

## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

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# **Managing Large-Scale Security Events:**

## **A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies**

Prepared by the Police Foundation in partnership with the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), U.S. Department of Justice and BJA National Training and Technical Assistance Center.

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# Executive Summary

Large-scale events provide local governments with a number of valuable opportunities, including increasing tourism and revenue; showcasing host city venues and attractions; and, working with the community to create a positive narrative about the city and its public safety agencies by serving as a welcoming host for a premier event.

However, with these benefits comes even greater responsibility. Local government leaders must ensure that the planning and coordination of large scale events are carried out in a way that balances Constitutional rights and civil liberties with security, accounts for the public's safety from a growing variety of threats, and considers public health implications. These responsibilities primarily fall to local law enforcement. Large-scale events also come with increased scrutiny of public safety agencies from the media, civil rights organizations, attorneys, and other watch groups.

Law enforcement executives tasked with managing a large event can maximize their efforts by learning from other agencies, adopting best practices and strategies, adapting to evolving environments and threats, and leveraging new tools and technologies. Too often, however, these strategies, best practices, and lessons learned are not documented in a clear and concise manner. To address this information gap, the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) worked in partnership with the Police Foundation to update this Planning Primer originally created by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) following the 2012 Presidential Nominating Conventions.<sup>1</sup>

This updated Planning Primer is based primarily on the 2016 Presidential Nominating Conventions. While the examples and best practices throughout the Primer are geared towards agencies that receive federal grant funding—primarily from BJA—for managing security at large-scale events, they are applicable to any large-scale law enforcement event, including responses to critical incidents. Therefore, it also documents best practices and lessons learned from other large-scale events and critical incidents, and highlights emerging threats and research that have occurred since.

This Planning Primer details best practices and lessons learned pertaining to security planning and implementation for a large-scale event, specifically pre-event planning, core event operations and strategies, and post-event activities. The Planning Primer includes information regarding 19 core operational areas that law enforcement executives can give to lead public safety planners as supplemental guidance. This can be used as the foundation for coordinating area-specific operational plans and can be modified to accommodate event security requirements and existing protocols. Furthermore, accompanying each operational area presented in the Planning Primer are actionable templates, checklists, and key considerations designed to facilitate the planning process (see Appendix A: Planning Toolkit).

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<sup>1</sup> Police Foundation team members conducted a review of past after-action reports for large-scale special events and used first-hand observations and analysis of the Cleveland, Ohio, Division of Police and the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Police Department as they planned, executed, and debriefed operations for the 2016 Presidential Nominating Conventions. Bios of the team members are included in Appendix E.

## 19 Core Operational Areas

- Administrative and Logistics Support
- Command and Control
- Credentialing
- Crowd Management
- Dignitary/VIP Protection
- Emerging Technology and Possibilities
- Financial/Grant Management
- Fire/Emergency Medical Services/Hospitals/  
Public Health
- Intelligence/Counter-terrorism/Counter  
surveillance
- Interagency Communications and  
Technology
- Legal Affairs
- Non-event Patrol
- Arrest Processing
- Protecting Critical Infrastructure and  
Utilities
- Public Information and Media Relations
- Screening and Physical Security
- Tactical Support and Explosive Device  
Response/Hazardous Materials
- Training
- Transportation and Traffic Management

## Major Observations

This executive summary highlights major findings learned from previous police departments related to planning, finances, logistics, operations, and command of a large-scale security event. While many of the major findings remain the same, the strategies and tactics, timelines, and tools—all explained below and throughout this Primer—have changed significantly since the original primer was published.<sup>2</sup>

### *Planning*

During large-scale events, the potential exists for disorderly conduct and violence, conflicts between individuals and groups involved, and increased risks to officer safety and wellness. Therefore, it is important for local law enforcement to actively engage in strategic and collaborative planning internally and with all partners, stakeholders, community members, and local and national groups that intend on attending and/or demonstrating during the event. Planning involves the following four steps:

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Develop a **strategic vision** centered on establishing a welcoming and safe environment.

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Law enforcement executives should develop an overall philosophy that prioritizes safety and security during the event while emphasizing engagement and de-escalation, Constitutional rights and civil liberties, and minimizing arrests when possible. This philosophy should be accompanied by specific tactics, strategies, policies, and procedures to guide all law enforcement officers involved. To ensure that the philosophy and specific components are implemented, plan to provide all officers with trainings and resources codifying these key elements.

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Create a **core planning team** to oversee major decision-making and planning.

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Local law enforcement should begin by establishing clear, formal oversight processes or mechanisms to ensure that decision-making is strategic and unified. The lead local agency should establish a core planning team immediately upon being selected to host a large-scale event. The

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<sup>2</sup> These areas are the five major management functions of the Incident Command System.

planning team should be staffed with personnel from each of the key participating agencies—for example police, fire, and emergency management agencies—as well as with personnel who have expertise in grants management policies and legal contracts. This team should establish standardized procedures and forms to be used by all stakeholders, identify single points of contact for the 19 core operational areas identified above, and create timelines and accountability measures for all partners and stakeholders. The personnel selected to serve on the core planning team should have the appropriate authority to identify, assign, and ensure the completion of tasking identified for event preparedness and conduct. Core planning team personnel should be entirely relieved of regular duties during preparation for the event to be able to focus their time and attention on all of the critical aspects of planning for an event of this magnitude. The team should review existing policies and protocols, such as those on use of force and safeguarding first amendment rights to make sure they are up to date and consistent with national best practices.

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Conduct **formal and informal meetings** with stakeholders to walk through cross-cutting activities and to develop relationships.

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The nature of the event will require collaboration among a multitude of local, state, regional, and federal entities, each with their own roles and responsibilities. Formal and informal meetings with these stakeholders are invaluable for establishing solid relationships. Having these relationships established and delineating roles and responsibilities prior to a large-scale event can streamline every aspect of the process of hosting, particularly planning and procurement, coordinating crossing-cutting activities in operational plans, and following up after the event has ended.

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Develop **scalable plans** that can be altered should intelligence indicate that differing resources are required.

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Large-scale security events will likely initially require worst-case scenario planning; however, as the event nears, information and intelligence may indicate that fewer resources are required to safely secure the event. In response, local law enforcement should establish plans that are flexible and can accommodate changes in resource demands.

## ***Finances***

Financial management is a critical component of effective command, security, and accountability. Therefore, it is important for local law enforcement to be mindful of the following:

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Be aware of federal grant making procedures and timelines, and understand that **funding is often made available later than desired**.

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One of the biggest challenges planning jurisdictions can face is financing pre-event procurements prior to receipt of grant funds. Costs incurred prior to the effective date of the award or project period may not be reimbursable under the grant. If funding is not appropriated or received by the jurisdiction's desired timeline, it may incur—and consequently absorb—unforeseen costs. Therefore, the lead jurisdiction should be prepared to leverage its own funding, use the



Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)<sup>3</sup>, leverage resources from neighboring agencies, and/or engage its State Administering Agency (SAA) to address pre-award and other costs that cannot be covered by the federal award. The SAA can serve as a resource for guidance on the federal grant procedures and timelines. SAAs can also provide personnel and resources to conduct the financial aspects of managing the grants as well as assistance in strategically leveraging other resources.

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Begin planning with careful attention to reimbursable costs and special conditions.

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Executives must be cognizant of funding procedures, special conditions, and guidelines for reimbursable costs. Especially when federal funding is being used, it is imperative to read, understand, and abide by all special conditions attached to the award, and to have the necessary documentation and receipts accounted for during monitoring visits and audits. The assigned staff should also be familiar with the provisions of the DOJ Financial Guide. In addition, accurately building a precise budget breakdown early in planning and having all procurement requests go through one agency, or the core planning team, may help to avoid the absorption of unallowable costs later on. Therefore, key financial and decision-making staff from the lead local jurisdiction—along with any personnel that will be providing assistance in handling the financial aspects of the grant—should complete OJP’s financial management training as soon as possible after being selected to host a large-scale event.<sup>4</sup>

### *Logistics*

Administrative and logistics support requires 24-hour care to all law enforcement and supplemental personnel throughout an event. It is important for local law enforcement to be mindful of the following when planning and coordinating this effort:

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Do not underestimate the large scope of caring for visiting officers.

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One of the largest and most complicated tasks that law enforcement will need to engage in is ensuring that all security personnel are cared for. Rest and relaxation sites should be strategically positioned throughout the city so that all officers can take advantage of them when they have breaks. “The wellness and safety of law enforcement officers is critical not only to themselves, their colleagues, and their agencies but also to public safety.”<sup>5</sup> Officer wellness services, such as access to gyms and other recreational activities, should be made available for out-of-town officers to enjoy during their off-duty time. When planners take into account the health and

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<sup>3</sup> The EMAC, “acts as a complement to the federal disaster response system, providing timely and cost-effective relief to states requesting assistance from assisting member states who understand the needs of jurisdictions that are struggling to preserve life, the economy, and the environment.” More information on the EMAC can be found throughout this document as well as at <https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/EMACOverviewForNRF.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> For more information about OJP Financial Training and Technical Assistance, visit, <https://ojp.gov/financialguide/DOJ/index.htm>.

<sup>5</sup> President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. 2015. Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

wellness of the officers assigned to these large scale security events, officers are better positioned to carry out their expected roles, even in strenuous situations. Agencies who have hosted large-scale security events repeatedly note that officer care is a large undertaking that can often be overlooked.

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Understand that officer logistics have **many overlapping planning components**.

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Care of officers encompasses a broad range of overlapping planning components and often becomes a catch-all function. Logistics for officers includes elements of transportation, food and beverage, housing, scheduling and timekeeping, credentialing, and ensuring health and wellness. It is critical to ensure ample staff is assigned to support this function.

### *Operations*

A number of operational elements will be executed during the event, many of which will require the heightening of normal security operations. In addition to these activities, law enforcement can execute effective strategies to maximize resources and ensure a safe environment, including the following:

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Provide **officer training** that focuses on non-confrontational team policing and the protection of Constitutional rights.

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Officer training should focus on educating all officers—especially those from out-of-town—on the overall strategy for the event, as well as departmental policies and procedures and approved tactics for interacting with crowds and demonstrators. Training should emphasize the importance of maintaining a balance between protecting Constitutional rights and the need to protect persons and property from injury and damage. Trainings should be spread across multiple platforms including online, classroom and scenario-based tabletop exercises, and in-person drills. Scenario training, exercises, and drills can prepare officers to remain unprovoked to demonstrators that try to bait and elicit negative responses. Online trainings can also ease the burden on providing out-of-town officers before they get on-site and help reinforce the local laws and policies and procedures. Furthermore, law enforcement executives play a vital role in instilling this message of non-confrontational policing, not only with officers, but with the public and demonstrators as well.

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Use and enhance only **proven and pre-established technologies**.

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For a large-scale security event, security planners should avoid using new technology systems and equipment that they have not had the opportunity to use in trainings or other large-scale events, as unforeseen technical challenges may arise. Instead, law enforcement should focus on enhancing existing tools and processes that have proven successful within the department.

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Use **dual-sport vehicles and bicycles** to effectively manage crowds and maneuver across large distances.

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Field forces should be deployed on bicycles and in dual-sport vehicles (as opposed to on foot or horseback) to manage crowds and demonstrators in an efficient and timely manner. Bicycle

officers tend to be seen by attendees as more approachable and friendlier and they are able to make rounds on a regular basis to ensure safety and security of all. Bicycle Units are also able to provide slightly more mobility than those on foot, allowing officers to provide assistance during movement of parades and marches. In these regards, Bicycle Units can be extremely positive and appreciated by demonstrators. When needed, bicycles can also serve as physical barricades for directing large crowds.

### ***Command***

Law enforcement responds to a wide range of security incidents and operations that are typically handled by a single unit or department. However, large-scale security operations require a different approach and structure. Therefore, local law enforcement executives should consider the following actions:

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Deploy local police executives in the field to facilitate real-time decision-making and maintain a constant and engaging presence to the public.

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An effective strategy for local law enforcement is to position local agency leaders including police chiefs, commissioners, and/or commanders in the field during demonstrations. By being present in the field, executives can assess a situation first-hand and determine the best tactics to deploy. Since these local leaders have a vested interest in de-escalating situations before they develop into larger issues, they can personally engage members of the crowds and set the example for line officers at the scene. As an added bonus, leaders often have the media following to further highlight the positive presence of law enforcement officers in the field. Response decisions can also be communicated to field forces faster when they come directly from command staff nearby, thus diffusing the escalation of potentially unruly behavior from demonstrators.

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Maintain situational awareness by combining and sharing information directly from officers in the field and utilizing technology.

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Public safety agencies should ensure that they maintain situational awareness throughout the event. Situational awareness plays a large role in resource allocation, identifying and proactively addressing issues, and ensuring overall safety and security of events. Deploying all uniformed officers with body-worn cameras (BWCs) can provide a multitude of perspectives from multiple areas around the event and help determine if additional resources are needed during a large gathering or demonstration. Especially with new technology that allows for BWC footage to be live-streamed to an agency's headquarters—along with cameras from dashboards; surveillance systems; smartphones; and helicopters, unmanned aerial systems (UASs), and other aircrafts—this could provide real-time citywide situational awareness for law enforcement executives and other important decision-makers. Pictures and videos gathered from social media can also enhance situational awareness.

It is also important to remember situational awareness provided by personnel—both in uniform and undercover—in the field. Information from the field shared with incident commanders who are not in the field, allows them to make timely and well-informed response decisions.

## Conclusion

Carefully planned security operations and multi-agency coordination before, during, and after a large-scale security event are paramount to local law enforcement's ability to maintain a safe environment and to conduct a successful event. With this Planning Primer, law enforcement departments and agencies nationwide can benefit from the lessons learned and proven practices of other agencies. The detailed activities in the Planning Primer and the interactive Planning Toolkit serve as useful instruments for lead planners as they develop operational plans around the 19 core operational areas. By having solid plans and policies, sufficient equipment, and trained personnel in place, law enforcement will be prepared for incidents and can help to ensure public safety throughout event operations.

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# Section 1: Introduction

Large-Scale Security Events (LSSEs) provide local governments with a number of valuable opportunities, including increasing tourism and revenue; showcasing the city and its venues and attractions; and, working with the community to create a positive narrative of the city and its public safety agencies by serving as a welcoming host for a premier event.

However, with these benefits comes greater responsibility. Local government leaders must ensure that the planning and coordination is carried out in a way that balances Constitutional rights and civil liberties with security; accounts for the public's safety from a growing variety of threats; and considers public health implications. While there are opportunities for local government officials to take a lead role in contributing to the positive citywide approach—primarily through de-criminalizing misdemeanors commonly associated with mass gatherings and demonstrations, allowing camping in public parks where it is traditionally prohibited, and extending liquor licenses of bars and restaurants—the responsibilities to ensure safety and security fall primarily to local law enforcement. Along with these responsibilities, large-scale events also come with increased scrutiny of public safety agencies from the media, civil rights organizations, attorneys, and other watch groups.

While many large-scale security events do not deviate greatly from typical law enforcement operations—including dealing with public intoxication, traffic control, or acts of violence—some events do garner additional security due to their high-profile nature. Large-scale events pertaining to political, economic, social, or religious themes have the potential to adversely impact public safety and security. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has designated some of these events as National Special Security Events (NSSEs). NSSEs include events such as Presidential Nominating Conventions, large sporting events such as the Olympics, international summits, elections, and presidential inaugurations.



To ensure that large-scale events and NSSEs are carried out safely, securely, and efficiently, a number of agencies and organizations must collaborate to perform a variety of functions. Local law enforcement's primary role in these large-scale events is to develop a comprehensive security plan that focuses on maintaining everyday policing activities; providing event site security, traffic, and crowd management; and, security of non-official event venues. This role is more distinguishable in NSSEs where local law enforcement must work collaboratively with the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) to ensure event security coincides with local security efforts. In these events, it is important for local law enforcement and federal partners to work collaboratively to

ensure the compatibility of plans. At the same time, it is the responsibility of the lead local jurisdiction to develop and implement a comprehensive local operations plan.

