law remained unanswered.

We presented the officers with one of two versions of a scenario that addressed, among other issues, whether they would feel justified in using more aggressive tactics if asked by the community (see p. 61). In one version, a randomly assigned half (438) of the officers responded to a set of questions based on the following scenario:

> While patrolling his beat, an officer notices several youths standing on a corner smoking cigarettes and talking to one another. The officer tells the youths to break it up and leave the area. The youths say, "We're not doing anything. Why are you hassling us?" The officer gets out of the car and orders the youths to place their hands up against the wall of a building. They refuse. The officer throws them against the wall and searches them. Finding nothing, the officer uses demeaning language, then tells them that this "will teach you to respect the law" and "I'd better not see you here again" and gets in his patrol car and drives off.

In the other version (see p. 63), the other half (482) of the officers responded to a set of questions based on the following scenario:

> In a community meeting, citizens told police that they were very concerned about groups of rowdy youths hanging out on street corners. After the meeting, an officer who participated in the meeting notices several youths standing on a corner smoking cigarettes and talking to one another. The officer tells the youths to break it up and leave the area. The youths say, "We're not doing anything. Why are you hassling us?" The officer gets out of the car and orders the youths to place their hands up against the wall of a building. They refuse. The officer throws them against the wall and searches them. Finding nothing, the officer uses demeaning language, tells them that this "will teach you to respect the law" and "I'd better not see you here again," and gets in his patrol car and drives off.

With these scenarios, we could capture whether officers felt justified in taking certain questionable actions when they had been asked by the community to do so. Interestingly, the

"…[P]olice officers sometimes have to explain to individuals and groups of citizens that the police are prohibited by law from using some of the tactics that citizens encourage them to use."

answers of the two randomly assigned groups of officers were virtually identical to the series of questions that followed the scenarios. Most officers told us that a verbal or written reprimand would and should follow such an incident. A substantial minority thought the discipline would and should be suspension without pay. Slightly more than one in three said they definitely would report a fellow officer who engaged in this behavior, whereas only 1 in 10 believed that most officers in their agency would report such an incident. These results suggest that police officers do not feel justified in using more aggressive tactics if asked by the community to do so.

Subgroup Analysis: Race, Rank, Region, Agency Size, Gender

Thus far, we have described what the survey suggests about the attitudes of police generally toward abuse of authority. But the data can also reveal something about how different subgroups within American policing view such issues. An analysis of subgroup differences is presented in cross-tabulations below. In reporting on differences in responses among different subgroups of police officers, we note again that our statistics were adjusted according to the sampling procedures we used.

Race

By far the most striking differences we discovered among subgroups in our survey were among police officers of different racial groups. Although we originally grouped the officers in two categories (white and non-white) so we could have larger numbers in each category, when strong differences according to race emerged, we re-examined the data, peeling back the non-white category into two subcategories: blacks or African Americans, and other minority officers. In so doing, the significance of the results increased, indicating that African-American officers hold the most distinctive positions on these issues. Without meaning to overstate the generalizability of our findings beyond American policing, the survey tends to corroborate the view that there is a racial divide between whites and African Americans in our society that is not transcended even by a culture as apparently strong as the culture of policing. Not that those differences emerged across every item in our survey, but when they did occur, the relationships were strong, and the kinds of questions in which they emerged grouped together in meaningful configurations.

Earlier we reported that almost 2 in 10 officers in the weighted sample agreed that police officers often treat whites better than they do African Americans and other minorities. When we considered this issue broken down by race, we found that more than half of the African-American officers felt this way (see Table 4.14).[15] By comparison, fewer than one in four among other minorities agreed with the statement, and fewer

…[T]here is a racial divide between whites and African Americans in our society that is not transcended even by a culture as… strong as the culture of policing.

Table 4.14

Police officers often treat whites better than they do African Americans and other minorities (by race). (N = 912)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	Percent			
White Officers	0.7	11.2	60.5	27.7
African-American Officers	4.6	46.7	39.8	8.9
Other Minority Officers	2.4	21.0	53.8	22.9

$x^2 = 41.78$　　　　df = 6　　　　p < .001

African-American officers did not see unequal treatment by police as determined only by race.

than one in eight white officers agreed.[16]

The divergence in views of African Americans and other officers continues and grows when we examine whether they felt that police officers were more likely to use physical force against African Americans and other minorities than against whites in similar situations. While only 1 in 20 white officers in the sample thought that African Americans and minorities received this unfair treatment from police, well over half of the African-American officers thought unfair treatment was more likely. Other minorities were more in agreement with the white officers (see Table 4.15).[17]

African-American officers did not see unequal treatment by police as determined only by race. While only 2 percent of white officers in the sample thought that police officers were more likely to use physical force against poor people than against middle-class people in similar situations, 54 percent of the African-American officers felt that way (see Table 4.16). Again, other minorities held a position between the white and African-American officers, but closer to the perspective of the white officers.[18]

While the survey suggests that African-American officers may not trust their fellow officers to treat minority and poor citizens fairly, they did tend to respond more positively to the role of community policing in reducing police abuses of authority. For example, we

Police officers are more likely to use physical force against
African Americans and other minorities than against whites
in similar situations (by race). (N = 914)

Table 4.15

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	Percent			
White Officers	0.6	4.5	58.0	37.0
African-American Officers	9.4	47.7	42.1	0.9
Other Minority Officers	2.4	10.0	50.7	36.9

x^2 = 86.80   df = 6   p < .001

Police officers are more likely to use physical force against poor people
than against middle-class people in similar situations (by race). (N = 916)

Table 4.16

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	Percent			
White Officers	0.8	8.0	60.1	31.1
African-American Officers	9.1	45.3	43.6	2.0
Other Minority Officers	4.2	13.0	52.9	30.0

x^2 = 85.42   df = 6   p < .001

Community-oriented policing increases, decreases, or has no impact
on the number of incidents of excessive force (by race). (N = 883)

Table 4.17

	Increases	Decreases	Has No Impact
	Percent		
White Officers	1.2	49.2	49.6
African-American Officers	6.6	65.4	28.1
Other Minority Officers	3.9	50.1	46.0

x^2 = 20.92   df = 4   p < .001

Table 4.18

Community-oriented policing increases, decreases, or has no impact on the seriousness of excessive force incidents (by race). (N = 882)

	Increases	Decreases	Has No Impact
		Percent	
White Officers	3.2	39.0	57.9
African-American Officers	7.2	63.4	29.3
Other Minority Officers	1.0	46.8	52.3

$x^2 = 27.13$ df = 4 $p < .001$

...[W]e found a ...relationship between race and support for the view that community-oriented policing decreases the number of incidents of excessive force

found a statistically significant relationship between race and support for the view that community-oriented policing decreases the number of incidents of excessive force (see Table 4.17).[19] Although fewer than half of white officers believed this to be the case, almost two-thirds of the African-American police officers surveyed agreed with this position. African-American police officers are also more likely to say that community policing decreased the seriousness of incidents of excessive force (see Table 4.18). Among African-American police officers, 63 percent expressed this view, as contrasted with only 39 percent of white police officers. Finally, African-American officers also had more faith in citizen review boards as an effective means for preventing police misconduct. Almost 7 in 10 African-American officers in the sample believed in the effectiveness of citizen review, compared with one-third of white officers (see Table 4.19). For such relationships, other minority officers once again fell somewhere between African-American and white police officers.

As we continue to discuss relationships among other subgroups in the weighted sample, it will become clear that—while other interesting differences occur—no differences were as large as those found among these racial groups.

Rank: Supervisors and Nonsupervisors

While most officers in the sample—those who were supervisors and those who were not—believed in the impor-

Citizen review boards are effective means for preventing police misconduct (by race). (N = 868)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
		Percent		
White Officers	2.5	30.8	52.2	14.6
African-American Officers	8.4	61.4	22.3	7.9
Other Minority Officers	2.4	38.9	43.6	15.1

x^2 = 32.04   df = 6 $p \leq$ .001

Good first-line supervisors can help prevent police officers from abusing their authority (by rank). (N = 921)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
		Percent		
Nonsupervisors	16.5	70.2	12.4	0.9
Supervisors	38.5	58.8	1.9	0.8

x^2 = 76.12   df = 3 $p <$ .001

If a police chief takes a strong position against abuses of authority, he or she can make a big difference in preventing officers from abusing their authority (by rank). (N = 920)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
		Percent		
Nonsupervisors	18.3	62.6	17.4	1.6
Supervisors	39.6	54.6	5.0	0.8

x^2 = 71.15   df = 3 $p <$ .001

Most police abuse of force could be stopped by developing more effective methods of supervision (by rank). (N = 913)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	Percent			
Nonsupervisors	6.3	43.7	44.7	5.4
Supervisors	9.9	58.5	26.7	4.9

$x^2 = 33.01$ df = 3   p $\leq$ .001

...[G]ood first-line supervisors could help prevent police officers from abusing their authority.

tance of supervision to good policing, that belief was particularly strong among the supervisors themselves. Thus, while more than 87 percent of nonsupervisors in the survey (primarily patrol officers) said that good first-line supervisors could help prevent police officers from abusing their authority, 97 percent of supervisors felt that way (see Table 4.20).[20] Similar relationships are found in other questions directly related to supervision. More than 80 percent of nonsupervisors and almost 95 percent of supervisors believed that if a police chief took a strong position against abuses of authority, he or she could make a big difference in preventing officers from abusing their authority (see Table 4.21).[21] And 50 percent of nonsupervisors and 68 percent of supervisors were likely to believe that most police abuse of force

could be stopped by developing more effective methods of supervision (see Table 4.22).[22]

Still in keeping with their role as supervisors, but less predictable, was a series of questions that suggested that supervisors were very serious in their attitudes about reporting misbehavior and that they held police officers to a very high standard. Well over 80 percent of supervisors believed in the value of blowing the whistle on misbehavior by fellow officers, compared with just over 70 percent of nonsupervisors (see Table 4.23).[23] Similarly, supervisors were much less likely to believe in the efficacy of the code of silence (see Table 4.24),[24] and supervisors disagreed to a much greater extent than non-supervisors that it is sometimes accept

Whistle blowing is not worth it (by rank). (N = 904)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	Percent			
Nonsupervisors	3.9	24.4	61.4	10.3
Supervisors	1.1	15.6	68.4	15.0

$x^2 = 24.99$ df = 3   p < .001

Table 4.23

The code of silence is an essential part of the mutual trust necessary to good policing (by rank). (N = 905)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	Percent			
Nonsupervisors	1.5	19.2	64.2	15.1
Supervisors	0.3	7.3	68.8	23.5

$x^2 = 28.46$ df = 3   p < .001

Table 4.24

It is sometimes acceptable to use more force than is legally allowable to control someone who physically assaults an officer (by rank). (N = 912)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	Percent			
Nonsupervisors	3.9	23.9	54.5	17.7
Supervisors	1.8	14.6	56.8	26.9

$x^2 = 21.09$ df = 3   p < .001

Table 4.25

Table 4.26

Police department rules about the use of force should not be any stricter than required by law (by rank). (N = 915)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	Percent			
Nonsupervisors	7.4	62.8	28.6	1.2
Supervisors	4.9	49.6	41.4	4.1

$x^2 = 24.90$ df = 3   p < .001

...[W]e did find a consistent difference between the western region of the country and others....

able to use more force than is legally allowable to control someone who physically assaults an officer (see Table 4.25).[25] They were more interested than nonsupervisors in having departmental rules about the use of force that are stricter than required by law (see Table 4.26).[26] Supervisors in our sample were also more likely to note that community-oriented policing could decrease the number and the seriousness of excessive force incidents (see Table 4.27[27] and Table 4.28).[28]

Region

As Professor Carl Klockars stated during the focus group of police scholars and executives at the outset of this study, "There are right answers in different places." During an untranscribed break in our rank-and-file focus group,

one officer explained that in her part of the country, it would be considered an affront if a community policing officer refused to accept an offer of a cup of coffee. Those regional cultural differences might explain why officers from the southern region of the country were more likely to offer an opinion that frequent friendly contact with local residents and merchants increased the likelihood that police officers would accept free lunches, discounts, or gifts of appreciation for effective service (see Table 4.29).[29]

While regional differences did not show up as clearly as one might have expected for many questions in the survey, we did find a consistent difference between the western region of the country and others on some specific indicators. Police officers from the

Community-oriented policing increases, decreases, or has no impact on the number of excessive force incidents (by rank). (N = 885)

	Increases	Decreases	Has No Impact	TOTAL
Nonsupervisors	14 (2.3%)	285 (45.7%)	323 (52.1%)	622
Supervisors	3 (1.4%)	165 (63.5%)	95 (35.1%)	263

$x^2 = 22.91$ df = 2   p < .001

Community-oriented policing increases, decreases, or has no impact on the seriousness of excessive force incidents (by rank). (N = 884)

	Increases	Decreases	Has No Impact	TOTAL
Nonsupervisors	22 (3.3%)	244 (38.6%)	358 (58.1%)	624
Supervisors	10 (3.7%)	129 (50.9%)	121 (45.4%)	260

$x^2 = 10.96$ df = 2   p < .05

Frequent friendly contact with local residents and merchants increases the likelihood that police officers will accept free lunches, discounts, or gifts of appreciation for effective service (by region). (N = 916)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	Percent			
North Central	1.0	18.2	60.4	20.3
Northeast	0.4	14.1	67.8	17.8
South	2.8	25.2	55.4	16.7
West	0.2	15.6	58.1	25.5

$x^2 = 23.08$ df = 9   p < .001

Table 4.27

Table 4.28

Table 4.29

Table 4.30

It is sometimes acceptable to use more force than
is legally allowable to control someone who physically assaults
an officer (by region). (N = 912)

	Agree	Disagree	TOTAL
North Central	40 (20.4%)	149 (79.6%)	189
Northeast	67 (29.4%)	163 (70.7%)	230
South	82 (26.8%)	229 (73.2%)	311
West	32 (17.7%)	150 (82.3%)	182

x^2 = 8.76   df = 3   p < .05

Officers from small departments believed more strongly in the efficacy of good supervision and in the authority of the chief to influence behavior.

West tended to have a more professional outlook about policing or tended to view policing as constrained by the law. Officers in the West were less likely to agree that it is sometimes acceptable to use more force than is legally allowable to control someone who physically assaults an officer (see Table 4.30).[30] And they are more likely to state that police officers always report serious criminal violations involving abuse of authority by fellow officers (see Table 4.31).[31]

Agency Size

Agency size also appeared relevant to police officers' concerns about police abuse of authority. Officers from small departments believed more strongly in the efficacy of good supervision and in the authority of the chief to influ-

ence behavior. Officers in the largest departments more frequently demonstrated what arguably was a more cynical or alienated attitude about leadership in policing, although even in those departments it was distinctly a minority viewpoint. The relationships described were quite strong.

While 94 percent of officers from small departments believed that if a police chief took a strong position against abuses of authority, he or she could make a big difference in preventing officers from abusing their authority, only 68.2 percent of officers from the largest departments agreed (see Table 4.32).[32] Similarly, while 97 percent of officers from small departments agreed that good first-line supervisors could help prevent officers from abusing their authority, only 80 percent of officers

Police officers always report serious criminal violations involving abuse of authority by fellow officers (by region). (N = 899)

	Agree	Disagree	TOTAL
North Central	63 (33.5%)	124 (66.5%)	187
Northeast	79 (35.1%)	145 (64.9%)	224
South	121 (40.0%)	189 (60.1%)	310
West	83 (48.6%)	95 (51.4%)	178

$x^2 = 9.81$ df = 3 $p < .05$

Table 4.31

If a police chief takes a strong position against abuses of authority, he or she can make a big difference in preventing officers from abusing their authority (by agency size). (N = 920)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	Percent			
Small Departments	37.6	56.2	6.2	0.0
Medium Departments	24.9	62.7	11.3	1.1
Large Departments	14.0	54.2	28.4	3.4

$x^2 = 54.37$ df = 6 $p < .001$

Table 4.32

Good first-line supervisors can help prevent officers from abusing their authority (by agency size). (N = 921)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	Percent			
Small Departments	26.1	70.4	2.7	0.8
Medium Departments	23.8	67.4	8.4	0.5
Large Departments	17.5	62.5	17.5	2.6

$x^2 = 25.93$ df = 6 $p < .001$

Table 4.33

Table 4.34

Most police abuse of force could be stopped by developing more effective methods of supervision (by agency size). (N = 913)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	Percent			
Small Departments	9.9	61.1	25.2	3.8
Medium Departments	7.2	48.0	40.5	4.4
Large Departments	6.2	39.2	45.1	9.5

$x^2 = 16.44$ df = 6   p < .05

…[O]fficers from the largest departments believed… police administrators concentrate on what police officers do wrong rather than what they do right.

from the largest departments agreed (see Table 4.33).[33] Following this pattern, 71 percent of officers from small departments agreed that most police abuse of force could be stopped by developing more effective methods of supervision, compared with 45 percent of officers from the largest departments (see Table 4.34).[34] Almost 8 in 10 officers from the largest departments believed that police administrators concentrate on what police officers do wrong rather than what they do right, while just over half of the officers from the small departments agreed (see Table 4.35).[35]

Gender

The survey did not reveal meaningful differences in the responses of officers according to gender. While several statistically significant results were found, the sizes of the differences were small, and no consistent theory or idea linked them or suggested that they were meaningful. We could argue that this finding suggested that women adapt to the dominant culture of policing or that women who self-select to enter policing are more like men in policing. However, this conclusion may be premature. As the National Center for Women and Policing (1998) reports, "Women police perform better than their male counterparts at defusing potentially violent situations and become involved in excessive use of force incidents less often." We think it is possible that we did not ask questions in our survey that would reveal specific differences between male and female police officers in regard to the problem of police abuse of authority.

Police administrators concentrate on what police officers do wrong
rather than what police officers do right (by agency size). (N = 920)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
		Percent		
Small Departments	14.0	38.6	42.7	4.7
Medium Departments	17.4	48.0	31.9	2.7
Large Departments	29.2	49.6	20.6	0.7

$x^2 = 32.92$ df = 6   p < .001

Table 4.35

V

CONCLUSION

Police…support a philosophy that looks to the public for advice and cooperation in confronting problems of crime and disorder.

Over the past three decades, American policing has gone through vast changes in its organization, tactics, and philosophy. At the forefront of such changes has been the transition from traditional military and professional models of policing, to innovative models of community policing. Our survey focused on the attitudes of American police toward abuse of authority in this age of community policing. It is the first truly representative study of police attitudes in many years, and thus it provides an important set of findings for understanding American police and for developing public policy.

It is clear from the survey that central components of the community policing idea have filtered down to rank-and-file police officers. Police today overwhelmingly support a philosophy that looks to the public for advice and cooperation in confronting problems of crime and disorder. The survey was unambiguous in this regard. Nearly all who were surveyed believed that citizens are vital to good policing and that police must work with citizens in solving crime problems. In turn, contrary to what some have feared about community policing, officers were more likely to state that community policing reduces the potential for police abuse than increases that potential. This finding, of course, does not mean that community policing has actually reduced the level of abuse in

American policing, but rather that police officers believe this to be the case.

Our portrait of attitudes toward police abuse is much more ambiguous. On the one hand, we have much positive evidence regarding the attitudes of American police officers and their views about their colleagues. Most police we surveyed do not agree that it is acceptable to use more force than is legally necessary, even to control someone who physically assaults an officer. The vast majority identified extreme brands of police abuse such as that reported in the Rodney King and Abner Louima cases as being isolated and very rare occurrences. Most police surveyed told us that their police departments always took a tough stand on the issue of police abuse of citizens.

On the other hand, the survey suggests that police abuse remains a problem that must be addressed by policy makers and police professionals. While the survey suggests that most police officers in the United States disapprove of the use of excessive force, a substantial minority consider it acceptable to sometimes use more force than permitted by the laws that govern them. They also believe that they should be permitted to use more force than the law currently permits. The code of silence also remains a troubling issue for American police. It is still the case that about a quarter of the police we surveyed told us that whistle blowing is not worth it, and two-thirds reported that police officers were likely to be given a "cold shoulder" by fellow officers if they reported incidents of misconduct. Most police officers in the study reported that it is not unusual for police officers to turn a "blind eye" to improper conduct by other officers.

These findings suggest that the culture of silence, which has continually plagued reform in American policing, continues. But it must be recognized that from the perspective of police, the concern of the public with problems of police abuse is not proportional to its incidence. The survey shows that most American police believe that the public is too concerned with police abuse. An even larger number believe that the media have paid too much attention to this question. From the perspective of police, the public and the press have placed too much of their concern on police abuse. At the same time, the police we studied believed that the relationship between police and community is a good one, and is one in which the community overall has respect for the police.

The survey suggests that race continues to be an issue for American police. One in five of those surveyed told us that whites are treated better by police than African Americans and other minorities. We cannot say whether this result represents a change in attitudes either in a more positive or negative direction. However, we can conclude that a substantial number of police in the U.S. see race as an important factor in understanding abuses of police authority.

…[P]olice officers were likely to be given a "cold shoulder" by fellow officers if they reported incidents of misconduct.… [and] it is not unusual for police officers to turn a "blind eye" to improper conduct by other officers.

Comparing African-American officers' views about police abuse with those of white and other minority officers, we found significant and substantial differences.

It is particularly troubling that this perception was far more prevalent among African-American police officers than among others. Comparing African-American officers' views about police abuse with those of white and other minority officers, we found significant and substantial differences. While a small minority of white officers in the sample believed that police treat white citizens better than African-American or other minority citizens in similar situations, a majority of African-American police officers held this view. Similar differences were found between African-American and other police officers in their views on the likelihood of using physical force against minorities and the poor. The magnitude of such race-based differences suggests a large gap between African-American police officers and other officers. Such a deep divide was not predicted at the outset of the study.

The survey also provides some surprising and important lessons regarding how police think abuses of police authority can be controlled. Consistent with the suggestions of certain scholars and police professionals (Grant and Grant, 1996; Scrivner, 1994), most officers believed that training and education are effective methods for reducing police abuse. A substantial majority of those who have experienced training in interpersonal skills, or have taken courses in ethics or diversity, said that such education and training is effective in preventing misbehavior. While those responses did not tell us whether indeed such programs are effective, they did tell us that American police themselves view the programs as important and useful.

Police we surveyed also emphasized the importance of police management in preventing police violence and other forms of abuse. A large majority of police believe that when the chief of police takes a strong stand against police violence, other police officers will follow his or her lead. Similarly, police officers told us that good first-line supervision is an effective method for preventing police abuse. These findings reinforce the long-held view of scholars and police professionals that developing effective methods of supervision and effective supervisors should be a first priority in efforts to control and prevent abuses of police authority.

While American police recognized the importance of supervision in preventing abuses, they continued to see a tension between getting the police job done and controlling misbehavior. Almost half of the police surveyed told us that "always following the rules" is not compatible with "getting the job done." More than half believed that supervisors focus too much on what they are doing wrong and not enough on what they are doing right.

Abuse of police authority continues to be a major public policy concern. This survey adds the voices of rank-and-file police and supervisors to the debate

over the nature of the problems that American police face and the potential solutions that can be brought. Our study suggests that most police in the United States understand the importance of limits to police authority, and are sensitive to the dangers of corruption and abuse of force. Nonetheless, police abuses of authority are a continuing reality in American policing, as is the "code of silence" that shields those who do abuse their authority. What can be done to prevent such abuses? According to America's police, education and training are effective means of preventing police abuse. They also recognize the continuing importance of effective supervision, and the central role that police executives play in sending the message that police abuses of authority cannot be tolerated.

…[P]olice abuses…are a continuing reality…as is the "code of silence" that shields those who do abuse their authority.

Endnotes

1. Details regarding the sample are provided in Chapter II of this report. The sampling frame of the survey as estimated by Maguire (1997) is 351,480 officers.

2. A number of questions were adapted from two previous Police Foundation surveys (Pate and Hamilton, 1992; Wycoff and Oettmeier, 1993). We used several questions from a survey on ethical conduct and discipline from Queensland, Australia (Criminal Justice Commission, 1995). We adopted the question structure (although not the content) for presenting hypothetical scenarios from the survey instrument on police integrity by Carl B. Klockars, Sanja Kutnjak-Ivkovic, and William E. Harver (no date). Scenarios were provided by Chief Jerry Oliver during the expert focus group (see Appendix B) and by Earl Hamilton of the Police Foundation staff. Some of the demographic questions were developed with assistance from members of Mathematica Policy Research Inc., who also assisted with editing the survey questions.

We also consulted a number of survey instruments that addressed police ethics. They did not provide specific questions but assisted us in our thinking. The instruments included the Royal Barbados Police Force survey by Richard R. Bennett (1994), the Illinois Police Behavior Survey (Martin and Bensinger, 1994), an Australian survey on police ethics (McConkey, Huon, and Frank, 1996), and a Police Foundation survey of Oregon State Police officers (Amendola, Hockman, and Scharf, 1996).

We conducted three focus groups, which provided a range of viewpoints from rank-and-file officers to chiefs and academics: The first group combined the knowledge and experience of academic experts and police chiefs (for a full report, see Appendix B). The second group was composed of rank-and-file police officers from departments across the country (see Appendix C for a full report, including selection criteria). The third group consisted of sergeants and lieutenants from departments nationwide (see Appendix D for a full report,

including selection criteria). In addition to the important contributions of the police scholars, chiefs, and officers who participated in our focus groups, as well as the officers who participated in the pretest, we consulted with a number of police researchers as we developed the survey instrument. Professors Carl Klockars, Peter Manning, Stephen Mastrofski, Albert Reiss, Jerome Skolnick, and Robert Worden provided valuable criticism that impelled us to keep a sharp focus.

3. Care was taken to protect the confidentiality and anonymity of all officers participating in the survey, from the design of the selection process through data collection and analysis. Selected departments were requested to provide to the Police Foundation a list of the names of all their full-time, sworn personnel. From this roster, officers were randomly selected for participation. This methodology enabled us to keep the names of the selected officers confidential from their chief and other departmental personnel. (There was some variation in this procedure. In two cases, the department generated the random sample in their own computers in the presence of Police Foundation researchers. In two others, departments provided serial numbers from which we generated the random samples, and only then were we provided names and contact information. Still, every effort was made to protect the privacy of the officers in each situation.)

All information received by the Police Foundation from the departments, as well as interview and survey data, was kept in locked file cabinets. Access to such information was limited to key project personnel.

Under the terms of a subcontract, all information furnished by the departments was made available to Mathematica Policy Research Inc. for the selection of officers and for subsequent interviews. Mathematica Policy Research Inc., in compliance with Police Foundation policy, agreed to maintain strict procedures designed to protect the confidentiality of selected officers. In addition to restricting access to this information to key personnel at Mathematica, the Police Foundation withheld the identity of selected officers from project personnel.

Interviewing staff members at Mathematica signed a confidentiality pledge prior to the surveying period. In signing this pledge, interviewers agreed not to divulge any private, project-related information to any person not authorized to have access to such information.

Serial numbers were assigned to selected officers before creating a machine-processing record and identifiers (i.e., name, address, telephone number, etc.). Those numbers were not included in the machine record nor in the resulting database. Survey data containing identifiers or potential identifiers were kept secured and were destroyed by Mathematica Policy Research Inc. within 10 days of sending the data set to the Police Foundation.

4. We sought at the outset to gain an accurate list of all U.S. police officers. However, attempts to acquire names of current police officers on a state-by-state basis from state licensing boards, although promising at first, were ultimately frustrated and unsuccessful. As a result, we turned to the two-step process defined here.

5. The Northeastern region includes the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The South includes Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. The North Central region includes the states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. And the Western region includes Alaska, Ari-

zona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.

6.   This method was developed in consultation with and conducted by John Hall, senior sampling statistician with Mathematica Policy Research Inc.

The sample was selected using a stratified multistage design. The sample initially included 121 police departments that were selected by using probability proportional to size (PPS) methods. To use PPS selection, each department was assigned a measure of size based on an estimate of its number of full-time sworn officers.

Departments that were so large that they were certain to be sampled using PPS methods were selected with probability 1.0 and are called "certainty selections."

Selection was made from a machine-readable file (the sampling frame) that included one record for each of the 5,014 eligible police departments in the study. Each record contained department identification, department type, region, and the estimated number of officers who were employed by the department and were eligible for the survey. The estimated number of officers was used as a measure of size in selecting the sample.

Before selection, the sample frame was stratified by size and region. The size categories were (a) certainty selections, (b) other departments with 25 or more full-time sworn officers, and (c) other departments with 10–24 full-time sworn officers. The sample included nine certainty selections: 84 from the middle-size group and 28 from the smallest group.

The Police Foundation contacted sampled departments and, from each cooperating department, obtained a list of all officers eligible for the survey. Those lists contained identifying information that enabled interviewers to contact sampled officers.

The sample selected from those lists was of adequate size to allow completion of 925 to 950 interviews. In *certainty* departments, the number of officers selected was based on the proportion of the total population of officers represented by the department. For *noncertainty* departments with 25 or more officers, we sampled 10 per department. For the departments with 10 to 24 officers, we sampled an average of 4.5 (a random half of the sample was allocated 5 selections, and the other half, 4).

7.   As noted in endnote 3, there was some variation in this procedure. In two cases, the departments generated the random sample from their own computers in the presence of Police Foundation researchers. In two others, departments provided serial numbers from which we generated the random samples; only then were we provided names and contact information.

8.   When the confidence interval exceeds plus or minus 4 percent, we provide the exact interval in the endnotes.

9.   Because of the multistage sampling procedure used in our study, we could not rely on standard estimates of standard errors or statistical significance. Adjusted standard errors and observed significance levels were estimated using the statistical analysis program Sudaan (see Babubhai, Barnwell, and Bieler, 1997), after specifying the specific sampling model used in our study.

10. The weighting procedure was developed by John Hall of Mathematica Policy Research Inc. The weights for the Police Foundation Survey account for differences in (a) probabilities of selection among officers responding to the survey, (b) nonresponse at the department level, and (c) response rates among groups of officers. Without the weighting adjustments, some groups of officers would be overrepresented (and others underrepresented), leading to potentially biased survey estimates.

Weighting took place in seven steps: (a) each sampled department was assigned an initial weight equal to the inverse of its probability of selection; (b) cells were formed for department-level nonresponse adjustment; (c) department-level non-response weights were computed; (d) each sampled officer was assigned an initial weight, which was the product of the officer's department's weight and the inverse of the officer's probability of selection within the department; (e) new cells were formed for officer-level nonresponse adjustments; (f) officer-level nonresponse weights were computed; and (g) each officer's final weight was the product of the initial officer weight and the officer-level nonresponse weight.

Initial Department Weights: Initially weighting departments by the inverse of the probability of selection was required because departments were sampled with probability proportional to size. Thus the initial department weight (IDW) is

$$IDW(dept) = 1/P(dept)$$

where P (dept) is the department's probability of selection.

When department-level nonresponse adjustments were made, the initial department weight allowed each department to represent its appropriate share of the population.

Department Nonresponse Adjustment: One large department (selected with certainty for the sample survey) chose not to respond. Because of this, we defined one cell for department-level nonresponse to include all sampled departments within those departments having at least 400 full-time sworn officers (FTSW). Other cells were defined by the intersection of region and major stratum (selected with certainty, noncertainty with more than 24 FTSW and 10–24 FTSW). Departments assigned to the first cell described above were not also assigned to other cells. The departmental nonresponse adjustment, DNRA (dcell), for

a cell is the ratio of the sum of IDW for all departments in the cell to the sum of IDW for responding departments in the cell, and the final department weight is

$$FDW(dept) = IDW(dept) \times DNRA(dcell)$$

Each officer was then assigned an initial weight (IWO), where

$$IWO(officer) = FDW(dept) \times 1/P(officer|dept)$$

where P (officer dept) is the probability of an officer being selected for the sample within the department.

Officer Nonresponse Adjustment: Computation of the officer nonresponse adjustment (DNRAO) was similar to that for departments, except the cells were defined differently. For adjustments at the individual level, one cell comprised four departments selected with certainty within a region. One cell included three certainty departments in two neighboring regions. One cell comprised a certainty selection and two other large departments within a region. Eight other cells were defined by the intersection of region and the two major noncertainty strata.

ONRA (ocell) for a cell is the ratio of the sum of IWO (officer) for all sampled officers in the cell to the sum of IWO (officer) for responding officers in the cell, and the final weight is

$$Finalwt(officer) = IWO(officer) \times ONRA(ocell).$$

11. The survey instrument and responses, including raw frequencies and weighted percentages, are provided in Appendix A. Throughout this report, unless otherwise indicated, percentages presented in the text are weighted percentages.

12. Officers could identify themselves as belonging to more than one racial category.

13. For example, in their re-examination of 5,688 cases in the 1977 Police Services Study data, Worden and Shepard

(1996) found that reasonable force was used in 37 cases, and improper force was used in 23 cases. We note that improper force was thus used in 38 percent of encounters that involved force. Similarly, in his re-analysis of 1,565 cases in Albert Reiss's 1967 data, Friedrich (1980) found that reasonable force was used in 52 cases, and excessive force was used in 28 cases. Excessive force was thus used in 35 percent of encounters that involved force.

14. These issues are revisited later, when we take up questions of differences among subgroups of officers and consider whether police officers of different races have differing views of racial bias by police officers.

15. We are beginning to examine whether the influence of race might be explained by other factors, such as the concentration of minority police officers in specific parts of the country. Our findings suggest that the importance of race is maintained even when controlling for other relevant demographic characteristics.

16. In Table 4.14, confidence intervals ranged from ±4.61 percent to ±13.43 percent for African Americans, and from ±5.86 percent to ±13.74 percent for other minorities. We remind the reader that we report confidence intervals only if they are greater than ±4 percent.

17. Confidence intervals ranged from ±5.86 percent to ±10.76 percent for African Americans and from ±9.8 percent to ±11.19 percent for other minorities.

18. Confidence intervals ranged from ±6.02 percent to ±10.94 percent for African Americans and from ±10.49 percent to ±12.23 percent for other minorities.

19. For the number of incidents of excessive force (Table 4.17), confidence intervals for white officers were ±4.12 percent for "decrease" and ±4.19 percent for "no impact." For African-American officers, confidence intervals were ±5.21 percent for "increases," ±9.88 percent for "decreases," and ±8.31 percent for "no impact." For other minority officers, confidence intervals were ±4.29 percent for "increases," ±11.37 percent for "decreases," and ±11.76 percent for "no impact."