## 1.1 Background

Detailed documentation to guide local law enforcement through the planning and operations of a large-scale security event is sparse. To address this information gap, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) worked with the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) following the 2012 Presidential Nominating Conventions in Tampa, Florida, and Charlotte, North Carolina, to develop the initial Planning Primer, entitled *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies*. Realizing the significant evolution of law enforcement equipment, technology, tactics, strategies, policies, procedures; best practices and lessons learned; and, the political and law enforcement environments, BJA worked in partnership with the Police Foundation to revise and update the original Planning Primer after the 2016 Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and the 2016 Republican National Convention (RNC) in Cleveland, Ohio. The primary goal of this update is to build on the experiences of subject matter experts (SMEs) that had previously hosted LSSEs and NSSEs—including the chiefs of the 2012 and 2016 DNC and RNC host cities—to update and further inform a comprehensive Planning Primer that documents best practices and lessons learned regarding security and planning operations.

## 1.2 Methodology

Prior to the event, Police Foundation staff and SMEs (Police Foundation Team) conducted one visit to each of the national convention sites.<sup>6</sup> During these site visits, Police Foundation Team members conducted the following activities:

- *Conducted Key LSSE Interviews* – Team members interviewed key members of convention security planning teams, including Cleveland Division of Police & Philadelphia Police Department personnel, including command staff; City officials, including EOC Directors and other public safety agency personnel; and state and federal partners including USSS Special Agents and Assistant Special Agents in Charge.
- *Attended LSSE Coordination & Security/Law Enforcement Meetings and Trainings* – Team members attended relevant NSSE Coordination & Security meetings; observed and documented key decisions; attended training sessions and reviewed intelligence reports; and, collected relevant data for analysis in both cities.
- *Direct Observation* – Team members visited convention centers; observed surrounding areas and popular ingress and egress routes, including public transportation terminals; and observed other relevant locations and activities.

In preparation for each of the site visits and for the national convention itself, Police Foundation Team members reviewed planning documents, relevant policies and procedures, meeting minutes, training materials, interagency coordination and surge planning strategies, and presentations that the lead planners provided from the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) and

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<sup>6</sup> Police Foundation conducted the initial site visits to Cleveland and Philadelphia from July 6 – 9, 2016.

the Cleveland Division of Police (CPD). Police Foundation Team members also researched and reviewed open source media articles; national standards and best practices in relevant areas of policing and LSSE policy and practice; after action reports from previous LSSEs, NSSEs and critical incidents; and other identified relevant issues.

Police Foundation Team members were also present in each convention city during conventions to observe and document the operations of the City of Cleveland and the CPD and the City of Philadelphia and the PPD.<sup>7</sup> In particular, they noted key decisions at local law enforcement agencies' major nodes of engagement, including police command centers, multiple operations centers such as the USSS Multi-Agency Command Center and Emergency Operations Centers, and in the field.

After the two events, the Police Foundation Team members focused on four primary activities to develop this Planning Primer:

1. Interviewing City of Cleveland and CPD and City of Philadelphia and PPD law enforcement personnel. Police Foundation Team members sought input and feedback from the event operators by conducting follow-up interviews and conference calls with core city, public safety, and law enforcement planners in the weeks following each convention.<sup>8</sup> These meetings helped Police Foundation Team members gain the operators' perspectives on issues, highlight best practices and lessons learned, and identify possible recommendations for future host agencies.
2. Developing Quick-Look Reports on the DNC and RNC that documented best practices and lessons learned for each hosting jurisdiction.<sup>9</sup> These documents, as well as the Quick-Look Reports CNA developed for the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department and Tampa Police Department in 2012, served as the basis for the analysis and findings incorporated into this revised and updated Planning Primer.
3. Reviewing previous law enforcement agencies' planning and operations of securing large-scale security events. This review included a literature review of existing planning guidance; department policies and procedures; and After-Action Reports (AARs) from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) (2012 RNC); the Tampa Police Department (TPD) (2012 DNC); and, the AARs from other large critical incidents including the response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing, the police response to the August 2014 demonstrations in Ferguson, and the 2015 San Bernardino Terrorist Attacks. This review also included direct contributions and feedback from SMEs who had hosted previous Presidential Nominating Conventions.

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<sup>7</sup> The 2016 RNC was held Monday, July 18 through Thursday, July 22, 2016. The 2016 DNC was held Monday, July 25 through Thursday, July 29, 2016.

<sup>8</sup> Police Foundation Team members attended a post-event debrief meeting in Philadelphia, PA, on August 23, 2016 and conducted phone interview debriefs with representatives from Cleveland, OH, on September 2 and October 25, 2016.

<sup>9</sup> Key findings for the DNC were documented in a Quick-Look Report titled, "The Philadelphia Police Department Protection of the 2016 Democratic National Convention: A Quick-Look Analysis of Public Safety Best Practices and Lessons Learned." Key findings for the RNC were documented in a Quick-Look Report titled, "The Cleveland Division of Police Protection of the 2016 Republican National Convention: A Quick-Look Analysis of the Public Safety Best Practices and Lessons Learned."

4. Incorporating feedback and observations, writing, and vetting from the Police Foundation team of subject matter experts who had hosted previous large-scale events and NSSEs, including both of the 2012 Presidential Nominating Conventions.

Through these activities, the Police Foundation in partnership with BJA revised and updated this comprehensive Planning Primer which synthesizes best practices and common security planning and operational themes for future planners, senior leaders, and decision-makers to implement for large-scale security events.<sup>10</sup> All law enforcement agencies, regardless of size or designated event, can benefit from the guidance identified in this Planning Primer.

## 1.3 Report Organization

The format of this Primer allows readers to easily refer to the operational area most related to their planning and operational responsibilities. The templates, listed in Appendix A, provide supplemental material for these efforts and are also organized by operational area. Broadly, this Primer covers the three major phases of managing a large-scale security event:

- Pre-event planning
- Operational management
- Post-event operations

**Section 2** contains critical information for getting started on event planning, including key considerations for initiating internal department planning and developing an operational plan.

**Section 3** contains information on planning and executing event operations. This section is organized by 19 core operational areas that are most important for event planning and operations:<sup>11</sup>

1. Administrative and Logistics Support
2. Command and Control
3. Credentialing
4. Crowd Management
5. Dignitary/VIP Protection
6. Financial/Grant Management
7. Fire/Emergency Medical Services (EMS)/Hospitals/Public Health
8. Intelligence/Counter-terrorism/Counter Surveillance
9. Interagency Communications and Technology
10. Legal Affairs
11. Non-event Patrol
12. Arrest Processing



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<sup>10</sup> Although this document was primarily updated using the lessons learned and observations made during the 2016 RNC and DNC, the best practices and themes noted throughout this primer are applicable to large-scale event security planning and operations.

<sup>11</sup> Police Foundation identified these areas using the original *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies* developed by CNA and interviews with officials from Cleveland and Philadelphia.

13. Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities
14. Public Information and Media Relations
15. Screening and Physical Security
16. Tactical Support and Explosive Device Response/Hazardous Materials
17. Training
18. Transportation and Traffic
19. Emerging Technologies and Possibilities

Command level officers and the police department's internal planning team may use appropriate sections for planning activities within their assigned operational area and/or subcommittee. Depending on the operational area, the information provided may be relevant to all large-scale security events or more specifically to only NSSEs. These activities are distinguished using the following coding:

	<b>Blue Circle</b>	<b>Pertains to Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs</b>
	<b>Red Triangle</b>	<b>Pertains to only NSSEs</b>

**Section 4** explains the demobilization process and the importance of writing an AAR.

Following the body of the report are five appendices:

**Appendix A** presents the Planning Toolkit, which contains templates and checklists for local law enforcement planners to use when planning and conducting operations for a large-scale security event. Planners should remember that these documents are guides and should be scaled to the event and tailored to the specific needs of the department/agency.

**Appendix B** presents a summary of the key planning considerations for each of the 19 core operational areas described in Section 3.

**Appendix C** presents a summary of overarching planning considerations.

**Appendix D** presents a list of acronyms.

**Appendix E** presents a list of bios of Police Foundation Team members.




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## Section 2: Pre-event Planning

A significant portion of the security effort consists of pre-event planning. Planning should begin with a core planning team immediately upon notification that a large-scale event will be held in a given jurisdiction, and should be done in earnest at least 12-18 months prior to the event. This section focuses on general lessons learned for planning and developing the event operational plan. Specific operational planning components are discussed in greater detail in Section 3.

### 2.1 Initiate Internal Department Planning

Given the nature of hosting a large-scale event, local departments should anticipate an intense and exhaustive planning process. Lead planners must emphasize the importance of expediently initiating internal department planning and should be relieved of regularly assigned duties in order to focus on the planning process.

Initiating Internal Department - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Review Lessons Learned from Previous Large-Scale Events and Other Mass Demonstrations	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Begin Planning Immediately; Do Not Wait for Federal Guidance	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop a Strategic Vision	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify a Lead Planner for the Department	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine Authorities of Participating Agencies	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Establish a Local Core Planning Team	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Understand that Operational Plans will Remain in Flux	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

#### ● *Review Lessons Learned from Previous Large-Scale Events and Other Mass Demonstrations*

Realizing the significant evolution of law enforcement equipment, technology, tactics, strategies, policies, procedures; best practices and lessons learned from other large-scale events and critical incidents; and, the political and law enforcement environments, BJA worked in partnership with the Police Foundation to revise and update the original Planning Primer after the 2016 Presidential Nominating Conventions. This Primer will document best practices and lessons learned, highlights emerging threats, and include research that has occurred since, but will also pull from previous successes and lessons learned. In fact, the best place to start planning is to reach out to other jurisdictions that have prior experience planning for similarly scaled events. For example, in preparing for the 2016 Presidential Nominating Conventions, both CPD and PPD noted that reaching out to law enforcement agencies in prior host cities—including Charlotte, North Carolina; Denver, Colorado; St. Paul, Minnesota; and Tampa, Florida—was beneficial to the planning process. These agencies helped to provide a better understanding of planning assumptions and other event-related expectations.

Additionally, valuable insights and information regarding the importance of many of the topics that arise in a large-scale event including communications and information-sharing, public and

media relations, maintaining situational awareness, technology and equipment, training, and command and control can be gained from reviewing the AARs from other large critical incidents including the response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing, the police response to the August 2014 demonstrations in Ferguson, and the 2015 San Bernardino Terrorist Attack.

### ▲ *Begin Planning Immediately; Do Not Wait for Federal Guidance*

There is no pre-set operational plan template for NSSEs. Various jurisdictions have noted that they were somewhat hesitant to begin developing plans as they awaited official guidance from their federal partners. However, local planners are responsible for developing their own operational plan regardless of the designated lead agency. Additionally, especially in NSSEs, federal agencies are only responsible for security and credentials in the particular event venue and the directly-surrounding perimeter. Local planners are still responsible for all of the areas outside of the security perimeter and for all of the venues where other events occur. Planners can use knowledge gained from visiting other cities to start planning at least six months **prior** to the arrival of the USSS designated security planning co-chair. The checklists and references provided in Appendix A (“Planning Toolkit”) will help planners to identify the key components of building and completing a comprehensive local operational plan.

### ● *Develop a Strategic Vision*

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Emphasize the importance of the Constitutional rights of all attendees, particularly the First Amendment, by reading it at roll calls, handing it out at trainings, and displaying it prominently for officers.

Developing a strategic vision is critical to governing both planning and operations. Given the political nature of Presidential Nominating Conventions and other NSSEs, the potential exists for political activism and protests. Even at other LSSEs, organizations may seek to take

advantage of the fact that there will be multiple media outlets by demonstrating. As such, planners must work closely with conflict resolution groups and known activist groups to understand how to adapt their policing styles/techniques to ensure the protection of the civil rights and civil liberties of all of the attendees (including activists, patrons, delegates, and VIPs). This work should include law enforcement leaders establishing relationships and rapport with leaders of these groups. Together, these groups should identify any intended large demonstrations or gatherings and explain the process to obtain permits, agree on rules of acceptable behavior and set expectations of one another, share rules of engagement and use of force continuums, and discuss processes and procedures. These meetings should begin significantly before the event happens and continue throughout the process, and should include a debrief after the event, to ensure that both sides have an opportunity to reflect and learn from one another.

Planners must also establish a mission to protect the Constitutional rights of all attendees while providing a peaceful and safe environment. It is critical that the strategic vision and mission are shared with the entire planning team, reinforced through training, and monitored during the event. Police chiefs and their command staff should promote the vision and mission to their officers, and emulate them in the field.

### ● *Identify a Lead Planner for the Department*

A lead local planner for the host department helps to ensure that commitments and plans across various subcommittees are appropriately vetted and coordinated. The lead planner:

- has decision making authority and is a command-level officer;
- serves as the incident commander for the planning phase, ensuring coordination among each of the various planning functions; and,
- reports directly to the Chief of Police and other city leaders to ensure buy-in and concurrence on all aspects of the local security plan.

The lead planner should also be supported by a core planning team—explained later in this section—to ensure that the planning decisions are communicated to, and accounted for in, the relevant subcommittees.

### ● *Determine Authorities of Participating Agencies*

Authority for event security planning and operations is often the responsibility of the local law enforcement agency that has operational control over the jurisdictional area. Public-facing<sup>12</sup>, arrest, and processing authorities are the most important to designate to local and host jurisdictions. In addition to being the most important to control the overall tone of enforcement and to embrace police-community relations, and especially since media attention will be focused on number of arrests and the way arrests are handled, ensuring that the message is positive and

that the lead local agency is responsible and accountable is imperative. However, other

agencies inside and outside of law enforcement

will likely serve key functions critical to successful security operations. Neighboring law enforcement agencies (including those with events in their jurisdiction) and other mutual aid partners should be brought to the table early to engage in the planning process. If grant funds are used to support personnel costs, these funds are typically administered by the lead agency. There must be an open and transparent process for those funds to be distributed among mutual aid partners to cover personnel and security event expenses and to related events in neighboring jurisdictions. Regardless of how many agencies are involved, there should be a single local police department to serve as the lead liaison between local response partners and all other partners for the purpose of developing the components of, and implementing, the event security plan. In this role, the local police department will identify key stakeholders (which may include agencies outside of law enforcement) that will have authority over security-related operations. Activities that are typically outside of the local police department's responsibility include communications, fire/emergency medical services/public health response, transportation management, tactical/explosive support, consequence management, emergency management, and recovery. It will be the police department's responsibility to utilize the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) to identify agencies and personnel to provide these services and complement its staff, and to coordinate the inputs of these stakeholders into the event security operations plan.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Public-facing, arrest, and processing authorities are the most important to designate to local and host jurisdictions.

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<sup>12</sup> Public-facing activities are those in which attendees and law enforcement officers are most-likely to encounter one another. They include crowd engagement and management, directing vehicular and pedestrian traffic around site(s)/venue(s), escorting demonstrators and marchers, and front-line security.

### ● *Establish a Local Core Planning Team*

Establish a core planning team to oversee and resolve issues between the subcommittees during the planning process, and to mimic the Incident Command System (ICS) structure that is used during event operations. Staff this core planning team with personnel from each of the key participating agencies, as well with personnel that have expertise on grant policies and legal contracts. Ensuring the right personnel—individuals with the appropriate experience, attention to detail, and forethought—are assigned to the right positions on this planning team is essential to the effectiveness of the team and to the overall planning and operations. This is more important than selecting individuals based on rank and seniority. The personnel on the team should ensure that decisions are not being made without the awareness of agencies that will be responsible for carrying them out.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Create a Core Planning Team that can maintain oversight of all local planning and operations.

Members of the core planning team should be assigned to monitor the activities of all event-related planning entities. The core planning team should be established immediately upon notification that a large-scale event will be held in a given jurisdiction and personnel assigned to




this team should be relieved of regularly assigned duties in order to focus on the planning process.

### ● *Understand that Operational Plans Will Remain in Flux*

Throughout the planning and operational phases, certain aspects of the operational plan will remain in flux. It is important to accept this burden early in the planning process and to remain flexible and prepared for both anticipated and unforeseen changes such as changes to event venues, scheduling and resource conflicts, itineraries, VIP attendance, and ad hoc security requirements. For example, planners may need to react to the cancellation of several events due to severe weather or the reallocation of staff as venue locations are changed. Additionally, resource allocations may need to be adjusted mid-event to account for unforeseen circumstances. Flexibility will ensure that last-minute changes do not result in any adverse security implications.

## 2.2 Develop the Operational Plan

The operational plan will be the most important output of the planning process. The operational plan should provide essential information relevant to all agencies and stakeholders supporting the event including the overall vision and mission, agency-specific operational plans, job aids and descriptions, roles and responsibilities, key policies and procedures, key contacts, and contingency plans. The completeness and efficacy of this plan will be a result of the coordinated effort of local, state, regional, federal, and private-sector partners.

Developing the Operational Plan- Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
	Staff and Engage in Subcommittees	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Coordinate and Participate in Planning Groups	<input type="checkbox"/>



Developing the Operational Plan- Planning Checklist		
●	Identify and Include Supporting Agencies and Organizations	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop Scalable Plans	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Test the Operational Plan Prior to the Event	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ▲ *Staff and Engage in Subcommittees*

For a NSSE event, the USSS will recommend the formation of subcommittees<sup>13</sup> to focus on and develop specific plans for its operational area. Local law enforcement should be actively involved in the initial coordination of subcommittees and should determine whether additional subcommittees are required. Since there are more than 20 committees and subcommittees involved in an NSSE operation and each subcommittee requires a representative with departmental decision-making authority from the lead agency, this can place an additional burden on local public safety agencies that have critical roles in the event. In instances where the hosting jurisdiction is overburdened, assistance should be sought from other local participating agencies that can communicate with the lead agency fluidly. It is important that local planners recognize that additional subcommittees may not be in the scope of interest for the USSS and thus will not be part of their planning packages and preparation.

Create an Executive Steering Committee (ESC), comprised of agency representatives across multiple jurisdictions responsible for maintaining situational awareness across planning subcommittees, ensuring that decisions made by subcommittees do not contradict or conflict with decisions made by other subcommittees, and that any gaps in decision-making are identified and rectified as soon as possible.

### ● *Coordinate and Participate in Planning Groups*

Determine planning work groups or subcommittees early to ensure ample time for developing planning considerations and assumptions. Ensure that group members represent the agencies responsible for implementation and with the appropriate expertise. For example, the technology planners should include someone from the City IT Department that will be able to inform the process, but will also know the limitations of collection, storage, and communication of large data files (including images and videos). The logistics/asset identification planners will need time to research the best methods of supporting personnel and identifying appropriate rest and rehabilitation locations, and the staffing and housing planners will need time to recruit the proper number of personnel and secure housing to keep costs reasonable. When identifying planning group members, be creative but also be sure that the group doesn't grow too large or broad. Focus on the following activities for security operations:

- Define the scope and goals;
- Assess staffing and resource capabilities;
- Identify and procure appropriate resources;

<sup>13</sup> The term "subcommittee" refers to the planning groups that the USSS forms for planning major NSSE operations. This term differs from "operational area," which is one that we use in this document to categorize and highlight the core functions we feel are important to event planning and operations. In many cases, operational areas will be assigned and covered in one or multiple subcommittees.

- Create collaborative partnerships with various government, community, and business entities; and,
- Develop policies, procedures, and training and organize them into a realistic and comprehensive operational plan.

In LSSEs that do not involve USSS subcommittees, assign local law enforcement personnel as co-chairs on planning groups or subcommittees with a public safety mission and as participants on the remaining subcommittees. Meet regularly to ensure that subcommittee planners and command-level personnel maintain situational awareness of planning activities and can make key strategic decisions in a timely manner.

### ● *Identify and Include Supporting Agencies and Organizations*

Develop relationships with supporting agencies and organizations with operational responsibilities related to security of the event, including federal law enforcement agencies such as the USSS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the U.S. Marshals; local, state, and regional law enforcement and public safety agencies; and, outside organizations. Meet with interagency partners regularly (on a weekly or monthly basis) to coordinate planning operations, and to build effective working relationships to form a foundation of collaboration and teamwork during the event. Additionally, consider allowing local agencies outside of the lead agency to oversee individual aspects of the security in its entirety such as transportation of delegates, hotel security, and low-level escorts.

Potential supporting organizations may include:

- Event Promoters/Sponsors;
- Emergency services agencies such as fire/rescue, emergency medical services, public health and safety; and, neighboring Emergency Managers and agency representatives to coordinate mutual aid needs;
- Local planning agencies and individuals such as community development agencies, city planners, and hazard-mitigation planners;
- Local emergency planning committees for hazardous materials information;
- Public works agencies and utility companies;
- State supporting entities, including the State Emergency Management Agency or National Guard;
- Social service agencies and volunteer organizations such as the American Red Cross and Salvation Army—including animal care and control organizations;
- Medical community representatives such as area hospitals, EMS agencies, medical examiners, coroners, and morticians;
- Communications representatives such as Public Information Officers, city spokespeople, and media personalities;
- Aviation and coastal authorities such as state aviation authorities, other air support representatives, port authorities, and U.S. Coast Guard stations;

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Hold regular formal and informal meetings with interagency partners to develop effective working relationships.

- Chief Financial Officers, auditors, the State Administering Agency (SAA), and heads of any centralized procurement and resource support agencies;
- Business and retail communities, religious leaders, leaders of community groups, and other organizations that are directly impacted by the event and/or are likely to attend or demonstrate;
- The jurisdiction's legal counsel and leaders from labor and professional organizations; and,
- Leaders of area facilities, including industrial and military installations, schools, and universities.

### ● *Develop Scalable Plans*

Constantly assess operational plans for efficacy based on intelligence reports and other available event data including how many people will be attending and the weather forecast during the event. Begin planning for the worst-case scenario to cover all potential security threats, however, develop plans that are scalable and can reduce or reallocate the planned workforce and resources should intelligence information indicate otherwise. For example, if less criminal activity occurs or fewer event patrons attend, identify other functions that personnel can carry out and other places to allocate those resources. De-escalation plans should be a primary planning assumption that is included in all relevant security plans and account for outside factors such as geographic location, travel for outside agencies, and available mutual aid.

### ● *Test the Operational Plan Prior to the Event*

Conduct numerous multi-agency, multi-disciplinary exercises to identify potential gaps in the planned response once required entities have drafted their sections of the operational plan and all of the components are unified to form the jurisdiction's operational plan. A variety of exercise types may be employed, and senior leadership should determine what type of exercise may best benefit their operations and which partners should be involved in which exercises. Regional public safety partners—including law enforcement, fire, EMS, and emergency management—as well as other government and nongovernment agencies, when appropriate, should be included in exercises that proceed through the entirety of the event and the potential aftermath of an incident at the event.<sup>14</sup> For each of these exercises, it is also important to decide who should be exercised: the decision-makers, the operators, or both. The following types of exercises should be considered:

- **Tabletop Exercise:** A discussion-based exercise typically involving senior leaders that is aimed at identifying knowledge gaps for authorities and participants pertaining to information contained in the operational plan. This type of exercise is best administered earlier in the planning phase, as outputs will be used to modify and amend planning guidance.
- **Functional Exercise:** An operations-based exercise that allows participants to test their operational knowledge of plans, policies, and procedures. This type of exercise should be

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<sup>14</sup> Braziel, Rick, Frank Straub, George Watson, and Rod Hoops. 2016. Bringing Calm to Chaos: A Critical Incident Review of the San Bernardino Public Safety Response to the December 2, 2015, Terrorist Shooting Incident at the Inland Regional Center. Critical Response Initiative. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

conducted closer to the event date—after participants receive training on the operational plan—to test the implementation of plans and to assess whether additional training is needed. This type of training can be delivered online to out-of-town officers, to ensure that they are prepared when they arrive onsite.

- **Rehearsal of Concept Drill:** This type of exercise typically involves the use of scenarios or vignettes of incidents that may occur during a large-scale security event. These scenarios provide participants with the opportunity to discuss their agency's actions based on these plausible situations. A key focus might be resource allocation, allowing participants and planners to make assertions or determine whether their planned response assets will adequately meet the potential needs of the event. These exercises, including reality-based training on a regular basis, are important for personnel who will come into direct contact with demonstrators/protestors to build their capacity regarding interpersonal interactions and equipment deployment.

In addition to pre-scripted exercises, host agencies should test their plans during regularly scheduled large-scale events such as Fourth of July celebrations and other events. Evaluating public safety coordination and response during these events will allow local agencies to assess their operational plans and to make changes based on lessons learned during these activations and ensure that commanders who will be assigned a responsibility actively participates in that role in real-time circumstances. This allows for observation of their decision-making and ability to adapt and provide additional training if necessary. Pre-event exercises also help planners to ensure that draft plans will adequately establish appropriate response guidelines and procedures.

Training that takes place in public view, particularly scenario-based and tactical training exercises, should be deconflicted with other agencies that may be operating in the same area in anticipation of the actual event, including pre-event surveillance and other non-uniformed deployments. Deconfliction should take place using traditional contacts with local agencies as well through the nationwide deconfliction efforts of the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS).<sup>15</sup>

### ***Toolkit References***

The following planning matrix, assessment form, and template (found in Appendix A) can be used to begin pre-event planning:

- A.1 Pre-event Planning Matrix, Page A-5
- A.2 Hazard Vulnerability Assessment, Page A-7
- A.3 Operational Plan Template, Page A-11

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<sup>15</sup> See <https://www.ncirc.gov/deconfliction/> for additional information.


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## Section 3: Core Operational Areas

This section provides lessons learned and major considerations for 19 core operational areas. Each section covers: a brief description of the operational area; an overview of key strategies in a planning checklist; an in-depth description of each strategy supported by lessons learned; and references included in the appendices that can be used to develop the event security plan. The core operational areas are listed in alphabetical order and are not ranked in order of importance.

### 3.1 Administrative and Logistics Support

Administrative and logistics support requires 24-hour care to all law enforcement and supplemental personnel throughout an event. This care encompasses a broad range of activities and often becomes a catch-all function. Activities include planning for and managing event logistics; coordinating officer assignments; coordinating with vendors; obtaining officer lodging and nourishment; arranging for officer transportation; capturing and tracking all officials and unofficial demonstrations, parades, protests and other events that have an impact on resource allocation and scheduling city services; keeping contact information for executives of each of the public safety agencies with a critical role; coordinating procurement and resource requests; and, reviewing timesheets and payments for officers involved.

Administrative and Logistics Support - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Engage in Collaborative Planning	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Work with Federal Grant Partners	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Acquire an Appropriate Number of Personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Obtain Necessary Equipment	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Focus Resources on Proven Systems and Technologies	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Logistics	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Practice Plans and Protocols	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine Staffing Requirements, and Track and Demobilize Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Collaborate with Vendors and Ensure Accountability	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Provide Fixed and Mobile Nourishment Sites for Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate Lodging for Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Arrange for Officer Transportation	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

#### ● Engage in Collaborative Planning

Partnerships and collaboration are critical to acquiring and coordinating logistics resources. Planners should quickly identify other entities that can contribute to planning efforts including federal and state agencies, or outside law enforcement agencies; fire departments; health departments; city agencies and business support services; project managers; vendors; or property owners. Local businesses and community partners may be able to provide resources and logistical support in the form of venues or donations such as cash, water, food, or first aid

supplies during the event. Additionally, ancillary agencies may have useful resources and perspectives that they can contribute to the event. For example, school districts may be able to provide buses to transport out-of-town officers and their athletic facilities for officers to workout in during the event.

In addition, communication between logistics personnel through regular meetings is critical. Since logistics activities are dependent upon other event security efforts, lead logistics planners should collaborate with other planners on activities that are likely to have implications on logistics such as delegate/VIP protection, airport and other relevant public transportation police, venue security (see 3.15 Screening and Physical Security), and credentialing.

### ▲ *Work with Federal Grant Partners*

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Work closely with federal funding agencies, and partners such as the State Administering Agency (SAA), to ensure that expenditures are appropriately catalogued, tracked, and accounted for. Ensure accurate timekeeping and procurement records during planning, which will save time during post-event financial auditing and prevent unallowable costs.

For NSSEs, agency liaisons should work regularly with the State Administering Agency (SAA) and federal funding authorities to properly communicate specific resource and funding needs. Since SAAs have long-standing relationships with federal funding agencies, liaisons should work closely with the SAA of their state to become familiar with financial processes and protocols to ensure that they are compliant with grant guidelines and

requirements when procuring equipment or making logistics purchases. Knowledge of these guidelines is critical to avoiding financial impacts and obstacles during and after the event, when all financial expenses are closely audited. Section 3.6 details the federal financial process and key considerations when receiving federal funding. It is important for the Host City to begin discussing funding processes and concerns with relevant partners (i.e. the SAA) immediately upon being awarded an NSSE to provide ample time to identify and address areas in which the SAA may be able to provide assistance and resources. However, it is also important to understand the relationship between federal appropriation of funds and procurement and expenditures of any type. Jurisdictions can continue planning and Appendix A-12 can help guide the discussion.

### State Administering Agencies

While some host cities of LSSEs elect to keep BJA grant funding at the local level, some may elect to utilize State Administering Agencies (SAAs) to assist to manage and administer the grant. SAAs can offer a myriad of resources, knowledge, and relationships for host agencies to leverage so that they can focus on the complex logistics of the LSSE, leaving the SAA to many of the administrative details.

- *Grant Administration* – Many SAAs have expertise and knowledge on staff to provide focused, detail-oriented support in submitting applications; dealing with federal, state and local procurement guidelines and processes; submitting reimbursement request; reporting; and, other grant administration details.
- *Finance* – Long after the crowds have left, there will be bills to pay and partners to reimburse for their time, talents, and assets during the LSSE. SAAs can work to help host agencies budget and ensure bills are paid in a timely fashion in the aftermath of the event. SAAs will also assist host agencies in following federal spending guidelines so that when the federal Office of the Inspector General arrives to conduct the final audit, host agencies are ready.
- *Leveraging Relationships* – Often, through their work in administering grants and other state functions, SAAs have relationships with many criminal justice and other governmental agencies, vendors, non-profits, and other organizations that they can leverage to support host agencies during LSSEs.
- *Acting as Conveners* – In many instances because SAAs work with organizations both in and outside of the state as part of their business, they are used to acting as conveners of diverse organizations to accomplish goals and complete projects. They are able to leverage these skills to bring organizations together to support the needs of the LSSE and the host city.
- *Specialized Skills/Technical Assistance* – Through professional networks and/or on-staff skills, SAAs can provide specialized skills and technical assistance as necessary to support the LSSE.
- *Providing Additional Resources* – SAAs can bring to bear a wide network of people and organizations to leverage for last minute need of equipment or other necessities.
- *Navigating the Federal Funding Process* – Funding and procurement processes at the federal level can be a labyrinth of restrictions, special conditions and additional requirements. SAAs often have vast experience in these areas that can assist host cities in navigating these details, ensuring a smooth process.

To find the State Administering Agency contact in your state, go to <https://ojp.gov/saa/>.



### ● *Acquire an Appropriate Number of Personnel*

It is easy to undervalue the demands that will be placed on administrative and logistics support personnel during the planning phase. During previous large-scale security events, staffing for planning and operations was often underestimated

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Plan reserve resources and logisticians to ensure flexibility of forces to quickly respond to unforeseen complications.

by law enforcement planners, causing assigned planning staff to be overburdened. Lead planners should ensure that ample personnel are assigned to logistics and administrative support during both the planning phase and the operational phase. Additionally, personnel in positions that can be scaled from other duties based on need can be given support responsibilities. Specifically, more than one person—ideally people from the core planning team or the Executive Steering Committee established earlier—should be responsible for overseeing the coordination of the following logistical planning activities: operational logistics and field resource requests, vendors, officer transportation, and officer lodging. During planning, these leaders should not be expected to maintain regular job duties while planning for the event, so they have adequate time to focus on planning.