20. For Table 4.20, confidence intervals range from ±5.53 percent to ±5.84 percent for supervisors.

21. For Table 4.21, confidence intervals range from ±5.88 percent to ±6.03 percent for supervisors.

22. For Table 4.22, confidence intervals range from ±5.25 percent to ±6.50 percent for supervisors

23. For Table 4.23, confidence intervals for supervisors ranged from ±4.98 percent to ±5.57 percent.

24. For Table 4.24, confidence intervals for supervisors ranged from ±5.99 percent to ±6.66 percent.

25. For Table 4.25, confidence intervals for supervisors ranged from ±5.84 percent to ±5.90 percent.

26. For Table 4.26, confidence intervals for supervisors were ±5.55 percent.

27. For Table 4.27, confidence intervals for supervisors were ±6.08 percent for "decreases" and ±6.35 percent for "no impact." For nonsupervisors, confidence intervals were ±4.27 percent for "decreases" and ±4.31 percent for "no impact."

28. For Table 4.28, confidence intervals for supervisors were ±6.25 percent for "decreases" and ±6.35 percent for "no impact." For nonsupervisors, confidence intervals were ±4.29 percent for "no impact."

29. For Table 4.29, confidence intervals for the North Central region ranged from ±4.50 percent to ±6.30 percent. For the

Northeast they ranged from ±4.50 percent to ±5.70 percent. For the South they ranged from ±4.30 percent to ±5.70 percent, and for the West they ranged from ±7.90 percent to ±8.00 percent.

30. For Table 4.30, confidence intervals for the North Central region were ±5.70 percent. For the Northeast they were ±6.02 percent. For the South they were ±6.31 percent, and for the West they were ±6.31 percent.

31. For Table 4.31, confidence intervals for the North Central region were ±8.57 percent. For the Northeast they were ±5.88 percent. For the South they were ±5.57 percent, and for the West they were ±7.02 percent.

32. In Table 4.32, confidence intervals ranged from ±5.00 percent to ±8.00 percent for the largest departments and from ±6.00 percent to ±8.00 percent for the small departments.

33. In Table 4.33, confidence intervals ranged from ±5.50 percent to ±7.50 percent for the largest departments.

35. In Table 4.34, confidence intervals ranged from ±4.82 percent to ±7.93 percent for the largest departments and from ±5.02 percent to ±11.56 percent for the small departments.

35. In Table 4.35, confidence intervals ranged from ±7.29 percent to ±8.02 percent for the largest departments, ±3.39 percent to ±4.25 percent for the medium departments, and ±7.56 percent to ±7.80 percent for the small departments.

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A

SURVEY INSTRUMENT WITH RESPONSES

SURVEY

Section A: Policing Issues

This section of the questionnaire examines a broad range of issues related to police authority and community policing. Respondents indicate a level of agreement with a series of statements.

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
a1	First, are you a full-time sworn officer in the [fill DEPT]?		
	Yes	925	100
	No		
	N = 925		
a2	The relationship between the police and the citizens in [fill CITY] is very good.		
	Strongly Agree	179	18.7
	Agree	634	69.4
	Disagree	92	9.9
	Strongly Disagree	18	2.1
	N = 923		
a3	Most people do not respect the police.		
	Strongly Agree	52	5.6
	Agree	172	19.1
	Disagree	604	65.2
	Strongly Disagree	96	10.1
	N = 924		

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
a4	Police officers are not permitted to use as much force as is often necessary in making arrests.		
	Strongly Agree	56	6.2
	Agree	225	24.9
	Disagree	554	60.5
	Strongly Disagree	77	8.4
	N = 912		
a5	Police officers should be allowed to use physical force in response to verbal abuse.		
	Strongly Agree	4	0.4
	Agree	60	6.6
	Disagree	618	67.6
	Strongly Disagree	238	25.4
	N = 920		
a6	A police officer is more likely to arrest a person who displays what he or she considers to be a bad attitude.		
	Strongly Agree	19	2.1
	Agree	434	46.7
	Disagree	408	45.1
	Strongly Disagree	56	6.1
	N = 917		
a7	Citizen review boards are effective means for preventing police misconduct.		
	Strongly Agree	28	3.1
	Agree	296	34.7
	Disagree	423	48.4
	Strongly Disagree	125	13.9
	N = 872		
a8	It is sometimes acceptable to use more force than is legally allowable to control someone who physically assaults an officer.		
	Strongly Agree	30	3.3
	Agree	191	21.2
	Disagree	506	55.2
	Strongly Disagree	185	20.3
	N = 912		

	Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
a9 An officer who makes many arrests will get many citizen complaints.		
Strongly Agree	104	11.3
Agree	427	46.6
Disagree	355	38.5
Strongly Disagree	33	3.6
N = 919		
a10 Police officers regularly use more physical force than is necessary in making arrests.		
Strongly Agree	7	0.6
Agree	31	3.5
Disagree	596	64.5
Strongly Disagree	290	31.4
N = 924		
a11 Whistle blowing is not worth it.		
Strongly Agree	27	3.1
Agree	196	21.8
Disagree	573	63.5
Strongly Disagree	108	11.7
N = 904		
a12 Investigations of police misconduct are usually biased in favor of police.		
Strongly Agree	4	0.4
Agree	48	5.1
Disagree	664	72.4
Strongly Disagree	198	22.0
N = 914		
a13 Preservation of the peace requires that police have the authority to order people to "move along" or "break it up" even though no law is being violated.		
Strongly Agree	100	10.8
Agree	585	63.4
Disagree	218	24.4
Strongly Disagree	14	1.5
N = 917		

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
a14	Police officers often treat whites better than they do African Americans and other minorities.		
	Strongly Agree	11	1.2
	Agree	144	15.8
	Disagree	523	57.8
	Strongly Disagree	236	25.2
	N = 914		
a15	Police department rules about the use of force should not be any stricter than required by law.		
	Strongly Agree	61	6.7
	Agree	542	58.9
	Disagree	293	32.3
	Strongly Disagree	19	2.1
	N = 915		
a16	African Americans and other minorities are much less likely to cooperate with the police than are whites.		
	Strongly Agree	28	2.9
	Agree	215	23.8
	Disagree	570	63.0
	Strongly Disagree	94	10.3
	N = 907		
a17	An officer who reports another officer's misconduct is likely to be given the "cold shoulder" by his or her fellow officers.		
	Strongly Agree	99	11.0
	Agree	515	56.4
	Disagree	277	30.9
	Strongly Disagree	17	1.8
	N = 908		
a18	Internal affairs units are not effective means for preventing police misconduct.		
	Strongly Agree	22	2.4
	Agree	172	19.0
	Disagree	601	66.2
	Strongly Disagree	115	12.4
	N = 910		

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
a19	Always following the rules is not compatible with getting the job done.		
	Strongly Agree	35	3.8
	Agree	360	39.1
	Disagree	453	49.6
	Strongly Disagree	71	7.6
	N = 919		
a20	It is not unusual for a police officer to turn a blind eye to improper conduct by other officers.		
	Strongly Agree	17	1.8
	Agree	460	50.6
	Disagree	393	43.3
	Strongly Disagree	38	4.4
	N = 908		
a21	Police administrators concentrate on what police officers do wrong rather than what police officers do right.		
	Strongly Agree	171	19.1
	Agree	437	47.1
	Disagree	287	31.2
	Strongly Disagree	25	2.6
	N = 920		
a22	Your police department takes a very tough stance on improper behavior by police.		
	Strongly Agree	325	35.2
	Agree	532	57.4
	Disagree	56	6.6
	Strongly Disagree	8	0.9
	N = 921		
a23	The code of silence is an essential part of the mutual trust necessary to good policing.		
	Strongly Agree	11	1.2
	Agree	141	15.7
	Disagree	595	65.6
	Strongly Disagree	158	17.5
	N = 905		

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
a24	Police officers always report serious criminal violations involving abuse of authority by fellow officers.		
	Strongly Agree	26	2.8
	Agree	320	36.2
	Disagree	530	58.5
	Strongly Disagree	23	2.5
	N = 899		
a25	Police officers in [fill CITY] use more force than necessary to make an arrest.		
	Always	2	0.3
	Often	6	0.7
	Sometimes	188	20.8
	Seldom	581	62.4
	Never	145	16.0
	N = 922		
a26	Police officers in your department respond to verbal abuse with physical force.		
	Always	2	0.3
	Often	5	0.6
	Sometimes	130	13.9
	Seldom	497	53.5
	Never	288	31.8
	N = 922		
a27	The public is too concerned with police brutality.		
	Strongly Agree	125	13.4
	Agree	381	41.6
	Disagree	388	42.5
	Strongly Disagree	24	2.5
	N = 918		
a28	The newspapers and TV in this country are too concerned with police brutality.		
	Strongly Agree	332	36.0
	Agree	407	44.2
	Disagree	173	19.0
	Strongly Disagree	8	0.8
	N = 920		

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
a29	Police should make frequent informal contact with people on their beat.		
	Strongly Agree	527	56.4
	Agree	380	42.0
	Disagree	11	1.2
	Strongly Disagree	3	0.3
	N = 921		
a30	Police should work with citizens to try and solve problems on their beat.		
	Strongly Agree	603	65.1
	Agree	315	34.3
	Disagree	4	0.4
	Strongly Disagree	2	0.2
	N = 924		
a31	Citizens can be a vital source of information about the problems in their neighborhood.		
	Strongly Agree	733	79.1
	Agree	189	20.7
	Disagree	1	0.1
	Strongly Disagree	1	0.1
	N = 924		
a32	Police officers sometimes have to explain to individuals and groups of citizens that the police are prohibited by law from using some of the tactics that citizens encourage them to use.		
	Strongly Agree	302	33.0
	Agree	584	63.9
	Disagree	27	3.0
	Strongly Disagree	1	0.1
	N = 914		
a33	It is okay for police officers to use more aggressive tactics than they otherwise would use if the community has asked them to do so.		
	Strongly Agree	15	1.7
	Agree	183	19.7
	Disagree	586	64.2
	Strongly Disagree	135	14.4
	N = 919		

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
a34	Frequent friendly contact with local residents and merchants increases the likelihood that police officers will accept free lunches, discounts, or gifts of appreciation for effective service.		
	Strongly Agree	13	1.4
	Agree	178	18.8
	Disagree	547	60.4
	Strongly Disagree	178	19.4
	N = 916		
a35	Police officers are more likely to use physical force against blacks and other minorities than against whites in similar situations.		
	Strongly Agree	15	1.7
	Agree	85	9.4
	Disagree	506	55.6
	Strongly Disagree	310	33.3
	N = 916		
a36	Police officers are more likely to use physical force against poor people than against middle-class people in similar situations.		
	Strongly Agree	18	1.9
	Agree	110	12.2
	Disagree	526	57.9
	Strongly Disagree	264	27.9
	N = 918		
a37	Most police abuse of force could be stopped by developing more effective methods of supervision.		
	Strongly Agree	66	7.3
	Agree	440	48.0
	Disagree	361	39.5
	Strongly Disagree	46	5.2
	N = 913		
a38	Good first-line supervisors can help prevent police officers from abusing their authority.		
	Strongly Agree	212	22.9
	Agree	614	66.9
	Disagree	88	9.3
	Strongly Disagree	7	0.9
	N = 921		

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
a39	If a police chief takes a strong position against abuses of authority, he or she can make a big difference in preventing officers from abusing their authority.		
	Strongly Agree	225	24.5
	Agree	557	60.3
	Disagree	126	13.8
	Strongly Disagree	12	1.4
	N = 920		
a40	Serious cases of police misconduct like the Rodney King case in Los Angeles or the Abner Louima allegation in New York are extremely rare in your department.		
	Strongly Agree	602	64.7
	Agree	290	32.4
	Disagree	20	2.3
	Strongly Disagree	5	0.6
	N = 917		

Section B: Police Response to Citizen Behavior

In this section, we present two scenarios for the respondent's reaction. A series of questions follows each scenario. Again, we are seeking the respondent's opinions. Answers to these questions do not imply that the respondent has either participated in or is aware of any such incidents in his/her department.

Note: There are two versions of the first scenario. The computer randomly selected which version was presented. Approximately half of the respondents were read Version A and the other half were read Version B. We did not provide further information about the scenario. The respondents used only the information we read.

First Scenario, Version A

While patrolling his beat, an officer notices several youths standing on a corner smoking cigarettes and talking to one another. The officer tells the youths to break it up and leave the area. The youths say, "We're not doing anything. Why are you hassling us?". The officer gets out of the car and orders the youths to place their hands up against the wall of a building. They refuse. The officer throws them against the wall and searches them. Finding nothing, the officer uses demeaning language, tells them that this "will teach you to respect the law" and "I'd better not see you here again," and gets in his patrol car and drives off.

	Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
b1-a How serious do you consider the officer's behavior to be?		
Not Serious at All	8	1.8
Not Very Serious	35	7.9
Moderately Serious	110	24.8
Quite Serious	157	35.2
Very Serious	128	30.3
N = 438		
b1-b How serious would most officers in your agency consider this behavior to be?		
Not Serious at All	23	5.5
Not Very Serious	71	15.8
Moderately Serious	160	36.9
Quite Serious	126	28.9
Very Serious	54	12.8
N = 434		
b1-c If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was reported, what, if any, discipline do you think would follow?		
No Discipline	13	3.1
Verbal Reprimand	151	34.3
Written Reprimand	150	34.2
Suspension Without Pay	73	16.6
Demotion in Rank	3	0.7
Dismissal	3	0.6
Something Else	45	10.5
N = 438		
b1-d If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was reported, what, if any, discipline do you think should follow?		
No Discipline	13	3.1
Verbal Reprimand	116	26.7
Written Reprimand	143	32.7
Suspension Without Pay	93	21.0
Demotion in Rank	1	0.2
Dismissal	3	0.7
Something Else	66	15.7
N = 435		

	Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
b1-e Do you think you would report a fellow officer who engaged in this behavior?		
Definitely Not	36	8.5
Probably Not	124	28.2
Possibly Yes	126	28.8
Definitely Yes	148	34.6
N = 434		
b1-f Do you think most officers in your agency would report a fellow officer who engaged in this behavior?		
Definitely Not	36	8.4
Probably Not	199	44.8
Possibly Yes	157	36.7
Definitely Yes	43	10.1
N = 435		

First Scenario, Version B

In a community meeting, citizens told police that they were very concerned about groups of rowdy youths hanging out on street corners. After the meeting, an officer who participated in the meeting notices several youths standing on a corner smoking cigarettes and talking to one another. The officer tells the youths to break it up and leave the area. The youths say, "We're not doing anything. Why are you hassling us?". The officer gets out of the car and orders the youths to place their hands up against the wall of a building. They refuse. The officer throws them against the wall, and searches them. Finding nothing, the officer uses demeaning language, tells them that this "will teach you to respect the law" and "I'd better not see you here again," and gets in his patrol car and drives off.

	Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
b2-a How serious do you consider the officer's behavior to be?		
Not Serious at All	8	1.7
Not Very Serious	44	8.8
Moderately Serious	114	24.2
Quite Serious	176	35.6
Very Serious	140	29.8
N = 482		

	Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
b2-b **How serious would most officers in your agency consider this behavior to be?**		
Not Serious at All	18	3.8
Not Very Serious	83	17.1
Moderately Serious	152	32.0
Quite Serious	150	32.3
Very Serious	70	14.8
N =473		
b2-c **If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was reported, what, if any, discipline do you think would follow?**		
No Discipline	10	2.0
Verbal Reprimand	170	35.6
Written Reprimand	158	34.0
Suspension Without Pay	89	18.1
Demotion in Rank	5	1.1
Dismissal	5	1.0
Something Else	40	8.2
N = 477		
b2-d **If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was reported, what, if any, discipline do you think should follow?**		
No Discipline	7	1.6
Verbal Reprimand	139	28.7
Written Reprimand	151	32.5
Suspension Without Pay	101	20.7
Demotion in Rank	3	0.6
Dismissal	9	1.7
Something Else	69	14.1
N = 479		
b2-e **Do you think you would report a fellow officer who engaged in this behavior?**		
Definitely Not	37	7.9
Probably Not	150	30.5
Possibly Yes	129	27.0
Definitely Yes	162	34.7
N = 478		

	Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
b2-f Do you think most officers in your agency would report a fellow officer who engaged in this behavior?		
Definitely Not	31	6.9
Probably Not	233	48.6
Possibly Yes	158	33.9
Definitely Yes	51	10.6
N = 473		

Second Scenario
An officer has a handcuffed suspect sitting at his desk while he fills out the necessary paperwork. With no provocation from the officer, the suspect suddenly spits in the face of the officer. The officer immediately pushes the suspect in the face, causing the suspect to fall from the chair onto the floor.

	Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
b3-a How serious do you consider the officer's behavior to be?		
Not Serious at All	141	15.3
Not Very Serious	201	21.7
Moderately Serious	249	27.3
Quite Serious	188	20.2
Very Serious	135	15.6
N = 914		
b3-b How serious would most officers in your agency consider this behavior to be?		
Not Serious at All	197	21.5
Not Very Serious	231	25.4
Moderately Serious	266	29.3
Quite Serious	145	16.0
Very Serious	68	7.9
N = 907		
b3-c If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was reported, what, if any, discipline do you think would follow?		
No Discipline	130	13.9
Verbal Reprimand	216	24.2
Written Reprimand	273	30.2
Suspension Without Pay	209	22.7
Demotion in Rank	4	0.5
Dismissal	11	1.2
Something Else	68	7.2
N = 911		

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
b3-d	If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was reported, what, if any, discipline do you think should follow?		
	No Discipline	184	20.2
	Verbal Reprimand	214	23.6
	Written Reprimand	240	26.8
	Suspension Without Pay	179	19.2
	Demotion in Rank	3	0.4
	Dismissal	8	0.9
	Something Else	82	9.0
	N = 910		
b3-e	Do you think you would report a fellow officer who engaged in this behavior?		
	Definitely Not	191	20.8
	Probably Not	254	27.7
	Possibly Yes	207	22.6
	Definitely Yes	262	28.9
	N = 914		
b3-f	Do you think most officers in your agency would report a fellow officer who engaged in this behavior?		
	Definitely Not	166	18.3
	Probably Not	378	41.3
	Possibly Yes	270	29.7
	Definitely Yes	94	10.8
	N = 908		

Section C: The Impact of Community-Oriented Policing

In this section, we examine the officer's familiarity with and experience with community policing.

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
c1	Are you familiar with the concept of community-oriented policing?		
	Yes	909	98.4
	No	14	1.6
	N = 923		
c2	Is your department involved in community-oriented policing?		
	Yes	858	94.8
	No	49	5.2
	N = 907		
c3	Does your department have a separate community policing unit or units, or is community policing implemented department-wide?		
	Community Policing Unit	367	43.5
	Community Policing Department-Wide	483	56.5
	N = 850		

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
c4	In your current assignment, are you involved in community-oriented policing?		
	Yes	471	54.6
	No	386	45.4
	N = 857		
c5	In previous assignments, have you been involved in community-oriented policing?		
	Yes	471	56.8
	No	364	43.2
	N = 835		
c6	Do you think that community policing increases, decreases, or has no impact on the number of incidents of excessive force?		
	Increases	17	2.0
	Decreases	450	50.9
	Has No Impact	418	47.1
	N = 885		
c7	Do you think that community policing increases, decreases, or has no impact on the seriousness of excessive force incidents?		
	Increases	32	3.4
	Decreases	373	42.2
	Has No Impact	479	54.4
	N = 884		
c8	Do you think that community policing increases, decreases, or has no impact on the risk of corrupt behavior?		
	Increases the Risk	63	7.1
	Decreases the Risk	316	35.8
	Has No Impact	504	57.1
	N = 883		
c9	Community policing requires police officers to wear too many hats.		
	Strongly Agree	42	4.4
	Agree	241	26.5
	Disagree	542	60.6
	Strongly Disagree	76	8.4
	N = 901		
c10	It is more difficult to supervise officers in community policing than in other types of units.		
	Strongly Agree	21	2.3
	Agree	190	20.5
	Disagree	592	67.3
	Strongly Disagree	89	9.9
	N = 892		

Survey

Section D: Police Officer Information

In this section, we determine characteristics of the respondent to enable us
to describe the officers included in the study. This information will help us
categorize the respondents.

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
d1	How long have you been a sworn police officer?		
	5 Years or Less	235	25.7
	6–10 Years	182	20.0
	11–15 Years	169	18.3
	16–20 Years	154	16.8
	21–38 Years	184	19.2
	N = 924		
d2	What is your current rank?		
	Patrol Officer	514	55.7
	Detective Criminal Investigator	110	12.0
	Corporal	36	4.0
	Sergeant	142	15.3
	Lieutenant	56	6.1
	Captain	17	1.7
	Inspector	2	0.2
	Major	3	0.3
	Deputy Chief	6	0.6
	Chief	14	1.5
	Other	24	2.4
	N = 924		

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
d3	How long have you held that rank?		
	5 Years or Less	236	58.3
	6–10 Years	106	25.3
	11 or More Years	68	16.5
	N = 410		
d4	Are you a supervisor?		
	Yes	140	34.4
	No	270	65.6
	N = 410		
d4a	How many officers do you supervise?		
	1–6	86	32.3
	7–10	48	17.6
	11–20	79	29.8
	21–350	55	20.2
	N = 268		
d5	How many years have you been with your current department as a sworn police officer?		
	5 Years or Less	288	31.4
	6–10 Years	184	20.2
	11–15 Years	156	16.9
	16–35 Years	296	31.5
	N = 924		
d6	What is your current assignment?		
	Patrol	534	59.9
	Community Policing	60	7.4
	Narcotics	8	1.0
	Juvenile	8	1.1
	Gang	34	4.0
	Swat	9	1.2
	Vice	7	0.9
	Other Special Operations	106	12.1
	Internal Affairs	5	0.6
	Communications	2	0.3
	Technical Support	12	1.5
	Administration	68	7.7
	Other Non-Field Assignment	11	1.6
	Other Field Assignment	8	0.9
	N = 872		

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
d7	How long have you had your current assignment?		
	5 Years or Less	662	72.5
	6–10 Years	158	16.8
	11–21 Years	103	10.7
	N = 923		
d8	Do you work with a partner?		
	Yes	241	27.4
	No	683	72.6
	N = 924		
d8a	How long have you worked with your partner?		
	1 Year or Less	148	62.9
	2–5 Years	62	26.2
	6–10 Years	16	7.0
	11–21 Years	9	3.9
	N = 235		
d9	Which of the following best reflects your normal working hours?		
	Day Shifts	355	38.5
	Afternoon and Evening Shifts	164	18.1
	Night Shifts	199	21.2
	Something Else	206	22.3
	N = 924		
d9a	If something else, would it be . . .		
	Flexible Hours	37	18.7
	Specific Rotating Shifts	161	77.4
	Some Other Arrangement	8	3.8
	N = 206		
d10	How many hours per week do you usually work in your job as a police officer, including regular overtime hours?		
	40 Hours or Less	307	33.5
	41–45 Hours	258	28.0
	46–49 Hours	227	24.3
	50–80 Hours	131	14.2
	N = 923		

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
d11	Do you work an off-duty job?		
	Yes	267	28.6
	No	657	71.4
	N = 924		
d11-a	How many hours per week do you usually work while off duty?		
	1–10 Hours	143	55.3
	12–20 Hours	90	34.3
	24–48 Hours	90	10.4
	N = 262		
d12	What is the highest level of school that you've completed?		
	Some High School	5	0.5
	High School Graduate/GED	133	14.7
	Some College	303	33.1
	Associate's (2-Year) Degree	174	18.6
	Bachelor's (4-Year) Degree	258	27.6
	Some Graduate or Professional School	19	2.0
	Master's Degree	29	3.2
	Doctoral Degree, Law Degree, Ed.D.	3	0.3
	N = 924		
d13	What was your major in college?[2]		
	Agriculture	1	0.1
	Biology/Life Sciences	11	1.4
	Business	96	12.4
	Communications	18	2.3
	Computer Science	10	1.3
	Criminology/Criminal Justice/Police Science	409	52.8
	Forensics	1	0.1
	Education	31	4.0
	Engineering	11	1.4
	Language/Literature	2	0.3
	Health Sciences	14	1.8
	Law/Prelaw/Legal Studies	20	2.6
	Mathematics	6	0.8
	Philosophy/Religion	4	0.5
	Physical Sciences	7	0.9
	Psychology	28	3.6
	Social Work	3	0.4
	Social Science/History	20	2.6
	Visual Arts, Theater, Music	8	1.0
	Public Policy	9	1.2
	Other Science	8	1.0
	Other Liberal Arts	28	3.6
	Other	59	7.6
	N = 775		

Survey

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
d14	What was your major in graduate school?[3]		
	Business	4	7.8
	Criminology/Criminal Justice/Police Science	14	27.5
	Education	5	9.8
	Health Sciences	1	2.0
	Law/Legal Studies	3	5.9
	Psychology	3	5.9
	Social Work	2	3.9
	Social Science/History	1	2.0
	Public Policy	15	29.4
	Other Science	2	3.9
	Other Liberal Arts	1	2.0
	Other	3	5.9
	N = 51		
d15	What level of education did you complete before becoming a police officer?		
	Some High School	8	1.0
	High School Graduate/GED	164	20.6
	Some College	261	33.8
	Associate's (2-Year) Degree	135	17.1
	Bachelor's (4-Year) Degree	205	25.9
	Some Graduate or Professional School	3	0.4
	Master's Degree	10	1.2
	Doctoral Degree, Law Degree, Ed.D.	0	0.0
	N = 786		
d16	Are you currently taking any college or graduate courses in pursuit of a degree?		
	Yes	140	15.4
	No	784	84.6
	N = 924		
d17	In your academy training or since becoming a police officer, have you taken any classes in interpersonal skills or interpersonal relations?		
	Yes	682	73.8
	No	237	26.2
	N = 919		

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
d17a	Do you think this training is effective in preventing abuse of authority?		
	Yes	544	80.3
	No	130	19.7
	N = 674		
d18	In your academy training or since becoming a police officer, have you taken any classes in human diversity, cultural differences, cultural awareness, or ethnic sensitivity?		
	Yes	812	88.0
	No	111	12.0
	N = 923		
d18a	Do you think this training is effective in preventing abuse of authority?		
	Yes	603	74.9
	No	204	25.1
	N = 807		
d19	In your academy training or since becoming a police officer, have you taken any separate courses in ethics in law enforcement?		
	Yes	579	63.2
	No	338	36.8
	N = 917		
d19a	Do you think this training is effective in preventing abuse of authority?		
	Yes	472	82.2
	No	104	17.8
	N = 576		
d20	Considering all aspects of the job, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your current assignment?		
	Satisfied	845	91.5
	Dissatisfied	78	8.5
	N = 923		

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
d20a	Would you say you are extremely satisfied, mostly satisfied, or somewhat satisfied?		
	Extremely Satisfied	333	39.6
	Mostly Satisfied	395	46.4
	Somewhat Satisfied	115	14.0
	N = 843		
d20b	Would you say you are extremely dissatisfied, mostly dissatisfied, or somewhat dissatisfied?		
	Extremely Dissatisfied	18	23.3
	Mostly Dissatisfied	24	30.5
	Somewhat Dissatisfied	36	46.2
	N = 78		
d21	Looking at your overall work as a police officer, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your career choice?		
	Satisfied	871	94.4
	Dissatisfied	52	5.6
	N = 923		
d21a	Would you say you are extremely satisfied, mostly satisfied, or somewhat satisfied?		
	Extremely Satisfied	468	54.3
	Mostly Satisfied	342	38.6
	Somewhat Satisfied	61	7.0
	N = 871		
d21b	Would you say you are extremely dissatisfied, mostly dissatisfied, or somewhat dissatisfied?		
	Extremely Dissatisfied	2	4.1
	Mostly Dissatisfied	22	41.4
	Somewhat Dissatisfied	28	54.5
	N = 52		

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
d22	How stressful do you consider your work to be? Would you say extremely stressful, quite stressful, somewhat stressful, not very stressful, or not at all stressful?		
	Extremely Stressful	145	15.5
	Quite Stressful	274	29.6
	Somewhat Stressful	392	42.5
	Not Very Stressful	93	10.4
	Not at All Stressful	18	2.0
	N = 924		
d23	How old are you?		
	22–25 Years	54	5.6
	26–30 Years	151	16.6
	31–35 Years	220	24.2
	36–40 Years	176	19.2
	41–45 Years	136	15.1
	46–50 Years	103	10.6
	51–55 Years	55	5.9
	56–66 Years	27	2.8
	N = 922		
d24	Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin?		
	Yes	84	9.6
	No	838	90.4
	N = 922		
d25	What is your racial background? Are you …		
	White	748	80.8
	Black or African American	94	10.7
	American Indian or Alaskan Native	8	0.8
	Asian	8	0.8
	Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	3	0.3
	Other	36	4.3
	Mixed Race	24	2.4
	N = 921		

		Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
d26	Including yourself, how many people usually live in your household? Please include children and infants and people not related to you.		
	1	118	12.5
	2	238	25.6
	3	221	24.9
	4	216	23.5
	5 or More	127	13.5
	N = 920		
d27	How many children do you have who are under 18 that are dependent on you?		
	1	212	23.6
	2	202	21.8
	3 or More	109	11.6
	None	397	42.9
	N = 920		
d28	How many children or other dependents do you support who are 18 or older?		
	1	146	15.8
	2	31	3.3
	3 or More	13	1.3
	None	730	79.7
	N = 920		
d29	Are you now …		
	Married	647	69.6
	Living With Someone as Married	35	4.0
	Widowed	3	0.4
	Divorced	87	9.7
	Separated	23	2.5
	Never Been Married	127	14.0
	N = 922		

	Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage[1]
d30 Code Without Asking: Respondent Is …		
Male	848	91.5
Female	76	8.5
N = 924		

Thank you for your time. You have made an important contribution toward our understanding of police views of authority and community policing.

1. For a detailed explanation of the weighting procedure, see endnote 10 on page 193.

2. Multiple responses were allowed for this question; therefore, while the N of respondents was 775, the total number of responses was 804. Because of the multiple responses, percentages do not add up to 100 percent, and no weighted percentages are available.

3. Multiple responses were allowed for this question; therefore, while the N of respondents was 51, the total number of responses was 54. Because of the multiple responses, percentages do not add up to 100 percent, and no weighted percentages are available.

APPENDIX B

REPORT ON FOCUS GROUP OF POLICE SCHOLARS AND EXECUTIVES

OCTOBER 15, 1997

Rosann Greenspan

David Weisburd

Kellie A. Bryant

Contents

B

POLICE SCHOLARS AND EXECUTIVES

Introduction[1]

On October 15, 1997, a group of eminent scholars and police chiefs gathered in the conference room of the Police Foundation in Washington, D.C., for a full day of discussion exploring management, legal, and ethical questions relating to police abuse of authority. This expert focus group was asked to identify key issues, to explore possible causes underlying police abuse of authority and police brutality, to suggest potential actions that police departments could take to prevent abuses, and to consider the potential effects that the community policing movement has had on such issues. For example, does community policing increase the risks of police abuses of authority or decrease them? Does it change the nature of such abuses or not affect them at all? The panel was also asked to provide ideas to assist in the development of a questionnaire for use in our national survey of police officers.

In identifying participants, the principal investigators drew on their knowledge of the field and consulted several scholars and police executives to provide lists of leading academic and police executive experts on issues of police authority, community policing, race, and the law. Scholars in attendance were Professor Carl Klockars from the University of Delaware, Professor Peter Manning from Michigan State University, Professor Ramiro Martinez from the University of Delaware, Professor Stephen Mastrofski from Michigan State University, Professor Jerome Skolnick from New York University Law School, Professor Alfred Slocum from Rutgers University School of Law, and Professor Robert Worden from the State University of New York at Albany. Police executives included Commissioner Thomas Frazier of Baltimore, Maryland; Chief Jerry Oliver of Richmond, Virginia; Director Bob Pugh of Atlantic City,

...[The] group was asked to identify... causes underlying police abuse,... to suggest potential actions,... and to consider the... effects [of] community policing.

New Jersey; and Chief Jerry Sanders of San Diego, California. Hubert Williams, president of the Police Foundation, greeted the guests and participated in the discussions. Dr. Rosann Greenspan presided.

Defining Issues of Police Authority: The Boundaries of the Proper Use of Authority

The first set of issues concerned the definition of abuse of authority. What are the boundaries of proper use of authority? Are our ideas about the meaning and boundaries of police authority changing? What forms of abuse concern the participants? How extensive is the problem? Is abuse an inevitable by-product of increased efforts to control crime and disorder?

"…[M]ost of the public don't really understand what the lines are with respect to police use of force, and that police are authorized to use force. The question is, when?"

As participants debated the boundaries of police authority, they considered whether the meaning of abuse of authority should be limited to matters related to the use of force. Some argued that corruption and unprofessional conduct more generally were important concerns that should fall within the definition. Police chiefs identified a wide range of unethical behavior by police officers—from language to corruption to brutality—as matters of concern to police executives. How to formulate a definition of abuse of authority was discussed not only in terms of which specific acts should be included, but also in terms of the sources for the standards and criteria that should define the scope of proper use of police authority.

Professor Skolnick led off the discussion by suggesting that because the media focus attention on incidents of "police brutality," it may be appropriate to focus our attention on police brutality. He raised the hope that this project could serve "to inform the public about how difficult an issue this is. I think most of the public don't really understand what the lines are with respect to police use of force, and that police are authorized to use force. The question is, when?" Skolnick suggested that one way to structure thinking about the boundaries of police authority would be, on the one hand, "the use of force in apprehending somebody who is considered to have committed a crime" and, on the other hand, the use of force after somebody has been apprehended. He pointed out that "this [difference] is really what distinguished in a way the Rodney King case and the Abner Louima case."

Skolnick pointed out that "it is true that police are authorized to, and sometimes have to, use force in order to apprehend a suspect, and sometimes police are authorized to and have to use deadly force." He then offered a provocative suggestion:

> Then I suggest to you that we cross a line. And the line is now you have a suspect who is in custody and who is under control, is immobilized….I want to suggest to you that there is never a reason to use force there. [There] might be [a] question as to whether working police officers can really understand that line.

Professor Klockars argued that "the blanket statement that no force is justifiable at that point is probably a little strong," and Commissioner Frazier suggested that first, "[t]hey have to be compliant. Then, of course, there is no justification."

Chief Oliver recalled a difficult situation in his department that involved the use of force when a suspect was in custody and handcuffed:

I can think of a situation that I've dealt with where someone was in custody and immobilized. Force was used as a reaction on that person….[I]t was certainly looked at from a disciplinary standpoint….[A]n officer was talking to an individual who was under arrest in handcuffs sitting next to him, and the person cleared his throat and spit in the officer's face. And then the officer's reaction was to immediately push that person away, and that's a situation where force was used. It was videotaped. We looked at that. If you just took that clip of the videotape of a person turning and pushing somebody that's already handcuffed, [it could appear as though that officer used unnecessary force or abused (his) authority].