### ● *Obtain Necessary Equipment*

In addition to staff, a variety of specialized equipment—such as bicycles and utility terrain vehicles (UTVs), additional smartphones, body-worn cameras, information-sharing and GIS software, helmets, bullet-proof vests, vehicles, or uniforms—may be required to enhance security operations. Below are some important strategies for assessing, procuring, and tracking equipment:

- **Assessment:** Conduct a needs assessment to identify existing equipment and needed equipment. This assessment should always include a discussion about whether or not the equipment may be rented instead of purchased, in order to maximize the use of federal funds. Use the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and work with interagency partners to see if resources can be borrowed and/or leased to minimize costs of having to procure new equipment.
- **Procurement:** Based on the needs assessment and the resources that were able to be obtained through the EMAC, develop broad “target lists” of equipment to purchase, which can later be scaled down to critical items if budgets do not permit the acquisitions. Provide strict deadlines for agencies to submit resource requests and require that all requests have agency leadership approval. This is a helpful strategy to ensure that all possible needs are identified in a timely fashion and is a good way to avoid incurring higher costs associated with rushed orders and expedited shipping rates. Acquire equipment early to allow time for testing and training, especially for newly acquired technologies. Additionally, if there are certain items that are imperative, but may not be reimbursable or may take longer to obtain federal approval for, consider setting aside or allocating City resources to obtain those items.
- **Tracking:** Assign one or two persons to ordering and receiving equipment, in order to reduce uncoordinated and duplicative efforts. The logistics unit should also develop a tracking system for all equipment as it is procured, assigned to officers, used in the field, and collected during demobilization. Such a system will allow the department to maintain accountability of where equipment is, who is using it, and how it should be reallocated, if

needed. The logistics unit should work closely with their local government procurement office, to assist with procurement, purchasing, and tracking of equipment prior to the event.

Other important strategies include assigning equipment to officers before the event begins so that personnel have time to become familiar with it and establishing and educating officers on demobilization protocols to ensure all equipment is collected and tracked at the completion of the event.

Agencies should not be afraid to over-plan. In the event that equipment manufacturers, vendors, or facility managers cannot meet order capacities and timelines or back out weeks or even days prior to the event, these contingencies will allow for flexibility.

### ● *Focus Resources on Proven Systems and Technologies*

Focus on acquiring equipment that your agency is familiar with, especially technologies. Agencies may become overwhelmed with offers, suggestions, and solutions to handle the event. Though new tools may be appealing, departments should adhere to

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Avoid acquiring new technologies and systems. Focus on known tools that can enhance existing resources.

those that have been proven successful within the department or other agencies that have hosted large-scale events. Implementing new tools may or may not have the intended effect of improving operations. Additionally, it will likely require a great deal of effort on the front end and administrative/logistics support and will likely create a significant amount of additional work for city and county IT staff to ensure that the infrastructure exists to support any technological enhancements. Therefore, instead of focusing on a series of new technologies and systems, focus on making deliberate and researched technological enhancements to existing systems to ensure effective operational capabilities. These enhancements can include adding additional surveillance cameras to an existing network or bolstering motorcycles capabilities for field forces. Regardless, test communication system surge capacities of all types before the event.

### ● *Develop an Operational Plan for Logistics*

A well-organized logistics plan describing check-in and time-keeping processes and forms, equipment distribution and return, FAQs, specific points of contact for each of the key areas, and feeding/sleeping accommodations is critical for setting the tone for the event. Develop a logistics operational plan in coordination with interagency partners that includes the following elements:

- **Logistics command assignments and contact information:** Include the names, assignment, and contact information of logistics command staff.
- **Organizational chart:** Detail reporting mechanisms between the logistics commander, field operations supervisors, operations support, mobile distribution, vendors, volunteers, etc.
- **Mission and goals:** Include statements declaring the roles and responsibilities of the logistics unit—such as providing 24-hour support to all personnel in the form of nourishment, hydration, sanitation, and/or rest and rehabilitation (R&R)—and the overall public safety mission and goals for the event.

- **Events and operational dates:** Provide an overview of the event, when the logistics unit will be operational, and how/where the unit can be contacted.
- **Communication protocols:** Include details regarding communication mechanisms such as radios or phones for various logistics activities.
- **Timeline of expected key events:** Describe employment-related event activities, such as when staff will be activated, when sites will be set up or taken down, when vendors begin deliveries of equipment or food, and when meals will be scheduled.
- **Execution plan:** Include details for meal schedules; key staff assignments and contact information; details on major and auxiliary facilities/locations including addresses, staffing, related activities, and photos; and, other supplemental information on site security, vehicle maintenance, vendors, parking, and/or fueling.

### ● *Practice Plans and Protocols*

If time allows, even if it is only a couple days before the event itself, exercise plans that are specific to the event—plans that are not standard operating procedures—prior to the event. At a minimum, conduct tabletop exercises to test capabilities and contingencies, but multi-agency and multi-disciplinary reality-based trainings are most effective. For example, prior to the 2016 DNC the City of Philadelphia hosted the 2015 Papal Visit/World Meeting of Families and the City of Cleveland used the Cleveland Cavaliers championship parade prior to the 2016 RNC to practice their operational plans, in addition to practicing during several smaller events. This practice allowed them to identify key personnel needs, field-test their plans, note various shortfalls in planned operations, and make appropriate adjustments to compensate for concerns.

### ● *Manage and Coordinate Officer Support*

One of the most important tasks for the security of an event is to ensure that all venues, VIPs, crowds, and traffic posts are sufficiently staffed. Some strategies to accomplish appropriate staffing include:

- **Conduct a needs assessment:** Conduct a needs assessment of personnel to acquire sufficient staff for various posts. Identify the priority positions—such as bike officers, demonstration-engagement officers, and logistics planners—that will serve as the foundation for the overall approach to the event and to managing attendees and demonstrators and ensure early on that an appropriate number of individuals are allocated to these posts. Designate staff to coordinate officer assignments early on, in anticipation of staffing resources from other agencies that might be changing up through the start of the event and that might require rearrangements of officer assignments. Plans should include a staffing contingency for last minute assignments and for flexibility of staff in scalable positions. For example, if the intent is to limit arrests, have a scalable arrest processing plan where the unneeded staff can serve in other capacities, allowing for more flexibility for field officers and other personnel.
- **Create a database to track officers:** Develop a database or use an existing one—such as WebEOC or similar platforms—to accurately track officer job assignments, shifts, and timecards. Tracking assignments allows command-level staff to maintain situational

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Develop a system that has both tracking and reporting capabilities, to keep commanders up-to-date on officer assignments.

awareness of officers and resources deployed and to make staffing and resource adjustments if a security incident occurs. Tracking assignments is also valuable for ensuring communication and collaboration between multiple operations centers and between operations centers and officers in the field. Tracking assignments and deployments is also imperative for keeping officers accountable of their timecards and accurately conducting payroll after the event. When developing tracking protocols and systems, logistics personnel should consider the following:

- Establish a time-tracking process for outside agencies;
  - Ensure existing databases have the ability, or develop one, to create job assignment reports for commanders during the event;
  - Ensure that the system allows for multiple assignments if it is necessary to alter officers' assignments/posts;
  - Use resource-tracking software, such as Radio Frequency Identification, to track personnel and their equipment. Conduct a test of the system prior to the event to identify potential downfalls or technical glitches; and,
  - Develop backup time tracking methods, such as written time logs, in the event that electronic tracking systems do not work in certain locations or there are technology glitches.
- **Collect and maintain officer timecards:** Obtain officers' completed timecards and accurately track days of departure during demobilization. This will ensure that overtime and travel compensation are accurately captured. Personnel should also be mindful that personnel tracking and accountability may require time and effort post event.

### ● *Collaborate with Vendors and Ensure Accountability*

Coordinating meals for a large number of officers in multiple locations throughout the city requires close collaboration with outside vendors. Conduct a comprehensive, city-wide assessment of current contracts to understand the scope of existing contracts and prevent duplication of efforts. Planners can reach out to existing and new vendors to acquire event resources. Become actively involved and familiar with—and ensure that public safety agency executives, city attorneys, and if needed the SAA are involved in—the bidding process to ensure that resources are properly acquired and details of contacts are properly understood by all parties.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Be actively involved in the bidding process for contracts to ensure that resources are properly acquired and that both parties understand the contracts.

Vendors should be held accountable for understanding and meeting their responsibilities and timelines to ensure that resources are provided in the appropriate manner. Planners can encourage accountability by conducting taste tests, performing site visits, and having vendors join in on planning meetings. Anticipate that

vendors will have different questions, complaints, and concerns regarding event logistics than law enforcement usually encounter.

Leverage the additional capacities that vendors and community organization such as volunteer groups may be able to provide whenever possible. For example, vendors can be used to provide off-site delivery to prevent the overstretching of logistics staff capabilities. Additionally, community organizations and volunteers may be willing to provide assistance and food. If your budget allows, consider hiring an outside contractor to work with the core planning team or

Executive Steering Committee to manage the larger logistics challenges, like a large feeding operation. Even though hiring a contractor can be costly, it could save law enforcement a lot of time and personnel that could be used elsewhere for the event.

### ● *Provide Fixed and Mobile Nourishment Sites for Officers*

All personnel assisting in the security operation will need to be fed and hydrated at least once per shift, with a likelihood of two meals, depending on shift-length. Fixed R&R sites are typically used to attend to officers' needs. However, mobile feeding operations are also necessary to provide resources to officers farther from R&R sites or on moving duties such as attending to demonstrators or parade routes during their shifts. Below are some useful strategies for providing event nourishment as it relates to R&R sites, mobile deliveries, per diems, and weather:

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Prepare for mobile delivery operations of food for officers who cannot get to fixed R&R sites.

- **R&R sites:** Plan for multiple R&R sites, taking into consideration officer assignments and posts to avoid having officers travel far distances for nourishment. R&R sites should be quality locations—where there is adequate space, restrooms, and heating/cooling—that are open whenever officers are on duty. Planners can set up sites that are specifically assigned to officers' posts and should ensure that each site has an appropriate amount of resources. Additionally, consider mobile R&R vehicles, such as buses, if there are not available fixed-site R&R locations close to where a large number of officers will be posted.
- **Mobile deliveries:** Prepare for mobile delivery operations using utility terrain vehicles (UTVs) to provide nourishment to officers that cannot leave post or for those with immediate resource requests like water or medications. This consideration should be planned for in the event of a large-scale demonstration where officers cannot leave their posts and must be fed and hydrated in the street.
- **Per diem:** Work with federal grant managers to determine if per diem can be given to officers in remote locations and for sources or plainclothes officers to minimize the scale of the feeding operations and ensure the protection of sources and plainclothes officers.
- **Weather:** If there are concerns with extreme heat or cold, set up cooling or heating stations at R&R sites, as well as at heavily-trafficked checkpoints, where officers will be on duty for long hours of the day.
- **Food Vendors:** Hire multiple outside vendors to feed personnel. Multiple vendors can be chosen to ensure that spoiled food from one vendor does not make the entire workforce sick, offer multiple options to officers with dietary restrictions, and to spread the return of funds to the local economy.

## ● *Coordinate Lodging for Officers*

All out-of-area officers who are not currently working or living within driving distance of the

### **BEST PRACTICE**

During the 2016 RNC, officers were housed at one of three universities based on their responsibilities and accessibility to transportation. Motorcycle officers were housed at the university furthest from the RNC because they had their own transportation.

event will require lodging. The scope of this task will depend on the number of local hotels, universities, or other lodging accommodations available. In order to efficiently coordinate housing assignments, contact participating agencies for information regarding personnel housing needs. Ensure that these agencies provide accurate lists of personnel in a timely fashion and have someone from the logistics team responsible for housing

check in regularly with out-of-area agencies to ensure the lists are accurate and changes are noted. House officers assigned to the same functions/activities within close proximity of one another to aid in coordinating transportation. Intelligence sources should be provided with secure housing facilities separate from other officers to ensure that their covers are protected. Planners should also work closely with Officer Transportation personnel when coordinating these assignments to house officers with their own transportation further and to house officers at universities with transportation and escorts to facilitate movement.

If applicable, confer with the host/event committee, or the group responsible for reserving rooms for event delegates and VIPs early on. This will allow law enforcement to gauge the availability of hotels that can be used for officers. Ensure that funding or federal approval is acquired early in order to reserve blocks of hotel rooms and secure low rates. If funding or approval is not available, hotels may not set aside rooms for officers and could open them up to the public. It is important that law enforcement communicate and work with federal funders (and the SAA, if applicable) early to begin necessary approval processes. In the event that insufficient lodging is available, look to use alternate mass housing options, such as local universities.

Before reserving any lodging facility, conduct site visits to facilities to inspect accommodations and avoid any health and comfort concerns such as pests, and functioning room amenities. Visit the secured lodging facilities just prior to the beginning of the event to ensure cleanliness and appropriate facilities for public safety personnel. For example, prior to the 2016 RNC, the Cleveland Division of Police worked with the colleges and universities housing officers to decorate the dormitories to look more welcoming and comfortable. In addition, health department experts should be placed on standby during the event to respond quickly to any health concerns.

Ensure that visiting officers are properly checked-in and checked-out. Identify local volunteers or officers and supervisors—who are familiar with the area and can welcome officers on behalf of the host city and agency—to perform this function. These local individuals should be provided with brief training regarding their exact roles and responsibilities.

Consider hiring an event planner or trusted travel agency to coordinate large housing needs in an effort to free time and resources of law enforcement officers for other security-related tasks. If applicable, be mindful of any federal grant requirements and guidelines for hiring an outside firm—such as the possibility of greater costs and the potential for complications with locked



contracts that include not being able to cancel or change reservations. With increased scrutiny around event planning in federal grants, the costs of hiring an event planner may not be reimbursable and this activity should be discussed with the federal funding agency (and the SAA, if applicable).

### ● *Arrange for Officer Transportation*

Officer transportation consists of the movement of all officers in and around the secure and non-secure zones of an event, as well as to and from lodging and assignments. Proper coordination of officer transportation is critical for ensuring that officers are on time for their assignments and can return to their lodging locations to rest after long shifts. The following are some useful strategies for creating officer transportation plans and coordinating movement for officers:

- **Officer transportation plans:** Determine the basics of your officer transportation plan as early as possible, including whether or not you will use an outside contractor, school district resources, or other methods of transportation. If you are using an outside vendor transportation providers will be a highly-sought-after resource and waiting too long may affect the quality of the company you receive. These companies may be used to transport officers assisting in the event and local law enforcement should work closely with vendors in developing transportation plans and protocols. Additionally, ensure that transportation plans and contingencies align with officers' schedules. Allot time to ensure that drivers fully understand the transportation plan and can identify the equipment and training necessary to implement the detailed provisions. Transportation providers may wish to purchase equipment such as GPS and radios to ensure drivers are able to maintain transport schedules and routes and constant contact with someone in one of the operations centers. The plan should:
  - Allow agencies to bring their own patrol cars if there is adequate parking, to alleviate the scope of officer transport;
  - Locate officers that cannot self-transport centrally, near mass transit options, and locate officers that can self-transport in surrounding hotels; and
  - Identify back-up transportation options for maximum flexibility.
- **Officer movement:** Assign local officers to help with officer transportation, since they are familiar with navigating the area. Assign a commander in the field to quickly respond to transportation needs. Provide visiting officers clear instructions of transportation plans and procedures including pick-up/drop-off locations and times prior to the event.
- **Officer pick-up:** Coordinate officer pick-up at a final duty station, rather than where a shift began, to eliminate the need for officers to return to the initial drop-off point.
- **Using Buses:** When/If acquiring buses to transport officers, ensure that sufficient vehicles are obtained to meet duty schedules and transportation distances to officer lodging. Buses should have the capacity to adequately accommodate officers' equipment and gear.

#### BEST PRACTICE

Allow agencies to bring their own patrol cars to minimize the number of officers who require transportation assistance. When possible, identify options in advance for parking these vehicles as staging areas will likely be limited during a large-scale event.



## Toolkit References


The following resources (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations of administrative and logistics support:

- A.4 Logistics Information Survey, Page A-13
- A.5 Food Vendor Information Sheet, Page A-15
- A.6 Inspection Checklist for Vendors, Page A-19
- A.7 Hotel Survey Questionnaire, Page A-23

## 3.2 Command and Control

Law enforcement responds to a wide range of security incidents and operations that are typically handled by a single unit or department. A large-scale security event will require a different approach and a different command structure.

DHS provides consistent national guidance to local, state, and federal government agencies for approaching incident management of domestic events.<sup>16</sup> This standard approach—including the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS)—provides a core set of doctrine, principles, terminology, and organizational processes that enable efficient, flexible, and collaborative incident management at all levels. Since large-scale security events involve the collaboration of multiple jurisdictions, NIMS and ICS provide an effective standard for coordination.

Command and Control - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Establish a Command Structure with Appropriate Leadership	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop a Professional Relationship with Agency Leaders	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate Response through a Unified Operations Center	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Coordinate Response with the MACC	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Maintain Situational Awareness	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Keep Open Lines of Communication	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Structure Operations Similar to Traditional Patrol Operations	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Establish a Command Structure with Appropriate Leadership*

Appoint an Incident Commander or Director to oversee operations early in the planning stages. Overarching leadership is important for ensuring that the major security functions are well-coordinated and managed. Commanders should have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities during both the planning and operations phases.

<sup>16</sup> This guidance was mandated as part of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5.

### ● *Develop a Professional Relationship with Agency Leaders*

During the planning phase, build professional relationships with leaders from outside local, state, and federal agencies involved in security operations.<sup>17</sup> If you are the lead agency, acknowledge that despite the ability to handle a large-scale event without assistance of others, collaborating and being inclusive are important to help accomplish your mission, and determine which agencies can provide the most assistance in achieving those goals.<sup>18</sup>

Arrange monthly informal gatherings—such as breakfasts, lunches, coffee, etc.—with relevant local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies—such as USSS, FBI, DHS, Air Force, U.S. Marshals, etc.—to assist in developing valuable working relationships. Conducting and documenting these meetings is invaluable in maintaining productive relationships especially as the event nears and planning intensifies.

### ● *Coordinate Response through a Unified Operations Center*

If the event involves VIPs, demonstrators, and/or other stakeholders, local law enforcement should activate its command center. In many cases, this may start a few days before the actual event occurs, to ensure that any potential challenges are worked out before the actual event.

### ▲ *Coordinate Response with the Multi-Agency Command Center (MACC)*

For NSSEs, event security is monitored by USSS through a MACC. The MACC is generally activated in a safe location, sometimes outside of the host city. Several agencies, including local, state, and federal agencies, are represented at the MACC to promote integrated communication and coordination, as well as enhanced situational awareness.

If local law enforcement has a close relationship with USSS and there is adequate space, local law enforcement operations can be coordinated together at the MACC. Otherwise local operations can be coordinated at a separate location, such as the department's Command Center. Local law enforcement can be deployed to the MACC to facilitate coordination of police responses with the USSS.

### ● *Maintain Situational Awareness*

During multi-day events, operations command centers should conduct shift briefings and develop and share situational reports to ensure that all key stakeholders maintain situational awareness. During the 2016 DNC, agency liaisons in the Philadelphia Emergency Operations Center (EOC) conducted regular “spot reports” to share important updates from their agency and to quickly identify solutions to any challenges. Executives should also maintain awareness through regular briefings with decision-makers from the mayor's office, police department, fire department, transportation services, solid waste services, public affairs, and the event committee. These

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<sup>17</sup> Braziel, Rick, Frank Straub, George Watson, and Rod Hoops. 2016. Bringing Calm to Chaos: A Critical Incident Review of the San Bernardino Public Safety Response to the December 2, 2015, Terrorist Shooting Incident at the Inland Regional Center. Critical Response Initiative. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. <https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/bringing-calm-to-chaos-a-police-foundation-review-of-the-san-bernardino-terrorist-attacks/>.

<sup>18</sup> Police Under Attack: Southern California Law Enforcement Response to the Attacks by Christopher Dorner (Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2013), <http://www.policefoundation.org/critical-incident-reviewlibrary/police-foundation-regional-review-of-police-response-to-the-attacks-by-christopher-dorner/>.

meetings should review operations from the previous day and expected activities and challenges for the upcoming day.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

During the 2016 DNC, agency liaisons in the Philadelphia Emergency Operations Center (EOC) conducted regular “spot reports”—in addition to sharing information through event-management software and regular briefings between agency executives—to share important updates from their agency and to quickly identify solutions to any challenges.

Deploying all uniformed officers with body-worn cameras (BWCs) can provide a multitude of perspectives from multiple areas around the event and help determine if additional resources are needed during a large gathering or demonstration.<sup>19</sup> Especially with new technology that allows for BWC footage to be live-streamed to an agency’s headquarters—along with cameras from dashboards; surveillance systems; smartphones; and helicopters, unmanned aerial systems (UASs), and

other aircrafts—this could provide real-time citywide situational awareness for law enforcement executives and other important decision-makers. Pictures and videos gathered from social media can also enhance situational awareness. It is also important to remember the important situational awareness provided by personnel—both in uniform and undercover—in the field. Information from the field shared with incident commanders who are not in the field, allows them to make timely and well-informed response decisions.

In addition, interagency partners can use event-management software, such as Knowledge Center, to maintain instant situational awareness and share information. These systems can provide officers and security personnel with a comprehensive format for viewing planned activities, tracking incidents, coordinating responses, and managing personnel and resources. Data recorders can be placed in established command and operations centers to record information related to the event in the software. Prior to the event, planners should consider how network firewalls may limit access for interagency users and field personnel and what levels of access different agencies should have.

#### ● *Keep Open Lines of Communication*

Communication and information sharing are extremely important to ensuring effective command and control. Commanders in operations centers must communicate changes in response plans effectively and in a timely manner to commanders in the field. Communication can be achieved using various technologies—such as smartphones, radios, or email—depending on the level of encryption needed. Radio channels are often used to facilitate communication for various security operations such as a transportation talk group or a mobile field force talk group. Commanders also can set up an “executive” talk group to promote open communication without congested radio traffic and unwanted interference.

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<sup>19</sup> Prior to leveraging BWCs in any capacity, jurisdictions should ensure that they have the proper policies and procedures in place and that they have conducted ample trainings on how/when BWCs should be used, relevant issues to their use in maintaining situational awareness, including fully understanding the differences between First Amendment-protected behaviors and suspicious activities. BJA provides a variety of valuable resources for law enforcement using BWCs. The toolkit can be found at <https://www.bja.gov/bwc/topics-gettingstarted.html>.

### BEST PRACTICE


Educate security personnel on proper communication protocols and reporting structures to avoid communication choke-points and oversaturation.

Due to the nature of large-scale events, consider establishing encrypted channels to ensure secure communications. Available technologies can be used to prevent individuals from scanning radio channels.

Brief all officers on communication protocols prior to the event to ensure that officers understand who they should be reporting to, how, and when. Unclear and/or mixed communication flows can overburden the Incident Commander, can result in miscommunication and confusion, or can compromise event security. For example, visiting officers may resort to reporting to their own agency's commander, who may then directly contact the Incident Commander, as opposed to reporting in accordance with their proper chain-of-command.

### ● *Structure Operations Similar to Traditional Patrol Operations*

Host departments can encourage seamless command and control with outside agencies by keeping out-of-town personnel from the same agency on the same squad and shift, and mirroring operations after typical law enforcement patrol structures, in which various levels of command facilitate coordinated communications. For example, the first level of operations can consist of a squad of nine patrol officers and one supervisor at the level of sergeant or above. The next layer can be a grouping of five to six squads into platoons, again with a local department executive overseeing each squad and platoon. The final layer of command and control can include functional group commanders, to which platoon leaders report, and should be an executive-level decision-maker (Figure 2 below). Establishing a command and control structure that is familiar to officers from outside agencies enables clear communication of activities and the direct supervision and reporting of issues throughout the event.



### Toolkit References

The following template and checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations of command and control:


- A.8 Incident Organization Chart Template, Page A-31
- A.9 Organization Assignment List, Page A-33

In addition, the following are references that other agencies and organizations have developed that contain useful information for planning command and control:

- DHS, *National Incident Management System*, December 2008.
- DHS/FEMA guidance on NIMS/ICS: [www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system](http://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system).

### 3.3 Credentialing

Credentialing is critical because it allows event planners and law enforcement to control the number of people attending the event; regulate access levels; and ensure that those who are being screened at checkpoints are who they claim to be.

Credentialing - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
▲	Abide by USSS Credentialing Protocols	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine the Type and Level of Credentials Required	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine if Vehicle Credentials are Needed	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Detail Credential Specifications	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Provide Specific Guidance to Individuals Requesting Credentials	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Process Credential Information in an Organized and Timely Fashion	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop Protocols for Creating and Distributing Credentials	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Ensure that Officers Understand Credential Protocols	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

#### ▲ *Abide by USSS Credentialing Protocols*

For an NSSE, the USSS will create federal credentials for access to high-security areas that will require background checks or investigations. Early in the planning process, work with USSS to submit names of local agency and/or city officials in order to control access to specific city locations or delineate security zone access and work with the host organization to address additional credentials or whether they will accept USSS credentials.

#### ● *Determine the Type and Level of Credentials Required*

The type and level of credentials required will vary depending on the event and the individual's roles and responsibilities. For an NSSE, the local agency may choose not to issue additional credentials. However, officers that will be involved in facilitating the movement of dignitaries should be included in the credentialing discussion. For non-NSSEs, the local agency might decide to provide one type of credential identifying all officers as local law enforcement and tier the access level according to an officer's role and responsibilities during the event. For example, a command officer might require access to various secure locations during the event, whereas an officer directing traffic might not. Local law enforcement may also choose to issue different types of credentials to improve their ability to manage outside persons such as city personnel or vendors that may require access to secure zones, but are not performing in a safety role.

When establishing the type and level of credentials, planners should determine if background checks will be required, and if so, who will conduct them. If the departments or agencies do not have the capacity to coordinate credentials and background checks, they can consider hiring a private-sector company to assist.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Limit physical access to the event by issuing credentials to essential personnel only.

In order to develop credentials in a timely manner and prevent production of unnecessary credentials, local law enforcement executives should determine who will require what type of credential and should attempt to standardize the credential specifications.

Since credentials outside of those created by the USSS are the responsibility of the host law enforcement agency, outside law enforcement agencies should be encouraged to only request credentials for those who will be participating directly in the event, and not complete staffing rosters. Having an abundance of extra credentials is a security risk and should be avoided.

#### ● *Determine if Vehicle Credentials are Needed*

Credentials can also be required for vehicles accessing secure zones or for parking in event areas, to show that a vehicle has been searched and/or where parking is limited. Vehicle credentials (placards) should be issued using vehicle information in order to prevent individuals from sharing credentials. Credentials can also be created for specific venues or events to create security measures in addition to perimeter checkpoints.

#### ● *Detail Credential Specifications*

Include—and attempt to standardize—the following specifications to ensure proper verification and to prevent counterfeiting:

- Photo identification;
- Personal information; and,
- Color-coding or details regarding the individual's level of access or role such as law enforcement personnel, event staff, or VIP. This strategy allows event security the ability to determine agency or venue access by first sight as opposed to a more in-depth inspection.

Choose the approach most suited to the operational environment early.

#### ● *Provide Specific Guidance to Individuals Requesting Credentials*

Clearly communicate cut-off dates and timelines for submitting credentialing information to all participating organizations. At a minimum, require that commanders and supervisors playing a leadership role during the event submit their credential information well in advance of the event date. Be prepared for any last minute personnel changes.

Instructions on requesting credentials should alert agencies of specific information requirements. Describe what personnel photographs should look like, including the dimensions of the photograph, appropriate attire such as hats and glasses not being

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Provide specific instructions on the information required to receive credentials to avoid unnecessary delays in processing access requests.



allowed in photographs, and describe the approval processes. The host agency should also provide examples of photographs to alleviate having to request new pictures.

### ● *Process Credential Information in an Organized and Timely Fashion*

The local jurisdiction may receive thousands of requests for credentials. To expedite the credentialing process, develop a system or database—or use a pre-existing one—to securely process personnel information and photographs and to track all required information. Additionally, ensure that necessary vehicles have the proper placards as early as possible. In addition, anticipate the need for last-minute production of new, corrected, or lost/forgotten credentials by establishing an adequately staffed and equipped on-site credentialing location near event venues and lodging sites.

### ● *Develop Protocols for Creating and Distributing Credentials*

Have a plan for receiving and distributing local, state, and federal credentials that ensures these materials are always in the custody of authorized personnel, whether they are delivered directly to support agencies or picked up in-person. If credentials are picked up in person, designate a single location that is open before and during the event to prevent uncertainty of where credentials should be obtained.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Determine protocols and authorities for tracking and distributing credentials to ensure that they are not distributed to unauthorized personnel.

### ● *Ensure that Officers Understand Credential Protocols*

Personnel staffing security checkpoints must know the credentialing protocols to prevent secure zones from being compromised. All security staff should be briefed on the appearance of credentials and their associated access requirements. Establish and publicize a single point of contact—including phone number or email address—to event attendees and security personnel for answering questions regarding credentials.

## ***Toolkit References***


The following checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for credentialing:

- A.10 Credentialing Checklist, Page A-35


## **3.4 Crowd Management**

Large-scale security events often attract large groups of demonstrators underscoring law enforcement's public safety role.

Crowd management planning must take into account all elements of an event, especially the type and duration, venue characteristics, methods of entrance, likely attendees, the size and demeanor of the crowds, communication mechanisms, crowd control strategies, and queuing practices.

Crowd Management - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Anticipate Crowd Behaviors and Actions	<input type="checkbox"/>



Crowd Management - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Collaborate with Other Organizations	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Use Data to Support the Development of Crowd Management Deployment	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop a Policing Strategy that is Focused on Non-Confrontational Tactics Centered on Team Policing	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify the Most Appropriate Resources for the Mission	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine Officer Dress	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Manage Demonstrator Activities	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Train Officers on the Policing Strategy	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Inform the Public of Response Tactics	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Create Mobile Response Teams	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Position Commanders in the Field	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Anticipate Crowd Behaviors and Actions*

Prior to the event, understand the nature of the audience attracted by a particular event. Engage with representatives from those groups most likely to attend and layout rules of engagement, share concerns, share safety and security plans, and establish working relationships with these various groups. As part of these relationships, determine expected demonstration groups, including their size, typical behaviors, and any adversary groups. Collaboratively identify potential behaviors and actions that crowd members may be planning to take—such as demonstrations, marches, protests, and getting arrested—and work with them to ensure the events remain peaceful. Additionally, work with faith and other community leaders to gather information on local gangs and other deviant groups that may pose a threat to the overall security of the event. Common demonstrator tactics that police should be aware of include the following:<sup>20</sup>

#### BEST PRACTICE

Engage with representatives from those groups most likely to attend and layout rules of engagement, share concerns, share safety and security plans, and establish working relationships with these various groups. As part of these relationships, determine expected demonstration groups, including their size, typical behaviors, and any adversary groups.

- Blocking roads, streets, and intersections;
- Heaving rocks, sticks, and other projectiles;
- Wearing masks or other protective equipment to block effects from chemical irritants;
- Spitting or yelling in police officers' faces; or
- Breaking windows or vandalizing property.

Separate intelligence gathering, counter-terrorism, and counter-surveillance activities from proactive engagement. While both aspects can provide important awareness of what to expect, it is important that community members and demonstrators don't feel that they are being co-opted

<sup>20</sup> A more extensive list of protestor tactics can be found in the DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, 2007.

or used. Information on demonstrators is primarily obtained through criminal intelligence gathering, which is detailed in Section 3.8 – Intelligence/Counter-terrorism/Counter Surveillance.

### ● *Collaborate with Other Organizations*

A number of local, state, and federal organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the DOJ Community Relations Service (CRS), specialize in interactions with demonstrators and may be able to provide advice and negotiate in advance of any demonstrations. CRS is a third-party conciliation agency that specializes in resolving racial and ethnic conflict. CRS personnel often attend large-scale security events and can help resolve disputes arising from alleged use of excessive force by police. Begin collaboration with these types of agencies during the planning phase.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Allow demonstrators to set up camp in designated areas, which may provide opportunities for improved engagement and awareness.

### ● *Use Data to Support the Development of Crowd Management Deployment*

Strategic analysis can be done prior to the event to determine where crowd management officers and assets should be deployed. For example, for the 2012 RNC, TPD conducted a geospatial analysis of the arrests that occurred in St. Paul, MN for the 2008 RNC and overlaid that data in the event space for Tampa. Because of this analysis, the department was able to make informed, data-driven decisions of where potential hotspots for arrests may occur and staged their resources appropriately.