Professor Skolnick pointed out that in the Abner Louima case—even before the alleged events at the precinct headquarters—"There were four officers who were being accused of taking this guy [who is under arrest] out of the police car, beating him up, and putting him back in the police car …beating him up to beat him up, to teach him some lesson." He suggested the discussion implied that it may be valuable to ask officers in our survey, "What are the occasions under which it might be possible to use force after somebody has been arrested? And if somebody spits in your face, what can you do? If somebody insults you, what can you do?"

Commissioner Frazier raised the interesting question, "Do you have an obligation to submit to illegal arrest…?" He suggested that "the definition needs to be written, and has to do with were you legally arrested and were you under obligation to submit

and was the force…used…necessary or unnecessary?" He recalled that a turning point for him in the Rodney King trial was when it was stated that officers had been trained in the legal limits of the use of force:

> …in the Rodney King trial, the one clip that I'll never forget was the federal prosecutor being asked, "What do you tell Los Angeles police officers about the use of force?" And he said, "You can use whatever force is necessary and not one iota more." That, I think, was the key. I mean, just because you use force doesn't necessarily mean there is anything wrong. But the line is more than is necessary to accomplish a legal end.

Professor Mastrofski suggested that a number of ways exist to approach the issue of defining abuse of authority. One way would be to use a legal definition: "We can, as a definition, just say that abuse of authority by definition will be only legal. That is, whatever the law sets forth—whatever case law and statutory law set forth—we can say that constitutes abuse of authority."

But he went on to suggest, "There is this other issue of bad policing or ineffective or not the best policing. And does that constitute abuse of authority?"

Mr. Williams responded to Mastrofski's question, "[P]olicy I would think is…one of the critical issues that has to be examined and not just the law."

Professor Manning added yet another consideration:

> [W]e know from public opinion polls that there are enormous differences by race and ethnicity around what is

"…[J]ust because you use force doesn't necessarily mean there is anything wrong. But the line is more than is necessary to accomplish a legal end."

legitimate use of force. So clearly from the point of view of the attitudes of the public or public legitimacy of the police, it's very important to look at what is defined as appropriate by the public as well as legal or state statutes.

Professor Mastrofski summarized the discussion as follows: "That really raises three possible standards—legal, professional, and …legitimacy of a larger society."

Returning to Commissioner Frazier's point about the importance of the citizen's compliance in determining the appropriate use of force, Professor Manning pointed out that the process is interactive, and that the police do not act alone:

> [I]f we take some of the Weberian definition of authority—that is when the compliance and deference to command—and we recognize that the police have the capacity to coerce that compliance up to [and] including fatal force, that makes the process interactive to some degree.…I think it's important to recognize that authority is an issue of negotiated acceptance of command, and [it] can raise quite a span.

Professor Klockars argued for a more expansive definition of abuse of authority and for the inclusion of the officer's motive as an aspect of the definition:

> We have, in the discussions so far, focused on only one very special type of abuse of authority, namely abuse of force.…[T]here [is] a whole range of abuses of authority, and the motives are often extraordinarily different. It's one thing to be motivated by gain or corruption; it's another thing to be

motivated by an attempt to get that guy off the street. It's another thing to be motivated by an attempt to pay back somebody who spit in your face.…It's also not clear…that the most serious forms of abuse involve the use of force. It seems to me that fraudulent testimony, which results in somebody being put in jail unjustly. I mean, if I have a choice of getting punched in the nose or sent to jail for a year or so wrongly, I'd take a punch in the nose any day.

Professor Manning suggested that the public is less concerned about issues such as corruption because such issues are less visible than instances of excessive force:

> Now the reason that [Professor Klockars's] points about procedure, deception, and corruption perhaps are less public concerns is that they are often done without people knowing or [being] aware of those things going on. Perjury in cases, corruption, implicit lying to each other, and manipulation of records and the rest [are] less likely to become public. So the focus is often on those more public cases of coercion.…The public concern is…[on] those issues of excessive use of force that…become known.…Media events, in the sense, are [not] created by the media, but the media amplified them.…The videos and the visibility of these things through television…[are] now become international.

Professor Slocum raised—in order to reject—the provocative suggestion, which he attributed to Professor Randall Kennedy, that "there ought to be a sliding scale when it comes to legitimacy.…[S]ince the black community is the biggest victim of all

…[T]he public is less concerned about issues such as corruption because such issues are less visible than instances of excessive force.

crime,…they need greater protection when it comes to 'equal protection,' and, therefore, aggressive law enforcement is required."

Mr. Williams agreed that the implications were "a little bit scary." Professor Slocum offered a preference for "a constitutional standard." The issue of local standards and legitimate authority is integral to the discussion of police authority and community policing. (See pages 89–91, 93–95, 107–108, inter alia.)

Abuse of authority can encompass a wide range of activities (or inactivities) from lack of professionalism to corruption to brutality. The police chiefs discussed which forms of abuse they were particularly concerned about in their departments. They identified three types of misconduct: excessive force, theft, and inappropriate language. In the context of community policing, they were particularly concerned with the restructuring of authority that might be leaving officers with insufficient supervision and inviting certain forms of corruption, such as accepting gifts, discounts, and so forth. They agreed that incidents involving unnecessary use of force do occur in all departments and that such situations are of serious concern when they do arise. However, they also agreed that such incidents are not widespread problems and do not occur on a regular basis. In the view of the police executives, the perception by the public that police brutality is rampant in many police departments can be attributed to the media coverage of isolated incidents.

Commissioner Frazier expressed concern about incidents of theft by officers in his department, but argued that he was seeing "isolated instances," not "systemic corruption":

This could be anything from picking up the money from the crap game when everybody runs, to young officers who start at $25,000 a year and see a drug dealer on the corner with $2,500 in [his] pocket.…They count it out and $2,100 ends up going back in the pocket. You foot chase [criminals who] used to pitch their gun; now they pitch their money because that ends the foot chase.

I don't see systemic corruption. I don't see an officer taking a thousand dollars a week, two hundred for him, two hundred for the sergeant, two hundred for the lieutenant, two hundred for the captain, two hundred for the district commander, but we see individual cases of theft.

And usually, I'd say more times than not, it involves more than one officer.

The chiefs also expressed concern about unprofessional behavior in the form of inappropriate language. Chief Sanders and Commissioner Frazier both indicated that discourteous and inappropriate language directed at community residents is a serious problem for police departments. It not only hurts the police department's image but also can hamper community policing efforts in neighborhoods. Commissioner Frazier revealed an incident that disturbed him:

[T]he other thing that disturbs me is language. [When] I gave my community policing speech, I had a woman basically tell me, "I'm not going to help you." Long story short, she said there was some kind of disturbance outside her front door. She opened the door to see what was going on.

…[T]he perception …that police brutality is rampant in many police departments can be attributed to the media coverage of isolated incidents.

[The] officer said, "Lady, get your ass back up inside that house."

She said, "That was uncalled for; I will not help you if that is the way your officers treat me."

That disturbs me because we're trying to develop trust and partnership and relationships that will assist us in community organization development.…In that community-policing model, we talk about retaking the city neighborhood by neighborhood, if we can; block by block, if we can't; house by house, if we have to. I mean, it's just not going to work if we cannot develop the kind of trust.

A wide range of issues was discussed in attempting to define abuse of authority. Participants pointed out that in determining the boundaries for the proper use of authority, one must examine the relevant standards by which an officer's behavior is judged. Most preferred not to limit the discussion to the use of force, but rather to include any type of misconduct, whether criminal or unprofessional. Three standards or levels of authority were identified as measures for inappropriate use of authority: court rulings and state law (legal), departmental policies (professional), and the larger society's concept of acceptable and unacceptable conduct (societal). In addition, the participants identified the need to take into consideration the level of compliance or noncompliance demonstrated by an individual being taken into custody by the police, recognizing that abuse of force is an interactive concept.

Participants suggested that the boundaries of abuse of authority are not limited to acts of police brutality but rather include any

Three standards… were identified as measures for inappropriate use of authority: court rulings and state law…, departmental policies…, and…society's concept of acceptable and unacceptable conduct.…

type of police misconduct. The media's intensive coverage of incidents of police brutality, coupled with the fact that most other forms of misconduct are not public knowledge, results in the assumption that brutality is the most prevalent form of abuse of authority. This misperception directs the focus of public concern to brutality and away from corruption and unprofessional conduct, which may be more prevalent in modern policing than brutality. The police chiefs confirmed this position, indicating that although brutality does occur, incidents are infrequent. The behavior that could be construed as abuse of authority by police officers and that was of greatest concern to the chiefs was theft and unprofessional and discourteous conduct. The rise of community policing emphasizes the development of partnerships among police and communities and their citizens. Misconduct by officers, especially discourteous and disrespectful behavior, erodes the foundation of trust that departments must build on to create successful partnerships, and it alienates the community.

Abuse of Authority and Community Policing

Central to the community-policing approach is the development of partnerships between the community and police to formulate and implement effective crime-prevention strategies. These strategies often require officers to use problem-solving skills and to rely on a range of resources and agencies in addressing community problems.

The impact of this philosophy on abuse of authority by police was a central topic of debate and a discussion by the participants throughout the meeting. Although most

agreed that community policing enhances crime control and crime prevention, they also agreed that this style of policing may lead to increased opportunities for, and thus incidents of, abuse of authority, especially given the significantly changed role of the supervisor under community-oriented policing.

In discussing police abuse of authority and the effects of community policing, participants enumerated several factors that influence an officer's use of authority. These factors may be categorized into two main themes: internal influences and external influences.

Internal influences include the effects of departmental policies on officer behavior. These effects include the use of civil remedies in crime control and the changing role of supervisors under community-policing models.

External influences include those factors that are the result of the police–community relationship. Factors included in this category are community demands and expectations on the behavior of officers, plus the effect that the close police–community relationship has on opportunity for abuses of authority, particularly corruption.

The Use of Civil Law to Address Crime Problems: The Local Context of Community Policing

Picking up on Professor Slocum's point about the differential use of aggressive law-enforcement techniques in poorer communities, Professor Manning introduced an interesting discussion about the "local context of enforcement" and whether the growth in the use of civil law to address crime problems has expanded the author-

ity of police beyond the boundaries of previously appropriate behavior. He raised the provocative suggestion that

> One of the kinds of abuse of authority that's growing is a collection of all kinds of civil penalties and…collusions by city agencies to use civil law, to, say, evict people from public housing:
>
> Abuse of authority that ranges into the mobilization of a political unit against minority populations on the grounds of it's drugs or on the grounds of it's public order, or on the grounds of it's other points.
>
> …But authority that comes through the widening of the net to use…and [that] coordinates a variety of other means to coerce and minimize the opportunities for appeal, I think, is very serious.…
>
> If you view mobilizing the housing bureau…you use civil law. There's tax law, [and you] use RICO statutes. Then you're beginning to organize the political [part of the state] in a very different way than focusing the police to aggressively, proactively intervene [with] the sweeps or stops or even arrests.
>
> I think that's a different level of abuse. And the remedies are very, very rare. Indeed, they're available only in civil law if you can hire a lawyer, and it's really simply not done. It just happens. You're out. It's done.

Professor Mastrofski agreed with Professor Manning, noting that the civil law mobilization he describes "is very much on the agenda of community policing, problem solving. Herman Goldstein devoted a good part of his book to saying

…[G]rowth in the use of civil law to address crime problems has expanded the authority of police.…

police should explore these very things." Mastrofski went on to suggest that these methods raise a question of invasion of privacy as a new form of abuse of authority: "There is another domain too, which is the invasion of privacy, which…often doesn't involve coercion, but can involve abuse of authority." Professor Mastrofski took the point further, questioning whether this entire set of community-policing strategies is good policing or whether it involves "a mobilization of bias":

> What do you do with a situation where—and this is quite common in my experience—police officers suspect someone of dealing drugs, maybe in public housing or something like that. They can't develop sufficient criminal evidence to invoke the criminal law. But there's a whole different standard when it comes to public housing that they can mobilize because of who they are, public housing people, quite selectively. And whether or not this is good policing or legal—I suspect it's legal; but whether it's good policing or whether it involves a mobilization of bias similar to the kind that [Professor Slocum] was talking about.

After these challenges to the legitimacy of central strategies of community policing, it was not long before Chief Sanders rose to the defense:

> I don't think that's any different than issues of discretion…on the criminal side and the civil side. And I think the civil side has just as many protections. We use the civil side for abatement on some difficult problems simply because the criminal side doesn't provide

"We use the civil side…on some difficult problems simply because the criminal side doesn't provide significant remedy…. And all of these involve community members; they involve attorneys; they involve judges."

significant remedy in the situation. And all of these involve community members; they involve attorneys; they involve judges. I mean, these aren't things that are done behind closed doors and some secret thing. These are done at community meetings, these are done with the presiding judge, they're done with a defense attorney, or they're done with the city attorney that looks at these things

And they're much more difficult…than pursuing criminals. But we're looking for a different outcome on it. And I would suggest that the same discretion an officer uses in making an arrest is used in this type of situation.

In fact, I think [it's] scrutinized even more because it's something that isn't an immediate thing. It's a planned thing where you have to go through so many hoops to get it done. Where an arrest out in the field is something that you see your probable cause, you use your discretion, you make the arrest right there, and then it's reviewed after the fact.

Professor Skolnick offered that he did not agree that having a "very local vision of…what's authority" is abusive. Chief Sanders noted that the procedures are open and participatory:

> These are done working with the people who are going to be affected and telling them what has to change …as you actually bring in legal aid to work with them and bring in adult protective services, bringing in child protective services, bringing in all those

resources to try to solve it at one level first. And yet, when the activity continues—and I do think that you bring the resources that you have to bear on that issue. And it's not—you know, I don't see it as being duplicitous or anything else. The agenda is out. It's not done behind closed doors.

Later, Professor Worden returned to the issue of giving police authority to invoke civil law to solve crime problems. Rather than expanding the potential for abuses of authority, he argued, "If I understood Herman Goldstein correctly, [civil law] might, at the same time, make it less likely that police abuse their authority. If they have a wider range of tools that they can apply in a somewhat more surgical fashion to the problems that they confront, they may be less likely to abuse their authority."

Professor Klockars agreed: "The argument is that one of the sources of police abuse of authority is our failure to give police adequate means to do the work we demand of them."

Professor Mastrofski suggested that invoking civil law provided the ability to "target through civil means" rather than "running sweeps in the neighborhood."

Chief Sanders expanded: "Rather than using a zero-tolerance model on all window washers or all…disorder issues, you look at specific areas where you have problems….You can document those areas, and you remove the cause that allows that to occur."

The Changing Role of Supervisors under Community Policing

Adopting the community-policing philosophy in departments is not a simple task. Internal policies and procedures have to be revamped to incorporate the new strategies and policing practices. As Chief Sanders suggested, "[T]hat's a really important issue with community policing…because we're restructuring departments to fit the community-policing model." With the implementation of community policing, departments are experiencing a change in the roles, responsibilities, and levels of authority of line supervisors, specifically sergeants and lieutenants. This change has led to a variety of concerns and problems related to supervision by sergeants and lieutenants, and to selection and appropriate training of sergeants.

The supervisory concerns expressed by the police chiefs are twofold: first, the issue of how the sergeants supervise and subsequently discipline the officers they command; second, the issue of how the sergeants communicate with the lieutenants. Chief Sanders laid out his concerns about supervision under community policing as follows:

> I think…a really important issue with community policing is the internal issues, the supervision…because we're restructuring departments to fit the community-policing model. And the rigid structures we have in place for how you supervise, how many people you supervise, how you did it, are gone. And now our sergeants don't really know how [to supervise]….We told them it's a team. We've reduced spans of control.

"…[Civil law] might…make it less likely that police abuse their authority. If they have a wider range of tools that they can apply in a somewhat more surgical fashion.…"

And all of a sudden we find the sergeants are closer to the team members, the officers, than they are to the department. And we're not seeing those types of decisions we had seen in the past where they stopped things before they become problems or where they're writing up discipline.

Instead, they're so close to the people on the team that it creates problems. And I think that's a large issue because it starts spilling out externally after you've had the internal damage. And we're struggling with a training program on how to bring the sergeants back up.

And as we're moving through this, we're finding that we're in whole new territories that we've never considered when we restructured the police department, because we just weren't aware of what was going to happen.

"…[T]o push authority, responsibility, accountability down to [lower ranking officers] to get…the community involved in the decision-making processes, you've actually changed all the management dynamics of your police department."

Community policing increases the authority of supervisors and line officers. "So we're going to give the lieutenant 24-hour-a-day responsibility.…[S]ergeants…don't know what to do and loyalties are misplaced.… [I]n an attempt to push authority, responsibility, accountability down to [lower ranking officers] to get…the community involved in the decision-making processes, you've actually changed all the management dynamics of your police department" (Commissioner Frazier).

Chief Sanders agreed completely with Commissioner Frazier:

And that's exactly what we're facing. We did exactly the same thing. And we used to have a lieutenant that supervised during a band of time, and the people knew that that person was there.

Now that person has 24-hour responsibility, and that lieutenant may not see [his] sergeants for a week or two.

Professor Klockars had observed the same problems in another department, and he felt that the lack of supervision created a great potential for corruption and other abuses:

Well the problem, from a management point of view, is that the community-services officers, by and large, dictate their own schedules. They're on total flex time.…Number two, the problems that they decide to address are calls they get…and they've got an answering machine that they pick up.

So they operate almost independently of the other. Well, there's nobody who's supervising in that situation. I mean, you can say I'm the lieutenant or the sergeant in that area, but I don't know when you're working.

And our paths may cross, and I'll get a little summary of what you've been doing; but in terms of you seeing me on any regular basis, it's very [infrequent].…I think from the point of view of potential corruption or abuses or whatever, that scares the hell out of me if I'm a police chief, to have these potentially 70 independent agents out solving what they think are problems [and] drawing on whatever resources they can command.

…And it's just one of those areas in community policing that, I think, [those] departments that are committed to [community policing will] have to struggle with as to how we control it, how do we supervise it, how we manage it.

Professor Slocum agreed that "the difficulty with this corruption aspect is they're independent agents, and that's conducive to corruption, [which] makes it the…least detectable kind of abuse."

This change in management style and internal department dynamics leads to another area of concern for police departments in implementing the community-policing model—selection and training of sergeants. The role of the sergeant under community policing has changed in terms of responsibility and authority. Commissioner Frazier pondered:

> It almost makes me wonder if we needn't redesign how we select sergeants. I mean, if we have selected sergeants traditionally to get one kind and now we need to get a different kind of result, [then] maybe the format we use, the way we weight the exams, the questions we ask, the answers that we're looking for need to change to select sergeants.…[N]ow that the lieutenant's not the bad guy anymore, the lieutenant has 24-hour-a-day responsibility, the sergeant has to be the disciplinarian, and maybe we've not selected correctly or trained correctly.

Chief Sanders agreed that the old training is no longer effective:

> I think you train the same way, but I don't think we follow up. You train in the traditional role. And then we're saying [that] we want you to be flexible. We want you to work with the community. We want you to be a team member with these officers. We want you to coach them. We want you to work on team projects. So [with] the training they've just received as a brand-new sergeant, we're saying…just keep that in the back of your mind, but what we really want you to do are all [of] these things.

Chief Sanders explained:

> We reduced the span of control from one sergeant [for] 10 to 12 officers down to one sergeant [for] six officers, thinking that they could better direct the activities, better coach, better be a part of it. And what we're finding is [that] they don't know what to do now. We removed the role of just evaluating, looking at journals, adding numbers. …Instead, we said you're a part of that team now; you have to direct it.…We gave 40 hours of community policing training, 40 hours of problem-solving training…but we neglected the supervision part.

The Impact of Community Demands and Expectations

Community policing stresses the need to establish partnerships with the community to identify neighborhood problems and to formulate solutions. The tasks that community-policing officers are asked to address can range from crime prevention techniques to crime control strategies. An important key to this police–community relationship is the idea that different neighborhoods require different police services. Therefore, community policing is a flexible model designed to change with each community the police department serves.

The differences that are acknowledged to exist from neighborhood to neighborhood will also be reflected in the community's expectations of its neighborhood officers. What is expected of an officer in the inner

"We gave 40 hours of community policing training, 40 hours of problem-solving training… but we neglected the supervision part."

city may not be expected of an officer in a suburban area. In addition, what the community views as acceptable police behavior will also vary across communities.

Chief Oliver spoke thoughtfully about the negotiated relationship between the police and the local community they serve:

> I think, at least from a practitioner's standpoint, that community policing implies—authorizes, I think, in a way police departments as a whole, and then as individuals—to negotiate a certain relationship with the community.

> It's a localized relationship with the community they serve. And they negotiate the expectations, some of which we have talked about here, the expectations of how police officers will behave, how much force they will use, where they will appear, the kinds of programs they'll be involved in.

> That's what community policing in my mind is. It's a negotiation—an ongoing negotiation and conversation [between] a community and its police department. And part of, I think, the glaringness of the abuses that we've talked about has to do with—in the context of community policing—[the fact that they] are so far out of the negotiated relationship that that police department and that community thought they had.

Chief Oliver suggested that when the community has been involved in "negotiated expectations," an incident like the Abner Louima case is even worse.

As the relationships and expectations vary between communities, so do the demands of community members on the police. In

high-crime neighborhoods where the community mobilizes to drive the criminals out, residents may demand swifter and stronger action by the police than they would in a neighborhood with a lower crime rate. These community demands may influence not only the behavior of the police in that neighborhood, but also the residents' perception of this conduct. Indeed, as Professor Klockars suggested, and as Professor Mastrofski affirmed, residents may ask the police to engage in what the police know is illegal activity—to use excessive force, to violate rights—and this may be a particular problem for community policing:

> (Klockars) [S]ome proportion of force is…in response to demands for it from the community.…The community says we want this problem fixed. And the community may apply real pressures on the police to use excessive means to achieve that.

> (Mastrofski) They do all the time.

> (Klockars) All the time. And may be uniquely a problem in community policing where that voice of the community becomes pretty strong.

Director Pugh thought that the police could resist these pressures: "Well you can't succumb to that. That just causes you major problems."

Professor Klockars emphasized the point: "But just don't misrepresent the problem; force is something that police officers are just generating. That there's a demand for excessive force from the communities is all I'm saying, too, in many cases."

These community demands, however, are not limited to implementation of stronger

"That's what community policing…is. It's a negotiation—an ongoing negotiation and conversation [between] a community and its police department."

crime-control tactics and a tougher stance by the police. With this community–police relationship, the community relies on the police to solve a broader range of problems, problems that have traditionally been outside of the realm of police work. This reliance on the police to solve a more varied set of neighborhood problems implies that society is vesting more authority in the police. The more authority the police are given, the greater the likelihood for abuse. Chief Sanders spoke of the increasing pressures on the police "to lead every effort," and Professor Klockars pointed out that "the more broadly you extend the scope of police responsibility and authority, the more occasions there are for the potential abuse of that."

As Chief Sanders put it:

[I]t's to the point now where everybody looks to the police to lead every effort, it seems like, because we seem to be the most effective in doing it.

When we make a mistake,…we're held to a much stricter standard than corporations. We're probably the least educated, the least funded to really know how to do all of these issues well. And yet we're held to a much higher standard.

And our officers are being tested every day with incredible challenges. I mean, when I was out on the street it was a pretty easy job. You got 10 numbers a day. And you stayed out of trouble. And you were rated as an excellent cop.

Our cops don't have that luxury today of having quotas anymore. We make them do all sorts of things. And every-

body is looking to them to lead every effort, whether it has anything to do with policing or not.

You know,…the problem with expansion of community policing is that we're more effective. There's more demand. And we're being placed in arenas that we just have no business being in.

And it's awfully hard for police departments to say no because we traditionally made our power base by doing more and more and more so that we got more cops and more funding and all of that. And the challenge, though, is what you talked about here.

And that's the reason I've been sitting here trying to figure out how you incorporate some of the ideas that we've talked about in here in the policy for police departments.

And it's very easy to sit around the table and listen to academics talk about the issues. I just hope you appreciate how difficult it is to turn that into concrete policy for our cops.

…[Y]our message has to be extremely clear when you send out directions to your officers because they will take it literally, especially if they don't like your directions.

The Closer Community–Police Relationship and the Potential for Corruption

In discussing the effects of community policing on abuses of authority, several participants raised the concern that the close relationship established between the community and police could increase the potential for corrupt behavior. Professor

"…[T]he problem with …community policing is that we're more effective. There's more demand. And we're being placed in arenas that we just have no business being in."

Klockars reminded the group that the professional policing model that is being rejected in favor of community policing was put into place precisely in order to prevent corruption:

> Let's keep in mind that all of the things we've tried to move away from in incident-driven policing and the old professional-model policing were originally put in to control corruption, to control abuses. And as we back away from them and move to community models, I suspect that we introduce a whole new set of problems.

Commissioner Frazier expressed concern that the emphasis on developing relationships is an invitation for misbehavior and for undue influence by community members:

> One of the things that troubles me about community policing is you talk about establishing relationships. The longer the relationship exists, I think the more opportunity for corruption.

> Let's say that your neighborhood services officer has been in a neighborhood for X number of years. And just as a departmental response, we say that these assignments are limited.

> And now the very communities that you have sent this officer out to develop a relationship with will come to me and then to all the political entities at every level to try to influence the assignment process inside. So that's going to come down the line.

> And you have to see a balance of relationship versus opportunity for misbehavior.

"…[A]ll of the things we've tried to move away from in… professional-model policing were originally …to control corruption, to control abuses."

The concern about abuse of authority under community policing that was expressed by the panelists focused on the potential for corruption that arises under the community-policing model. None indicated a concern about increased incidents of police brutality under community policing. Director Pugh suggested that excessive force comes from officers who are frustrated because they are not part of a "glamorous community-policing unit":

> A lot of the excessive force [is] not coming from the individuals assigned to community policing. [It's] coming from the individuals who are frustrated, who feel that they're not a part of that glamorous community-policing unit that gets all of the praise for everything that's done that's successful in the police department.

> So that mobile unit, that unit that handles the calls for the department, they feel that they're isolated in the unit in another arena. And the community suffers for that.

The types of corruption that result from this relationship with the community usually take the form of officers accepting gratuities, discounts, and other similar gifts from community residents and businesses in their area. Participants illustrated a number of examples of the situations that can arise; a central theme in these examples is the complexity of the issue and the difficulty of establishing standards for what is abuse of authority. As Professor Klockars put it:

> Maybe it just is different in different places and you have people…articulating different points of view on how

to do this. You know, there's the police foundation solution. There's the one that says we want these community partnerships. The other one says we'll have these community partnerships, but there can be no financial component to it. I mean, we don't want our communities to be buying our bike patrol officers bikes. If they need bikes, we'll buy them out of the general fund. You know, there's all sorts of different views.

Director Pugh suggested that some community members tried to buy bikes for specific officers in hopes of keeping those officers on their beat:

> One of the things that they're starting to do, which we have to—well, I have to stop immediately. They weren't attempting only to buy the bicycle; they were buying it for Officer Jones. They could guarantee that Officer Jones would stay there.

Professor Klockars pointed to the irony of some situations: "So if you run a McDonald's and you give a cop a free meal, that's corruption. But if you give a whole booth, that's community policing."

Director Pugh pointed to the complexity:

> The officers don't feel that there's a problem with accepting a sandwich or coffee, or I can recall where they would have a cookout, businesses, for the officers from the community-policing unit assigned. And they would feed them all.

Mr. Williams also suggested how complicated questions of corruption can become under community policing:

I wonder whether or not in an era of community-oriented policing it is important to look at the issues of motive and not merely look at questions of when you, in fact, cross over the line. Let me give an example.

> Let's assume that a young police officer comes on the job. He's walking the beat. He goes in. He orders a slice of pizza. He puts his money down to pay for the pizza. The owner says, "No. I don't take money from police officers. Here. Take this back."

> And the officer says, "No, no, no. I always pay. Take the money." And it ends up getting into almost a fight, you know. I'm telling you because I experienced this situation.

> Is that corruption? I mean, you have to fight this guy to make him take the money. You know? And you're telling the cops now, "We want you to establish contacts and work with the neighborhood, develop relationships, and stuff like that."

> I think this issue, this corruption issue, is very complex.

Professor Martinez offered another example:

> As another example, there is a favorite cigar shop that some of the detectives in Miami go to and get discounts. Sometimes I go with them, and I get discounts too.

> I asked the shopkeeper why about this discount. His response had very little to do with maintaining a relationship with these specific officers, but what

"…[I]n an era of community… policing it is important to look at the …motive and not merely …questions of when you… cross over the line."

he wanted was for the local bad guys to see the cars going in and out, maintaining a presence in that area. And that was his motivation to let the other people know in the community, "Hey, I have people coming in on a regular basis. Don't rob me during the day. Don't burglarize my shop at night."

Professor Klockars described the formalized nature of police discounts in one business establishment:

Anybody who is interested can come to Delaware to Dunkin' Donuts, the doughnut shops. On the register, they've got a list of prices that faces back to the person who operates the cash register. And then next to that, there's a column that says, "Police." And they're all half.

…[T]hat's just the policy. They like the cops coming in and out for extra security, and they want to be able to call on them when there's a problem.

One concern that emerged was the motive of the police officers involved in any incident of misconduct, as well as the motive of the citizen or business that provides "gratuities" to an officer in the community. This consideration of motive was seen as increasingly important as many police departments move toward the implementation of community policing.

Participants recognized that this type of behavior (i.e., businesses giving free or discounted meals to officers, etc.) had been going on before the implementation of community policing, but as Chief Sanders pointed out, "It's just more subtle now than it was before." Also, the consequences of not accepting gratuities can be greater in

"…[D]o you allow your officers to go out for a big …event that's a combined thing with the community and…solicit hot dogs and hot dog buns?"

terms of alienating members of the community with whom the police are trying to establish a working relationship under the philosophy of community policing.

We have gone to an establishment that had a police key, which was half-price. We went out and said, "If you don't stop doing that, we will forbid our officers to eat here."

I mean, we've had to do it with …several places. But that happened before community policing. It's happening now. I think…the issues now are so much more subtle. I mean it's: Do you participate in, like you said, a business or group of business people showing appreciation to all, perhaps?

It's a much more subtle thing. Or do you allow your officers to go out for a big community event that's a combined thing with the community and go out and solicit hot dogs and hot dog buns…? And do you allow them to take that?

I mean, what business feels like they can say no to cops [who] come in and say,…"We need 500 hot dogs for the community social on a Friday"? And that's difficult for cops because they're trying to do their part to increase togetherness in the community.…

I mean, I think it's just much more subtle now than it was before. And it's hard to talk in those shades because the officers get invited to dinner at people's houses because they create friendships.

The friendships are created, which is what we're trying to do. And when is it not? And when is it a gratuity to go into a friend's business and get a cup

of coffee, and when is it not? I mean, I just think these are really difficult issues not only for the police officers but also for police management.

Where do we draw the line? Is it, as O. W. Wilson said, "The first cup of coffee you take for free is the start of corruption," or is it [that] we need to be a little bit more understanding about the motives that we're talking about?

Professor Skolnick spoke about the motives involved:

Businessmen have a motive for developing a category that will allow them to make a profit so that they have these places being used because there's a general overhead.

And that's what I'm saying why motives get to be very complicated. The question is whether rational economic motives apply to the police in the same way. And in some ways they do, and in some ways they don't.

I mean, it's rational to give a category of persons a break because you want to do more business and the more business you do, the more your general costs are covered.

[Yet,] you want to give police a break because you want services from the police. And one of the services may be merely appearance. [B]ut then you have the other appearance problem of the free hot dog, which then people don't understand this and don't see it as ethical.

I guess the bottom line is [that] I don't think you can get into these larger ethical questions. I don't think that's the issue.

Mr. Williams addressed the issue as follows:

So [with] this issue of corruption, I think maybe we have to be careful about how we try and frame this thing. [We have to] recognize the complexity and the subtlety associated with it in this community. When we had the old traditional style of policing, we could say to the cop, "Here's what you do." He's dispassionate and he's distant.

Now you want him to be close to the people he's servicing. You want him to establish relationships. You want him to formulate partnerships.

In summary, the implementation of community policing has far-reaching effects on police departments that go beyond how police services are rendered to the community. Participants suggested that several aspects of the community-oriented policing model and its implementation, both internal and external, may increase the opportunity for, and thus the likelihood of, abuse of authority.

The internal factors are the increased use of civil law and procedures to address crime problems, and the new role of sergeants and lieutenants under the community-policing model. Both factors affect officer behavior, and participants voiced concern that each may increase the opportunity for abuse of authority. Participants debated whether the new tools that the civil law provides will expand authority, and thus potential abuse, or will refine police actions and, therefore, reduce potential abuse. Supervision problems include the lack of training for new roles and relationships, the sergeants becoming too close to the officers they supervise, and the lieutenants becoming too removed.

Supervision problems include the lack of training for new roles and relationships, the sergeants becoming too close to the officers they supervise, and the lieutenants becoming too removed.

External factors and concerns relate to the relationship between the community and the police, which is critical to community policing. This relationship can lead to increased demands and expectations by the community, which may pressure officers into using excessive means to address the community's problems. Also, the close nature of this police partnership with the community creates increased opportunities and pressures for officers to engage in some forms of corrupt conduct. Despite these concerns, it was suggested that if police managers were able to take steps to address the potential problems that may result from implementation of community policing, this policing style could improve community relations and benefit police departments.

Finally, Chief Sanders expressed what was probably a consensus position when he said, "The departments that have the corruptive influence under the other style of policing are the ones who are going to be the most susceptible under the community-style policing."

Societal Factors That Affect Abuse of Authority

This section of the meeting moved away from the structure of policing and its relationship to police authority to a discussion of other societal factors that may affect abuse of police authority, issues such as perception and reality of the role of race, ethnicity, and social status. These factors are of increasing concern in an increasingly multicultural society. Several surveys have shown that racial minorities perceive the problem of violation of rights by police as being much greater than the white community does. This difference suggests that examining societal factors is a relevant and important segment of a study of abuse of police authority. Are these differences misperceptions or do they reflect reality?

Participants were asked what their thoughts are on this issue, whether or not the public's perceptions are accurate, and whether different styles of policing are more relevant in an examination of these societal factors. The panelists' responses covered a wide array of topics. In some instances, their comments addressed the issue of race and the effects of race on police–citizen interactions. However, their responses also addressed the effects of different communities' income levels on citizen perception and police behavior, and the effects of neighborhood crime rates on police and policing strategies.