### ● *Develop a Policing Strategy Focused on Non-Confrontational Tactics and Team Policing*

Most demonstrators tend to be peaceful and simply want media attention drawn to their causes. As a result, crowd control strategies should focus on non-aggressive policing tactics that not only protect civil rights and First Amendment rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, but also encourages open communication between the police and the public.

Focus policing strategies on the importance of working as a team when responding to large crowds/demonstrators and to prioritizing engagement and de-escalation. Working as a team will provide a unified front for local law enforcement's public safety plans and protocols and prevent crowds from targeting individual officers. Especially given the attention focused on law enforcement's response to large gatherings, mass demonstrations, and other critical incidents it is imperative to remind officers that "to be successful, dialogue will depend not only on what police do, but also on what they are seen to do, both by their peers as well as those within the crowd."

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Stress team policing tactics and impress upon officers that their mission is to protect the Constitutional rights of all of the event attendees. Emphasize the importance of the First

Amendment<sup>21</sup> and abiding by the department's use of force policy by handing them out and displaying them prominently in check-in, lodging, and R&R sites.

Though non-aggressive strategies are recommended for crowd control tactics, law enforcement must also be prepared to respond to criminal behaviors. Protocols on what types of behaviors will not be tolerated and appropriate uses of force should be detailed in operational plans and trained on repeatedly. Instilling the department's philosophy on use of force can be a challenge since these events may require bringing in officers from outside agencies with different use of force policies. Ensure that all outside officers are thoroughly trained on the selected use of force policies for the event and are reminded of the policies at each roll call.<sup>22</sup>

### ● *Identify the Most Appropriate Resources for Crowd Management*

A variety of vehicles can be used as part of non-confrontational crowd control tactics, including bicycles, dual sport motorcycles,<sup>23</sup> or UTVs. Such vehicles are valuable because they can be used as physical barriers for managing crowd movement and can allow police to rapidly respond to crowd control incidents. Dual sport motorcycles are useful for patrolling the larger outer perimeter of an event, as they do not fatigue officers like bicycles do. Additionally, bicycle officers tend to be seen by attendees as more approachable and friendlier and they are able to make rounds on a regular basis to ensure safety and security of all. Bicycle Unit officers were also able to provide slightly more mobility than officers on foot, allowing officers to provide assistance during movement of parades and marches. In these regards, the Bicycle Unit was extremely positive and appreciated by demonstrators. When needed, bicycles can also serve as physical barricades for directing large crowds.

It is also important to note, that while planners may consider the use of mounted officers for crowd control, they should understand the advantages and disadvantages of these resources. The use of horses can be inefficient and costly and not as useful as bicycles based on cost, maintenance, and speed.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Use bicycles and dual-sport vehicles to create force flexibility and as a non-confrontational crowd management tactic.

### ● *Determine Officer Dress*

Officer dress can impact public perceptions and actions. For example, officers in full riot gear may encourage demonstrators to be more aggressive, while officers in regular duty uniforms may de-escalate demonstrators and appear more welcoming. Determine if a common uniform or an officer's regular duty uniform should be used. A common uniform can be valuable in providing a unified front for crowd control operations. Conversely, the local agency can allow visiting officers to wear their department's uniform, which can be a cost-effective approach to showing a wide-range of force.

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<sup>21</sup> The BJA National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center provides *Responding to First Amendment-Protected Events—The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers* online training videos and resources at no-cost, available at: [https://www.ncirc.gov/Training\\_First\\_Amendment.aspx](https://www.ncirc.gov/Training_First_Amendment.aspx). These trainings should be required for all officers.

<sup>22</sup> Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, *Recommendations for First Amendment-Protected Events for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies*, Bureau of Justice Assistance (2012). <https://www.it.ojp.gov/GIST/35/Recommendations-for-First-Amendment-Protected-Events-for-State-and-Local-Law-Enforcement-Agencies> (accessed February 3, 2017).

<sup>23</sup> Dual sport motorcycles are 400 cc on/off road motorcycles.

During both the 2016 RNC in Cleveland and the 2016 DNC in Philadelphia, crowd management officers that were visible to attendees and demonstrators were dressed in regular duty uniforms, while crowd management officers nearby—but out of sight—were dressed in full riot gear with helmets, shields, and chemical irritants. These individuals were not deployed at either location.

### ● *Manage Demonstrator Activities*

Consider the following strategies for controlling demonstrator activities during a large-scale security event:

- Pre-designate parade and march routes to better manage traffic interruptions of planned demonstrations;
- Prior to the event, scan the area to remove objects that could be thrown at officers or used to damage property;
- Pre-position officers out of sight in hatch/riot gear;
- Designate space for demonstrators to sleep and set up their base of operations to consolidate demonstrators to one location and allow police to maintain better awareness of demonstrator activities; and,
- Evaluate the need for and layout of a free speech platform.

### ● *Train Officers on the Policing Strategy*

Critical to the success of crowd management operations is effectively training all officers—not just field officers assigned to crowd management—in predetermined policing strategies and the overall mission, vision, and goals. Include information on expected response tactics—including de-escalation and respect for First Amendment rights—and unacceptable behaviors in training. Specifically, train officers to use behaviors and tactics that allow demonstrators to exercise their Constitutional rights, as well as encourage officers to engage in friendly interactions with attendees. Moreover, reinforce department policies on use of force and how an adverse reaction or lapse in judgment may lead to an overall negative public perception of the department.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Reinforce appropriate police responses by educating officers of actions they should not participate in.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

TPD executed a highly effective training strategy for the 2012 RNC entitled “Don’t be that guy.” This training reinforced enforcement actions through videos and pictures of officers using poor decision-making skills, conducting themselves in an inappropriate manner, and using excessive force.

Offer trainings at multiple times and through multiple mechanisms to ensure that all officers receive and understand the department’s protocols and expectations for crowd management. Trainings should be spread across multiple platforms including: online, classroom and scenario-based tabletop exercises, and in-person drills.

Scenario training and exercises and drills can prepare officers to remain unresponsive to demonstrators that try to bait and elicit negative responses. Online trainings can also ease the burden on providing out-of-town officers before they get on-site and help reinforce the local laws and policies and procedures. Examples for delivering training include presentations, webinars, online course curriculum, or in-person training at an academy. Lesson and instructional training can also include specific scenarios and exercises that resemble actual or probable events. To

highlight the importance of this training, consider having the Chief or Sheriff provide a direct message that reinforces the department's crowd management primary mission and tactics.

### ● *Inform the Public of Response Tactics*

Conduct a public awareness campaign that includes the overall goals, crowd management strategies, and use of force protocols that law enforcement will be using for the event, so that the public is properly informed of expected actions. This campaign should educate demonstrators and the public on law enforcement's primary crowd management objective: maintaining professional interactions and a balance between protecting demonstrators' rights and public safety.

The campaign should consist of meetings with protestor groups and civil rights organizations ahead of the event to discuss primary objectives and resolve public concerns. Town hall meetings should also be facilitated by leaders of the city to inform the public and community members on what to expect prior to and during the event (see Section 3.14 – Public Information and Media Relations for details on how to communicate effectively with the public).

### ● *Create Mobile Response Teams*

The use of Mobile Field Force (MFF) teams can be effective for crowd management responses, as they are dedicated forces assigned to responding to incidents immediately. These teams should be trained specifically to quickly remove agitators and law breakers before they can incite the crowd.

### ● *Position Commanders in the Field*

Position executives and leaders in the field during the event. Walking through and engaging demonstrators, showing support to line officers, communicating with residents, and generally being present is beneficial to all parties. For public safety officers, commanders in the field can assess a situation first-hand and determine the best tactics to deploy and response decisions can be communicated to field forces faster, diffusing the potential escalation of disruptive behavior. For demonstrators and attendees, commanders in the field serve as authority figures to engage with and report issues to. If possible, field commanders should also be issued designated golf carts or dual-sport vehicles to quickly navigate secure zones.

### **BEST PRACTICE**

Throughout the 2016 RNC process, CPD Chief Williams and Cassandra Bledsoe—the Chief's Community Liaison—engaged religious leaders, the Peacemakers' Alliance, business owners, and community members—to address community violence issues and community concerns about march/parade routes, traffic issues and general law enforcement issues. CPD also emphasized the important role that these groups would play during the RNC. He gained their support—including as community volunteers—during the Convention. CPD also collaborated with local universities that agreed to house out-of-town officers before and during the event. During the RNC, Chief Williams could be seen walking through the demonstration crowds, engaging with demonstrators, personally de-escalating potentially contentious situations, and speaking with the media regularly.

### *Toolkit References*


The following resource (found in Appendix A) can be used for crowd management planning and operations:

- A.11 Considerations for Managing Crowds, Page A-39

### 3.5 Dignitary/VIP Protection

Dignitaries and VIPs require security protection, as they can be targets for harmful or criminal attacks. Dignitaries are categorized as, “any person that has a law enforcement protective detail as directed by state or federal statute,” such as current or former U.S. Presidents, state governors, foreign heads of state, or Senate/House leadership posts. A VIP is, “any person who has limited protection or is being granted special access privileges,” such as U.S. senators, U.S. Congress people, city mayors, diplomatic corps, or famous individuals such as actors or athletes.<sup>24</sup>

For NSSEs, the USSS is responsible for the protection of White House personnel. Local law enforcement will primarily be responsible for assisting in all non-USSS protection details participating in the event, which includes coordinating the use of multi-agency assets to assist dignitary/VIP transportation, access to event venues, credentialing, communications, special event coverage and hotel security.<sup>25</sup> If Congressional leaders will be attending, local law enforcement should engage the U.S. Capitol Police to understand and account for their requirements as soon as possible.

Dignitary/VIP Protection - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Determine Who Needs Protection	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine Your Protection Strategy	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Acquire and Train Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for VIP Protection	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Minimize Officer Fatigue	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

#### ● *Determine Who Needs Protection*

Identify which dignitaries and VIPs will require protection, what level of protection they will need, and if there are individuals who will not be provided local officer protection. Reach out to protectee staff prior to the event to directly obtain sensitive information regarding a protectee’s anticipated movements and activities. Direct contact between local law enforcement and protectee staff removes additional layers of information-transfer through agencies and can speed up the VIP protection-planning process.

#### ● *Determine Your Protection Strategy*

Choose a strategy for organizing and conducting protective details – the “jump teams” approach or the “wheels-up to wheels-down” approach.

- **“Jump teams” approach:** This approach assigns officers to quick-response teams that provide security as needed to VIPs, for

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Assign officers to each protectee to provide effective communication and situational awareness of all VIP activities.

<sup>24</sup> 2012 RNC Dignitary/VIP Subcommittee, *Executive Steering Committee Brief*, January 11, 2012.

<sup>25</sup> Some dignitaries and VIPs may provide their own bodyguards, details, and protection.



example, during the event while attending a meeting or party or while transporting in a motorcade. This approach permits response flexibility and is more accommodating if few personnel/resources are available.

- **“Wheels-up to wheels-down” approach:** This approach assigns an officer to each VIP requiring protection, allowing commanders to communicate and maintain situational awareness of all VIP activities/issues.

### ● *Acquire and Train Officers*

Ensure that adequate police personnel are available to provide security, which will require cooperation with other police, fire, and sheriffs’ departments, as well as coordination with other event-planning subcommittees (e.g. Venue, Delegate Buses, Transportation, Officer Lodging/Transportation, and Credentialing subcommittees).

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Acquire and train all security personnel prior to the event, including private security and/or personal security guards.

It is critical that all personnel resources, including reserve or light-duty officers, are identified and accounted for prior to the event. Train and brief each officer on expectations, standards, and the professionalism and fluidity required of them. Briefs

should include logistics and details of the operational plan for providing protection to important personnel (e.g., shifts, communication protocols, transportation routes, and credentialing procedures). Equally important are briefs on relevant security information to private security and personal bodyguards.

### ● *Develop an Operational Plan for VIP Protection*

Cover the following key elements in the operational plan for VIP protection:

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Include pre-defined routes and parking information for protective details in transportation plans.

- **Access:** Include information on arrival and departure locations and site-security plans.
- **Transportation:** Cover logistics of protective motorcades, tail and lead vehicles, or drivers. Plans should include pre-defined routes and parking that protective details will use and should consider coordinating protective details’ transportation movements with that of pedestrian sidewalk traffic.
- **Contingency routes:** Include back-up routes in anticipation of traffic problems.
- **Communication:** Detail dispatch centers, email groups, or radio coverage mechanisms.
- **Credentialing:** Explain coordination with the credential subcommittee, as well as credential requirements and formats for dignitaries and VIPs, the process to obtain request for credentials, and the distribution process of credentials.
- **Site coverage:** Describe the usage of law enforcement officers at key event venues that dignitaries and VIPs will be attending.
- **Training:** Detail pre-event training on operational plans, transportation routes, and emergency evacuation/medical procedures.



### ● *Minimize Officer Fatigue*

Protective detail officers will probably be tired from long shifts hours, due to getting up early for vehicle sweeps and staying out late at special events. Minimize officer fatigue by strategically pairing officers' behaviors with those of VIPs. For example, match officers' early-morning or late-night behaviors with those behaviors of VIPs. In addition, reduce long hours by locating officers' lodging accommodations near, or in, their protective details' hotels.

In addition, keep in mind that law enforcement officers on protective details must follow the movement of their protectees and may not be able to go to designated R&R sites for food. Thus, local law enforcement should consider providing adequate food options such as per diem or access to multiple R&R sites so officers are properly nourished.<sup>26</sup>


### *Toolkit References*

The following template (found in Appendix A) can be used for dignitary/VIP protection:

- A.3 Operational Plan Template, Page A-11

## 3.6 Financial Management

Financial management is critical for the effective execution and accountability of a large-scale security event. Specifically for NSSEs, jurisdictions should understand any requirements and expectations that accompany the receipt of federal funds.<sup>27</sup> It is important to understand the potential amount of planning and preparatory costs prior to applying to host an NSSE, as some early pre-event planning costs will arise in advance of the grant-funding approval and will remain solely in the responsibility of the jurisdiction. A jurisdiction must keep in mind that the grant process for these kinds of large-scale awards is often a lengthy one. In addition, expenses incurred prior to the appropriation of federal funds for this purpose will likely not be reimbursable.

Financial Management - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Develop a Comprehensive and Detailed Budget	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Understand How NSSEs may be Financed	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Engage the State Administering Agency (SAA) for State-wide Resources as Needed	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Maintain Open Lines of Communication with Financial Stakeholders	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Prepare for Federal Site Visits and Post-event Audits	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs    ▲ NSSEs		

<sup>26</sup> Also discussed in Section 3.1 – Administrative and Logistics Support.

<sup>27</sup> Not all large-scale security events receive federal funding; in these instances, local jurisdictions operate with finances similar to those set aside for daily operations. The information provided in this section is applicable to those events where federal funding is received.

### ● *Develop a Comprehensive and Detailed Budget*

Create a comprehensive budget that outlines and breaks down every potential cost—including personnel and overtime, equipment and technology, liability insurance, lodging and food, etc.—to successfully and safely host the event. Accuracy and detail are paramount to this process in order to avoid any unexpected costs or last-minute purchases, and to prepare for potential city and federal audits immediately following the event. In cases of an NSSE, follow the established budget categories outlined in the DOJ Grants Financial Guide<sup>28</sup> in order to assist the federal agency in an expedited review.

### ▲ *Understand How NSSEs may be Financed*

Local jurisdictions will incur certain costs for NSSE designated events. Congress may appropriate funds for an NSSE event through BJA, U.S. Department of Defense, and/or DHS to reimburse security costs incurred by a host jurisdiction. Wherever possible, jurisdictions should look to leverage existing grant and local funds for these events. Additionally, all personnel from the lead local jurisdiction—as well as anyone involved in developing a proposal to host a large-scale event—should complete the DOJ Online Grants Financial Management Training.<sup>29</sup> Executives must be cognizant of funding procedures, special conditions, and guidelines for reimbursable costs. Especially when federal funding is being used, it is imperative to read, understand, and abide by all of the special conditions attached to the award and to have the necessary documentation and receipts accounted for during monitoring visits or audits. In addition, accurately building a precise budget breakdown early in planning and having all procurement requests go through one agency, or the core planning team, may help to avoid the absorption of unallowable costs later on.