Incivility and Cultural Differences as Influences on Abuse of Authority

Throughout the day, the effect of citizen misperceptions of police and the effect these mistaken views have on police–citizen interactions arose in the discussion. Participants noted that many instances of police abuse of authority result from a negative interaction with a suspect or offender. In other words, police officers do not go out looking to abuse an individual, but rather the abuse is a response to a "bad" attitude by the citizen, and it takes the form of discourtesy or disrespect toward the police.

Professor Mastrofski offered the following observations, which he based on a recent departmental study:

> We found in this particular city that the rate of incivility or discourtesy…coming

"The departments that have the corruptive influence under the other style of policing are the ones who are going to be the most susceptible under the community-style policing."

from citizens was far higher than was coming from police.… The factor was about five to one for African-American citizens, [which was] much higher than the other groups in terms of acting in a discourteous fashion toward the police. The police rate was much lower. We also looked at who acted discourteously first.…[I]nitially the police initiated discourtesy quite rarely,…but they will retaliate. [And] that is fair. So what comes from this particular department is a fairly professional response. And that is a very human thing when you get dissed to respond in a similar fashion. So there are a lot of ways of looking at it. Every instance of discourtesy by a police officer is bad PR and bad policing, but not unexpected in a human kind of thing.

An interesting discussion took place about the effect of the cultural differences that may exist between the officers and the citizens they come into contact with. Some felt that these cultural differences may result in the officer's perceiving an individual as antagonistic or uncivil. Mr. Williams suggested:

> One of the things that we've got is [that] often we don't understand the language that's being communicated. And we're communicating in different ways. That's why you heard all this talk at some point about ebonics because of the linguistics.

> …I think that it would be interesting to see…how [African Americans] see themselves in terms of reacting to certain kinds of things. What do they call themselves? Do they see themselves as being uncivil? Do they see themselves as being unfriendly to the officer, or is

there something else going on there that maybe we don't really understand?

> Maybe the cop is looking at it as "this guy is not showing me respect." And maybe the person in the community, the environment where he communicates, is showing him all the respect that he could possibly be giving him.

The discussion of the role of cultural difference was not limited to racial differences. Some emphasized the environmental and background differences between officers and citizens that result in misunderstandings. Professor Skolnick suggested, "[Y]ou can take a 22-year-old kid, and you put that kid in Bedford-Stuyvesant, and he's grown up in a New Jersey suburb. He's scared to death, a white kid who is a cop. He doesn't know quite how to act."

Chief Oliver noted:

> I come from a city that is not typical of what you are describing. This is a city where there's an awful lot of African-American officers [who] are working predominantly in African-American areas. And we are faced with some of the same situations.

> In many cases, the officers came from the neighborhood and…speak the same language, understand the nuances of what people are saying and how they say it to them. We're still having some difficulty.

> If there's more to it than that, I really would like to get at that. I think it's fairly superficial just to say that it's a white [or] black [thing]. It's people [who] didn't grow up in the area, that kind of thing. There are a lot of other dynamics, a lot of other variables going on

"Maybe the cop is looking at it as 'this guy is not showing me respect.' And maybe the person in the community… is showing him all the respect that he could possibly be giving him."

here about authority and about the way people are alienated and disenfranchised.

…So there's a lot more to it than just a white person [who] did not grow up in there. There are some serious other issues going on here, even intraracial issues that have nothing to do with color. It has to do with culture.

"There are some serious …issues going on here, even intraracial issues that have nothing to do with color. It has to do with culture."

The Effect of Race on Police—Citizen Interactions

Although the effect of cultural or environmental differences on police and citizen interactions may explain some incidents of police abuse of authority, the effect of race on police behavior was also addressed by the participants. Recent court rulings on the police practice of "profiling" are a clear example of the impact of race on police practices and individual officer behavior. It was suggested that the effect of race on police behavior goes further than merely the use of profiles to target certain groups of citizens. Race reaches into and affects the daily interactions between officer and citizen. As Professor Slocum described his own experience:

[Chief Oliver's] point when he said he can take people who are black, born in the community, raised [in the] nuances of the language, [and] put them in that position, [then] he got the same conflict he has for whites out there.

My whole life experience is I'm sitting here saying this is not theory for me.

…I'm driving down a highway 90 miles an hour. And I pass two state troopers who were like talking.…

I see a guy pull out. I know he's coming. He roars. He doesn't turn the light on. What is he doing? He drives past me at 100 miles an hour. But he looks at me to see who I am. He looks first. And then he slowed down, pulled in behind me, turned the red light on.

And then when he pulled me over, I bad-mouthed him. I told him, "Well, you didn't like what you saw."

And he looked at me, and said, "Well, you're okay, man."

"No, no, no, no, no. Why didn't you turn the light on when you first saw me speed by you?" I asked him. And he never gave me a ticket, and he let me go. And I did bad-mouth him, told him he was an incompetent police officer. I did.

Well, see, let me tell you this. I had assumed I was going to get the ticket. But I was more aggravated because in my mind's eye…[h]e said, "Speeding isn't the violation. It's you, who you are, who would go by me and speed. And I have to see who you are first." And when I told him that, he knew I had told him the truth, and it paralyzed him. It's true.

Professor Mastrofski offered some results from a study:

It is more complicated than that. We actually have data on Richmond that we collected in '92. One of the things we looked at was whether the citizen complied when the police said, "Quit being disorderly. Leave somebody alone. Don't bother them. Leave the scene," or "Stop doing something illegal."

One of the things we looked at was the appearance of the race of the officer and the race of the citizen. And sometimes what you get is not necessarily what you expect because we've been talking about the likelihood that the African-American citizen will rebel against the white officer.

In Richmond, we found that that combination was the most likely to be [a] white officer [and an] African-American citizen. And, not unexpectedly, the combination that was least likely to secure compliance was an African-American officer [and a] white citizen.

I'm trying to remember the comparison of like race. I believe it was the case that basically there was no difference between an African-American officer, [with an] African-American citizen and [a] white officer [with a] white citizen at the extremes.

High-Crime Areas and Officer Perceptions and Behavior

The topic of neighborhoods with high-crime rates led to [a] heated discussion among the panelists. One opinion expressed was that—because many minority citizens reside in low-income, high-crime areas in cities—acts by the police that appear to be racially motivated may, in fact, be a response that can be attributed to the high-crime rate in that neighborhood. Professor Klockars suggested:

One of the consequences of living in a crime-ridden neighborhood is that police, rightfully so, are going to interfere in your life very often.

When they get a call [that] there's a black male walking hurriedly down the street and there's been a robbery, if you happen to be a black male, you're going to be stopped. It's not racist activity. It's simply one of the prices you pay for living in a high-crime area.

This idea led to discussion over whether or not this type of police action was indeed fair. Mr. Williams suggested, "Well, what if you don't have much of a choice, you're poor?…It's the only place you can live.…So you end up being subjected to a kind of harassment without your having done anything improper or illegal."

The panel disagreed over whether citizens residing in high-crime areas should view these frequent contacts with police as a consequence of living in that neighborhood and not as harassment, inappropriate behavior, or abuse of authority. Professor Klockars suggested that it is critical that police attempt to communicate to citizens the reasons behind their actions and to apologize:

In those circumstances, it's absolutely critical that police explain why they stopped you. And there are lots of things you can do to repair that.…

[W]hat we have to do is train police to apologize, to explain why it was necessary for me to stop you, but you can't say to them, "Don't stop people in that neighborhood."

The Effect of Neighborhood Income Levels on Interactions with Police

The correlation between income level and interactions with police was initially raised by Professor Skolnick. He argued that

The panel disagreed …whether citizens residing in high-crime areas should view…frequent contacts with police as a consequence of living in that neighborhood and not as harassment….

varying types of enforcement strategies affect poor people more than the middle and upper classes, and, as a result, affect minority groups because of the high correlation between racial minority and poverty. He described his experiences observing police behavior in New York City, where there has been a growing emphasis on implementing enforcement strategies focused on quality-of-life crimes:

> [T]his comes from some observations: A young man is drinking beer on a hot night on 170th Street and lives in an apartment that's not air-conditioned. He is stopped by the police. Now, the next thing that happens is he's asked for his ID. People walk downstairs, and they don't necessarily carry their IDs in their wallets with them.

> He's been arrested. Okay? Now this is all following the pattern. You know, there's no…"racial animus" here.

> [I]f you don't have your ID, you're going to be arrested. If you're going to be arrested, then you're going to be handcuffed and you're going to be searched. This is going to happen more on 170th Street than it is on 70th Street, where people live in air-conditioned apartments.

> So one of the things that happens in a place like New York is that poor people live more of their lives on the street. And because they live more of their lives on the street, they are going to be engaged in minor violations.…

> So I think there's no question that this kind of enforcement has [an] impact [on] people who are poor essentially. And there's a high correlation between race

and poverty in most places, and certainly in New York.

This type of zero-tolerance strategy has a greater impact on people with low income because, as Professor Klockars put it, "Poor people commit more minor offenses," offenses that are characterized as quality-of-life crimes. But is this abuse of authority? Is an enforcement strategy that seeks to place limitations on acceptable behavior in public areas an abuse of police authority simply because it will have a greater, and perhaps a more negative, effect on a certain group of citizens? Professor Mastrofski suggested:

> It depends on whether you're talking about infringement of offenders' freedoms and selectively doing that, or whether you're talking about a community that because there are so many people who have need of using public space makes it all the more compelling to regulate behavior in those public spaces.

The community's perception may sometimes be that the enforcement policy is selectively applied and thus is an abuse of police authority. This perception may exist because residents do not believe the behavior that a zero-tolerance policy targets is a problem or is related to the larger crime issues in that neighborhood. Working with each neighborhood to identify problems and to formulate solutions may limit this perception, as Chief Sanders suggested:

> I think the issue, though, is that what we have found in working with partnerships with[in] communities in asking what their priorities are, instead of

"…[T]his kind of enforcement has [an] impact [on] people who are poor.… And there's a high correlation between race and poverty in most places.…"

us coming in and saying, "This is our priority," is that we have a lot of officers who grow up in an area where they've never seen anybody drink on the street [or] drink outside of a liquor store. They thought that's what the problem was.

When they go in and ask communities what the priorities are, it almost never is those types of things because that's just a custom in the neighborhood. They'll talk about other issues that are more important to them.

And I think that's what the problem of community policing is: actually working on issues that the neighborhood agrees are a priority, instead of cops coming in and saying, "This is unsightly. This doesn't fit the mold for the last area that I worked in," or "I think that this is a crime generator." The people in the community know that it's not…. It's their father out there; it's their cousin; it's whoever.

And I think that's where we're going to have to start making those inroads and where we get the community's priorities, instead of [having] us overlaying ours on top of them and deciding we're going to enforce in a certain way.

And that's the only way we're going to be able to do it.…Otherwise it's always going to be on the racial side because that's what the majority of the police departments are going to see as a problem because it doesn't look like where they grew up.

Professor Manning suggested that zero-tolerance policies regularly reflect middle-class interests and not the interests of the people in the community at which they are directed:

> When you look at it, you see what is being done in the name of zero tolerance. Well, that's not because it's soliciting community police people to find out what the neighbors want. But it's what the real estate people want and the private property owners and others who want the business districts to live [and] thrive.
>
> So it's not a reflection on community interests. And every one of the examples of zero tolerance is about lower-class interventions and lower-class activities in a public area that interfaces with the middle class.

In summary, the discussion suggested the importance of considering a wide range of societal factors, such as income, race, crime rates, cultural differences, and even personal attitudes of individuals, when examining influences on police abuse of authority. Also evident from the discussion is the complexity of evaluating the real impact of those factors on police and citizen behavior.

Citizens' perceptions of the police will likely influence the manner in which they interact with an officer. These perceptions are formed and influenced by many factors. Police must also consider such factors when they interact with citizens. For example, when aggressive policing policies such as zero tolerance are implemented in a department, the enforcement of such policies will have more of an impact on lower-income citizens. This increased contact with police for minor violations of the law may result in more negative perceptions. Such

"…[T]hat's what… community policing is: …working on issues that the neighborhood agrees are a priority, instead of cops coming in and saying, 'This is unsightly."

interactions may be viewed by some community residents as abuses of authority because the police are focusing on behavior not perceived as problematic by the community. Another important factor that was discussed was the impact of race on police practice. Participants debated whether this factor manifests itself through a combination of cultural differences and bias, or whether each of these concepts singularly influences abuse of authority.

Possible Solutions:
Promoting "Good Policing"

In this section of the meeting, panelists were asked to identify policies and practices that departments may implement to promote better standards of policing among officers. The participants approached this topic by attempting to determine how to reduce, and ultimately prevent, varying types of police abuse of authority. They agreed that the best way to achieve this goal would be to address policies that would serve to alter the mentality of police officers. To change the way police officers think, departments would have to focus on three areas: training, professional standards, and means of reward and recognition.

Particpants suggested that departmental policies and practices that emphasize the positive may serve as better deterrents to abuse of authority by officers than merely implementing more stringent types of discipline for misconduct. Three positive policies or practices were: (1) training and encouraging officers to do "good" policing, (2) establishing high standards of professional excellence, and (3) recognizing and rewarding the efforts of officers for a job

To change the way police officers think, departments would have to focus on three areas: training, professional standards, and means of reward and recognition.

well done. The panelists also suggested that raising the age of recruitment may be beneficial. We will address the issue of age first.

Participants suggested there is a relationship between the age at which officers are hired, their behavior, and their subsequent abuse of authority. Some police departments have begun to hire older individuals because they bring greater maturity and life experience to the job. The premise is that this increased maturity and life experience will improve the level of policing and perhaps reduce abuses of authority. Chief Oliver stated, "That's what we're doing, 20 to 30, as opposed to 20."

Chief Sanders remarked about hiring a 22-year-old: "You know, you give him the best training you can, the best supervision. You've still got a 22-year-old with a gun and a fast car." As he elaborated:

> Yes. We're in there even older. Our average is about 26 or 27 because what you're getting is people who have had some life experience.

> I shudder to think. I joined when I was 22, and I don't think I quite caught up to the job until I was in my mid 20s or late 20s. It's all of our, the police chiefs', nightmares to have a 22-year-old with a gun and a fast car and red lights out there.

> You know, you give him the best training you can, the best supervision. You've still got a 22-year-old with a gun and a fast car.

Professor Manning concurred:

> [I]t seems to me that people who are a little more advanced in life with more

life experiences might have a deeper commitment to ethical values, for want of a better term, might be better able to resist some of the temptations that they confront on the job so that who they are is better established. And it has been reflected in what they do and ideally is more compatible with what the community expects.

And so did Professor Klockars:

> I would have answered that the opposite theory applies. That is, they are more balanced and less extreme than the 21-year-old, for whom the world is much simpler. The more life experience you have, the more complicated the world becomes and, hopefully, the more restraint you can show.

> So…the one who scares me is the one who joins as a police recruit at age 17, hears all these old stories, lives inside the police world, and then goes on to become a policeman. This guy has never talked to real people, just police, or crime control. [He thinks] the community is divided between the good people and the evil people and all of those kinds of things.

> I mean, you put me out. I start working in a factory. I begin to understand that there [are] all sorts of different people in this world. And they have troubles, and I've had the same troubles. And maybe I come to it with a little bit more maturity at 25 than I do at 22.

Cultivating "Good Policing" Skills
The panelists agreed that training and encouraging officers to be "good" officers rather than how not to be "bad" officers

was a priority for police departments. Officers should have the necessary skills and tools to be "good" officers instilled in them from the start. As Professor Worden put it, "If they have a wider range of tools that they can apply in a somewhat more surgical fashion to the problems that they confront, they may be less likely to abuse their authority."

Professor Klockars went on:

> [T]here has to be a cultivation of police skill that motivates a police officer to use those things with restraint or with precision. That is, [officers should not] settle for behavior [they] can get away with without violating the criminal or civil law, but [you should have] a standard of good police work that you want cops to aspire to.

> And we can all point to cops [whom] we know can take a riot and calm it down, and turn any domestic into a riot. And that is an issue not of the law—the criminal law or the civil law—but of the skill of competent policing.

> And what you end up trying to do…is you try to encourage police officers to become skilled police officers, to learn how to handle incidents without making it worse than when you came there.

Standards of "Good Policing"
The policies of a police department reflect the standards of behavior for the officers serving in that department. To identify what is "good" policing and what is "bad" policing, one must look to the standards and boundaries of behavior set forth by the department in its policies. When the

"…[O]fficers should not] settle for behavior [they] can get away with without violating the…law, but…should have] a standard of good police work…to aspire to."

discussion turned to this issue, Mr. Williams noted, "The law defines the outer parameters [of police authority and behavior], but policy defines the boundaries." The importance of departmental policy as a factor in examining abuse of police authority, or conversely "good" policing, was acknowledged by several of the participants.

In conjunction with this concept of departmental policy as a means of establishing a standard of behavior is the role of the supervisor in enforcing these standards. "[T]here's a presumption in the…discussions I've heard so far that the supervisor plays an important role in the regulation of police behavior. And presumably, that good supervision means that you're going to have a lot less behavior outside the bounds of [departmental policy]" (Professor Mastrofski).

As Professor Worden put it:

> The notion that we could impose something other than, and perhaps higher than, a legal standard, some standard of…professional competence or craftsmanship, if you will. [And] it's not just supervision; it's also management.

> But conceive of the problem as not simply taking steps to detect abuses of authority and sanction abuses of authority, but more positively to and affirmatively to establish standards of professional or competent policing. We may, at the same time, do as much to stem bad policing if…we said this is the way to do a good job. [Then] we may make it less likely that officers do a bad job [because] I suspect that many of the officers who engage in these abuses of authority are not fundamentally bad

"…[W]e could impose something other than, and perhaps higher than, a legal standard, some standard of…professional competence or craftsmanship.…"

people looking to act in bad ways. [However, they] may need some guidance and constructive support and so forth.

Methods of Rewards and Recognition
Commissioner Frazier suggested, "A promotion is a reward," and this is true in the majority of police departments. Promotion to a higher rank has always been a traditional means of reward and recognition at the departmental level. Commissioner Frazier suggested adapting the promotion system to "fit" the kind of officer whom the department wishes to reward. This is done by tailoring questions for the oral examination to the specific officer's work experience, such as with the Police Athletic League facility.

However, others noted that promotions are not available to all officers. In these instances, a less formal means of recognition for an officer who is doing a good job may be even more meaningful and appropriate than a promotion. Professor Worden suggested that sometimes having a supervisor simply take notice of an officer who is doing a good job and letting that officer know that his or her work and effort is recognized (an "attaboy") can improve morale. Professor Worden suggested:

> …[S]ometimes when I talk to police officers in my classes, they say, "Yeah, you know, just an attaboy makes me feel good, makes me feel like I've done a good job."

> And I'm not sure whether we haven't underestimated the value of just commendations, being held up as someone whose work might be emulated. That might be a part of being a coach and a mentor,…that is, identifying

officers who are doing what you want them to do.

[We should] not only prais[e] them, but hold…them up for others as role models to follow, which might, ultimately, affect the culture of the organization.

This informal, frequent recognition of exemplary police work not only rewards the officer who is being recognized but also serves to reinforce the high standards of professional behavior that a department encourages its officers to achieve.

In addition to the rewards mentioned, police chiefs were curious about what methods of reward rank-and-file officers would consider to be satisfactory. They suggested that the national survey or the upcoming rank-and-file and supervisory focus groups address this issue, and that the chiefs be informed of the officers' responses in order to consider the officers' suggestions for implementation.

Deterrence of abuse of authority may not be achieved solely through rigorous enforcement of departmental policy or through harsher disciplinary measures for the violation of such regulations, but also by cultivating "good" policing skills in officers, by instituting a higher standard of professional conduct, and by providing positive reinforcement for exemplary conduct.

At the training level, officers need to be provided with the necessary tools to carry out their responsibilities. If they are not, one should not be surprised when officers resort to relying only on their authority to arrest, even when this approach may not be the most effective solution to a problem. As Professor Worden said, "There might be other approaches if you have other tools. And if the tool is the civil law, providing that you are trained and learn how to use that properly, then that might expand [the officers'] range of options."

In addition to the provision of more extensive training, it was suggested that departments consider establishing a higher standard of professional conduct than is dictated by the law. Encouraging officers to achieve a higher standard of conduct and professionalism may decrease the likelihood of officers abusing their authority and engaging in misconduct. Making policy changes that address prevention of abuses of authority and misconduct is a task that falls on the department administrators and managers. However, simply establishing a higher standard of professionalism is not enough. This standard must be effectively reinforced through adequate recognition and reward by midlevel superiors.

These line superiors have the most contact with rank-and-file officers on a daily basis; therefore, these supervisors must be diligent in their efforts to positively reinforce this standard of conduct in their officers. Supervisors should make all efforts to acknowledge exemplary conduct, "that is, identifying officers who are doing what you want them to do, and not only praising them, but [also] holding them up for others as role models to follow" (Professor Worden). Reward and recognition, both formal (i.e., promotion) and informal (i.e., a slap on the back), are key elements in motivating officers to practice "good" policing.

The panelists agreed that this combination of training officers with the proper skills,

"Reward and recognition, both formal (i.e., promotion) and informal (i.e., a slap on the back), are key elements in motivating officers to practice 'good' policing."

encouraging officers to achieve a higher standard of excellence, and rewarding exemplary conduct should decrease the likelihood of officers abusing their authority or engaging in misconduct.

Also, to improve policing services and to reduce abuses of authority, departments are beginning to recruit slightly older individuals because they believe that people with more life experience may be better situated to exercise discretion effectively.

Conclusion

Most of the themes and questions raised by this group of police scholars and executives were addressed again in subsequent focus groups of rank-and-file police officers and police supervisors, with interesting similarities and differences. Many of their concerns and specific experiences were incorporated into the survey questions and were drawn on during the analysis and writing of the final report.

1. The quoted portions of this appendix have been edited sparingly to enhance readability while maintaining the speaker's voice.

APPENDIX C

REPORT ON FOCUS GROUP OF RANK-AND-FILE POLICE OFFICERS

OCTOBER 20–21, 1997

Rosann Greenspan

David Weisburd

Edwin E. Hamilton

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Rank-and-File Police Officers

C

RANK-AND-FILE POLICE OFFICERS

Introduction[1]

In selecting police departments for participation in the two panels of police officers—one of rank-and-file officers and one of supervisors—we established a set of criteria to guide the process. Our goal was to achieve representation from various types of departments, as characterized by their style of policing, with attention to size of community served and region of the country. We began by using our own expertise as well as by consulting several colleagues to develop a list of police departments that are particularly known for either community-oriented policing, problem-oriented policing, or traditional policing. As the list grew, we attempted to ensure that all regions of the country were represented. Having reviewed and refined the selections, we then categorized them by size of population served and region of the country. In this way, we derived a list of 24 departments, representative of all regions and sizes. Half were assigned to the rank-and-file group, and half to the supervisory group. In the end, 11 departments participated in the rank-and-file focus group, and another 11 departments participated in the focus group of supervisors.

To guide the participating police departments in selecting representatives to participate in the rank-and-file focus group, we provided the chiefs with a list of suggested criteria. We asked them to choose an officer with 5 to 10 years of experience. We asked departments that were selected for their orientation toward community- and problem-oriented policing to choose officers from those units. We asked departments that were selected for traditional policing to choose officers from specialized units such as narcotics or gangs who have considerable contact with community residents.

Eleven departments participated in the rank-and-file focus group....

The 11 officers from all regions of the country who participated in the rank-and-file focus group ranged in experience from 3 years to 15 years, with an average of 10 years of experience as police officers. As we requested, their assignments included community- or neighborhood-policing units, problem-oriented policing units, and gang and narcotics units.

The rank-and-file focus group was moderated by Rhoda Cohen, survey director for the project, under contract with the Police Foundation from Mathematica Policy Research, with the participation of Dr. Rosann Greenspan, Research Director, and Earl Hamilton and Kellie Bryant of the Research Division of the Police Foundation. The focus group met for two days: from 9:30 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. on October 20, 1997, and from 9:30 A.M. to 4:00 P.M. on October 21, 1997.

The officers discussed a range of topics with a set of questions to guide each topic. The broad categories included a definition of police authority, the nature of the problem and their concerns, the effect of community policing on the abuse of authority, the societal factors that affect police authority, the culture of policing, and what can be done. In addition, the officers pretested the first draft of the upcoming national survey. They provided valuable input by reviewing and reacting to each question in the first draft of the survey instrument and by making general and specific recommendations.

The participants worked hard, grappling with some of the most difficult and personal issues they face in policing. We were grateful for their thoughtful and frank conversation. We were surprised, as they were, by the degree of consensus among them on many different issues.

> *"…I am generally guided by my own sense of what is right and wrong…my own personal view of what is moral or immoral…"*

Defining Issues of Police Authority: What Is Professional Conduct?

To explore how contemporary police view the boundaries of police authority, we asked participants to discuss what they consider appropriate and inappropriate conduct in their exercise of authority. Their responses quickly turned to a thoughtful discussion of the sources of both the formal definition of good conduct and a personal sense of what is good conduct. One officer started off the conversation by again posing the question in different ways:

> What is professionalism? What are our expectations of ourselves? What is the expectation of the citizenry of the law enforcement agency that works on their behalf? [H]ow is it that we ought to act and behave? How is it that these things are appropriate or inappropriate, or right or wrong, or good or bad?

The officer answered that, for him, the definition of appropriate conduct begins with his own sense of right and wrong, but it does not end there:

> I think that I am generally guided by my own sense of what is right and wrong. In other words, my own personal view of what is moral or immoral, what's right and wrong….What becomes a challenge for me is how I behave in very difficult circumstances,… how I behave in cases where people hate me, [and] how I behave in cases where people want to kill me. So how do I keep from misbehaving? How do I keep from doing things that are wrong inherently, either morally or criminally? And so that is a huge challenge…on a daily basis, not just for the individual, but, I think, for the organization.

Another officer suggested that the source of the definition of acceptable and unacceptable behavior must be society and that the boundaries of appropriate conduct, therefore, change as society changes:

> I think that we as police officers are guided by what society says is acceptable and is not acceptable. Thirty years ago [in] law enforcement, certain actions were acceptable, where[as] today's society has decided that those things are not acceptable. As a result, …my definition of acceptable behavior is what society says the rules are for us. Twenty years from now, law enforcement will probably be different because society will have said that force can go this far—that professionalism means x, y, or z.

However, he agreed that one's personal standards were also relevant: "I think within that boundary, then we rely on our own personal moral and ethical ideas to define and guide that." That officer later modified his response: "I think when I said about society deciding what is acceptable, I think I didn't use a correct term. I think it's the community in which we live [that] decides that."

A third officer raised the interesting suggestion that society's standards are too low and that unless a higher, personal moral standard is applied, force will be exercised in effecting an arrest when it may be possible to use language to gain compliance:

> I think that society in general is taking a very dangerous trend in some of the things [that] are morally acceptable, some of the things that are socially acceptable.…

Society says that I can effect the amount of force necessary to effect the arrest. In other words, society has given me the green light to use some degree of physical force in order to control an individual. And I know that I can do that. And there may be something wanting me to do that [because] this individual has provoked me to some degree in which I have the option of exercising some force. But I know that if I can talk rationally to this individual and still gain compliance, then I should probably take that route or accept that as an alternative, as opposed to using some degree of physical force.

This comment turned the discussion to the participants' definitions of professional conduct. One officer suggested that key to professional conduct is treating each individual with respect:

> …[B]eing professional is about respect …whether you are talking to the president of the United States or whether you are talking to Joe the hobo.…Everybody has a story and [people have] their own shoes.…Just [as] I could in no way do what the president does, there is no way I could do what the hobo does. The hobo would teach me how to survive, just [as] the president could teach me a bunch of other things.

Picking up on the idea that attention must be paid to the individual, another officer emphasized the importance of learning about the individual situation:

> You have to learn what the situation is and the background behind that problem. You have some police officers— they are so gung ho—[who] bust in the

"…[W]e as police officers are guided by what society says is acceptable and is not acceptable."

house and it's so much the profanity and it's so much this. They never know what the environment as far as the family [is], what's going on in there. Social issues: father could be laid off, the mother has…five kids, the father is frustrated because he doesn't have a job so he starts drinking, and that's when the domestic violence comes in.…Good police need to focus more on being professional, finding out what the problem is, and the bad police officers need to think some time before they are so gung ho.

Later, another officer expressed the difficulty of entering a situation like the one just described and explained how, despite an officer's good intentions, the situation is interactive, and the individual may have a pattern of using violence caused by poor oral communication skills that may make it very difficult to avoid the use of force:

> [S]ome people…have grown up in environments in which their oral communication skills are horrendous. The only way in which they know how to resolve conflict—express their emotions and feelings—is by getting physical. They beat their wives; they beat their kids; they beat the dog. That is how they express themselves. If the dinner was too cold, they smack their wife and that tells her the dinner was too cold. The kids are making too much noise in the other room; he gets the belt and just starts beating the kids to let them know that they are drowning out his football game in the living room. So for this guy to all of a sudden be a human being and treat you any differently [from how] he treats his family, once you go into his living room,…is a very difficult thing to do.

"Good police need to focus more on being professional, finding out what the problem is.…"

Another officer suggested that officers under stress in their personal lives will engage in misconduct, and she suggested that very young officers may also have such problems: "[Y]ou also have babies coming on. I'm talking about 19 to 20 years old. Can carry a gun but can't take a drink."

In contrast to an earlier suggestion that standards of acceptable conduct have lowered, one officer explained how policing has changed over the decades, how a reform chief in his city in the 1980s played a role in changing the face of policing. Until that time, police violence was the norm:

> …[B]eing a child of the '60s, a teenager of the '70s, and an adult of the '80s, I watched the…police department go through the change. In the '60s, there was no accountability whatsoever. Same thing in the '70s. [In] the '80s, the department really started changing its face. Twenty years ago, it was acceptable if you got a burglar call, the burglar was shot, plain and simple. There were no questions asked. [An officer from another department across the country agreed. The first officer continued.] We got a chief…[name omitted] came in. The face of the police in [name omitted] changed.…In the '70s,…you got stopped, [and] you went into a panic because you knew…something bad is going to happen to me.… And they could walk up and basically knock the hell out of you.…There was no internal affairs in [name omitted] until 1978.

Another officer, agreeing that standards have risen, that "police operated differently in a different era," suggested that the Rodney King case had a big impact on

police accountability—educating the public about the limits of police authority, increasing civil litigation, and elevating recruitment standards:

> [E]verybody, I think, is operating now under the post–Rodney King era, in which people are probably more aware of their rights and the limits in which police can actually do their job. And that holds police to a great degree accountable for their action. I think departments have come into great civil liability in that they cannot afford [any longer] to hire the six-foot-four, 300 pounds, police officer [who]…couldn't pour water out of a bucket without getting most of it on him. But he could kick butt and take names.

Summing up the sources of the definition of the limits of police authority, of what is acceptable conduct by the police, this officer noted that, "Your morals are guiding you, the department is guiding you: policy, rules and regulations, society."

Another officer suggested that an important concept that had been left out of the discussion was…"discretion. How much discretion you can use, and when to know how to use the word discretion."

Another officer offered what for him was the key to what makes a good police officer,…"compassion. If you have the ability to feel, you are going to care about that person. I don't care if an officer has 30 years on the force, if you haven't developed that compassion, you are useless as a police officer."

Handling Situations That Challenge Police Authority: Rules and Practice

The moderator asked the participants to discuss the appropriateness of police behavior in a scenario in which abortion protesters refused to leave and were forcefully picked up and dragged to a paddy wagon. One officer responded by describing his own experience with demonstrators involved in a newspaper strike. He explained how he defuses such a situation:

> If I am on a line,…I will ask, not the ones who are hollering at me so much, but someone next to them, what are [you] guys really fighting about?…[A] lot of times the police—the rank and file as we are—don't know what the real issues are. So I will ask what is the problem? Then after they explain, I let them know that I understand. Then I tell them that these are the rules: you just stay back there and I will leave you alone. Most of the time—I am telling you 95 percent of the time—they go, "Cool, cool." And they will protect me!

As these officers reminded each other repeatedly over the two days, "The bottom line is officer safety. We want to go home."

Asked to relate situations where they had to deal with challenges to their authority, the officers responded by providing a range of stories in which they had acted by using less force than might have been permissible. One officer described how he had avoided a potentially volatile situation:

> We had the…shooting,…emergency services had to go through a door, and

"[E]verybody…is operating now under the post–Rodney King era, in which people are probably more aware of their rights and the limits in which police can actually do their job."

they had to shoot her because she came at them with a knife. Right away, we are the bad guy. I was going down to court one day on the subway and right away, they said, "You shot grandma," and this and that. I had three or four people looking at me like I did something wrong. How should I react to that? Maybe if I was a young cop,…came from a nice neighborhood, and was a gung-ho kind of guy, I could have escalated that on the train and then I would have had a riot situation. Or I may have had to lock up somebody.…So, I took it; I swallowed a little bit of my pride; I tried to act as professional as I could without escalating the problem.

"You may not like what I am doing, but it is the community who dictates what the laws are, and I am simply following through.…"

Another stated that it is because of his compassion that he takes "that extra second" to de-escalate a situation, "by letting them vent first and then asking what is wrong. The first thing they say is that I don't care, and I tell them that, yes, I do care. Tell me."

Another officer told a story of being called on a domestic disturbance where the individual had left in a car. To the surprise of the officer and his partner, the individual jumped out of his car and ran when they pulled him over. "We are thinking it is just a disturbance, so why would the guy run?" They chased him into a field, where he pulled out a switchblade. "He told us he was going to stab both of us in expletive terms." The officers spent five minutes yelling back and forth, trying to get him to drop the knife, which he finally did. "Would other officers have handled it differently? Sure. There could have been a shooting. We could have been hurt. But I think that how we dealt with it [was by] not person-

alizing the question of authority.…It is not a personal issue whether you hate me. You may not like what I am doing, but it is the community who dictates what the laws are, and I am simply following through with that."

One officer shared a story, "not a dramatic story whatsoever," where he learned the limits of his authority. He responded to a situation where there was a group of people playing basketball, and he wanted to speak to someone on the court. He asked another guy, "Hey, run over there and get that guy and tell him to come over here."

> Well, the guy told me to kiss my behind; that's not his job. I thought, just me arriving in uniform, I could direct people and just tell this guy what I wanted him to go do for me. And that guy told me where to get on and where to get off.…I was verbally assaulted.… And it made me really think, and it really does.…[M]y authority only goes so far;…I do not dictate [to] people or control lives [as] I think I do—or [as] the uniform makes me think I do.

Officers' Perceptions of the Extent and Nature of Abuses of Authority

The Role of the Media

Expressing a sense that the media, in reporting instances of abuse, influence the public to distrust all police, one officer said, "[E]veryone of us gets labeled for every problem from every city.…When you respond on a call, [then] you just did everything that they heard of for the past 10, 20, 30 years of their life. You just did it, you represent it, and they're going to take it out on you in those cases."

Another put it this way, "And as far as the Detroit deal—yeah, we caught heat behind that; L.A., we caught heat behind that; and New York, yeah, we caught heat behind that."

Another said, "[N]o matter what we do in [name omitted],…or anybody else does, I have to answer for it. If I go to Portland, Oregon, to see family, say for example, they're going to question me about what happened in Detroit, and I have no connection.…And if I take the approach that the police were right—they were not wrong—I better be ready with my ticket, my keys, whatever way I came, because I'm going to take some heat for that."

Some also expressed concern about the accuracy of media reports. Because they tend to present only the dramatic event of police violence, the media neglect the situation that precipitated the violence, offering what some felt was a distortion of the facts:

> …I was giving an example earlier with the situation in Baltimore. I didn't see the 20 minutes of footage that occurred before that, in which the three officers are around this guy—please drop the knife; please drop the knife. I just saw the 10 seconds leading up to the point right before they shot and killed the guy. I know there was more to the story, but the average person [who] looks at that particular situation, that's what they see.

One officer suggested that, although in her city the police receive both bad and good media coverage, the general trend is to report only the negative stories about police, and in that way, the truth is distorted. "You still don't hear about the bulk of us who are out there doing [our] j-o-b because we believe in what we do.…"

Another felt that police departments needed to be more media savvy:

> I think that we are hurt as law enforcement by our lack of communication with the media.…But I think our lack of willingness to be honest with the public—and maybe not the lack of willingness, but the lack of know-how, to perceive that [lack] in the media is what is damaging us—not necessarily our actions but our inability to relate that to the mass public.

The Extent of Abuses of Authority

There was general agreement that a small percentage of officers abuse their authority. One officer referred to the "95/5 rule, in that 95 percent of the people on the department are doing what they're supposed to do, doing a good job, and…there's this 5 percent that cause all the problems in your organization." And 5 percent became the rule of thumb generally accepted by the participants. At least some felt that these abuses were generally of a relatively minor nature:

> I think on my part, that the 5 percent [who cross the line into abuse of authority] are usually guys [who] are in violation of some sort of policy procedural error, in that they didn't take a report, or they failed to administer first aid when the situation called for it.… Of that 5 percent, you probably have 1 percent that actually goes out and violates someone's rights.…I don't think that 5 percent…that are in trouble within the departments are actually taking bribes and shaking people down—

"You…don't hear about the bulk of us who are out there doing [our] j-o-b because we believe in what we do.…"

you know, abusing authority. I think it's more [that] this guy just comes to work, his uniform is bad, or he had alcohol on his breath today, or whatever.

One officer suggested that it takes maturity for an officer not to become jealous when he sees a drug dealer driving a nice car: "And then that's when he starts doing illegal searches, not turning in the money, not turning in the drugs.…And that's what some of these officers are doing. They're putting their hands in the cookie jar,… they're being caught, and the media [are] feeding off of it."

Another expressed his distaste for officers who engage in illegal activity:

> And the reality is there's nothing that turns your stomach more or that's more distasteful than to find an officer [who's] doing something illegal.…[W]e had some officers in [name omitted] [who] were breaking the law,…were shaking down people.…Not only was it illegal, but it was just so personally offensive.… You want to arrest them, but you also just want to throw up at the same time.

The Forms of Abuses of Authority

When the officers were asked what kinds of inappropriate behavior they were most concerned about, they mentioned a range of behaviors. One officer described "a trend" in his department of "narcotics trafficking," by officers who fit "the so-called new prototype police officer, college educated, passed all the tests, background checked out perfectly."

A number of the officers expressed concern about verbal abuse or a general lack of respect by police officers in dealing with

"…[T]here's nothing that turns your stomach more …than to find an officer [who's] doing something illegal.…"

the public. One officer suggested that he found for himself that the solution is to explain your actions to the people affected:

> One of the problems that I think [is] an issue with regard to police work is that the public requests to be informed, and the officer feels as if he has no obligation to inform the citizen as to what he's doing. I've found that I've eliminated a large percentage of complaints that I've had lodged against me and just [had] an easier time of doing my job by simply explaining to the individual what it is that I'm doing.…You find that [with] most police officers [who] find themselves in trouble, it isn't because he's shaking people down or he's taking bribes; it's because he does not…explain his actions in a lot of situations.…That person is hyped up and that person is really emotionally involved. And now the officer's emotionally involved. And the next thing you know, the officer says something he wishes he could have grabbed back and pulled back. You know, it's the verbal assault again, [which] the officer levies against the citizen, that hurts him.

One officer indicated that the behavior he is most concerned about as a police officer is "other cops [who] are bigots and other cops [who] are brutal." He expressed concern that officers are placed in these brutalizing situations without having relationships with police supervisors who encourage talking about what they are confronting. He argued that "we're putting a lot of young people of all races and a variety of different educational backgrounds …into the worst possible environment, and we're just leaving them there.…And then we're all real surprised when the media show

up and they're filming this person beating the hell out of somebody."

Abuse of Authority and Community Policing

Most of the rank-and-file officers who participated in the focus group expressed belief in the value of community policing. They recognized that it expanded the tools available to solve community problems, but they cautioned about its potential for encouraging the community to place undue demands on the police. They saw a potential for violation of citizens' rights; they doubted a management concern about corruption. Most saw community policing as involving a much greater commitment of time and dedication than traditional policing. As one officer put it, "If you don't put in 110 percent as a community officer or beat cop or whatever, you're not doing your job; I don't care what anybody says." Their conversation seemed to assume that community policing and problem-oriented policing are the future of policing—a reality to which management and older officers must adapt—rather than an experiment or a marginal activity that may disappear or be deemed to have failed in time.

Community Policing and the Expanding Authority and Responsibility of the Police

The officers discussed a wide range of issues that relate to the expanded role of the police in community policing, to the use of civil law, and to the effect of community demands and expectations.

One officer told a rich story that was about community policing and that demonstrates both the close relationships between police and community and the expanded power of the police. He spoke of how he developed a teen basketball league some 12 years ago in the inner-city neighborhood where he was then assigned and still is working as a community-policing officer. The relationships he developed in the basketball league led to the development of narcotics information and warrants, as well as to a neighborhood "trespass affidavit program" and other techniques such as vertical patrol, which are all aspects of an expanded police role under community-oriented policing. In his words, "All these tools were added to us for locations like this so we could use [them] … in our daily routine of patrolling." The basketball league continues to occupy much of his leisure time to this day:

> I went to a community meeting…in a housing project, where blocks and blocks of buildings were…drug infested.…And the people were complaining about drug dealers…hanging out late at night, drinking on the corner, throwing garbage out the windows, bringing garbage downstairs, boom boxes, drag racing, fixing cars on the street. It was out of control.…They were yelling at me and screaming at me.… So I started thinking of what I could do. And I walked around, and on my beat there was a local church.…I went upstairs,…and I saw there was a small gym.…I started a basketball league.… I made out a few flyers.…I had to consolidate it to [ages] 10 to 14 because I had too many kids coming.

> Well, we built it up a little bit. Kids would give me information—not that I was looking for information, but they were giving me information on certain

Most saw community policing as involving a much greater commitment of time and dedication than traditional policing.

places. We would target them ourselves. I would pass the information to narcotics. I would do my own search warrants. And little by little, we cleared up each building at a time.…

We set up another program, called the Trespass Affidavit Program, where we have people in the building; then we have the rent roll, so that if there were people that were outside from other areas coming to buy drugs—and I knew there was a spot in one building—I could grab them in the building when I was doing a vertical.

I do a vertical patrol, [which] means you go up and down a building and check it. If I saw somebody coming out that I didn't know—because I knew people on the block—and [those people] couldn't give me a good answer…take me back to the apartment they were visiting, they were placed under arrest for criminal trespass.

Now, today, I have 12 teams still doing it. I run the program from January to June. It's four hours a night of my own time, but I have a good time, more than the kids, but I can't let them know that. And I have 120 kids, and a 12-team league. It's still going strong.

Another officer described a recent program to enforce a loitering ordinance. Police had been using the tool of criminal trespass, getting property owners to "post their properties," as in the above example, in order to move "drug dealers and other people." But the targeted population "kind of wised up to it and changed their tactics a little bit." They moved to a public park. The tool now being used to move these

"We, as law enforcement, take responsibility for far too much in our society ….[W]e're feeling…[an] overwhelming requirement to be everything to everybody."

people has been "a very controversial ordinance." The officer described it as "a real difficult ordinance to enforce," with "five or six criteria in order to even write the ticket," suggesting there are easier solutions than trying to enforce this ordinance. But some of the public and a radio talk-show host have raised concerns that "we are just stomping all over the people's constitutional rights with this ordinance."

But this expansion of authority also places a great burden of responsibility on police officers. As one community policing officer said, "[Y]ou, as a police officer, have to wear many different hats: a fireman one day, a lawyer another day, a doctor another day, a marriage counselor one day, a psychiatrist one day. It is amazing because we don't go to school for that. We don't get paid for having all these degrees."

Another community policing officer stated, "[E]verybody's always looking for the police to answer all their problems."

A third put it this way, "We, as law enforcement, take responsibility for far too much in our society.…And I think every time someone comes to us, we feel it is our responsibility to solve that problem for them."

Another offered, "I know we're feeling… just [an] overwhelming requirement to be everything to everybody."

There was intermittent discussion about taking your work home with you, whether such a move is unhealthy, what to do about it, and what its effect on home life is, because the successful community-policing officer is an individual to his community. Officers admitted they gave citizens their home phone numbers and received calls

at all hours: "It never turns off." But the most striking example was the following:

> I'm down at the shore. I'm down there the last two weeks in July and the last week in August. I have a beeper. Well, [it's] a great invention, but community leaders beep me. Community activists beep me. People [who] have a problem in the park beep me. You know why: S——, we didn't see any radio car tonight; S——, can you do something. Could you call up one of the lieutenants at the desk and give him a heads up [to] send a car over.

These expressions of the burdens of community policing precipitated a discussion of the community's responsibility in the community-policing partnership: "I'm not responsible for all the answers, and sometimes the community is."

Another said, "[T]he problem is probably going to come to you first.…But you've got all these other resources to funnel everything so…you're kind of a liaison. And…you deal with the whole family with the idea that eventually you want to totally empower that whole community so, in a sense, you wouldn't have to be there anymore."

Officers also stated that at times they have to explain to community members that there are limits to their authority: "Can I hit this house two doors down from you? Probably, if I can get enough information that gives me the legal authority to do it. I can't just go in there and just run through this person's house just because you say that you think something's going on.… [T]here's certain legal—there [are] certain rules and regulations,…which I have to follow."

Perhaps most striking was the officers' indication that a potential for abuse of police authority comes directly from the heightened community expectations and the closer community–police contact and relationship that occurs under community policing:

> But just an example of the possible abuse, you get a person who lives in a neighborhood, and [such people are] in charge of a neighborhood watch program. Or they've got a house [that] they know [and that] they kind of get a little concerned about. Now, it's not a regular 911: they're [not] shooting or there's [not] any kind of real problem. But they begin this process because now they have…the ear of the police because I'm designated as the person that they can call—not just a generic number, but now there's a face and a pager. And they start calling me. Well, I sort of become the innuendo police…the rumor police. I…hear that so-and-so living at the house is—you know, I think he could possibly be doing a variety of things. I said, well, none of those seem to fit with what's criminal…so maybe in some cases it's more of a neighborhood personality issue than it is a crime issue. And now I've got [these people] in the community who [have] my ear [and] who feel like I'm accountable to them.…They're demanding that I do something.…That's the key piece; [discretion] is being able to tell them—which is nothing they're going to want to hear from me because they think that

Perhaps most striking was the officers' indication that a potential for abuse of police authority comes directly from the heightened community expectations and the closer community–police contact…

I'm there to do what they want, not to enforce the law or keep the peace—[and] find…a way of telling them it's not something I'm going to be able to deal with for you.

Community Policing and the Potential for Corruption

Asked whether the closer ties with the community increased the risk of corruption, one officer suggested that this was a misperception held by police management and some citizens:

> That's how these chiefs and higher-ups think because…they're behind closed doors. They're in their offices.…I deal with a lot of store owners because they give me things at the end of the year when I have my championship game.… I get donations that go right down to the PA [Police Athletic] office, and I get a receipt.… They're afraid that we might get hooked into something with these store owners where—we might give them protection…a slap if they're doing something illegal…in that community area. And then people [who] live in the community perceive this. And they see that we're hanging out with somebody; right away we're doing something wrong. And this is why these chiefs and everybody—they don't want to hear this. And right away, they want to put a bashing on community policing.

Besides the potential for corruption from legitimate commercial enterprises, the use of vertical patrol raises some concerns among police management because of the potential for corruption by drug dealers when officers cannot be observed by their supervisors: "I [police administrator] don't

"You're asking a quasi-military type organization with a very structured chain of command, and …upper-level and mid-level managers to relinquish some of their authority.…"

want any cops going into buildings. Why? Because they're going to get involved in something. Or maybe it's easy for corruption. Right away, they're corrupt. They're going to get into an apartment, or they're going to get…grabbed by one of the dealers and maybe—let's make a deal."

Departmental Structure and Community Policing

Some officers expressed concern that police management is not adapting to the changing authority structure, namely the expanded authority of the rank and file under community-oriented policing:

> You're asking a quasi-military type organization with a very structured chain of command, and you're asking upper-level and mid-level managers to relinquish some of their authority and some of their responsibilities.…As a detective, I'm bypassing and eliminating the middleman and going right to the top with my plan and my solution, and that's a threat against everything that you're taught as a police officer.

Another suggested, "The problem seems to be…the breaking down of the pyramid…from staff to officer. There is a lot of old-school thought…that the street officer doesn't really have the ability to create an autonomous decision."

And another said:

> The micromanagement part was our biggest foul-up in the system.… [Command officers from the old school didn't believe in community policing.] Just go out and lock people up…and when you came up with ideas and things you wanted to try,…they were

reluctant to give you the go ahead on it….If you still have those people [who] are policing from the '60s and the '70s with the same ideas…it's hard to push new ideas around them sometimes.

One officer suggested this ideal for supervision under community policing:

You have to have immediate supervisors and mid-level managers [who] trust you and trust your judgment and [who] give you latitude to make decisions. And even if you fail in your decision, they cannot…micromanage. I guess they have to allow you to be innovative, to express yourself, to not be afraid to come in with an idea and implement that idea. I think that's very important.

Others suggested that they encountered problems, not with management, but with veteran officers who are not serving as community-policing officers: "[S]omething that we're experiencing right now is that neighborhood officers are over here; patrol officers are over here. And you're kind of looked at as this special group, and you get to kind of adjust your hours."

Societal Factors That Affect Abuse of Authority
The Effect of Race and Ethnicity

Although we considered that the topic of race as a factor in police behavior—suspicion, investigation, stops and searches, use of force—was important to our consideration of abuse of authority, we were uncertain whether the participants would be willing to talk openly about their perceptions. As with all other topics addressed, we were impressed with the apparent thoughtfulness and frankness of the officers. We began the discussion with a direct question that engaged the group: Is it unfair to stereotype or is it "smart policing" to know that people of certain types—seen at certain hours in certain places—are basically up to no good? This question led to a lively discussion that began with an insistence on distinguishing stereotyping from profiling, with the assumption that stereotyping is bad, while profiling is ethical, though its legality has recently been limited. By the end, the two seemingly disparate terms were comfortably conflated.

One officer suggested that profiling is "ethical to a certain degree, not necessarily… right. But you have a good feel of whom you are dealing with. I mean I can tell a normal person—a normal student—because I deal with a lot of kids. If I see a kid walking, I can pretty much judge what kind of person he is." But as he explained, "We're careful about stereotyping. The term we use is profiling." Several officers questioned the difference between the two terms. Then one provided the working definition in his gang squad:

The way in which we have the practice in our department, I should say the practice in gang squad, to differentiate between stereotyping and profiling, is that to stereotype we go strictly…[on] physical appearance. Profiling would be the physical appearance, the location in which the person is, and what [such people] are doing in that location and what others are doing around them.

Exploring the meaning of stereotyping and profiling, one researcher described an actual incident where two black teenagers driving around in a white neighborhood were approached by two officers with their guns trained to the back of the boys' heads.

"You have to have immediate supervisors and mid-level managers [who] trust you and trust your judgment and [who] give you latitude to make decisions."

Two African-American participants took the lead in responding to the situation. The first admitted that he had been the recipient of similar treatment, "I have experienced the same things that you have experienced." But he maintained the legitimacy of stopping someone at certain times on the basis of a sense that they have "no business being there," because it is what the residents of the neighborhood want:

> I'm from his hometown. I understand what you are saying. I have been on the other end. I haven't been a cop, as I say, all my life. I have been stopped. I have been stopped by white officers in mostly white or predominantly white neighborhoods. I understand that. I think there's— and I think everybody has been discussing this—a very fine line between stereotyping and profiling. If it has a beak and it quacks, it's a duck. Regardless of what it calls itself, it's a duck.

> If you are walking down [or] if I was walking down that street,…I have been stopped during the middle of the day,…I don't think that necessarily my actions warranted a stop. But if I am…walking down that same street at 3:00 in the morning when everybody else is asleep and I had really no business being there, I cannot justify my actions for being there. I have no legitimate address I am going to or coming from, and, therefore, I warrant the police to stop me.

> If I live in that neighborhood, I don't care what race he is or what ethnic background he is, I want the police to check that individual out and why he is even there.

The officer expressed hope that the police department is hiring better-educated and more-compassionate recruits who have "an understanding of things and can resolve a situation without it resolving or ending in conflict"—if only to limit lawsuits.

Another African-American participant recalled that while "growing up in [name omitted]"…he too "was stopped many times." But he noted, "One of the major factors is the time, the era for which that happened to you." Like his colleague, he felt that such stops based on "profiling" are justified:

> So…I tell the kids now, so what [if] you get stopped. So what [if] you get pulled over. So what? As long as you have all your paperwork in order, which you should have, there is nothing that an officer can do to you as long as you are in the right. If [an officer does], then you have a legitimate complaint. If we stop you and you have got all your stuff together, hey,…Excuse me for stopping you. I'm sorry that I delayed some of your time. Okay?

A white officer suggested that sometimes race is seen as a factor when it may not be. He told a story that began:

> …just after the Rodney King trial, maybe the day after, my partner and I, both white, we [are at] work in a predominantly black neighborhood. We see a couple of guys in a car smoking dope, so we roll up on the car. I go to the driver's side and say, "Hey, sir, I see you are smoking dope. Put your hands on the steering wheel. Don't move." He is more or less buffered—I mean the behavior, what he is saying to me. He is not indicating that he is compliant. He's uncooperative.

"…[T]here's… a very fine line between stereotyping and profiling. If it has a beak and it quacks, it's a duck. Regardless of what it calls itself, it's a duck."

So I become a little bit more concerned for my safety. It's very low light, a couple of guys in a car. We don't know who they are. They are not searched, so I have them get out of the car. "Put your hands on the back of your head, and lock your fingers." I grab hold of his hands. "Now step out of the car." …I don't know if he and his partner are going to start shooting at us or what.

They step out. I go to handcuff him. He physically resists it. He tightens his whole body up. I am thinking—he kind of starts crouching down. I'm waiting for his hand to come off the top of his head, to [go] into a waistband. I ended up getting him cuffed up. We got the dope. He was dealing marijuana out of the car. They [were] smoking marijuana.

But we get in court several weeks later. He says, "I saw what happened on TV. I watched what the white police do to black men." He sees me walk up on him, and he begins to see me in a particular way.

I begin to see him as a threat to my safety. [When] we both sort of start looking at each other as men in this way, that's not really good for either one of us. I mean it's good in a sense because we're not going to die, but it's bad in a sense that now I kind of see him as a guy who is not a very nice person, and I don't know the man. He…starts maybe seeing me as this racist, brutal, heavy-handed white cop.

I have got to walk up on that car. But one of the things I don't have to like is what happens to me because of what I do, and what happens to people be-cause of what I do [and] in terms of the relationship we get in.…We don't ever have time to get to know each other.

Relinquishing the distinction, several officers agreed that "[s]tereotype or profile or whichever word we choose to use…sort of keeps us alive."

Citing a Maryland study that suggested African Americans are discriminatorily the subject of traffic stops, we rekindled the race discussion by asking whether police engaged in racially discriminatory practices or if this was a false perception held by the minority community. The term "discrimination" seemed more evocative than did stereotyping or profiling. One officer tried to refine when it was acceptable to treat people by appearance, suggesting that the standard should be: "I think it's discriminatory if I am judging somebody based on something that they have no control over." Thus, returning to the earlier example, he argued that "[y]ou are a teenager; you're black; you are in a white neighborhood; you are driving. You have no control over the color of your skin. For me to stop you simply because you are black…would be discriminatory." He continued in this direction, "However, you are a teenager who happens to be black, who chooses to dress like a gang member, who chooses to hang out with several other gang members, who chooses to be tagging in a neighborhood. Now I stop you. I think there's a difference. You had a choice.… I think…we can base a lot about how a person is dressed."

Another officer suggested this approach does not always hold up in court:

> Then when I go to court, the kid [is] wearing the gang attire, standing on the

…[S]everal officers agreed that "[s]tereotype or profile or whichever word we choose to use…sort of keeps us alive."

corner or whatever. He's got his mom with him, his dad with him, and a lot of family members. They have got a lawyer, an American Civil Liberties Union; they are pissed off. Then the media [have] gotten in the middle of it and [are asking], "So that's good police work? This just kind of seems a little intrusive to us, officer."

As a result, his department no longer condones this activity: "[T]hey went the opposite liberal extreme. Our chief told us that if you see a kid who is dressed in gang-bang attire [and] who is in the wrong neighborhood at the wrong time, that's not enough to contact him."

Another officer said her department also would not permit such a stop:

> We don't have routine pit stops or routine core stops. I mean, I can't assume because you are wearing your hat back with your pants back—they are falling down—that you are out there selling drugs. You might be a college-educated person that liked that type of dress, so we can't assume that. We are held responsible for that kind of thinking.

The moderator cited a national poll that reported that while 63 percent of whites stated they had a great deal of confidence in the police, only 26 percent of African Americans felt that way. The moderator then sought participants' reactions. One officer made these observations:

> I can see why, though the people who are black might be more inclined to have less confidence in police because police historically are predominantly white.…I think white officers—those that stereotype or those that have

…[S]trong police presence in minority communities, which have traditional policing, contributes to the negative view of police.

discriminated—are more likely to discriminate against black, Asian, or Hispanic people.

…I'll give you an example. We're sitting around a table at a chief's forum.… I work in the black community. I have got a black man sitting next to me who is a leader in the black community. He says there [have] been X number of gang homicides on this street over the period of the last couple of weeks, and we need to do something about it. We have got a white guy sitting across the table who lives near one of the white area high schools. He says, "Well, the problem in our neighborhood is smoking off campus. The chief is sitting there. He's [thinking], "Let's see. We've got people dying over here, and we've got Mr.-let's-not-have-kids-smoking over here".…How can you help but have the disparaging sort of view from the different racial populations about police authority. I don't see how you can get away from it.

Another officer, also not surprised by the poll, suggested that the strong police presence in minority communities, which have traditional policing, contributes to the negative view of police:

> [I don't know if] the traditional way that we do policing [is] reflective of everybody's department.…The majority of police stations or policing, as it were, are situated or centralized in predominantly black or minority communities. Therefore, most of the police contacts that occur during the course of a day are involving blacks or people of color.… Most of those contacts have to do with enforcement, either that or the police

have been called in again to remedy or resolve a situation.

Race and Community Policing

The view of the officer who saw a strong, but negative, police presence in minority communities was that community policing can be expected to improve the confidence level in the police of African Americans. This view was shared broadly among participants. As he suggested,

> By seeing the police in a different light and seeing them as not just people who go in to enforce the law and to effect an arrest, but [as] problem solvers and facilitators in that they help guide and direct people into situations—help resolve their problem—I think that number [26 percent] is probably going to go up. It has no choice but to go up. I mean,…the police are now helping out as opposed to the bad guy [who] comes in and just drags people out of a neighborhood and takes them away.

One participant prescribed community policing to improve race relations, without actually naming it. He saw

> …race relations improving with the amount of police that you are able to put on the street. The more police that you are able to put on the street, the more police officers will be out there [and] be able to do one-on-one community involvement. There is no way you are going to improve relations on an amicable basis…when all your officers are able to do is answer runs.

One officer who worked in community relations saw the solution in expanding communications, which is also a feature of community policing:

> You have certain cultural groups—because of where they come from—[who] come to America. They have their own fear of police. We [police] have to go in and break down that fear, set up communications, set up information, open those lines of communication, [and] bring them into the fold.

The Culture of Policing

In seeking to understand how much the culture of policing contributes to abuse of authority, we focused on two aspects attributed to police culture: (a) the "us-versus-them" mentality, with its premise that police officers who are in constant contact with problematic citizens tend to view all civilians suspiciously; and (b) the "code of silence," in which police officers protect (by not reporting) their fellow officers in situations involving inappropriate or abusive police conduct. We began by asking whether the participants believed there was an us-versus-them mentality and what its role might be in the abuse of authority.

"Us-versus-Them" Mentality

One participant referred to a scholarly article that described the psychological and physiological response to living with the dangers of police work on a daily basis:

> When you go out into the street and you make contact with somebody on a call or a car stop…you begin to see people, anybody, anywhere, as potentially a threat of death to you. So you develop this vigilance for work: I'm ready. I'm on. I'm prepared.…And then what happens is [that] you sort of turn that [approach] into hypervigilance.… You're always…looking over your shoulder;…you're a little more aware

"We [police] have to go in and break down that fear,…set up information, open those lines of communication, [and] bring them into the fold."

than the general public about dangers that you encounter.…And then, over a period of time, you [need] something to check that. In other words, people don't get on the phone to 911 and tell us how good their life is going;…they get on the phone [to] tell us when things are horrible. So those are the kind of experiences that we have over a period of time [that] can divide us. And we may respect people.…We may be thinking compassionately.…But ultimately…you begin to see people as a threat of death to you.

A number of participants acknowledged that the us-versus-them mentality is a corollary of the requirement of their work that they be vigilant at all times. It is an attitude that never leaves many of them, on duty or off. Two described experiences in traveling to Washington, D.C., for these meetings:

We were talking—this is ironic again. We were talking the other day about going in restaurants and…we kind of [took] an unscientific poll. How many of us sit with our back to the door as opposed to sit facing the door? How many of us read customers that come in there? And we were talking about keeping our eye on the cash register. We're almost expecting something to happen.

Or in the cab. Everybody was talking about [being] in a cab.…We're in a city we're not familiar with. Get in a cab with this guy. It's the middle of the night, and we're driving, and, oh, okay, he's taking us somewhere to kill us. All right. So what do I do now?

"There's an over-identification with the police role. In other words, police work becomes your life.…"

However, the participants felt that this vigilance does not lead to problems. More severe manifestations of the us-versus-them mentality can cause potential problems. Participants described a type of police officer who is intensely identified with his role and who may be "the ones that don't make it":

You've got a lot of guys [who] are cops in the day.…They hang out with cops. They talk about cop stuff. All they do is cop, cop, cop, cop, cop. And those are the guys [who] are in that hyper-vigilance mode. These are the guys [who] read gun magazines.…And, you've got to wonder about that.

Conversely, one officer suggested that the attitude described as problematic was more common than the more-balanced attitude that the participants were claiming, and he implied that the participants may not be all that different from the supposedly more-extreme adherents of the us-versus-them mentality:

There's an over-identification with the police role. In other words, police work becomes your life in some ways. The people who are here in this room—in many ways in my experience—are the exception. I mean, I know a lot more people [who] are acting and behaving in the ways that we are characterizing than people who live and act and behave as we're saying we do.

Comparing his life to that of his brother the banker, one officer admitted to living with an us-versus-them mentality:

[W]hen you're bombarded with negative all day, pretty soon that becomes

your life, okay, because you are out there doing it to save your life or save the life of others.…But as a police officer, I have to be concerned with my life and everybody else's.

Another officer admitted not being so far from the gun-loving officers characterized earlier:

I agree with…your over-gung-ho people with the gun magazine promoting guns and this, that, and the other thing. I like guns as much as the next guy, but I'm nowhere near that. But I do have something to say. In my experience, the [military] veterans are…some of the best police.…They usually find a common bond. Yes, a lot of them come out of the chute a little too fast.… But some of our veterans are some of the best guys you can depend on.… [W]e work 8 hours a day, 40 hours a week, for a combination of 30 seconds of pure, sheer terror that can come at any unknown time. I can't think of another occupation that's like that. That's where the understanding comes in.… I'm asking you [the public] to sympathize. You're [the police] supposed to be perfect, perfect…up to the point where you make a minor mistake. Then you're held with a level higher, held to higher accountability.

Thus, as the discussion progressed, it became apparent that from the participants' viewpoint, many police officers have the more-negative version of the us-versus-them mentality, and perhaps the original distinction was overdrawn. This revelation led to questioning whether the participants felt they were the exception to the general population of officers in their departments. They joked, "Oh, I think so," and "The department will not send one of them to Washington." Because the participants considered themselves "exceptions to the rule," they were asked how they personally managed to avoid the more-negative aspect of the us-versus-them attitude. The participants credited their own personal integrity—and often their religious or spiritual beliefs—with being key factors in avoiding those attitudes. They also suggested involvement with positive people or experiences, and humor. Typical comments included these:

I think it is filtered out by how much you are involved in other things other than your job.…[Those who] are involved in church…get to see the good side of life. For most of us, kids suck because the only kids we deal with are kids who are problematic. I'm lucky enough that I'm involved with the youth group at our church. So I see the best of teens also. And that kind of balances things. If you don't seek out the best in [kids], all we are left with—with this job—is the worst in [kids]. And you have to actively do that, otherwise you will become mental[ly] unstable.

I think in myself, anyway, [that] I have a great appreciation for life after seeing death. You see people die [at] a young age. You see so many things that you see the worst in people and you see the best in people. And you really kind of balance it out.

You have to use every tool that you can. Because of my demeanor, I use humor to bring about some levity, to

"[W]e work 8 hours a day, 40 hours a week, for a combination of 30 seconds of pure, sheer terror that can come at any…time. I can't think of another occupation that's like that."

bring about some light in stressful situations. [It is] by no means demeaning, but I try to bring about some light.

I feel the spiritual side. I know what guides me because I would have burned out years ago. I know how to bow down to that. I know how to accept it. I know how to find it within me. It's what drives me. A lot of officers will not admit to a spiritual side until it gets tested.

What does it take to humble you as a police officer? It may be something as simple as an old lady you're giving a ticket to who will give you her license and say, "I need to come off the road"….Or it may take a kid whose mother just got killed by his father, you know. What is it going to take for you to come back to reality and realize that you're just a cop? You're just somebody out here doing eight hours.

You have to keep that spirituality within your heart because God is the one that watches over you, protects you from that unseen danger….I tend to find myself bringing that spirituality in the community and that gets rid of that us-versus-them because that's when the devil gets involved.

I'm going to take care of my family and that's one of the things. Here I've been doing this job for 10 years and prior to that, I didn't have the sense or the feeling in that very strong way. So that's an important point for me. Sort of a stake in the ground in terms of taking care of myself, taking care of my family.

While acknowledging that a number of officers exhibit these more problematic

…[P]articipants indicated the need for more experienced officers to take a lead in helping officers cope with the stress of the job and their personal lives.

forms of the us-versus-them mentality, the participants generally felt that type of officer does not remain very long in the police profession. Comments included these:

They're the ones that don't make it.… Four or five years, burned out. They get injured, get hurt.…And they're the constant revolving door of law enforcement.

Get hurt mostly.

The participants indicated the need for more experienced officers to take a lead in helping officers cope with the stress of the job and their personal lives:

And you help the other police also with that [seeking the best and not the worst in the job].…You help other police officers. Because when they had a problem, their own personal, they'll come to you because they see you in a certain light. And they see [that] you're always working with kids. You got something I can do with a kid.…So you become a reference point for them.…And I find it ironic that we, in community policing, help the community. But what happens to our problems?

We still have everybody [who] graduated [in] our class in the department, and everyone is doing well and we keep in touch with each other. [When] somebody has a problem, we can call one another.

Our department has a mentor officer program. When new guys come on, the training department looks at the old guys [who] have been on a while like we're looking at one another here and saying, you know, that guy is a guy [who's] doing something right.…They take guys like me, and they pair me up

with a brand new guy.…You just talk about whatever interests him.…Of course, new people want to know about being a cop, and my job as a mentor officer is to make sure that he understands everything: how to be a 20-year veteran, how to retire from the job, not how to make it necessarily the year. FTOs [field training officers] will take care of that. You've got to make sure that they are human beings and members of society for that entire career.

Community policing was also seen as a critical component in preventing the us-versus-them mentality by allowing officers the opportunity to have more positive contacts with the community. As one of the participants commented:

I think when you're in control also, you see the community in which you work a little differently than a community police because you're in service. Okay. The radio dictates your movements, your time. The only time you're in control is when you take a personal or when you take lunch. When you're in community policing, you dictate what happens. You control the pace.…Most officers I've seen who come out of patrol…[when] they come into a position in community policing, they sit back. Say, for example, in a situation like this [the focus group] and it's, "Oh." The sigh of relief. You're in with people [who] have education, [who] have a home, [who] have interests other than robbing a bank, taking drugs, beating on kids, or whatever the case may be.… If they were in service [patrol], whatever skills they have, now they can come to surface. In other words, they're

using what they have.…So that diminishes that us-versus-them because they…get a chance to know a police officer or know the community on a first-name basis.

The participants agreed that all police officers exhibit some degree of an us-versus-them mentality—as a mechanism for survival—but that attitude in a more extreme form can cause problems with the community's perception of the police. Community policing may prove to be an important key for addressing the problem by creating more-positive interactions with the community that will, in turn, provide officers with a more-positive perspective on the people they serve.

Code of Silence
The topic of the "code of silence" or "blue wall of silence" generated more controversy than any other topic discussed. The discussion began with a flat denial: "I've got to tell you: there is no code of silence." However, even this naysayer before long admitted to what amounted to a code of silence, though he preferred to call it "police subculture."