Please see the Appendix A.12—*BJA Special Event Funding Guidance*—for information on the use of federal funding, including financial guidance on pre-event planning, the application period, the award period, closing the award, and a sample timeline of key activities.

### ● *Engage the State Administering Agency (SAA) for State-wide Resources as Needed*

For NSSEs, local liaisons should work regularly with the State Administering Agency (SAA) and federal funding authorities to properly communicate specific resources and funding needs. Since SAAs have long-standing relationships with federal funding agencies, agency liaisons can work with the SAA to become familiar with financial processes and protocols to ensure that they are compliant with grant guidelines and requirements when procuring equipment or making logistics purchases. They may also assist with Mutual Aid Agreements for officers outside of the city or state where the NSSE is held. Knowledge of these guidelines is critical to avoiding financial impacts and obstacles during and after the event, when all financial expenses are closely audited.

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<sup>28</sup> U.S. Department of Justice. “DOJ Grants Financial Guide.” 2015.  
<https://www.justice.gov/ovw/file/892031/download>.

<sup>29</sup> This training, provided by OJP at no cost, is available at: <https://ojpfgm.webfirst.com/mod/page/view.php?id=1>.

## ● *Maintain Open Lines of Communication with Financial Stakeholders*

### **BEST PRACTICE**

Keep open lines of communication with financial stakeholders to ensure accurate financial reporting in accordance with contractual requirements.

Convene appropriate key personnel early at all levels, including local, state, and federal, to discuss and determine the financial scope of the event and all expected costs. Discussions can address how to expedite timelines for receiving federal funds, streamlining the process for receiving approvals to purchase equipment, and purchasing equipment as early as possible to prevent additional costs.

Additionally, these discussions can include descriptions of what policies, procedures, and functions must be in place prior to receiving approval to purchase certain items and what the review process will entail. Regardless, dedicate personnel to act as a point of contact with the city or federal agency. Ensure that this point of contact conducts regular conference calls or in-person meetings throughout the process to communicate any issues or changes in the projected budget. Plan to work with the BJA team on pre-approval before draw down of funds and justification and approval for equipment lists.

## ▲ *Prepare for Federal Site Visits and Post-Event Audits*

With federal funding, expect the federal agency and/or its oversight offices as well as other oversight bodies to conduct site visits and audits prior to and after the event. These visits

### **BEST PRACTICE**

Keep detailed records of purchases and expenses in preparation for a post-event financial audit.

will include a thorough review of all expenses

incurred with grant funds and serve to ensure that grant funds were managed properly.

To effectively prepare for post-event audits:

- Ensure that all administrative, financial, managerial and related operational personnel participate in Office of the Inspector General (OIG) fraud-prevention training.
- Share fraud-prevention information to all host site personnel that have the potential to be involved in acquiring safety and security materials and services. It is important that all those involved understand what grant and/or procurement fraud is and the consequences for intentionally or unintentionally committing fraud.
- The host jurisdiction or state must keep a record of every transaction throughout the grant program. Collect necessary documentation for fiscal audits as they come in and take pictures of equipment purchased with federal funds as they are deployed to help justify their use.

## *Toolkit References*

The following guides (found in Appendix A) can be used for financial and grant management planning and operations:

- A.12 Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Special Event Funding Guidance, Page A-47
- A.13 Financial Provisions and Policies, Page A-51
- A.14 Post-award Requirements: Grant Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, Page A-55

Additional resources on financial planning and grant management include:

- The OJP Procurement Procedures for Recipients of DOJ Grants


Post-award Instructions for Office of the Chief Financial Officer grant recipients and sub recipients

([http://www.ojp.gov/financialguide/PDFs/New%20Procurement%20Guide\\_508compliance.pdf](http://www.ojp.gov/financialguide/PDFs/New%20Procurement%20Guide_508compliance.pdf)).

- DOJ Financial Guide
- Federal government regulation information: <http://www.regulations.gov>
- Grants Management System (GMS) Training and Technical Assistance: <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/training/gmstraining.htm>
- The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) Sub-award Reporting System (FSRS): <https://www.fsr.gov>

### 3.7 Fire/Emergency Medical Services/Hospitals/Public Health

Public health and medical support focus primarily on preventing, minimizing, and quickly responding to injury or health issues. Fire departments, Emergency Medical Services (EMS), and medical care are primarily responsible for supporting this public health operation during large-scale security events and law enforcement officers can assist when needed. Likewise, fire, EMS, and medical care agencies can also assist law enforcement by providing situational awareness information and ensuring officer wellness.

Fire/Emergency Medical Services/Hospitals/Public Health - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Obtain Necessary Personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Outline Operational Activities in Response Plans	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Collaborate During Steady-State Operations to Prepare for a Health Event Response	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate Joint Responses to Encourage Situational Awareness	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Train Medical Response Personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

#### ● *Obtain Necessary Personnel*

Ensure there are enough personnel to support the public health operation during the event without detracting from the services being provided to the rest of the city. If necessary, request mutual aid and leverage EMAC for fire/EMS services as well. Their schedules should align as closely as possible with those of the lead local law enforcement agency to ensure collaboration and assistance is available as needed. Additionally, pre-shift briefings can occur together, ensuring all first responders are aware of pertinent issues.

## ● *Outline Operational Activities in Response Plans*

Document the following information for public health and medical operations into the operational plans:<sup>30</sup>

### **Fire/EMS**

- Command, control, and coordination structures;
- Pre-hospital/field emergency locations such as mobile field hospitals and protocols;
- Resources, equipment, and personnel for fire, medical, and mobile response teams;
- Logistics deployment and requirements;
- Transportation protocols and traffic routes for emergency vehicles on the ground and in the air—patient evacuation;
- Staging information for fire trucks, ambulances, and other emergency vehicles;
- Protocols for National Disaster Medical Assistance Teams or other strike team assistance including Urban Search and Rescue or Aeromedical Response Teams;
- Transitions to consequence management, if required including staging and dispensing of antibiotics or considerations for mass casualties; and,
- Having equipment available for mass evacuations and heavy equipment on standby to move debris and other large items, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

### **Hospital**

- Methodologies for tracking patients and conducting surveillance of health incidents;
- Communication protocols, tools, and systems;
- Integration with local primary and secondary response hospitals; and
- Medical measures for prisoner and detention-related activities.

### **Public Health**

- Food security and safety;
- Disease-prevention strategies;
- Plans for protecting the local public health and medical infrastructure; and
- Decontamination measures.

## ● *Collaborate During Steady-State Operations to Prepare for a Health Event Response*

### **BEST PRACTICE**

Promote interagency collaboration to help ensure a city-wide common operating picture is maintained.

The local fire department and EMS agency will have lead authority in the planning and operations of fire and medical coverage. Regional public safety partners—including fire, EMS, emergency management, public health, and law

enforcement—should plan and exercise unified command and cooperative response to complex

### **BEST PRACTICE**

Consider how weather will affect the operational activities and how Fire/EMS and other City agencies can proactively address and prevent issues. During the 2016 DNC in Philadelphia, the city provided pallets of water bottles, water misters, and an air conditioned tent for demonstrators because of the extreme heat. There was also a severe thunderstorm in which police and Fire/EMS helped protect demonstrators that were camping at FDR Park.

<sup>30</sup> More detailed discussions of fire and EMS planning and response activities can be found in DHS/FEMA's *Special Events Contingency Planning: Job Aids Manual*, March 2005.

incidents regularly.<sup>31</sup> Among relevant agencies, identify required and available resources based on joint threat and vulnerability assessments.

### ● *Coordinate Joint Responses to Encourage Situational Awareness*

Create a Joint Medical Operations Center (JMOC) to serve as a central coordination unit that will oversee triage stations, state hospitals, field hospitals, and mobile medical units. The JMOC should be staffed with all health and medical assets, including public health, mass casualty, animal health, and agriculture.

Develop situation reports and conduct daily briefings to ensure that everyone is aware of fire/EMS/hospitals/public health incidents and response actions.

### ● *Train Medical Response Personnel*

Train all local medical response personnel, as well as federal strike assistance teams, in the fire/EMS/hospital/public health plans, protocols, and communication mechanisms. This training reinforces communication channels among response personnel and maintains a safe public health and medical environment.

### *Toolkit References*

The following checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for Fire/EMS/Hospitals/Public Health Services planning and operations:

- A.15 EMS Venue Assessment Checklist, Page A-59

## 3.8 Intelligence/Counter-terrorism/Counter Surveillance


Intelligence operations for local police departments are often conducted by internal criminal intelligence units. To better support intelligence operations—including obtaining, assessing, and disseminating information about potential threats of all types—departments should complement their intelligence unit with information and intelligence from regional, state or local fusion centers, and contact federal agencies for assistance.

For larger events, especially NSSEs that have national priorities and high-level security implications, the FBI is the lead federal agency for intelligence, specifically terrorism-related issues. Local law enforcement is responsible for intelligence gathering as it relates to anarchist, demonstrator groups, and other criminal activity not related to terrorism. During NSSEs, federal partners have event security plans that can activate many intelligence operational centers, such as the Protective Intelligence Coordinating Center, the FBI Intelligence Operations Center, and the MACC; intelligence teams, such as USSS Protective Intelligence Teams (a.k.a. “ID Teams”) and FBI Intelligence Teams (a.k.a. “I” Teams).<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Braziel, Rick, Frank Straub, George Watson, and Rod Hoops. 2016. Bringing Calm to Chaos: A Critical Incident Review of the San Bernardino Public Safety Response to the December 2, 2015, Terrorist Shooting Incident at the Inland Regional Center. Critical Response Initiative. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

<sup>32</sup> 2012 Republican National Convention Subcommittee, *Final Plan of Operation Intelligence Subcommittee (DRAFT)*, May 2012.

Intelligence/Counter-terrorism/Counter Surveillance - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Conduct Threat and Risk Assessments	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Intelligence	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Collaborate with Field Operations	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Leverage Technologies to Provide Real-Time Information	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Conduct Traditional and Non-Traditional Crime Analysis	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Use Intelligence Sources with Mobile Technologies	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Strategically Integrate Intelligence Sources	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs    ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Conduct Threat and Risk Assessments*

Collaborate with the FBI to identify potential threats from outside the jurisdiction. Local law enforcement should work closely with intelligence counterparts to ensure accurate threat information is obtained. Prior to the event, local, state, and federal intelligence agencies should be actively monitoring and tracking anticipated demonstrators and security threats, while also being respectful of First Amendment rights and protected activities. Local officers can work with faith and other community leaders to gather information on local gangs and other groups that may pose a threat to the overall security of the event and identify potential behaviors and actions that local demonstrators may be planning to take—such as marches, protests, and getting arrested. Threat and risk assessment is valuable to determine vulnerabilities and the resources required for intelligence operations. Focus threat assessments on the following four key elements:<sup>33</sup>

- **Threat inventory:** Determine groups or individuals that may pose a threat to the event.
- **Threat assessment:** Determine the level of threat for each threat identified in threat inventory.
- **Target assessment:** Determine probable targets and locations in the jurisdiction that criminals may attempt to disrupt.
- **Target vulnerability:** Determine how vulnerable each target is for an attack.

### ● *Develop an Intelligence Operational Plan*

An intelligence operational plan should include the following elements:

- **Mission and goals:** Describe the purpose of the intelligence unit and what type of threats it will be trying to deter.
- **Event details and participating agencies:** Include information on the execution of the event and the roles and authorities of various agencies.

<sup>33</sup> Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies*, November 2004.



- **Command and operations centers:** Include information on staffing, hours of operation, and reporting protocols.
- **Other operational elements:** Include specifics on field teams, intelligence sources, communication mechanisms and protocols, critical incident response protocols, air space or waterway restrictions, and pre-event intelligence.

### ● *Collaborate with Field Operations*

Local law enforcement coordination of intelligence can be enhanced by conducting joint operations between intelligence and field officers. Collaboration can improve field commanders' awareness and knowledge of key players causing disruption, allowing for strategic arrests and deterrence of criminal behavior.

### ● *Leverage Technologies to Provide Real-Time Information*

Leveraging technologies including body-worn cameras (BWCs)—along with cameras from dashboards; surveillance and CCTV camera systems; smartphones; and helicopters, unmanned aerial systems (UASs), and other aircrafts—information gathered from social media; and other technologies to provide real-time information. BWCs can provide a multitude of perspectives from multiple areas around the event and help determine if additional resources are needed during a large gathering or demonstration. Especially with new technology that allows for BWC footage to be live-streamed to an agency's headquarters, this could provide real-time information.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Leveraging multiple technologies and platforms can help with real-time information sharing and decision-making.

In addition, interagency partners can use event-management software to collect and share information. These systems can provide officers and security personnel with a comprehensive format for viewing planned activities, tracking incidents, coordinating responses, and managing personnel and resources. Data recorders can be placed in established command and operations centers to record information related to the event in the software.

After appropriate technology is selected, make sure that all event personnel are trained on how to use it. In addition, tests and exercises should be conducted to validate that technologies are operational. Finally, establish back-up plans, such as replacement technologies or technicians on standby to fix broken equipment, in the case that technologies fail during the event.

### ● *Conduct Traditional and Non-Traditional Crime Analysis*

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Supplement traditional crime analysis tools with other technologies, such as monitoring cellphone networks or social media.

Traditional crime analysis activities can bolster the effectiveness of information collected from various technologies. For example, police departments can conduct commonly-used analysis strategies to identify threats and use technologies to monitor calls for service; use license plate readers to identify suspicious vehicles; and, search faces of suspicious persons on intelligence databases/watch lists such as the National Crime Information Center, local police department command center, and NSSE watch lists. Additionally, agencies can use more novel crime-intelligence strategies—such as monitoring social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, and Vine, or cellular network technologies—to

compile and disseminate useful security information. Agencies can even use geofencing technology to create a perimeter around the event to determine which social media posts are more worthy of investigation than others.

### ● *Use Intelligence Sources with Mobile Technologies*

Deploy intelligence sources and intelligence officers to gather real-time intelligence on identified suspicious persons or activities, intent, tactics, and challenges. Intelligence sources can use text messages and smartphones to communicate intelligence to command staff for operational responses. Consider using mobile technologies that also allow intelligence sources to send photos and videos and allow commanders to track their locations. Intelligence sources can also receive covert responses from their command post through text messages.

### ● *Strategically Integrate Intelligence Sources*

Integrate intelligence sources with demonstrator groups in a multi-tiered system in case officers are discovered. In addition, a number of measures should be conducted to limit a source's interactions with law enforcement, including briefing them off-site, giving them per diems for meals, and locating them at a separate R&R site.<sup>34</sup> An easy-to-identify system must be developed for interactions between intelligence sources and regular law enforcement to ensure that they can identify themselves without compromising their cover. If practical, this system should not be obvious and used as needed as not to give away other covert sources.


## ***Toolkit References***

The following checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for intelligence/counter-terrorism/counter surveillance activities:


- A.16 Intelligence/Counter Surveillance Planning and Operations Checklist, Page A-61

## **3.9 Interagency Communications and Technology**

Security personnel and partner agencies must be able to communicate with their own staff and among one other to obtain a proper understanding of the nature and scope of response operations. Hosting a large-scale event is an opportunity to upgrade and integrate public sector communications technology to ensure that all these agencies can communicate seamlessly when needed. To further facilitate interagency communication, establish partnerships and hold regular meetings or conference calls early on in the planning process.

Interagency Communications and Technology - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Interagency Communications	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify Communication Technologies	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Test Communication Mechanisms	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Establish a Coordinated Communications Center	<input type="checkbox"/>

<sup>34</sup> Also discussed in Section 3.1 Administrative and Logistics Support.

Interagency Communications and Technology - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Create Communication Strike Teams	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Develop an Operational Plan for Interagency Communications*

A comprehensive communications plan should provide streamlined communication for both field operations and interagency coordination. Separate event-related communications from regular city communications such as 9-1-1 calls, so that event personnel can differentiate between the two.