At first, some held that the code of silence was a media creation and was based on isolated incidents that would negatively stereotype the public's perception of the police. Others admitted it exists and poses problems, but they suggested it is not as pervasive as is sometimes depicted in the media. The officer who denied outright that a code of silence exists immediately described something approximating such a code for minor transgressions. What concerned him was that people would suggest such a code applied for criminal activities by fellow officers:

Community policing was …seen as a critical component in preventing the us-versus-them mentality by allowing officers the opportunity to have more positive contacts with the community.

The code of silence is I take care of you, you take care of me. Yes, I might drive a drunk officer home. We may overlook the minor things. They're in no way infractions upon society or other police officers.…Good police officers police other police officers. Nobody does that stuff in front of me.…But the media take that and run. Code of silence. Code of silence.…I'll protect just about anything: your morals, your foundation, your beliefs.…But I'm a criminal, and you're going to look out for me. No way. It's just the opposite.… So that code of silence…insults me personally. Its credibility.

Another officer stated, "[T]he blue wall of silence, Louima thing, blue code of silence, and everything else,…this is all stereotyped in the media. Whatever the media see and whatever they print, people perceive that to be true."

Others agreed that the media exaggerate the wall of silence:

I think it does vary from department to department, jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but, in general, I think certain people in the media or just certain people [who] have been violated by the police would suggest that it's so pervasive that's it's going on everywhere.…I'm not a fink, but if it comes down to [my] getting on the box [trial stand] lying for you or [my] putting my family out into the soup line, I'm not going to lie for you.

All it takes is one incident. One negative. And then the media come in and they blow it into like that's what goes on every day, all day.

As the discussion continued, it became apparent that much of the resistance to

admitting to the possibility of the wall of silence resulted from the kinds of activities that were permitted to stay behind the wall. What kind of "police misconduct" was being ignored? Whether the term "police misconduct" referred to officer violations of minor departmental rules and regulations, or to criminal violations committed by officers, affected the participants' perceptions of the code of silence. The participants consistently insisted that for them no code of silence exists for incidents involving criminal misconduct by a fellow officer.

One officer admitted he might turn his head while his partner "smack[ed] a crook," though he would not tolerate stealing:

No, I'm not going to tolerate your stealing in front of me. Okay. I'm not going to tolerate your abusing your family in front of me. Am I going to turn my head while you smack a crook?…It depends.…Then is my partner going to tell on me? Maybe. Is the crook going to tell? Maybe. But that's something that I did.…I think it's upon every officer, if he's going to do something…is it something that I'm going to get in trouble for or is it something that I won't get in trouble for? If there's a chance I'll be getting in trouble for it, 99 percent of the time I'm not going to do it.

One officer described a rejection of the code of silence in his unit:

If somebody has done something, our unit has an understanding. Nobody lies for nobody. You don't do something as my partner that I have to lie for you. …If you are going to require me to lie for you, then I don't want you as my partner…because now what the hell

…[P]articipants …insisted… no code of silence exists for incidents involving criminal misconduct by a fellow officer.

else are you going to require me to lie for you over?

Another officer emphasized drawing the line at felonies:

[T]hat's a felony. There's no cut and dry when it gets to that point. If he puts you in that line of fire, he's not your friend anymore. He's not your partner.…It's not, well, you know, no problem.…But once you cross that line into felonies, you can forget it.…I don't know a cop out there [who's] going to go to prison for another cop.

Another suggested that there are those cops who get involved and those who don't, and the dishonest cops know the difference: "The cops that are doing these kinds of things…they know the cops [who] have integrity [and] who are concerned about their images.…As a result, they don't pull you into that."

Some participants felt either it was their duty to report even small departmental rules violations, or at least they would not cover for the violators if asked, because participating in that way could, if discovered, jeopardize their pay. That is, the cost of upholding the code of silence could be too high: "I'm not a snitch, and I'm not a fink, but if it comes down to [my] getting on the box [and] lying for you or [my] putting my family out into the soup line, I'm not going to lie for you." Whichever position was taken on whether to report such infractions, the decision was generally viewed as being at the discretion of the individual. That discretion included whether to report the violation to superiors, to report only if asked, or to remain silent to protect the officer. The following dialogue between two of the participants illustrates the minor rule violation dilemma:

[Officer 1] "Now,…my question to you is what is your line? Are you saying as far as, let's say, a felony, that a fellow officer would commit or [are] you saying some minor rule or regulation? A cop didn't wear his hat."

[Officer 2] "Tell the truth or get suspended for 30 days without pay."

[Officer 1] "It depends upon the instance."

[Officer 2] "No. It depends upon whether or not I tell the truth or lie and my family is put out and inconvenienced as a result of some indiscretion or action as a result of you."

[Officer 1] "It depends upon the incident. Are you going to tell on your partner because he didn't wear his hat?"

[Officer 2] "…well, we don't have to wear a hat.…"

[Officer 1] "You say you are required to wear your vest.…Are you going to tell on your partner because he didn't wear his vest?"

[Officer 2] "I'm going to hope my partner doesn't put me in that position, but if my supervisor—"

[Officer 1] "Would you tell on your partner if he didn't wear his vest that day?"

[Officer 2] "If I would voluntarily go before my supervisor and say, [he] didn't wear his vest. No."

[Officer 1] "Why?"

[Officer 2] "That's not my position…if the situation reversed, if the supervisor came before me and asked me the question, you know, I would have to decide at that particular time, but I'm going to tell you here's where it escalates.

"…[O]nce you cross that line into felonies, …forget it.… I don't know a cop out there [who's] going to go to prison for another cop."

"Where they [the public's perception] hold you over the barrel is they constantly want to attack your level of discretion."

If the supervisor says, tell the truth or do 30 days without pay. Well, he didn't wear a vest."

The discussion suggests that for one of the participants, his assessment of the seriousness of the incident and the possible consequences (e.g., disciplinary action) of his failure to report the incident were critical factors to be considered in the decision to "tell on your partner." Similar points of view were expressed by other participants, although one participant felt that it was not at the officer's discretion. That participant emphasized the need for the officer who did not wear a hat or vest to be accountable for that action and not to place a fellow officer in an awkward position when questioned by a supervisor. Reactions to the minor departmental rule violation example included the following:

Where they [the public's perception] hold you over the barrel is they constantly want to attack your level of discretion. They want to say, "Okay, you wouldn't tell on your partner for not wearing his hat, not wearing his vest?" So what's to say that you're not going to tell on him for robbing a bank, taking a handful of money on a burglary call out of the open door in back? Whereas you're susceptible to not turning [him in]…from wearing his vest or wearing his seatbelt. What's to say you're not susceptible for the thing? Same thing might be susceptible for not writing a traffic ticket when you blew that stop sign yesterday. It was my discretion. It's the same thing that makes me take the driver home on a DUI [driving under the influence] rather than arrest him.

Now, as far as…we have to wear our hats if we're in uniform.…So if I make a run and a citizen drives by and sees my partner without his hat on…and I get questioned about it later on, I don't know. He may have had on his hat. I wasn't paying attention. Do I know for sure? Maybe I do; maybe I don't. Is it going to affect my paycheck? That's what he's [the participant] thinking. If it affects your paycheck, yes [partner was not wearing hat] because now you're affecting his livelihood. But if it's something as minor as that [violating the policy on wearing a hat while in uniform], I don't care about that.

If it comes down to something as stupid as a hat, and we're sitting next to one another and the supervisor [asks], "Was [the officer] wearing his hat?" It's up to [that officer] to say, "No, I wasn't." And if [that officer] doesn't, he wants to make me lie over a hat? No, negative. I tell my supervisor the exact truth.…I'm not going to lie for you nor are you willing to require me to lie for you.…No [it's not discretion]. We police ourselves in that way because…if anybody wants to make me lie for them, then that's somebody that I certainly do not want near me.…I'm going to tell the truth, and then that person is no longer a part of whatever, whether it [the incident] be minor or major. And criminal violations are way out. You don't wait for somebody to ask you over. If it's a criminal violation,…you take care of that [person] immediately with your supervisor and that's taken care of.

[Participant's response to the comment made above.] That's why that term [code of silence] is insulting to a good cop. Any [officers who push] me in that line of fire [criminal violation], they brought on themselves. They asked for it.

The focus of the foregoing discussion was a situation involving the violation of a minor departmental rule or regulation. We wanted to find out the participants' perspectives on situations involving more serious (i.e., criminal) forms of police misconduct. An example of a situation involving serious police misconduct was suggested by one of the participants: "Or use the popular one. The handcuffed prisoner [officer physically abuses prisoner]. That's the most popular."

Thus, we asked the participants to provide their views on a situation involving a fellow officer whom they witnessed striking a handcuffed suspect. The consensus among the participants was that officer discretion, as a factor in the decision to report the offense, would be totally eliminated. In addition, some indicated that the individual officer's own moral code would be a crucial factor in the decision-making process. Typical comments included the following:

I'm honest. I'm not going to bull here. I'm telling you exactly the way it is because I don't care. All right. I am not going to,…let's say, tell on my partner about things—and I understand what he's saying—things that do not pertain to my paycheck or to my life, my personal life. No, I'm not. But if there's a chance that it could come back and cause stress and strife in my personal life, without question [I'll tell]. You hit. You know. You should have done it when I wasn't

there. All right.…For me, it's better for my partners [whom] I've worked with to know that yes, if you do something ridiculous, I'm going to let it be known because that keeps them in line and that keeps me in line. Okay. And then there's no question.

No. You take me right out of the discretionary loop once you do that. If somebody is in jail, and you decide to give him a good crack, you took me out of my discretion. You put me now into—you forced me into—the role that I'm already in as a police officer. Now I'm forced to police you. You put me in the line of fire.…So you're accountable at that point.

The attitude has existed here [his department] a number of years where you don't burn blue. The so-called bad cops will put you in that position, and they will try to rely on your loyalty. You see me slap him. It's like okay, you don't— in front of all the guys. Because of the moral issue, do I say, "Yes, you did," or do I say, "No, I didn't see." It's up to the individual officer. You do something criminal, [and] you put me on the spot— indicted, you be a man and you handle yours. Don't force me to force you. Certain lines I don't cross. It's an individual thing.…But a lot of cases we won't come forward, but when the department finds out and we're put in the line of fire, yes, you know it, we know it.…But a bad cop will force you to try to remain silent. He will put you on the spot, and I don't appreciate it. I hate it.

[Y]ou are who you are and you are what you are. The badge and gun only emphasize sometimes what it is that you

"…[A] bad cop will force you to try to remain silent. He will put you on the spot.… I hate it."

are as a person. You have your own set of morals. And yes, the department has [its] set and the society has [its] set, but you yourself, when you talk about code of silence, you know what you'll be able to do and what you'll be able not to do, and it's up to you to make that decision.

"…[I]f your partner does something felonious and you do not say anything about it…you are in just as much trouble as your partner.…"

To provide further illustration of the personal dilemma that an officer contends with in making the decision whether to report police misconduct, one of the officers recalled an incident that he was involved in with a partner. In his discussion of that incident, he framed his story in terms of the earlier discussion of the code of silence as a way to understand the personal challenges that an officer can face:

I had a partner when I first started working vice. On our way to one of the bomb threats, my partner happened to see his girlfriend in the car…with her boyfriend.…I don't know the girlfriend. I don't know the boyfriend.…I didn't know anything.…I had no idea what the hell was going on. My partner says to me, "Hey, that's a friend of mine.…See if you can pull them over so I can talk to her".…I pulled over. I got out. My partner got out. And he got into a physical altercation with this young lady. And so I began to get out of the car to break this up. Her boyfriend got into this altercation also. My partner's gun was drawn, and he feloniously assaulted both of them with the gun.…He beat them. He pistol-whipped them.…

Now, I'm standing there scratching my head going, "Oh, shit. What am I going to do?" Here this is my partner who is watching my back many times, whom

I've gone through doors with…who has gotten out and now he's put me in this situation. What the hell am I going to do?

Well, the easy way for me to do it is to shut up and sit back, and let the investigation start. And let me see what I may have to say. I was going to take that approach until my partner called me …"you can't tell them what went on."

And I said, "Wait a minute." And I started…[comment made by another participant] [to say], "Is this going to affect my house?" Yes. Because…if your partner does something felonious and you do not say anything about it…you are in just as much trouble as your partner.…

So I was going to be quiet until they asked me. I wasn't going to volunteer. That's the way a lot of officers do. They [think], "Well, I'm not going to say anything until they ask. If they ask me, well, I'll make a decision then." Which is what…[comment made by another participant]…I did that until he called me at my home and asked me.…In fact, he demanded, "You can't tell them what went on. Man, I'll be—I'll lose my job."

I said, "Wait a minute. If I don't tell them, I'm going to lose all those same damn things that you're talking about. This wasn't my girlfriend.…But you put me there." Which is what…[comment made by another participant] is talking about.…If you think, as an officer, that you're going to do something that's going to jeopardize your partner or that you yourself could get in trouble for, you better not do it in front of me.

Noting that the participant initially felt he should wait for an investigation or until he was questioned by a supervisor rather than come forward to report the incident, we asked if that was a common approach among police officers. The perspectives the officers brought were theoretical when compared with the actual experience the first officer related. Several officers spoke of a higher standard to which police are held. For example, "We don't have—the public doesn't have those expectations toward those people [people in private organizations]. [When] you look at us, we are held to a higher standard….And we accept it…you have public accountability, just like politicians. You have an accountability to the public."

One participant said his approach would have been immediately to call his supervisor:

> I would handle that differently….And there's no right or wrong, but as soon as that person committed that act, then [it's] up to the supervisor to make that decision. My supervisor gets a call and then he makes the decision…when [an officer] hits somebody for no reason, my supervisor is called. Everybody waits right there and he can explain to [the supervisor]. Because at that point, when he pulls his gun out and pistol-whips somebody for an illegal reason, then he's made my decision for me. I have no more discretion.

Another officer felt it was "a tough call":

> I think [that with] the questions you're asking, we have a policy. As an obligation, you're obligated to report this to internal affairs to come and question you with regard to that. And I think the

question is, are you protecting the code of silence by—even allowing—knowing inevitably you're going to go ahead and break down? But are you, in a sense, I guess, enforcing the code of silence by waiting as opposed to… knocking on the door. Hey, I got something to tell you? That's a tough call.

Another officer invoked both integrity and the higher standard to which the police are held, which favor calling and reporting the incident:

> But ultimately, your integrity is going to be more important to you over your career than your loyalty to one another is going to be. And the public does hold us to a higher level….I mean, it's [the public] certainly [having] the expectation that we are not liars and thieves.

A frank discussion of the pressures of the subculture of policing was offered by one participant:

> I'd say another thing…is the subculture of police….Subculture policing helps hold that down. There's a lot of guys [who] would say things but don't because they're afraid to be chastised by the people around them, the other cops….But let there be a snitch in the department…and we absolutely hate him. It's the worst thing you want to hear about….Very few people…in that subculture say, "Hey, wait a minute. What would you have done?"…Oh, I guess I would have done the same thing. You're danged right you'd have done the same thing. That subculture stops….How you're treated, how you're chastised, how you're labeled. It's a very big thing in policing.

"…[A]nother thing…is the subculture of police…. [L]et there be a snitch in the department… and we absolutely hate him."

"…[Y]ou are judged on the acts of that one [officer]. …[N]inety-nine percent… are out there doing the right thing.…"

The discussion made apparent that a code of silence does exist in the police subculture and could place pressure on an officer's deciding whether to report an incident involving serious misconduct. The officer may consider not only what his or her own morals are, but also how fellow officers will view his or her decision. Officers who report on fellow officers may be "chastised" or "labeled":

> If you place an officer in a position where he would have to either lie for you or face alienation by coming out. We have one guy that busted…our TAC [tactical] unit, but to save himself.…That [was in] 1987 and he's still on the outside. He doesn't exist. He doesn't get backup. No one hangs out with him. Far as they're concerned, he's a bastard child in the department because he came forward in the way he did. He saved himself from indictment but everyone else got indicted.…That's an exception. It's not common at all. It's a one time thing.

> To be isolated for something, for being labeled. It happens all the time.… Nobody wants them around. You're afraid to say anything.

> …[A]s a police officer, you don't get backup…which means that because you stood on something that you felt morally right on…that's a hard pill to swallow.…[U]nfortunately these same officers that sometimes you are snitching on, or you are telling on, or whatever, are the same officers [who] are going to be there at a domestic. Or who are going to be the ones that you're going to [see] when you call for help; they're going to be listening. And they're

going to put down their doughnut and come to get you. That's hard. That's hard.

Although the discussion suggested a code of silence influences their behavior, participants commented that the amount of behavior that involves covering up misconduct is very small. Estimates ranged from 1 to 5 percent. But, as one officer suggested, "[F]rom that 1 percent, you are judged on the acts of that one [officer]. It's 99 percent that are out there doing the right thing.…Because it's that same one person that you will be judged by civvies."

At the close of the discussion, the participants criticized the media for creating the public perception that the code of silence problem is an everyday occurrence in policing. Because of misrepresentation by the media, all police officers are perceived by the public to support each other when incidents of police misconduct occur by not acknowledging to the proper authorities that the incident took place:

> But that [incident] got blown out of proportion [by the media].…Is the blue code of silence, Louima thing, blue code of silence, and everything else…stereotyped by the media? Whatever the media see and whatever they print, people perceive that to be true, no matter how much it is [and] no matter how minute it is.…But that's how people perceive things. And everybody gets stereotyped.

> The media take that one bad experience that he had and make it everyone.

> All it takes is one incident. One negative. And then the media come in and

they blow it into that's what goes on every day, all day. It's like that incident in New York.

The public's perception of the existence of a code of silence poses problems for the police profession, even if the perception is exaggerated. As the participants suggested, the community will not perceive their police as professional if the code of silence or if police misconduct in general is condoned.

Solutions
Agency Procedures for Dealing with Abuse of Police Authority

We posed a number of questions regarding procedures for handling complaints: How should investigations of citizen complaints be handled (i.e., internally or by outside civilian review)? Is civilian review of police misconduct effective in addressing problems of abuse? Do such reviews affect officers' behavior?

Interest is growing in the possibility of establishing independent civilian agencies to monitor police conduct. A number of U.S. cities have some form of civilian review for citizens' complaints against police. However, controversy persists about the best mechanism for handling police misconduct. Police sometimes argue that only the police can effectively "police" the police. We asked the participants for their perceptions of the use of civilian review boards, as well as whether their own cities had established civilian boards for reviewing citizen complaints. Participants responded as follows:

> We are just getting it [civilian review].… We as police officers and the unions are adamantly against it. We are very,

very much troubled by it.…I feel bad for the first one, two, three, four police officers who are going to be the test pilots, if you [will]. They are going to get, I feel, very mistreated. Everybody does. There are good things, don't get me wrong, with a review board.…But right now we are having a hard time incorporating.

> …civilian review board, we have one; it doesn't have any power. It doesn't dictate department policy.

> We have it. A lot of controversy. Lots and lots. Officers don't particularly care. The general consensus is they don't particularly care for civilians judging them and their actions, because they don't see it from—the perception is different.

> They [civilians] don't know the emotional side and everything that we see and we deal with.

> Who is on the bar association? Lawyers judging lawyers. Who is on the doctors' associations? Doctors judging doctors, doctors policing doctors. We are a specialty; we go to training; we deal with other people just like them. Why are we different?

> But in our profession…it's civilians now and not police officers and bosses or mid-management or upper management, however you want to call it, making a decision.

> Ours is not a fact-finding board so to speak. What they do is just an oversight committee that basically ensures that the investigation is thoroughly conducted and that…no indiscretions or abusive things [are] going on during the

"Who is on the bar association? Lawyers judging lawyers. Who is on the doctors' associations? Doctors judging doctors.… Why are we different?"

investigative process.…But everybody seems to be pretty happy and content …in that the police are policing and the citizens are content with the fact that they are somewhat representing them to ensure that the police are, in fact, policing the police and didn't sweep it under the carpet.

I mean historically in [his city] civilian review boards were not a good idea. They didn't work or are not going to work because basically you've got a bunch of headhunters.…We also have…[a committee]. Basically, your peers [assistant chief, captain, lieutenant, sergeant, and a police officer]. And they review the complaint, they review the evidence, and they suggest a punishment.

We asked whether they preferred internal review processes over civilian review boards and received the following responses:

I'll tell you. It should stay the way it's been. IAD [internal affairs division]— whatever you want to call it. I'll tell you what: I had no complaint with ours.… What I need is to take care of our own. And that's one place where they were doing a fine job of it. Our IAD was doing a good job.

…not only IAD, even when it comes down to just a simple supervisor's complaint. [Sometimes] your sergeant has come out and [is] supposed to be with the person and [to] stop it right there before it even gets to IAD.

In general, participants had limited experience with civilian review, but they preferred that the responsibility for reviewing

"…[P]articipants …preferred that the responsibility for reviewing police misconduct be placed in the police and not with civilian review boards."

police misconduct be placed in the police and not with civilian review boards.

Rewarding Good Policing

The topic of rewarding good policing was never addressed directly, but officers referred to it at various times. One suggestion was from an officer who recommended "going to people and saying, 'Hey, you did a really good job.' Nobody ever comes up to me and says that." Another officer put it this way:

You'd like to see somebody come from on top of the hill to say, "Hey, I applaud this officer." That's what I'm saying. And I know [from] being there, it was difficult for [me] and several officers that I work with because you're looking for someone to say—not so much they have to give you a little plaque with your name on it and all that. That's not what I'm talking about. Just [for them] to acknowledge.

In general, the participants felt the need for the department, particularly among individuals in upper management, to recognize the positive accomplishments of officers and not to focus entirely on the negative. Typical comments included the following:

It's difficult to do because I don't think anybody came on this job, number one, if they are financially independent and, number two, being praised. For the most part, it's a thankless job. There are a lot of things that go unnoticed. A lot of people don't recognize or realize …it could be balanced out if people from management to citizens or whoever [could] take as much effort and attention to looking at your deficiencies and [could use] that same energy to look at some of the positive things

you do.…You know, just to tell a guy a job [is] well done motivates that guy to get up and pull himself out of bed the next morning and give…at least that same effort.

But you get hollered at every other day for something that you did [that] in their [police administration] mind is wrong.… So I think there should be an equal amount.…If you are going to get at me about what I do wrong, get at me about something I did right, too.

…in the last three or four years, I received over 40 [commendations] and letters from citizens thanking me.…The community has been very responsive in thanking me. My department has given me two in the same period of time; my partner and I won an international award for problem-oriented policing.…A year and a half later, I haven't received a letter from my department saying good job. But I've received letters from all over the nation saying good job. It's interesting to me that we often don't appreciate those next to us while we [do] appreciate someone from across the country.

We don't get recognized by upper management. I wouldn't say middle management…your direct supervisor probably knows what you are doing because you make him look good as supervisor.…But for all those attaboys that you've got, all the pats on the back, I'm saying, once you make a mistake in judgment—not a severe thing, not a criminal thing—forget about all those attaboys you ever got. Nobody will remember that.

I find that, for me, I was always asking that question in my years of community policing. But I guess for me I found the pat on the back by being asked to come here [as a participant in the focus group]…To me, that was a lift.

I agree with [comment above], [it's the] same thing. That's why I'm here, because of my commissioner, and he thinks very highly of me, which feels good.

In addition to the need for departments to provide recognition of positive police behavior, the participants feel that recognition from the community is also an important factor. While having a difficult time with a certain community in embracing the concept of community policing, one participant commented:

…But I guess that one community that I was speaking of earlier, I think if I got more thank yous and pats on the back from them, I would be more motivated to work with that particular community. But [in] the other two [communities he is assigned to], I can do something as small as [this:] Just one old lady…lives in the community, and she calls me for everything. And every time that I do something for her, she really makes me feel special.

Awareness of this universal yearning for approval and recognition can perhaps inform the improvement of policing and the changing structure of police authority in the age of community policing.

"If you are going to get at me about what I do wrong, get at me about something I did right, too."

Conclusion

The rank-and-file focus group discussions provided insights into some of the most difficult and sensitive issues in policing. Initially, we were concerned that the participants might be hesitant to express their attitudes and thoughts on these issues. In the end, we were satisfied that the discussions were both candid and thoughtful, thus enabling us to view and understand these issues from the perspectives of the rank and file, who are challenged by them on a day-to-day basis. Their perspectives influenced the further development of the survey instrument and continued to affect our research.

APPENDIX D

REPORT ON FOCUS GROUP OF POLICE SUPERVISORS

OCTOBER 27–28, 1997

Rosann Greenspan

David Weisburd

Edwin E. Hamilton

Contents

Police Supervisors

D

POLICE SUPERVISORS

Introduction[1]

We explained the selection criteria that guided the process for choosing the police departments for participation in the two panels of police—one of rank-and-file officers and one of supervisory-level officers—in Appendix C, Report on Focus Group of Rank-and-File Police Officers. However, the method bears repeating here.

Our goal was to achieve representation from various types of departments, as characterized by their style of policing, with attention to size of the community served and region of the country. We began the selection process by using our own expertise and by consulting several colleagues to develop a list of police departments that are particularly known for either community-oriented policing, problem-oriented policing, or traditional policing. We attempted to ensure that all regions of the

country were represented as well as departments of varying sizes. On the basis of the established criteria, we derived a list of 24 police departments, assigning half to the rank-and-file group, and half to the supervisory-level group. As a result, 11 departments participated in the rank-and-file focus group, and 11 departments participated in the focus group of supervisory-level officers.

To guide the participating police departments in selecting representatives to participate in the supervisory-level focus group, we provided the chief executives with a list of suggested criteria. Criteria for selection of supervisory officers were naturally somewhat different than for the rank-and-file group. We asked the chief executives to choose an officer with the rank of sergeant or lieutenant and 3 to 5 years of supervisory experience. For those departments selected for their

…[For] the supervisory-level focus group,…[w]e asked…chief executives to choose an officer with the rank of sergeant or lieutenant and 3 to 5 years of supervisory experience.

...[S]upervisors ...turned to the form of abuse...they perceive[d] as the most extensive...: discourteous behavior by officers toward citizens.

orientation toward community- and problem-oriented policing, we asked that the officer selected be a member of those units. We asked departments selected for traditional policing to select officers from specialized units, such as narcotics or gang units, who have considerable contact with community residents. As requested, their assignments included community- or neighborhood-policing units, and specialized units including narcotics, organized crime, mounted patrol, street crime, and internal affairs. The 11 officers from all regions of the country who participated in the supervisory-level focus group ranged in policing experience from 10 to 29 years, with an average of about 18 years experience as police officers. With respect to their experience as supervisors, they ranged in experience from 2 to 11 years, with an average of 5 years of supervisory experience.

The supervisory-level focus group was moderated by Rhoda Cohen, survey director of the project, from Mathematica Policy Research under contract with the Police Foundation, with the participation of Dr. Rosann Greenspan, Research Director, Earl Hamilton, and Kellie Bryant of the Research Division of the Police Foundation. The focus group met for two days, from 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M., on October 27, 1997, and from 9:30 A.M. to 4:00 P.M. on October 28, 1997.

Following a framework similar to that used with the rank-and-file group, the moderator led the sergeants and lieutenants in a discussion of a range of topics with a set of questions to guide each topic. The broad categories included defining police authority, supervisors' perceptions of the extent and nature of abuse of authority, the effect of community policing on the abuse of authority, societal factors that affect police

authority, the culture of policing, and what can be done to prevent problems of abuse of authority.

In addition, the supervisory-level officers pretested the second draft of the instrument to be used in the national survey. They provided valuable input by reviewing and reacting to each of the survey items, and by making general and specific recommendations. The participants worked diligently, discussing difficult and personal issues they face in policing and their burdens and responsibilities as supervisors in addressing those issues. We are sincerely grateful for their thoughtful and frank conversation.

Defining Issues of Police Authority

We began the focus group by discussing how police supervisors view the boundaries of the proper use of authority, as well as by asking participants to discuss what they consider appropriate and inappropriate conduct in the exercise of police authority. The supervisors immediately turned to the form of abuse that they perceive as the most extensive problem in their supervisory work: discourteous behavior by officers toward citizens. Although some focused on this abuse as the problem in itself ("A lot of what comes through our department is the language complaints, the attitude complaints."), others stressed the relationship between officer insensitivity and the escalation of the problem. They suggested that abuse of a more serious nature could be prevented if officers maintained a polite demeanor from the outset.

One Internal Affairs officer led off the discussion by stating, "Our Internal Affairs Division investigates anywhere from eight [thousand] to ten thousand complaints a

year. And many of them stem from incidents that really need not occur if people were more courteous or officers were more sensitive to people they're talking to." She elaborated that her observation of this problem was also based on her experience while working with patrol officers, "Just looking at some of the complaints…from what was my experience on a district level when I did work with patrol officers, many of the complaints could be avoided simply by being more courteous and more pleasant, schmoozing."

Another officer suggested that no connection necessarily existed between discourtesy and brutality: "We don't have a brutality problem, but we sure as hell have a discourtesy problem."

A key element in courteous behavior recognized by the officers was taking the time not only to "schmooze" but also to explain "what you're doing and why you're doing it.…Most of the time you take the 15 or 20 seconds to explain what you're doing and why you have to do it, and you can avert [or] divert from a lot of problems."

Despite the general agreement that courtesy was the big problem—the problem that concerns their departments—one officer found this emphasis both in the focus group and in his own department surprising:

> I find it very interesting because just two weeks ago we had one of our supervisors' meetings. And IA [internal affairs] was scheduled as one of the presenters at the meeting. And so you have about 30 supervisors from the captain and the sergeant ranks listening to IA and I suppose, like me, expecting that there were going to be some pretty severe topics that IA was

going to focus on. And their complete focus was trends of police officers, trends that are specific to what we're talking about that were—and I'm not trying to lessen it—but nothing more than officers not being personable enough with the public.

One officer shared a recent incident that he just investigated as an illustration of the type of "courtesy complaint" that causes problems for officers and that influences the negative impressions citizens have about the police:

> I've got a good example.…[A]n officer went to a house with his sunglasses on to get some information from a complainant. She asked him to have a seat, but he wouldn't sit down. He wouldn't take the damn sunglasses off. She's pissed off. She says, "He has no concern. Why did I bother to call in the first place?"

> So I chatted with the officer before I came up here about it, "Well, you know, I didn't think about the sunglasses".…Most of our officers are less than three years on. And unless that couch has roaches on it and I've got to scrape them off, you know, I'll plop down anywhere most of the time. But this officer just did not feel comfortable sitting in this lady's house. And it wasn't a call that was a—it was a noise complaint. That's why she called 911. And that's what we see a lot of, that type, where just the body language is all bad, what they're projecting when they talk to people.

As the discussion continued, a theme emerged among these experienced officers

A key element in courteous behavior…[is] taking the time …to explain 'what you're doing and why you're doing it.…'

that suggested that a source of the discourtesy problem was the younger or more inexperienced police officers in their respective departments ("Our department is a very young department…).

As one officer suggested, "We are talking about officers in the field—officers that it sounds like most of them, including [his department] are more inexperienced than even the younger officers, and that they may be more responsible for inappropriate language or conduct."

Another officer noted, "A lot of this is just inexperienced officers [who] haven't been there.… It's a learning process … and most of it goes back to training and experience. You can come out of college with all the degrees you want, but unless you learn people, unless you know people, you can ask for a call, you can fill in the blanks on the forms, but you really haven't solved the problem."

However, another officer indicated that perhaps attention should focus on issues of supervision and training instead of the fact that the incident involved a young or inexperienced officer:

> [I]f the citizen has made a complaint, it's just what we did here at this table. We've only focused on, well, he is a young officer. We've got a good police department, but they are coming out with training. And if they come out with an attitude, the attitude is either purveyed by management or by training. So it's either the supervision or the training [that] makes the officers handle situations, because no officer wants to go out there and have a complaint. And no officer wants to go out there and do

"…[I]t's either the supervision or…training [that] makes …officers handle situations.… [N]o officer wants to go out there and have a complaint."

something improper, specifically a young officer coming off the street. Police [officers] create attitudes, and we get cocky and we get arrogant, and we get authoritative sometimes in situations. But it's either allowed by the management, or it's taught by the training, or it's taught by the senior officers.

Yet another officer suggested that he doubted that training was the culprit because training in his department had been emphasizing communication for the past 10 years, and yet the complaints had continued to increase:

> I find it interesting because, for us anyway, our academy instruction has changed dramatically in the last 10 years where the educational process is specifically focused on how to better deal with the public, and [on] what different social groups you are dealing with and what expectations those groups have. Yet I'm hearing that the trend is that just not listening well enough, officers using inappropriate language or are not taking the time to see another side of the story or whatever.

The officer concluded, "Maybe the public is just…less willing to listen to us, to our authority." This comment was part of a very interesting discussion of whether the attitude and expectations of the public have changed, whereby they are less willing to accept police authority at the same time that they want more from the police. These changes, rather than an increase in disrespectful police behavior, have raised concern about police conduct. In other words, perhaps the public has been changing the definition or boundaries of proper police behavior. The same officer suggested

earlier: "So I think that it's changed a little bit, the public's perception of how open the officers should be to their discussions, the way that they're talked to [by] the police. And I think that the expectation from that end is a little more than it was in the past."

One officer suggested, "I think they kind of look for us to be a little bit more compassionate to their needs or [to be] able to give them the answer to their solutions right then and there."

Another officer noted, "What I have found over the 24 years—and it seems to be getting worse, at least in [his city]—is there is less of a willingness of the [public] to submit to authority." This comment met with general agreement from the participants.

One officer offered his perception of the negative attitude that the general public has toward police authority, which results in a need for greater "verbal skills" on the part of police officers:

> [T]here [are] going to be the one percenters [who] are going to complain, no matter what the officer does. But also now it's like you're having to use more verbal skills to get over the immediate dissension that people have about police authority. Before, …whatever a police officer told someone was not questioned. People just reacted and responded out of the respecting authority. With the media and the perception of us becoming more human and our mistakes being magnified, people don't accept what a police officer says as quickly as I think they used to.

One officer suggested that the problem is lack of empathy, that officers who come through the cadet program or who come from suburban areas "don't associate with the area that they work with. They don't have the empathy that they should have with some of these other cultures that they police."

Another officer argued, "[The empathetic officer] has greatly improved over the last number of years,…but the complaints are more now."

Another officer pointed out that standards of acceptance of police authority vary from community to community and depend on how residents in a community view past relationships with police. Thus, the boundaries of acceptable behavior are variable:

> I also think that it depends on where you're working. What's acceptable in one area of your community might not be acceptable in another. I could tell two people the same thing in different ends of this city. And one might take offense at it, but the other one would just go ahead and just do it because it's the norm. I think they look at who they used to deal with…the expectations of the past, police officers, as opposed to what we're dealing with now.

Further discussion indicated that the standards set by the citizens have altered considerably since the Rodney King case and the increased media attention it brought to police authority. One supervisor suggested that the public's greater expectations are related to their being better informed about law enforcement:

> [T]he public's expectations, as well as their knowledge of law enforcement, has changed here in the last 20 years.… Obviously one of the big benchmarks

…[S]tandards of acceptance of police authority vary from community to community and depend on how residents …view past relationships with police.

was Rodney King.…[The case] had nationwide impact. Something else that goes along with that in just about the same time period is the development of the news media to where they are always out there, and their cameras are always rolling; they are capturing all these events. So the public's knowledge of how we operate in law enforcement has increased and changed.… I think these are two significant things that have changed the public's outlook of law enforcement and their expectations of it.

One participant complained that citizens now expect that they can provoke officers with impunity and that since Rodney King, police are expected not to react but to be "robocop":

> You should be able to walk up to a policeman and slap him, kick him six or seven times, and then when he starts to raise his fists, say, "I give up," and the policeman is supposed to say, "Oh, okay. Could you put your hands behind your back for me?"

In concluding the discussion about defining the boundaries of abuse of authority and leading into a discussion about supervision, one participant pointed out the multiple, interactive levels of defining, exercising, and controlling authority. He suggested that successful encounters depend on the citizen's acceptance of the legitimacy of the officer's authority, as well as on the unseen supervisor's acceptance of authority over that officer: "So, it's a citizen's willingness to be policed as well as a supervisor's willingness to supervise and make hard choices and hard decisions."

"…[I]t's a citizen's willingness to be policed as well as a supervisor's willingness to supervise and make hard choices.…"

Abuse of Authority and the Role of the Supervisor
Handling Citizen Complaints of Abuse of Authority

Participants' critiques of the citizen complaint process became a vehicle for entry into an interesting discussion of the role of the supervisor. A number of participants expressed the view that the complaint process had changed in significant ways that have led to an increased number of citizen complaints. Citizens increasingly abuse their right to complain about an officer's misconduct, and the supervisor's right to reject complaints as unfounded has been removed. One officer called it "abuse of complaints":

> I would just like to add one thing,… personally. There is also abuse of complaints being taken; that's a fact. In this information world we live in, [all people know] they can sign a complaint. A lot of complaints are used as leverage for— I know defense attorneys [who] just tell their clients right off the bat, you go down and sign a complaint against that officer, for assault, whatever—verbal abuse. And it's used as leverage in court for a plea bargain situation. So I think everything said in here is correct, but there is also abuse of the system. It's just so widely known that you can sign a complaint against a cop, [that] you can sue a cop or threaten a cop [when] you are going to sue,…that it's abused in some forms.

Others agreed that citizens abuse the system as a way to punish the officer:

If a complaint comes in, we've got to document it, and then we've got to go through the investigative steps. [We've got to] interview, we've got to call, and it's just a bunch of bullshit [in] the majority of the cases. A lot of it is just… vindictive. They are trying to backdoor the officer because they [complainant] got jammed up on something. So they want to deflect the—what R——was saying. They want to deflect the focus of what's going on. And they want to jam up the cop by making a complaint.

It's like he said, like R——said; it's a ploy to get something for nothing. And we find it all the time. Most complaints are not valid.

One participant, acknowledging an increase in complaints, was curious about whether the other participants were required as supervisors to take reports of complaints that they knew would not be sustained. "So is it the norm now that we are accepting these complaints, and would everyone agree that there is nothing wrong with a supervisor telling someone on the phone or in person, 'I'm sorry ma'am. You don't have a complaint.'"

Replies indicated agreement that they should have the discretion to reject complaints, but that their supervisory authority to handle incidents in such a manner had virtually been eliminated.

As one noted, "We don't—the administration has taken that away from us as mid-level managers, as frontline supervisors, our administrations have taken that away from us. We have orders that if somebody calls in a complaint, we are going to put it on paper; it's going to be documented." That

officer gave an example, by way of contrast, of when he was a young patrol officer and his own supervisor had exercised the discretion to reject a complaint against him:

I remember when I came on, my sergeants—I remember I was working traffic and I went out and I tagged this woman for speeding and whatever else. Well, she called in a complaint to my sergeant. And this woman alleged that I used certain words…"I'm sorry ma'am," he said. He said, "Ma'am, I have known this officer for a number of years. I know how he speaks and I know the terms. He says he does not use language like that. You have no complaint. You are lying." And she hung up the phone on him, and it was true. And we don't have that authority anymore.

Other participants shared the frustration that all complaints must be accepted, suggesting it "breaks down morale" and contributes to "just an awful environment":

He is right.…When people walk in with a complaint, no matter how minute it is, we have to take it; it has to be written down before we can do anything.… I'd rather go to bat for that officer who I know didn't do it, because it breaks down morale. Our morale here is very low. So to have these additional complaints only tears the officers down. On top of that, if the complaint is so gross, we call the [officers] right off the street and take their gun and badge right then and there. And then we just do the initial paperwork, and it goes straight to IAD. Sometimes we are not even able to get involved until it goes to what we

"…[A]s frontline supervisors, …[w]e have orders that if somebody calls in a complaint, we are going to put it on paper; it's going to be documented."

consider a trial board. And if among the peers, you actually have to go—it's like court, and you feel so bad for the officer because the majority of the time it's not true.

General Supervision Issues
The discussion of the complaints process led to a broader discussion of what some considered the powerlessness of police supervisors at all levels:

> You know, I've got to say 85 [percent] to probably even 90 percent of the officers in any organization want to go out there and do the right thing. They also want support.…What happens in [this city] [is] we have a big media board and we've got neighborhood activist groups. We have what is feel-good community policing; we have civilian review board, cruiser review board, accident review boards, discharge, dog bites. And everybody today, and it's probably not just [in his city], but all over, it's a contagious attitude. We are being challenged constantly. Everything is second-guessed. You are second-guessed by civilians, supervisors. I mean, our chief is—there is no such thing as really a lieutenant or sergeant's job. They have taken your power away from there. City government plays too much into our administration's decision making. It's just an awful environment.

> But, you know, it starts from the top down.…They have kind of taken the sergeant's rank. It's a nothing…but it's powerless, and lieutenant's [rank] is even less power.…Unfortunately, the rank—what used to be the meat and

"…[L]et's zoom in on people who are… beating people up, cursing at people. I know who they are; you know who they are."

potatoes of the organization—was sergeants and lieutenants. The sergeants ran a lot of stuff, and lieutenants [did too.] You worked at a harmonious relationship and you did your stuff on the street.…Sure, we have some bad cops go through the system, absolutely. Do we have discourteous guys? Yes, definitely. But, by and large, most officers want to go out there and do a good job. We need support from the chief, and we don't get it in our city. We just don't get it. It's kind of a joke.

Others disagreed, noting that the supervisor still retains the power to review the complaint packages: "But the sergeant and lieutenant do have a lot of power because you have the power of lieutenant when you review those packages."

As the general discussion of the supervisor's role continued, one officer expressed concern that management is bound by procedural guidelines that require it to create "blanket" standards and policies instead of addressing the problems individually. This procedure leads to an inability to target problem officers:

> I just—well, we spend too much time in the police department, I think.…If you have a problem, instead of zooming in on people who are committing the problem—who are the reason for the problem—we spend too much time on blanketing everything. Okay, big sexual harassment policy for everybody, which you need to have.…But let's zoom in on people who are specifically doing the sexual harassment, or whatever it is, beating people up, cursing at people. I know who they are; you know who they are. Let's stop

acting stupid and zoom in on them. Who is abusing sick time? I know who they are. Again, you know who they are.

Although he agreed that not addressing the individual problem leads to unnecessary blanket policies among other problems, one participant argued that the fault for not addressing problems at the individual level originates with the sergeant who protects his officers rather than holding them accountable. He made the suggestive observation, which others corroborated, that "most supervisors in law enforcement more often want to be the buddy rather than to be the supervisor":

> That comes back to police supervision.…[I]n a lot of instances, sergeants know what's going on, protecting their employees. The lieutenant knows that the sergeant is doing the protection and [that] nobody is responding to the specific issue. So, therefore, departments have to come out with blanket policies instead of accountability. If the sergeant is not accountable, which is the first-line supervision [and] supervisor to the troops [and if] he doesn't work with the troops and address training issues, and address the deficiency that the officer has, then it all gets convoluted as it goes through the system.…Then it gets to Internal Affairs because it becomes a big problem because we don't [address the problem.] Some of my troops, when they first start working for me, call me nitpicky because I do. You have to look at the small issues to keep from having to look at the big issues. And most supervisors in law enforcement more often want to be the buddy rather than to be the supervisor.

This idea was repeated that supervisors are reluctant to behave as supervisors. One officer noted that in his department there seemed to be a breakdown in supervisory responsibility, which he attributed to the fact that many of the supervisory-level personnel were young and too close to their experience as patrol officers. Therefore, they were unwilling to serve in a supervisory capacity:

> …So we've got a bunch of young cops coming on, and we've got a bunch of young supervisors who have not been able to make the break from patrol officer. Now all of a sudden they are supervising. So I think there has been somewhat of a breakdown in super[vision.]—I mean, they are still the patrolman's tail kind of thing.…I don't know how many times I've gone up to some of these kids, and I [will] say, "You are a cop; take charge of that situation and go." And so they—we are behind the learning curve so much. So, it's a citizen's willingness to be policed as well as supervisors' willingness to supervise and make hard choices and hard decisions.

Another officer showed the serious consequences that can result when supervisors are unwilling to behave in accordance with their supervisory responsibilities. Describing a current investigation in her department, she suggested that in an apparent situation of a "very sick," serious pattern of abuse including using verbal abuse, planting drugs, and stealing money, the supervising sergeants must have been complicit at least in that they "didn't do anything" about the situation:

> There—in that situation—this investigation is not over yet. It has to come to trial. But we found that there was a

"…[M]ost supervisors in law enforcement more often want to be the buddy rather than…the supervisor."

pattern of complaints. That is why this whole investigation was launched: there was a pattern of having verbal abuse complaints, planting drugs, stealing money, all kinds of allegations that took on a very sick pattern. And when we went and looked at it and did the joint operation with the FBI,…it turned out to be true.

But there were all sorts of things that had been discussed here that fall into that [category]. Number one, there has to be—and it has not surfaced yet—but there has to be a level of, if not complicity, responsibility on the part of the sergeants. These officers were absolutely lawless, and I don't know how anyone could not have seen that. And although people aren't pointing fingers and naming names yet, I would imagine that might happen in the future. So there is a level of responsibility on these sergeants and lieutenants that no one accepted. I find it—coming from the situation and my background [of being] with the police department,…[for] 20 years—I find it astounding that these sergeants didn't do anything.

Another officer suggested that the apparent unwillingness to exercise supervisory responsibility may be related to the absence of proper supervisory-level training, as well as a lack of innate ability to effectively supervise others:

A lot of that, I think, has to do with the training of the supervisor and then just the innate ability to be a supervisor. You can have a street cop who is excellent at what he does. Then people assume that he would make a good supervisor, but he wouldn't.

"…[W]hen that new recruit… sits with his… [field training officer] for the first time, that is where he begins learning the police culture."

People assume that if you pass the test, if you are a good test-taker or you can interview well, you are automatically a supervisor. Our department provided no training to be a supervisor, and I think that that is very reflective in what you are saying; here is your gold badge; go do it. Then you just flounder around; there is just, in many cases, no training.

Although he acknowledged the important role of the supervisor, one participant pointed out that the role of field training officers (FTOs) was also a critical component in shaping the new recruit because "that is where he begins learning the police culture":

One thing that we haven't talked about in officer conduct and authority and what not, [is the police culture and] I think that's where it starts.…You can have all the training that you want, but when that new recruit hits the street and he sits with his FTO for the first time, that is where he begins learning the police culture. That is where the FTO says, "I don't care what they told you in rookie school; this is the way it is, pal. This the way we are going to do it." I think it starts with their FTOs.

Nevertheless, these police supervisors emphasized the view that the role of the supervisor as a role model and mentor is a critical factor in setting standards and expectations regarding appropriate behavior. As one put it:

We are talking about [a bunch of factors] here, but one that I keep going back to, and I think is so vitally important, is the supervision. The supervisor, the first-line supervisor, the

sergeant, is so critically important in how he sets the tone, the expectations. How he says things and supports department programs or doesn't support them [is critical], if not by what he says, then by body language and tone of voice—[by] how he sells it or doesn't sell it. That sort of thing, I think, is real.

Similarly, another participant commented:

I think the whole thing comes down to expectations: expectations that the sergeant has among his troops, [and] expectations that the lieutenants have for the sergeants. I could go with my department, and I could pick out a sergeant and his group and another sergeant and his group, and one group has better morale, or another group has more arrests, or that group is doing a better job for some reason. What is the reason? Well, this sergeant is there mentoring, doing the coaching that he or she needs to do.

Another stated that it is "the individual supervisor [who] is important….A lot of that, I think, has to do with the training of the supervisor and then just the innate ability to be a supervisor."

Most agreed that it is the supervisor's most important responsibility to show the officers how to behave by "set[ting] the tone" and acting as a "role model":

But if you are an example, a role model, you basically don't have to even give your unit a talking to; we are going to do it my way. My way is the right way. Your reputation? The people know. No matter what job you are working. If you come into a certain supervisor's unit, they'll know what they can get over.

Cops want to be told what to do. Told is the wrong word. But they want you, as a supervisor, to find things for you to do.

Handling Situations of Police Misconduct

We asked the supervisory-level officers to discuss how they handle incidents of police misconduct by officers under their supervision. In contrast with their earlier complaints of lack of discretion in taking reports of complaints, the participants generally stressed that supervisors have a great deal of discretion in determining appropriate discipline, which ranges from "coaching and counseling" to formal reprimands or terminations. One participant described his department's system as "broad enough" to provide him a range of options, depending on his assessment of the officer's intentions and needs:

Our system is set up broad enough that I can look at the investigation that IA [has] completed and decide whether it was a training issue or whether it was intentional conduct. Then, depending on what it is, I can decide if it is a written warning or something as formal as a reprimand or termination. There are mistakes of the heart and mistakes of the head. If it is an error where he thought he was doing the right thing, then he goes back to coaching and training.

Another officer spoke of the "leeway" and "latitude" provided by his department's "discipline matrix":

We have a discipline matrix, and part of that matrix is policy and procedure inquiries.

"…[T]he first-line supervisor, the sergeant, is so critically important in how he sets the tone, the expectations."

It may not be a violation, but they didn't follow the correct policy and procedure. That gives supervisors some leeway in making some decisions on whether this qualifies for coaching and counseling or should there be some form of discipline attached to it such as letter of reprimand or days off. So we have some latitude there.

...[A] clear line exists between... behavior that can be overlooked or treated lightly and... intentional criminal activity that deserves the harshest response....

Another officer explained that his discretion ranged from deciding to do nothing about an incident to deciding to terminate officers involved:

It's very discretionary, and I guess that is why you aren't getting a lot of response to this. I can only speak for myself, but I have had to handle matters that range from where nothing was done to where officers were terminated. To be truthful, in some situation...I stuck my neck out and ignored the department procedures and policies and dealt with the officer one-on-one. It is hard to identify exactly why I did that, except that I thought it was a worthwhile officer who did [his or her] job well and efficiently, and I didn't want to see a blemish on [that officer's] record.

However, participants were quick to distinguish incidents involving intentional criminal activities, where they would not exercise discretion to impose less than the maximum discipline. As one officer said, "If it is something criminal, then you are on your own; shame on you." Another put it this way:

But I also set a very specific football field. You can make a mistake while you are doing the job, and I will fight

and cover for you the best that I can. If you make a mistake because you are messing off or trying to do what you aren't supposed to do, then I will burn you and I will send you to Satan or wherever you need to go.

The general sentiment that a clear line exists between a behavior that can be overlooked or treated lightly and an intentional criminal activity that deserves the harshest response was expressed by one officer in this way:

I think everybody would agree: we're all supervisors. If it's something from the heart—mistake of the heart [and] the intentions were good—fine, everybody makes mistakes. Nobody walks on water. It's something you can work on, improve or coaching, training, simple documentation, whatever, one-on-one over coffee. But if it's criminal, shame on you. Bye; we don't need you; we don't want you.

One participant noted that helping out an officer accused of a serious violation could get the supervisor in trouble. "And I agree, if I can fudge a little bit on a minor infraction and handle it differently, I'm going to do that if it's a good hardworking officer. But I'm not going to cross that line where I'm violating—getting myself in trouble."

As the discussion focused on criminal misconduct by police officers, one officer remarked that "misconduct is progressive," and it is the responsibility of supervisors to observe and document patterns of inappropriate officer behavior.

I think that misconduct is progressive, and a lot of times supervisors, when it's in the minor stages, choose not to

document in some way, so that a pattern can't be seen. And the thing is, too, an officer sometimes is transferred around to where we pass our discipline problems to somebody else. Somebody will say, well, what do you think of this guy. And you're thinking, oh, boy; he's great; take him. You can't go wrong with this guy. But the point…is then the disciplinary process starts all over.… That supervisor has to see this progression, and it gets to the point when they pass him on. So the officer goes through a long time without any discipline when maybe we should be documenting more.

An officer provided a story of sexist verbal behavior toward her by a rookie that she came to regret having laughed off. "Well, 5 years later, he was indicted and fired for stopping vehicles with young women in them. He'd run their plate, stop them, find out they had an active traffic warrant or something on them. [He'd] get them in the car with him and say, "We can work this out. You know, if you want to do something for me, we'll let this warrant go.""

However, another argued that it may be unfair to use an officer's history of complaints. "[I]f you have 15 brutality complaints, does that mean that there is some legitimacy to any allegations if you caught them in a shooting[?] Not necessarily, because officers that work street-crime units or narcotic units are the ones [who] get all the complaints."

Another officer agreed that the number of complaints an officer receives is related to the work assignment: "I agree. It depends [on] where you work. You know if you're a community service officer, [with] more positive contact, you're apt to get a lot less complaints. If you're the street-crime unit where you're kicking in doors, chasing these knuckleheads, and doing what you've got to do, they're going to come in."

One participant noted that a problem with the way supervisors handle problems of abuse of authority is a lack of consistency in disciplining officer misconduct:

> One problem we have with our [supervisory] officers is the lack of consistency.…[M]aybe on Charlie's side it's, try to get your ass there next time; I throw it in the trash. And officers [hear] that. Well, on Charlie's side you can get away with that; on the Adam side you can't. And that's a problem we have in our department; we're not applying the rules fairly to everybody.…I just think they really do lack consistency in their routines every day,…no problem, I'll cover it; don't worry about it, I'll take it. You can't do that. And…the biggest problem we had is everyone needs to supervise and be fair about it. And I think it's a learning process.…I think you said [that] everybody wants to be your buddy, wants to be your best friend. I think we all want to be buddies with our officers, but there's a bottom line you cross. I'm your supervisor today, and this is what we've got to do.

But how clear is the line that the participants saw between criminal and noncriminal or between appropriate and inappropriate behavior? The moderator presented a scenario and asked the participants to discuss whether the behavior constituted abuse of authority. A handcuffed suspect is sitting at an officer's desk while he fills out the necessary paperwork. With no

"…[M]isconduct is progressive," and it is the responsibility of supervisors to observe and document patterns of inappropriate officer behavior.

provocation from the officer, the suspect suddenly spits in the face of the officer. As a reflex action, the officer pushes the suspect in the face, causing the suspect to fall over the chair onto the floor.

Responses varied widely. To some extent, differences could be attributed to departmental policies, but some participants indicated opinions would vary within their departments. The first reaction was "No," this is not an abuse of police authority:

> No…I don't think that—I think that's pretty much a normal—not a normal, if that's the right word—reaction of an officer to use your hand to that person's face.…I don't think the officer intended on that person's falling over backward in the chair and busting his head open or whatever the repercussion. And I don't think that that's an abuse of authority. I think that that's a reaction to a disgusting act by this person who's sitting in the chair. If you can cover [the person's] mouth and prevent [him or her] from spitting and the [person from falling] over in the chair, you're doing the same thing, which would be perfectly fine.

An officer explained that his department's policy would permit the behavior because "if there's a handcuffed prisoner…in the back of your car, and that handcuffed prisoner is spitting and kicking, we can use OC and spray that prisoner in the face, which is very, very painful. And that's completely proper." Yet he expressed the opinion that many officers in his department would, nonetheless, not approve: "[T]here are plenty of people who would say that this is an abuse or improper reaction to that situation."

"…[W]e pay… officers… to make split-second decisions,… we've got to give…[them] the necessary tools to make… decisions."

Another participant was clear, "By my department standards, it would be abuse—it would be excessive force." Yet he felt, "I think it would be judged with the entire situation in mind. In other words, an officer might not suffer a great deal of discipline."

Another analyzed the situation similarly, stating that although "there [are] very few instances that I know of that justif[y] striking someone [who is] handcuffed because you do have complete control of him,…if it's retaliatory, it's abusive. If it's reflex, it's not abusive."

Another officer felt, "Once they're cuffed, that's the end of the game," although "you do have to take some kind of physical action to handcuff some people."

Another put it this way: "I mean, 99.99 percent of the time, if a prisoner's handcuffed, if the officer strikes him, it's wrong."

And yet another officer said, "If you're handcuffed in my office and you spit on me, [even if] not handcuffed, I don't care; it's an assault.…I'm not going to continue to beat you, but I'm going to have to knock you to the floor as a reaction."

The discussion concluded with one officer expressing a consensus that each situation has to be judged on its own merits and that officers must be provided the tools to exercise their discretion well:

> The bottom line is each situation—I mean, we pay these officers to make decisions, to make split-second decisions.…[Y]ou read each case. But each case rises and falls on its own merits about what a particular officer did at a given time given the situation. You can't come up with a

blanket statement concerning everything because each situation has its own nuances, has its own differences. And yes, we've got policies and procedures. But within those policies and procedures, you've got to have the discretion. It's something that we talk about all the time, officer discretion.…We've got to train; we've got to coach; we've got to do all those kinds of things that give our officers the necessary tools to make the kinds of decisions.

Supervisors' Perceptions of the Extent and Nature of Abuses of Authority

The Role of the Media

Even before we raised the question, some supervisors were expressing concern, even bitterness, about the role of the media in misrepresenting the extent of abuses of police authority: "[A]nother element of policing that is there and we don't want it to be…is the media. If the media stayed out of a lot of things, we wouldn't have the problems that we do because they put a spin on something that isn't there."

As one officer expressed what she felt was the media's obvious bias against the police, "I mean, aren't we tired of the 1968 convention yet?" She continued, "[T]hey are absolutely ruthless when it comes to police officers."

Another officer put it this way: "We're judged on Rodney King, Fuhrman."

One officer explained his view of how the media manipulate public opinion to believe police brutality has occurred when it has not for the purpose of sensationalism:

The media…take situations that are perfectly justifiable, perfectly within the scope and conduct of the officers, and they turn [the situation] into a negative. And then they go out into the community and they elicit [responses]—they love these…immediately after the incident to get the people screaming and hollering about police brutality. And that's what they leave the public with.

An officer suggested that these situations occur particularly when the police respond only by saying, "There is a case under investigation, can't respond, there's no comment.…Well, then they go to the dirt bag, and the dirt bag's family, and they report it as fact."

Another officer spoke of the inaccuracy of the reporting,

By and large the media are lower than slime. I mean they're absolutely ruthless. They don't care [what] they'll do, and they don't care what facts they destroy. I've been on situations and I've read about it in the newspaper, and I'm quoted. I mean I look at the situation that's described and I wonder if I was even there, and I'm the one that handled it.

Another asked, "Where are their ethics and morals?"

One participant pointed out the reporting inaccuracy that can occur when only a final blow inflicted by a police officer is seen:

We paint the picture that the police department and the government is automatically wrong when they go [to]

"…[The media] are absolutely ruthless when it comes to police officers."

"We're judged on Rodney King, Fuhrman."

the situation. And then of course, somebody that saw the last swing of the cop finally hitting the guy, no matter how bad the cop is beat, their statement is, Johnny was on top of them just beating the hell out of him. So that's what's all over the media.

Another said that the media are not held accountable for the accuracy of their reports. "I wish there was some way we can hold them accountable, but we can't. We all know we can't. They can do whatever they want, when they want. And it's just unfortunate that they do that type of stories."

"…[G]ood publicity comes and goes real quickly…. [A] bad incident… goes on for months…."

One officer suggested that police departments could and should pay more attention to their relationship with the media:

> But the other thing is [that] we don't massage the news, the press, and the media. We don't want to acknowledge that it does have the large role that it does have. And our departments—most departments—do not use it, and put it in as family with us like it probably should be, so that we can control and manipulate the press, just like the press controls and manipulates the facts that they get from us. But nobody really works at it.

This led to a discussion of the importance of the role of the chief in counterbalancing the media's exaggeration of police brutality. Some felt that their departmental leadership was not afraid to stand up for their officers in controversial cases ("Chief —— came right on the television and said, 'Hey, they did exactly what I expected detectives to do.'"). Others indicated that their chiefs never supported the officers'

behavior before the media. (When one commander stood up on television for an officer who shot a pellet gun, it was "absolutely rare, because the chief chewed his ass later on.")

At least one officer felt that even though the media are as ruthless and awful in his city as the others had depicted, "Our department…has a great deal of credibility and respect from the media." He pointed out, "The press is also used in a lot of occasions by us, and it brings out some of the positive things we do. We're trying to implement and improve our work, and so on. So there's a positive side as well."

Another officer agreed that the media can provide the police with good publicity, but he cautioned:

> Well, the good publicity comes and goes real quickly. You know, you may have a good day [such as] a community day, and the police are interacting very well, but it's gone. If that was on Monday, it's gone on Tuesday.
>
> You have a bad incident [and] there's an allegation of misconduct. It goes on for months and months, and then a year later they'll play tapes…and so forth. So I think that we have to use the media as much as we can to show the good things. But I think that they are self-serving when it comes to the bad things, because it's more sensational; people want to watch that more often— just like any other bad sensational thing.

The Extent of Abuses of Authority

Participants agreed that violent acts of police misconduct were isolated aberrations perpetrated by a very small number

of problem officers, despite the apparent public perception of much more widespread problems: "I mean, how many law enforcement people are there across the United States [among] the FBI and the local police and the sheriff's departments? I mean, there [are] thousands. We're judged on Rodney King, Fuhrman." But as one officer stated, "I think yes, it is an aberration. But…it's intolerable."

Another suggested, "Cops are nothing more than a microcosm of society at large.…It's not that there's a bunch of rogue cops out there that are brutal and corrupt and criminals. It's just—it's everyday cops going out and doing their everyday job." He continued, "You've got your very best, you've got a large group in the middle, and you've got some on the other end of the spectrum that are not so good, and maybe even criminals.…We need to get rid of them."

Another officer suggested there is little serious misconduct, both because as a "government entity," police are highly scrutinized, and because police officers "have a conscience."

> [W]e're a government entity, so we're totally an open book. We get more scrutiny than the priests [who] molest little boys. We get more scrutiny than the mayor [who's] corrupt. We get more scrutiny because we are representative and we do deal with everybody on a day-to-day basis. But we probably have less corruption and [fewer] problems in our society, the police society, than probably any other organization, any other group of people.

He went on to suggest that "even the idiot [who] comes into this job just to have a job does perceive that we are supposed to do right," and that when police are involved in a criminal incident, they give themselves up quickly "because most policemen have a conscience."

Participants laid blame on the media for perpetuating the public's perception that incidents of police violence are a common occurrence. "[T]hey perpetuate some of these theories about police misconduct, and they would have the public believing this happens all the time, everywhere, and everyday, and so on."

While acknowledging that isolated incidents of police misconduct do occur, participants stressed that their departments work hard to prevent such incidents from occurring. As one officer put it, "[W]ill we find more police officers doing the same kind of thing? Probably, because the money and the drugs are there, and because of the temptations. Have we, as an organization—are we trying our best to look at all kinds of ways to stop this from happening again? Yes, we are." Later, this officer suggested that departments should work even harder at preventing these occurrences, however isolated they are: "But you just have to look at it and say, 'Is the whole system bad?' No, it isn't. But let's take more seriously any hint that there could be something wrong going on with it. Let's really look at it." The officer suggested reviewing all aspects of training and supervision: "[A]nd you just can't discount all of those things: the training, the supervision. All of those things have to be reexamined anytime there's an allegation."

Another participant commended police departments' ability to remove the "bad apples": "And I think, by and large, as organizations, just from what I've been

"…[Y]ou…can't discount…the training, the supervision.… [T]hose things have to be reexamined anytime there's an allegation."

listening,…we do a good job of getting rid of people [who] need to be gotten rid of. It's a long, laborious process because we've got labor contracts to deal with and unions and the whole spectrum. But I think by and large, we do a pretty good job of policing ourselves when these incidents do come up."

…[T]he department had gone too far in creating expectations that the police would solve all the problems.

Abuse of Authority and Community Policing
Community Policing and the Changing Authority of the Police

The officers discussed a variety of issues related to the expanded role of the police in community policing and to the changing and sometimes misunderstood nature of their authority. One officer had recently worked for two and a half years in community policing in a department with a relatively long (10-year) experience of community policing. He described how the department had gone too far in creating expectations that the police would solve all the problems when they initially were trying to convince the community of the value of the new model of policing:

> I tried for years to get the group…to prioritize their problems. They are crime problems; we can deal with crime problems and we will help you deal with some of the civil problems. The biggest problem was the narcotics, the prostitution, and some of the more severe stuff.

> However, they focused, during the entire time that I was there, on the illegal vendors near the school in that area. They wanted the police to fix the problems. And that is a civil problem. You

have Health and Safety in the Health Department who can handle that, write citations.

We tried to redirect this group to those people because that is where the enforcement leverage comes from, not from us. But the point that I am making is they were trying to force the police department to enforce the health violation laws. When I refused, of course they complained to council representatives, and it [got] into the political arena.

We created problems like that years ago when we started this neighborhood policing and [when] it was necessary for us to convince them that the police were on their side. We did absolutely everything for them: civil, criminal, job fairs, cleanups, completely run by the police department. And it had to be that way because we wanted the commitment from them and they wanted to see the commitment from us.

We are just now, after 10 years of doing this, we are just now trying to transition from that; we can't do everything and don't expect us to do everything. We are struggling to do our job. It really impacted their perception of our authority.

He went on to explain how he felt that the expectations of community residents exceeded the limits of the authority of the police:

> Our community meeting was nothing more than a police meeting. I say that because the police were up in front and there were 100 people waiting to

report every problem they had in the neighborhood to the police. They had the expectation that we would come back next week and tell them that the problem had been fixed. We allowed [the problem] to go like that for some time.

We tried to empower these groups, but there was a whole lot of resistance. They really did not want to be empowered; they wanted the police to do it for them. We were not really willing to tell them that their perception of our authority was wrong for fear of their thinking we were bailing out on this program that we were working on for years.

Later, he described how dependent residents can become on "their" neighborhood policing team and the dangers of such over-reliance:

I had myself and 10 officers working a small crime-ridden geographical area as the neighborhood policing team.…[T]hey became completely possessive of my squad. They chose not to call communications to report crimes. They chose to hold onto 911-type aggressive, serious violations until we met the following week so that they could police bash. "Hey, someone pointed a gun at me last Thursday, and I want to report it to you."

"Did you call the police?"

"Well, no; we want a neighborhood policing team officer to respond."

So…there's some caution…with putting these teams together and working in the communities and having them too available to community groups or to the residents to suggest that we were the only ones [who] could address those problems.

…Now they get a patrol officer [who] goes to cover or respond to a problem, and they [have] a complete different demeanor.…They're not comfortable with [the new patrol officer]. They're not familiar [with him or her]. He [w]on't sit and have coffee with them at meetings.

Another officer discussed how police authority under community policing is unlike the "adversarial" authority officers are taught to exercise in their training, with its emphasis on arrests. In community-oriented policing, officers must learn to exercise authority with "the good community":

And partly because the police mentality from the day the person's hired, going through the academy, with their field training officer, all through [the person's] career, it's always go out and make arrests. You know, it's kind of an adversarial training thing here that we're going to battle with the criminal, which we [battle daily]. And there is a place for that [mentality]. But there is not the comparable training to partnership with the good community and engage that community in part of the problem-solving.

One officer described how the expectations raised under community policing can entail an "unrealistic" request to revert to police actions that once may have been acceptable, but now may exceed the limits of police authority:

"…[T]here is not… comparable training to partnership with the good community and engage that community in part of the problem-solving."

…[T]alking about the community… asking for unrealistic things—25 to 30 years ago, in the downtown area, they had what they called the Bum Wagon. And that was a paddy wagon that would go around and just pick up all the bums and, depending on how they behaved, they either went to jail or to skid row or you took them someplace else and threw them out. But they weren't there when everybody got to work in the morning, so it looked nice. And these people were calling for the Bum Wagon to come back. That's what they wanted to do.

However, the community apparently did move the police to take action on the homeless problem by developing new approaches to address a problem that they had ignored up until the old approach was rendered unacceptable. They considered using arrest, but "we didn't think our panhandling ordinance could withstand the scrutiny of a Supreme Court challenge, and we have more than enough homeless advocacy groups out there that would be willing to challenge us. Plus, it's a lousy waste of a police officer's time." Instead, "they came up with some very innovative ways to deal with this, [such as bringing] in service agencies that deal with these individuals. Bring in what's left of the mental health professionals out there [who] will actually come."

Community Policing and the Potential for Corruption

Asked whether community policing increases the risk of police corruption or misconduct, one participant's immediate response was, "I think it's just the opposite.…I think the more you're known in the community that you work, the less likely you're going to get involved in any kind of corruption or stuff like that. I think if you're not known, you're a stranger, nobody knows you, [and] you don't know anybody, [then] I think you'd be more vulnerable."

Similar points of view—that community policing decreases the likelihood of abuse—were expressed by other participants without dissent. One suggested there would be a decrease in both abuse and complaints of abuse because police would be less likely to abuse people they know, and because citizens would be less likely to accuse officers they know of abuse when they use force:

> I think that knowing someone personally [causes] a lot less police misconduct because it would be hard to abuse someone you know or [who] knows you as you are. I think when something is maybe construed as abuse, [for instance,] you have an arrest where you have to use force, [then] the people [who] know you [and] would observe [you] in the neighborhood where you work would be more supportive of your using that force because they know how you are.

Another participant suggested that community-policing officers "take a great deal of pride in their relationship with their community or their area, and they value that pride for the most part. They've bought into that neighborhood and they don't want to tarnish [their reputation].…So I think many of their intentions are so honorable that, again, corruption is not a factor."

"…[T]he more you're known in the community…, the less likely you're going to get involved in any kind of corruption.…"

Another officer pointed out that instances of serious allegations of abuse received at Internal Affairs are rarely, if ever, directed against beat officers:

> …[T]he allegations of serious corruption or serious criminal misconduct are not made against those officers who are walking around, walking beats, or [working] in the neighborhood going to the beat meetings. You don't hear complaints about those officers. You don't see those allegations of misconduct.

> …The profiles of the officers that these kinds of serious accusations are made against are plainclothes [or are] doing tactical or narcotics investigation. Those are relatively young; they have a lot of freedom. I understand the need for that in those kinds of investigations, but I think that's where those kinds of accusations are headed toward—not to the person sitting at the community meeting. I don't hear those allegations.

One officer suggested that although community policing is "a very positive thing," its presence creates problems by contrast for traditional patrol units. "The problem we're dealing with sometimes with patrol units is that when we have to go into an area, [we] know [we]'re met with a contentious attitude because…we don't know these people. I don't deal with them all the time, so when I have to arrest Joe Blow's kid and Johnny Jones's daughter.… "

In reply, another participant pointed out, "We get to know people and we get to know their first names, and we get to know something of the family history, but it's strictly on a professional level."

A participant gave an excellent explanation of why he believed community policing is not "just a throwback to the old beat officer" and will not "lead us into the corruption we saw back then." The difference is the "changes in morality and ethics in law enforcement from back 40, 50 years ago" and after "things like Rodney King":

> Well, I think this theory of increased corruption or potential for corruption in relation to the community, a policeman comes along with the thought that many people say that, well, community-oriented policing is just a throwback to the old beat officer…on the street in New York City. He knew everybody on that street, where they lived and every shop owner and so on. And there was, in fact, corruption very frequently. But I think we're in a different day and age, and I'm not so sure we're going to get the community-oriented policing to lead us into the corruption that we saw back then. The reason… is we've had things like Rodney King, and what's happened in Chicago, and what happened there, and what's described as happening in many cities. I think there is a different emphasis on morality and ethics in law enforcement than we saw back 40, 50 years ago. I don't think even the public has a tolerance for the corruption that was a fact of daily life in New York 50 years ago.

> So I'm not so sure there is this greater risk to it as some people seem to think. I do believe that as time goes on and as community-oriented policing moves forward, there will be some instances of it and people will right away say, "Aha, that was what I was talking about."

"…[T]here is a different emphasis on morality and ethics in law enforcement than we saw… 40, 50 years ago."

But I think we're in a different day and age, and I don't think it's as great a risk.

Another officer explained that he thought community-policing officers are less likely to become involved in corruption because they are under observation and feel the need to be "representative of what people think a policeman should be":

> …[W]hen you look at police corruption, most times it's under unsupervised, uncontrolled situations to where either they've been in a narcotics assignment for a long time, or they've been in some type of special situation where they have no supervision or they have very lax supervision. They work either with just one partner or alone in situations where you have the interaction with the community.

> [Under community policing], [t]he community is going to hold you to a higher standard, and the officer is going to feel [as if] he needs to be [held] to a higher standard because he's going to be representative of what people think a policeman should be. But I think that if— as with community policing—you open up the whole command system, there [are] more avenues for people to point out indiscretions of an officer [who is] working with the community.

Departmental Structure and Community Policing

There was some discussion of the way supervision should be restructured in the transition to community policing: "[I]n most agencies where community-oriented policing [exists]—there should be a looser supervision to some extent where the supervisors [should] empower the officers a great deal more. Give them more and more latitude in problem-solving and in developing relationships with the community."

Not only the structure but also the content of the supervisor's role changes under community policing. One officer who was given charge of the community-policing unit explained how his work has changed.

> I went from being a crime fighter, more or less—not that I'm not a crime fighter now; it's still part of our role. But I basically, for the last 15 months, have become [a] real help [to] these young officers [as they] develop a personality [when] they had the confidence just to talk [to groups]….I was basically like a coach there—but I had younger people who just could not talk to groups or just didn't want to be there.

Of particular interest was the concern expressed by one of the participants that his department and police departments across the country did not have a true definition of what constitutes community-oriented policing:

> I think I can identify some shortcomings. And because of that, I think we're unable to say that you've got a true community-oriented policing program. I think that's what you find quite a bit across the country. I don't think…many agencies…really have community-oriented policing tacked down solid. I went to one conference a couple of years ago…. They started off the conference saying, "What do you do at your agency for community-oriented policing?"

"I don't think…many agencies… really have community-oriented policing tacked down solid."

Somebody says, "Well, we have a horse patrol. Well, we have a substation or a community service center." And they described all these features. But none of those features constituted by themselves community-oriented policing. And we still, to some extent, hear that today.…So, you know, I think we're not getting community-oriented policing. We're not hitting the nail on the head.

Another officer suggested,

I think in our department…the chief… tr[ies] to make the department too user friendly or too just community-policing concept.…The problem is that we have—between [sic] the basketball leagues and the boat rides and the petting zoo…and about 25 community service officers,…these [community] meetings are usually still police-bashing.…But I think we're almost too community oriented.…We've got everything for the community.

Another officer replied, "[W]hat I just heard you describe is a lot of community-relations programs. I didn't hear you talk about community-oriented policing."

Commenting on the problems that the department encountered while embracing the community-oriented policing concept, one officer was concerned about the "separation between the officers who are doing this community policing and what you call patrol.…And that's the basic weakness we have. I mean, community policing is really supposed to be a philosophy that everyone's involved in. And we're just training my neighborhood task force guys, and the patrol guys are kind of being left out of it completely."

This officer also had an interesting observation about the problem of integrating community policing as it pertains to officers assigned to the midnight shift:

…[M]idnights in our police department, and I think [in] a lot of police departments, is just left out in the cold in regard to any of this, community policing, whatever it may be. The midnight tour on our police department is exactly the same as it was 17 years ago when I came on. It's minimal manpower. The desk man, the house mouse, maybe four cars per precinct. That's it. Now they don't know community policing from a hole in their head.

Some of them don't even know we have bicycle patrol out there. What the hell is that? Bike? What the hell [are] you doing with that? When did that happen? About 5 years ago. You know, 2 or 3 years ago. And I think that's where you run into a lot of corruption problems or authority problems, ethical problems.

[Officers in the] midnight tour [are] just out there on their own. And it's their own world. No one gives a shit about them. No one brings them on board. And to me, that's one of [the problems]. I'm always trying to [work on the problem]—because I'm an old midnight guy and I know the midnight world.

And I'm always trying to talk to the bosses that I'm exposed to and say, "You know [the problems]; you've got to get the midnight guys involved in something. You've got to give them some kind of training. You know,

"…[C]ommunity policing is…supposed to be a philosophy that everyone's involved in…and the patrol guys are…being left out… completely."

they're out there 8 hours a day themselves dealing with the same community that we're dealing with, but they don't have any of this philosophy, or any of this training, or any of the support."

Societal Factors That Affect Abuse of Authority
The Effect of Race and Ethnicity

The topic of race as a factor in police behavior—suspicion, investigation, stops and searches, use of force—is an important consideration in any discussion of issues related to abuse of authority. We began the discussion by asking the group: Is it unfair to stereotype, or is it "smart policing" to know that people of certain types, seen at certain hours in certain places, are basically up to no good?

One officer remarked:

> If I know [that] at 2 o'clock in the morning in a residential neighborhood no 12- and 13-year-old should be walking back and forth business, then to some something is wrong and it's not because they're two young black kids. It's because of where they are in that particular setting. If I work in an all-black neighborhood and I have arrested 40 people the last 2 weeks, it's not because I only look for black people; it's because that's all that was there.…I can't arrest white people, Korean people, Italian people if there are none.

Furthermore, the officer stressed that for her the issue of race was irrelevant when it comes to enforcing the law:

> And I say to them all the time, I lock up people who are doing wrong, re-

gardless of color. If you're wrong, you're locked up. I make no bones about it. It doesn't matter. I lock up old people, unfortunately, grandmas, little children, everybody gets locked up if you're wrong. My criteri[on] is who was wrong and who was right. Age has no limit; color has no distinction. Everybody is locked up.

Responding to this comment, another officer suggested, "And I think that comes with experience. You have experience in a certain area; you know who is who and what's going on, who is not supposed to be there and who is. Then you get that gut feeling: this guy—I'll check it out."

Another officer suggested that officers who exhibit racist attitudes in the conduct of their duties eventually "weed themselves out of this job," because racism interferes with doing police work successfully:

> In American society today, [if you have] a racist cop, [and]…in my experience it's always proven true,…black cops [who] were racist and white cops [who] have been racist in [his department]…weed themselves out because ignorance creates ignorance. They make their own stupid mistakes that have cost them their jobs. Everyone of them [whom] I've known in my career [and who] are black and white [and] had a problem with race or being prejudiced or having particular prejudices, weed themselves out of this job. An ignorant person and racism and prejudice and discriminatory actions [are] nothing but ignorance. And ignorance weeds itself out of this job very quickly because it takes away your other senses

and the other things that will make you survive in this line.

Others suggested that the key to preventing problems associated with "stereotyping" is for officers to be sensitive to cultural differences and to effectively communicate their actions to the person they approach. As one officer said, "So not only do we have to become cognizant of what's going on in their culture, they have to realize what the law is as well, because they do bring their cultures here and they [will] do different things than we do that's wrong in our society."

Another emphasized the importance of explaining your actions:

> You have to know how to talk to people….When you approach someone, you have to tell [that person] what you're doing and why you're doing it. Approaching people and conducting an investigation [is] when a lot of problems occur. You explain to whoever you're dealing with, "I just had a robbery by a black [person and] you fit the description. I'm stopping you." They respect that. People who are out there respect that, and if they don't, well, too bad. I've got to do my job. But see, if you just don't explain the situation, black, white, Hispanic, Oriental, it doesn't matter. Then you're looking for trouble.

This remark led to considerable agreement. One participant offered, "Yeah, that's true. If you take the 20 seconds to explain, you can divert a lot of problems. People just want to be informed [of] what's going on." Another added that people want to retain their dignity:

But even when you make [an] arrest, you still have to leave them with a certain amount of dignity, and that's what we were getting on young officers about. [Those officers] were grabbing them and telling them to lay on the ground in the rain. [Then the officers] might have finished what they're doing, but it's raining and they still have [the person] there. We ride by and say why is that person there? Did you do it? Yeah. Well, why is he still there? Put the cuffs on and get him in the car. They're still people.

When asked whether the participants felt that discriminatory police behavior is prevalent among officers or whether it is just a false perception in minority communities that is influenced by the media, one officer stated that the media were in large part responsible for those perceptions:

> …[O]n the race issue, I think the police are still hurting from…the media issue. You very pointedly see Alabama where they were letting the dogs out on the marches and taking the fire hoses on. And black politicians, as we have transcended into the inner cities of being African-American or minority populations in the inner cities, [those] black politicians have used the police department as stepping stones into political leadership as well, because it's been an area that they could attack.

He also suggested that it may serve political purposes to accuse police of racism, but the police do not have time to behave in a racist manner:

> It serves political benefit to keep a division of the races and to keep the

"When you approach someone, you have to tell [that person] what you're doing and why you're doing it."

diversity in the arguments expounded because I think most police [officers, particularly those who are men,] no matter what he says when he goes home to be the macho self in each particular situation, usually handles it in a professional situation because again, in most inner-city policing if you went in and handled one color differently [from] the next one [according to] race, you'd be a busy person thinking all day.

Some officers did acknowledge that discrimination is a problem among officers. As one put it, "Sure. The race card will never go away. It won't. It's always there. Somebody is going to play it."

Another admitted, "Let's face it; prejudice is still out there.… I have it in my department to some degree, but it does happen."

Race and Community Policing

General agreement existed among the participants that community policing had a positive effect on relationships between the police and minority community residents. As one officer suggested:

> I think the black, the African-American community in [his city], [can change] as the police department becomes more responsive. Policing has not been responsive to the black community [both] in the past and in the minority communities. We've only been [there] because of the disenfranchised; we've only come in and [taken] people in jail. With community policing, we're seeing more changes in those positions.

Another officer commented, "I think community policing is, in fact, about communication; communication has gotten a lot better. I think that's a big thing that I see

> **"The race card will never go away.… It's always there. Somebody is going to play it."**

between the [minority] community and the police officer."

One officer, agreeing that community policing has a positive effect on relations in minority communities, described a situation where prejudiced attitudes among residents can sometimes hamper community-policing efforts:

> I've got a community right now and it has community police officers assigned to it. They came to me 2 weeks ago wanting black officers, not white officers. I told them there's nothing to indicate these officers are not doing their job. It doesn't matter what their race is. I surveyed the other people in that community. It's a black community and she was the only one [who] was making that comment. So it was her own personal prejudice. But I got called in the deputy chief's office about the issue. He was called also.…Normally, I think trust has gone up with the community policing in the black community with white officers, overall. It's just this one neighborhood, and it really caught me off guard when she hit me with that.

The Culture of Policing

In seeking to understand how much the culture of policing contributes to abuse of authority, we focused on two aspects of police culture: (a) the "us-versus-them" mentality, with its premise that police officers' constant contact with problematic citizens leads officers to view all civilians suspiciously; and (b) the "code of silence," in which police officers protect (by not reporting) their fellow officers in situations involving inappropriate or abusive police conduct. We began by asking whether the

participants believed there was an us-versus-them mentality, and what its role might be in the abuse of authority.

"Us-versus-Them" Mentality

As we began the discussion of whether the police are perceived by citizens as operating under an us-versus-them attitude, one officer stated she could see why some citizens would have that perception: "Well, I can see where that might come across to citizens, especially ones [who] don't have much contact with the law. When they do they get a bad, disinterested police [officer], [that officer is] the only contact they have.…"

However, she pointed out a theme that dominated this discussion. Community policing could be effective in changing that perception of police. "I think the community-policing concept is helping to eradicate [the problems] because…there's more of a personal relationship there, I think."

Another participant shared a similar view that community policing would not only change the attitudes of citizens, but also the attitudes of police officers:

> When you first come on [the police force],…you're out there in that patrol car, and all you're dealing with is assholes. So [officers] get this mind-set that everybody's an asshole, and it drives their view of everybody. And that's why I think community policing is so important, because it does a lot to break down those attitudes. It lets folks know—it lets cops know—that there are good people out there. There are people out there that support you.

Another officer added:

> Well, I think what community policing does is put those officers in direct con-

tact with—the entire array of citizens. In other words, not just the crooks that they're dealing with day after day and night after night. But also it puts them in contact with the good citizens, so it brings them balance—brings balance in their perspective of the public.…Good people [are] out there. Whereas without that we tend to see, by contact, [that] those we view [are] all jerks.

Part of the reason that community policing alters the us-versus-them mentality is that the community, in partnership with the police, becomes part of the "us." As one officer put it, "The communities are pointing the finger, saying, 'That's him; that's him. He's dealing drugs on the corner; get him, and get him out of our neighborhood.…' So it's a community actually steering us to them; they want us to do that. So for that certain element—say that 85 or 90 percent—that's where we are in a favorable light."

Some participants thought that to some extent the us-versus-them mentality is more prevalent among new or inexperienced police officers:

> Only to the extent that I think new police officers quite often project a superhero attitude or demeanor, which tends to separate law enforcement from the public. I agree that we beg acceptance and so on, but I think that comes after—let's say, somewhere in that first 5- or 7-year period.…An awful lot of officers…project a superhero image in their off-duty time, as well as their on-duty time.

A number of the participants commented that the us-versus-them mentality is a

"…[C]ommunity policing…put[s] …officers in direct contact with…not just …crooks…[b]ut also…with… good citizens. …[I]t brings… balance in their perspective of the public."

requirement of their work and, more important, that attitude is more often directed toward those individuals who constantly come to the attention of the police than toward the general public. Typical comments included the following:

"[For] a beat officer and in street-crime units, …99 percent of that contact is negative contact."

> Yeah, I agree. I mean depending on what group of society you're dealing with. I mean the positive element, no. We go out there and are projected in a positive light. But the people I deal with in a street-crime unit, yeah, it's almost like urban warfare. It is us against them. My job is to get them; their job is to bail out, and jump over fences.…Yeah, with that certain drug-dealing element, the little scum of society, yeah, absolutely. That's the way I feel. And, by any means necessary, we go out and we do our job. I'm not saying kick them in the face, handcuff, and beat them, and put their heads in toilets. But we do our job; we do it with the court's law, and the policies and procedures, and the law and all the parameters that we have to meet. But, yeah, absolutely.…But [considering] the people I deal with a couple nights, three, four nights a week, it's brutal.

> I agree with everything that's been said, but it's that small population.…But those people we keep—like M—— was talking about, you keep arresting the same people over and over and over. Well, I think [that for] the majority of the citizens, I don't think it's us and them.

> But, yeah, I agree. There's a certain percentage that we deal with all the time—actually it's a big percentage.

[For] a beat officer and in street-crime units, all your contacts for that 8-hour period, 99 percent of that contact is negative contact. So how can you take an individual and give him any other attitude or any other perception of life, other than dealing with negative, which makes him negative in its context.… He's either hearing how bad somebody just ripped them off, or dealing with the bad guy saying how [someone] just ripped him off.

The officers engaged in an interesting discussion of how they cannot shed their police identities when off duty ("You almost live this job"), and how they find it difficult to maintain contact with friends who knew them before they became police officers. It takes concerted effort to get away from the police culture. Those factors exacerbate an us-versus-them mentality. As one said,

> I think there is an us-versus-them [attitude], and "them" could be the bad guys and the good people out there.… He had to make an effort, and I made the same effort, although sometimes I analyze it and say, "I failed." I've made an effort to keep all my non-police friends. But you know what? Because of the schedule you work and the hours you work, and as the years go by, I say to myself, Jesus Christ, I haven't seen [those friends] in years.

> I go to weddings; it's usually cop weddings. Again, because of the hours you work, if I go for a beer, it's usually with [a] bunch of cops. It's something that I consciously wanted to avoid, but it's difficult to avoid because you're all

living in the same environment, the same schedule. And that creates an us-versus-them [attitude]—not even good guy, bad guy. You're in a culture that you have to make an effort to get out of. Actually, it's a pleasure to be around people—non-police people—who don't bring up policing also.

Another officer stated:

There's nothing more annoying than when you go in a place, or a restaurant, and they go, "I didn't do it; he did it"….You almost live this job; you really do. And you try not to have [only police friends]. [As] both of these gentlemen said, "I have friends on the outside, but [because of] our schedules and interests, [I] end up going back to that: I'm always with cops."

Another officer stated, "Sometimes you don't tell people you're the police." Once she made the decision to tell people her occupation: "Everybody at that point changed and treated me different, because I'm with the police. And I am who I am. Policing is what I do; it's not who I am. And I have to make people aware that I'm still a person."

Summing up the sentiments expressed by those officers, one officer noted:

I think we're all begging for acceptance. We're not the ones saying us versus them. What we're asking for is to accept T—— and accept S——, not to group us as police; they group us as individuals and human beings. That's what I think all police [officers] are asking. It's not us against them, as far as we perceive it. We're going to deal with

each issue as it comes before us….But it's not—we deal with particular issues, and [we hope] we deal with people on an individual basis more than we deal with them as us versus them.

Another added, "We're more stereotyped than some of the ethnic groups and all the other groups that are out there.…So that's part of the us against them. It's not us, the good guy against the bad guy—we're just regular…we're blue collar [workers] too."

To combat problems associated with the us-versus-them mentality, one officer suggested that officers should be rotated throughout the different areas of a city:

…[O]ur city is divided in quadrants, basically four quadrants. You have your business area, which would be considered here; then you have your straight residential area. And for people who patrol nothing but residential area all their career, and [who] have never been outside that particular district, they do have a separate mind-set. And I've always said, "People should be rotated through the quadrants of the city, because if you know only one thing, and how to deal with one sector of people, it's hard to break that habit." And some people have been in that same career, [have never gone] anywhere else. And if you take them from straight ghettos and put them in someplace like [an upper-class neighborhood], it doesn't work. You will get complaints.

People think that this person is absolutely out of control, but you take that officer out of that and put him back where he is, and he's the best thing happening. So [officers] need to be

"You almost live this job…"

"Policing is what I do; it's not who I am."

rotated around. I always tell people, after 5 years, try to move somewhere else, even if it's to an investigative position or something. [Officers] need something else, because, if not, [they] get in that mold and it's hard to break.

Agreeing with that comment, another officer stated, "It makes you a better police officer, I think. It makes you a better all-around police officer, but it's hard to do."

Code of Silence

The topic of the "code of silence" or "blue wall of silence" generated controversy as it had when the topic was discussed in the rank-and-file focus group. The discussion began with one of the participants providing a definition of what she thought is the code of silence, a code that pertains to rank-and-file officers, but not to management:

> When I think of code of silence, I guess I don't look at it so much as from a management point of view, but I look at the two scout car partners, and one guy crosses over the line. And the guy [who] has to drag him out the house and, he knows, should not have struck the citizen.…That [officer's] responsibility…is to tell, and sometimes they don't until that complaint comes down and you do that investigation. And that's where I always see the code of silence.

> Because they feel like, I went in and snitched. I don't want to be the one [who] has to tell it. But then you have to let [officers who cross the line] be put in the hot seat, because it's always somebody out there who saw what happened. Whether you know it or not, somebody, some citizen, somebody passing by, some other police officer

who might have been on the opposite side of the street [will come in and give] you a statement. So you try to give [officers] that opportunity to come forth, and when they don't, you just light them up. You have no choice, and that to me is the code of silence.

One participant noted, quite angrily, that the topic of a code of silence was not unique to the police profession, "You talk about the code of silence as if it is something that is unique to police work. But what have we all heard since we [were] first able to talk? Don't be a tattletale. That is what society wanted. This isn't something that is just specific to police work, for God's sake."

Another agreed, "What disgusts me about this topic is that law enforcement gets tagged with this, and it is such a critical issue from the public's perspective. Yet, they don't see that this is what is going on with doctors and lawyers."

However, that officer, as well as the other participants, agreed that to a certain extent the code of silence does exist in policing. Eventually it seemed, as in the rank-and-file group, that it was the term itself that was most offensive:

> In law enforcement, I think it primarily pertains to the layers of rank. In other words, code of silence among officers and then among supervisory personnel, and so on, as [one participant] pointed out. I think there is, I hate to use the term, this concept in operation, but I don't think it is near what the public and the media portray it as. There are other elements working about this, I hate to use the term, code of silence.

"You talk about the code of silence as if it is something that is unique to police work."

Another officer suggested that the more appropriate term would be "[c]overing for people." He went on to explain why officers have to cover for someone who, "as big a jerk as he may be, might be your lifesaver":

> Officers tend to cover for each other because they know that a part of that shift is a person they don't like. They know they don't like the way their partner operates and the things that they do, but they don't know how often they will have to work with that individual, and they know that they always have to count on that individual for backup. That person, as big a jerk as he may be, might be your lifesaver. You may not like him. If it was your choice, you wouldn't work with him, but you have to depend on him.

> A case that we had once was a deputy, who I am glad to say quit.…The day after he left, all these stories surfaced from the deputies about his activities and what he was doing. We were scratching our heads and asking why didn't you tell us last week or 3 months ago or a year ago. But they wouldn't say. I think it is somewhat understandable, because even though they didn't like him, he was part of their backup.

As the discussion continued, it became apparent that an important distinction existed between the participants' perceptions of a code of silence when violating a minor departmental rule or regulation and the code of silence when committing a criminal violation. As one said, "[I]f anyone of us knew that one of the other ones was in the process of committing a felony someplace, …there would not be a code of silence."

One participant noted that a supervisor's overlooking minor rule violations does not constitute a code of silence.

> I think M—— is making a good point in differentiating when talking about the code of silence and criminal conduct, and what might be perceived as improper behavior within our rules and regulations …and whether or not it was investigated or if that person is disciplined or not.… That was a supervisor's decision to do one thing or another thing that may or may not be proper. And even if you don't turn that person who went to take a nap into IA [internal affairs], if you didn't do that…that is not the code of silence. [It should be] my choosing to discipline or not.…It is not even close to a code of silence.

Another officer commented, "And as a supervisor, whether you are a sergeant or a lieutenant—and in most organizations, you have a progressive discipline procedure if you have a minor violation—you don't want to burn the guy on paper. You can pull him in; you can counsel him and document it for your own records."

One officer observed that officers will "close ranks" during a criminal investigation, not just rank-and-file officers, but sergeants too. "They won't impede your investigation. But they do, to a degree, close ranks."

In contrast, with respect to criminal violations, all of the participants agreed that they would not "condone blatant criminal activity." Short of what they considered criminal though, the code may apply: "Criminal things, we don't condone that. Once in a while, there is a cop who gets

"…[Officers] won't impede your investigation. But they do, to a degree, close ranks."

pegged with DWI. The guys stop to get a beer after work and [he] gets stopped and arrested. Should he lose his job? No. Do you have a domestic? Sometimes things get a little hot between you and your spouse; you make a bad choice and get pinched. Should you be vilified publicly? No."

"I don't think there is a code of silence at all when we are talking about criminal conduct."

Comments on distinguishing the application of a code of silence in criminal and non-criminal situations included the following:

> [Concerning] the code of silence, there are very few police officers—and it may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction—but … just from what I know about the people sitting at this table, I think that if anyone of us knew that one of the other ones was in the process of committing a felony someplace, there would not be a code of silence. And I really object to labeling us as having a code of silence. I think there have been instances in different departments when three or four officers, who are involved in a felony, know about something, [and] maybe two or three officers won't say anything. But on a supervisory level and a management level, I think there are very few instances when the code of silence would [become] the pointed dagger that you are trying to throw here.

> I don't think there is a code of silence at all when we are talking about criminal conduct. And if it is, those people are part of a criminal mind.

> I think that the wall of silence, as far as criminal things, is a thing of the past. I hear a lot of cops saying they are not going to lose their house because of you.

I think this wall of silence, the media picks it up out of police doing things wrong. That is not a wall of silence; that is a criminal conspiracy. You know you have the buddy boys in New York. That is all conspiracy stuff. Those are criminals wearing uniforms.

> [O]ne point to keep in mind…is that you are in a room full of lieutenants and sergeants here. And we are honored to perform our job for our organization. As far as code of silence, I think that what C—— said, that at the patrolman level, maybe it is a little different. But there is nobody in this room who is going to condone blatant criminal activity.… But when you are talking about the code of silence, you are talking about New York and the really limited things that happen. But everybody here, we are supervisors and we are going to represent our organizations. Even on the patrolman level, if a cop really screws something up, every other member of that organization is giving thumbs up when they pinch him. We don't want bad cops representing us, either.

> …But the point is [that] we all want to do the right thing; most people do in society. As police officers, [when] we come to work, we want to do the right thing. When somebody crosses the line, we don't cover it. We are all good people here. And across the nation, policemen are, by and large, hardworking people; we are no different from you.

At the close of the discussion, one participant related an investigation of criminal misconduct among a group of officers in his department, which indicates that rank-

and-file police officers share the supervisors' attitude against a code of silence to protect criminal violators:

> We had [a] group that was doing the drugs and different stuff. We had an undercover FBI investigation going. But we were constantly getting calls from other officers to the point that they were saying, "You sonofabitches ain't going to do nothing about it, and I don't even know why I bother to tell on them anymore"….[However,] we were trying to get all the ducks in a row to get them prison time.

Solutions

Agency Procedures for Dealing with Abuse of Police Authority

We asked a number of questions regarding procedures for handling complaints: How should investigations of citizen complaints be handled (i.e., internally or by outside civilian review)? Is civilian review of police misconduct effective in addressing problems of abuse?

As we discussed in the rank-and-file focus group's report, a number of U.S. cities have some form of civilian review for citizen complaints against the police. However, the use of civilian agencies to monitor police conduct is very controversial, with the police arguing that only the police can effectively "police" the police. We asked the participants what their perceptions of the use of civilian review boards were and whether their own cities had established the bounds for reviewing citizen complaints. Participants responded as follows:

> Internal affairs works. Civilian review authority, as soon as you mention

civilian review, the knee-jerk reaction is no way, yatta yatta, they go on and on. If they only knew, civilian review authority is nothing more than a toothless tiger. They're easier on cops than the departments are themselves. Bottom line.

[O]ur review authority…[is]…looking to get a case. They had 9 months without a specific case.

We found that when we had it, they were not prepared for the complaints. We were like 5 years behind. We had maybe 400,000 complaints with four or five people on the board.…It was just overwhelming, so they did away with it. So we do it in-house at the station, and if it's criminal, it goes to IA.

We're just starting one so our citizen review is going through a citizen academy now. They're not going to review every complaint, only those of deadly force issues and more serious issues. They're not going to handle the courtesy complaints and the verbal stuff.

Yeah, it's totally different. The problem our officers have [is] we have civil service protection and that's all civilian. So they review—the chief cannot fire you. He can only suspend up to 90 days. That's all the power he has. He can recommend termination. It goes to civil service board, and they meet and you have your attorney present and the board has their attorney. They present the case to this board. And they've been pretty fair to the police. Police officers love civil service. They fired one 2 or 3

"…[C]ivilian review…is… a toothless tiger. They're easier on cops than the departments …themselves."

weeks ago, but still, we trust them for the most part and we like it. But now we've got this extra. To me, civil service is almost like a civilian review. So now we've got something else to go through. And any police unit we have [is subject to] the homicide investigators, internal affairs investigators, SBI, sometimes the FBI, the DA's office and their investigators, and now civil service and citizen review. I mean where does it stop is what we kept wondering. How much further double-checking, double-checking, double-checking? So I…wanted to hear how these civilian reviews work. We were petrified of them to begin with because it came about a couple of pre-shoots. We had a couple of them close together and all of a sudden we need civilian review; we need civilian review and now we have one.

We have a civilian review board that is always empaneled when there's a controversial issue. If it's not controversial, the board doesn't review it, but it's usually issues of deadly force or excessive force. [Such issues always make] the headlines.

Our civilian review board has investigative powers and the [members] actually have subpoena powers. That's been an ongoing fight here lately, and it's in appeal to the state supreme court that they actually subpoena our personnel records….And this has been in existence about three and a half years. To this date, they have yet to find a substantive case against an officer.

> *"…[I]nternal affairs is more threatening…. We've all been out there, so we know how to play the game."*

It's a toothless tiger. I mean they come back, they exonerate, and then [they] do not sustain more cases against cops than our Internal Affairs unit does.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the participants overwhelmingly preferred internal review processes (e.g., Internal Affairs) over citizen review, and they believed internal review was most effective in preventing abuse of authority:

Internal affairs works.

I think internal affairs is more threatening because we're police officers. We've all been out there, so we know how to play the game.

…The officers feel [that] if it goes to IAD, it's going to be thorough and done because our IAD comes. It's just like Dragnet. They come and they…flip the badge. They take you and they say IAD is in the building, pull the files. People are already petrified.…So it's an amount of fear, a mind-set when IAD comes, but when you say [civilian review], people say whatever.…

I'd rather deal with internal affairs. I think the lieutenants assigned to it are fair, and they clear more cops. I think they investigate and they're a lot fairer and a lot more thorough and more precise. I would go with them. In our civilian review board, it's a group of folks [who] review little training and sustain—of course, with the chief in our internal affairs and our chief can overturn and he has the final say. But I'm not going to leave my crew to some

guy who is the day manager of Little Caesar's or the day manager at 7-11 to say whether I can work again because he sits on some review board.

I think my people feel just because they hear the other officers talk they're a little bit intimidated by it, but I don't know anyone who has got a bad deal from IA. I think once [officers] get up there they get a fair shake.

Rewarding Good Policing

The topic of rewarding good policing produced an interesting array of responses from the participants. One officer suggested, "Good work is its own reward. How many people go out and do a good job?" Another indicated, "We don't have support from anybody really. All the satisfactions that we get are all in our own minds."

Other comments included the following:

The phone call of saying, "Hey, thanks."

Oh, just the recognition among your peers or in front of your peers of a job well done.

In general, the participants felt that community policing offered an excellent opportunity for providing positive feedback to and recognition of the accomplishments of police officers. As one officer suggested, now the appreciation goes beyond one's fellow officers: "And I think community policing has expanded that circle a bit. And there's more community support."

Another officer related her experience as a community-policing officer when the community arranged an awards banquet for the officers:

…[T]he district I worked in recently was all residential neighborhoods—like the worse place. People said when you come out of the academy, don't go in that district. That's the worse district. So people really had a fear going in [such as] "oh, my God! I'm going to be shot at every day." It's a total ghetto. There's nowhere to eat.

But once the [officers] got there they found they learned a lot. The citizens wanted to kind of build up a more positive image, so what they did was they came to a meeting and they told our commander, "We want to put on an awards banquet for the officers because we really appreciate them. We're going to get different businesses and other beat officers and whoever nominates an officer on the beat. We'll give the [officers] a plaque and a big dinner, and they get to invite a guest of their choice: wife, spouse, or whatever.

So officers were [saying,] "Okay, let's see what's going to happen." And they rented a beautiful hall. It was one of the hotel's ballrooms, and they gave out these wooden plaques and money, and the officers really didn't think it was going to be a big deal. They invited the mayor and the council members,…I mean it was just a big thing and for that moment, just felt [as if] after all I've done in 15 years, [people] really thought enough of me to go out of their way.

In [another area of the city], the police department [and] the officers complained they didn't have a place to work, so the citizens of the…area gave

…[C]ommunity policing [offers] an excellent opportunity for providing positive feedback to and recognition of the accomplishments of police officers.

them brand-new work-out equipment [and] built [for] them [an actual] work-out room. It's the little perks, the little thank yous.

Another officer, providing a remarkable example, described how the community reacted in a positive manner, demonstrating their support for the remaining officers when faced with a police scandal involving officers in their district:

…[A]fter the…scandal [and] officers were arrested, that community did a number of things for the police in that district. I'm sure that's the only thing that kept that district going. That had to be devastating to have seven of their people on television being led into the Federal Corrections Center. What a horrendous morale problem they had. But their community banded together and they had an award ceremony. They did other things for the remaining good police officers. That means a lot. I don't know if that would have happened if [community policing] hadn't been in place.

Conclusion

Like the previous groups, the supervisory-level focus group discussion provided insights into some of the most controversial and sensitive issues in policing. We were satisfied that the discussions were both candid and thoughtful, enabling us to better understand such issues from the perspectives of police sergeants and lieutenants, who not only are challenged by them on a day-to-day basis, but also have a responsibility to see that those under their supervision meet those challenges. Their perspectives were incorporated in developing the survey and continue to inform our research in the study of police authority in the age of community policing.

1. The quoted portions of this appendix have been edited sparingly to enhance readability while maintaining the speaker's voice.