Detail the following information in the communications plan:

- **Mechanisms:** For field operations, the use of radio talk groups (channels) can reduce radio congestion and ensure that radio communications cannot be scanned by non-law enforcement officials.
- **Equipment:** Radios are the most common form of communication equipment for law enforcement agencies, but the use of smartphones by law enforcement is also increasingly more popular than radios because of the ability to text multiple numbers and share information and images/videos at the same time. When using radios, interoperability between various agencies and their dispatch centers needs to be evaluated on both encrypted and non-encrypted channels. When using smartphones, be cognizant of who you are texting and how the phone is being used. Include distribution and demobilization plans, as well as a tracking system, for planned equipment.
- **Communication protocols:** Brief personnel on proper protocols for communications and clearly explain it to all officers and personnel prior to the event, to avoid uncertainty of how radio channels operate, whom to report to, and assign call signs and terminologies.
- **Dispatchers:** Assign sufficient personnel to manage calls through radios and ensure that they are equipped with proper information. For example, during the 2012 RNC, Tampa Police Communications Center had its own internal Wiki that was used extensively by dispatchers. Rosters, phone numbers, radio numbers, schedules, event information and much more were programmed into the Wiki site, which enabled the dispatchers to quickly access information within seconds.
- **Contingencies:** Plans should include redundancies such as back-up radio networks, dispatchers, or radio talk groups in case primary mechanisms lose signal or battery life, slow down because of data usage, or become overloaded. Other useful contingency strategies include having full contact information of officer radio assignments should officers need to be contacted for technical difficulties.

### ● *Identify Communication Technologies*

Focus communications plans primarily on technologies available for maintaining situational awareness throughout the event. Technologies can include radios, smartphones, mobile data terminals (MDTs) and tablets, email, mass email services, or texting services, or web-based event/incident management software systems. It is important that agencies determine if

technologies are interoperable to freely allow field units and participating agencies to communicate in real time, regardless of different equipment or frequencies.

### ● *Test Communication Mechanisms*

Brief all personnel on the use of various technologies and then conduct tests and exercises, prior to the event, to ensure that systems are functional and that personnel know how to effectively operate them. These tests should also include simulations in system slowdowns or entire shutdowns during an event and require the use of alternative strategies and protocols.<sup>35</sup> The lead local jurisdiction may also want to consider coordinating these tests with vendors present to identify and address potential issues that may arise.

### ● *Establish a Coordinated Communications Center*

Communication operations and responses should be well-coordinated among partners during the event. A coordinated communications center—at a Command Center or a dedicated location—with representatives from each major agency can ensure that information flows are streamlined and open. Staff this communication center with appropriate personnel from the police department, fire department, and emergency services. By having all stakeholders in the same room, personnel will be able to maintain situational awareness of the entire communications operation.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

During the 2016 DNC, Philadelphia had a liaison from each of the relevant stakeholders in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). All of the PIOs from these agencies also had their own Joint Information Center (JIC) where they ensured coordination throughout the process, while still allowing individual agencies to control their own message and delivery.

### ● *Create Communication Strike Teams*

Systems or technologies can fail during a large-scale security event. For example, it is common for officers in the field to have issues with broken radios or need back-up batteries due to their long shift hours. To properly prepare and quickly respond to communication failures, create communication strike teams who can be quickly called upon to resolve technical problems.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Create communication strike teams to quickly respond to technical issues that could potentially stall safety operations.

### *Toolkit References*

The following form (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for interagency communications and technology:

- A.17 Incident Radio Communications Plan Form, Page A-63

## 3.10 Legal Affairs

The complexity of security for large events means that there may be legal issues to address before, during, and particularly after the event. Law enforcement should pay close attention to

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<sup>35</sup> Braziel, Rick, Frank Straub, George Watson, and Rod Hoops. 2016. Bringing Calm to Chaos: A Critical Incident Review of the San Bernardino Public Safety Response to the December 2, 2015, Terrorist Shooting Incident at the Inland Regional Center. Critical Response Initiative. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

legal issues related to public disclosure and to minimizing risk for civil liberties litigation. It may also be worthwhile to have an attorney assigned to command personnel, station attorneys in the field where there is the highest likelihood of demonstrations or other events that could lead to lawsuits, and in the EOC where they can provide real-time recommendations and information. A major challenge for law enforcement is minimizing the risks of lawsuits when responding to demonstrations, engaging in use of force, and making arrests. For example, during arrests, it is important that officers who are making arrests understand how to articulate reasons for arrest to the Assistant District Attorney, so that the charge isn't declined before going to court.<sup>36</sup>

Legal Affairs - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Include Law Experts in Early Planning	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Ensure that Plans are Constitutionally Sound	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Prepare and Thoroughly Review Contracts	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify Strategies to Mitigate Litigation Risk	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Ensure Outside Officers have Legal Jurisdiction	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs    ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Include Law Experts in Early Planning*

Early coordinated planning, collaboration, and involvement of attorneys is critical throughout the large-scale event process, particularly with procurement and preventing litigation challenges after an event. Assign law enforcement liaisons to all subcommittees that will require their expertise. The legal subcommittee should consist of law experts from all major planning agencies who can discuss potential legal issues with city officials, civil rights groups like the American Civil Liberties Union, and special interest groups like the National Media Guild. The legal subcommittee should also include city attorneys as part of the procurement process to ensure that things are being ordered according to city rules and according to any regulations and to help write any necessary legal policies and/or procedures needed to be able to order certain equipment. Subcommittee members should clearly define its mission and objectives and meet on a regular basis.

### ● *Ensure that Plans are Constitutionally Sound*

Engage in legal planning specific to the security of the event and work with the internal legal

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Conduct a legal review of security plans, procedures, and protocols to ensure that tactics are Constitutionally sound.

department and City Attorney's Office to review all security plans, procedures, and protocols on tactics to ensure that they are Constitutionally and legally sound. This will give the host agency

confidence in all aspects of their plan, allowing them to be open and transparent with the media and unions.

<sup>36</sup> Police Executive Research Forum, *Managing Major Events: Best Practices from the Field*, June 2011.

Work with the City Attorney's Office to draft and pass new rules, policies, or event ordinances specific to improving safety of the event. Policies can detail regulations for prohibited items, police use of force and arrests, and demonstrator activity. Comprehensive policy analysis from other cities that commonly handle large-scale security events can be conducted to determine whether new and/or amended regulations need to be established. New ordinances should be discussed in advance with the media and union groups in order to establish the precedence and general message that the agency has safety measures under control.

For example, if the focus is on minimizing arrests, legal planning should consider ways to assist in reducing the number of arrests. Prior to the 2016 DNC in Philadelphia, the Mayor signed a bill introduced by the City Council to change the crimes generally associated with mass demonstrations—including Disorderly Conduct, Failure to Disperse, Public Drunkenness, and Obstructing the Highway—from criminal summary citations to lesser civil penalties and/or fines.

In addition, ordinances against camping in Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) Park were not enforced the week of the DNC. These policy and ordinance changes exemplified the positive message the City intended to carry out throughout the DNC, and significantly reduced the potential for litigation filed by demonstrators challenging tactics used during arrests. Likewise, in Cleveland during the 2016 RNC, attorneys and risk managers were even included in the EOC during the RNC to provide real-time information and suggestions to officers in the field.

### ● *Prepare and Thoroughly Review Contracts*

Work with city officials to prepare and review the contracts that will be established to obtain necessary goods and services such as hotel accommodations, food, office space, etc. Outside assistance on contract reviews can be provided to law enforcement officers who may not be familiar with contractual procedures and ensuring that contracts meet not only grant, but city legal requirements.

### ● *Identify Strategies to Mitigate Litigation Risk*

Other strategies for mitigating civil litigation include the following:

- Review existing ordinances and laws, and amend or create new laws to ensure the safety of the event;
- Provide officers with specialized training;
- Manage crowds and their activity based on illegal behaviors and the number of resources available;
- Assign City, County, and State's Attorney representatives to the law enforcement command center to provide guidance on arrest laws;
- Deploy attorneys from the department's legal department or City Attorney's Office to the field for demonstrations and arrests;
- Plan ahead for post-event litigations by documenting activities and keeping meticulous records during planning, training, and operations. Record these activities in an after-action report. In addition, consider using body-worn and other on-site camera recordings

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Have legal representation at the command center to answer questions regarding arresting rights.



for fending off lawsuits or carefully overseeing the collection of public records prior to, during, and after the event; and,

- Videotape all encounters with protestors for future review.

### ● *Ensure Outside Officers have Legal Jurisdiction*

Legal planners are also responsible for ensuring that all officers from outside agencies have legal jurisdiction in the local area. These visiting officers should be covered by a mutual aid agreement that details critical topics such as compensation, insurance, and compliance with grant conditions.


## **Toolkit References**

The following checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for legal planning and operations:

- A.18 Legal Affairs Checklist, Page A-65
- A.19 2012 Convention Event Ordinances, Page A-67

## **3.11 Non-Event Patrol**

During a special event, local law enforcement must maintain its standard daily public safety response requirements for community members in their jurisdiction, and must ensure that they do so in a way that does not significantly impact the areas outside of the event. These agencies must also collaborate with other city agencies to ensure the maintenance of non-security-related essential services and to prepare for emergency relief.

Non-Event Patrol - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Maintain Staffing and Resource Levels	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Manage Non-Security Event Responses	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Prepare for Large Emergencies	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Maintain Staffing and Resource Levels*

Maintaining regular patrol operations requires that regular duty assignments remain adequately staffed, sufficient resources are available for normal operations, and regular communication mechanisms are not interrupted. This involves ensuring that all non-event personnel understand the importance of their roles and their contributions to the overall mission and goals of hosting the event. Particularly for officers, explain the potential implications of self-deployment. Additionally, to the extent possible, keep non-event personnel in the jurisdictions/roles they are used to.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Ensure that staffing and resources for regular patrol operations are maintained.

However, all non-event patrol should still be educated and trained on event security plans, protocols, and incidents in case they are required to supplement event response. In addition to responding to normal day-to-day operations, non-event patrol officers will likely also support



crowd management units when demonstrations venture into areas outside of the designated march routes. To maintain situational awareness with event incidents, patrol supervisors should provide patrol officers with daily roll calls and briefings between relief shifts. Due to the high potential for non-event patrol officers to come into contact with demonstrators, in each shift briefing, shift commanders should reiterate the department's clear and concise expectation of demonstrator rights and the need for officers to show tolerance and patience.

### ● *Manage Non-Security Event Responses*

In addition to daily law enforcement operations, local emergency management agencies should manage the jurisdiction's emergency operations to coordinate non-security related matters such as water, power, waste management, and bank services, including the potential for natural and man-made emergencies separate from the event. These agencies should also ensure that they maintain regular personnel and resources, either by limiting vacation and extending shift lengths or requesting mutual aid.

### ● *Prepare for Large Emergencies*

Cities often have existing man-made and natural disasters consequence management and emergency operating plans that can be used as a basic response plan during the event. Such plans should be coordinated by the local Emergency Operations Center (EOC). For example, during the 2012 RNC, emergency management agencies and partners supporting the event operated the Consequence Management EOC, which allowed federal, state, and local emergency management agencies and partners to collaborate and communicate effectively and to transition seamlessly into a crisis/consequence management mode in the event of an emergency or disaster incident, like Hurricane Isaac. Although Hurricane Isaac did not directly hit Tampa as was initially tracked, officials activated the EOC and prepared to activate emergency operating plans. Emergency planners should be included in the local EOC early in planning to allow ample time to prepare for the event and coordinate with other agencies. In addition, planners should be located in the EOC or with other local command nodes in the same building including the JMOC, the Critical Infrastructure Resource Center (CIRC), or the Interagency Coordination Communication Center (CCC) to allow for a common operating picture.

### *Toolkit References*


The following template (found in Appendix A) can be used for non-event patrol planning and operations:

- A.3 Operational Plan Template, Page A-11

## **3.12 Arrest Processing**

Large events can likely draw demonstrators seeking media attention for their cause by breaking the law and getting arrested, disrupting traffic, and trying to breach venues or the event.

However, with the appropriate policies, engagement, and training, large events do not have to involve large numbers of arrests. Regardless, law enforcement personnel should be properly educated to deter arrests, but also prepare them to handle mass arrests in an efficient manner that does not disrupt event activities or escalate unruly behavior and have a processing plan that can be scaled according to need.

Arrest Processing - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Focus Strategies on Deterring Arrests	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Arrest Processing	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Conduct Pre-Event Exercises and Training	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Conduct Arrests Quickly	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop Protocols for Handling Evidence	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Focus Strategies on Deterring Arrests*

While preparations should be made to handle the increased potential for mass arrests, a specialized focus on deterring arrests is also important. City officials can take the lead in deterring arrests by de-criminalizing misdemeanors commonly associated with mass gatherings and demonstrations, allowing camping in public parks where it is traditionally prohibited, and extending liquor licenses of bars and restaurants. Additionally, local law enforcement agencies should work with faith and community leaders to address community violence issues and community concerns and to involve them as volunteers during the event. Law enforcement officers can also identify and implement effective crowd management strategies, such as initiating any responses with bicycle officers and officers in their regular duty uniforms, building cooperative relationships and engaging with demonstrator, and providing officers with MFF training on behaviors to prevent criminal activities. This will allow law enforcement planners to avoid negative media attention and costly litigation (see Section 3.5 – Crowd management for details on MFF training).

Review strategies and plans used by law enforcement departments for managing mass arrests during previous successful large-scale events. Be mindful that typically a small percentage of arrests made are a result of criminal behavior and that arrest numbers are typically driven up by non-criminal demonstrators simply wanting to exercise their freedom of speech. Deterrence strategies should consist of careful analysis of arrest data from previous events, specifically with an assessment of arrests made for unlawful assembly versus criminal behavior. This is valuable for understanding and properly educating arresting officers on the types and scale of arrests that will be directly related to use of force and for developing an appropriate and scalable operational plan.

### ● *Develop an Operational Plan for Arrest Processing*

An effective operational plan should address the potential need to make mass arrests (i.e., personnel for arresting and prosecuting, equipment for arrests, and jail space). Automation of the arrest process needs to be developed at least 10 months prior to the event and should also be part of the testing and exercises. This plan should be developed in coordination with interagency partners and include the following elements:

- **Mission and goals:** Describe the purpose of arrest-processing activities and their importance to event security.

- **Event details and resource/staffing logistics:** Include information about staffing numbers, which individuals do and do not have the authority to make arrests if needed, shifts, prison locations, expected peak and off-peak operation times, and mutual aid agreements or vendor contracts. For staffing, consider authorizing only lead local jurisdiction officers and other in-state officers, to make arrests and for arrest processing to avoid having to bring outside officers back for litigation. Also, consider beginning with a minimal number of personnel and expand as needed.
- **Organizational and command structure:** Provide detailed charts and contact information on responsible authorities, including attorneys that are in the field to provide information.
- **Arresting officer procedures:** Detail officer check-in processes and procedures for receiving equipment, communicating, and obtaining credentials.
- **Operational procedures:** Include specifics on transporting personnel, making on-scene arrests, processing arrestees remotely, transportation and tracking of arrestees, searching of arrestees and their property, receiving and housing, and booking procedures. Include maps of facilities and directions, when appropriate.
- **Contingency plans:** Although alternatives to mass arrests are encouraged, contingency plans should be detailed should such actions become necessary to facilitate the restoration of order.
- **Housing and population assessments and plans:** Include information from assessments, which can include inmate capacities per facility and separation of genders or different age groups.
- **Court procedures:** Describe how follow-up civil processing will occur.

#### BEST PRACTICE

CPD and the Cleveland Division of Corrections (CDOC) created an arrestee processing strategy for the 2016 RNC that focused on maximizing efficiencies for all parties involved. Arrestee processing vans were stationed strategically throughout the RNC area. Upon arrest, an individual would be brought to the nearest van and booked into the system. The individual would then receive a wristband with their personal information and the arresting officer's name and badge number. By capturing that information and putting it on the wristband, officers did not have to be pulled from their assignment in the field and could be followed up with after their shift or when inflammatory situations calmed. Additionally, CDOC moved current prisoners to out-of-town facilities to increase available space for RNC-related arrests.

Once this processing plan is developed, brief and educate all personnel on processing and tracking procedures.

#### ● *Conduct Pre-Event Exercises and Training*

Remind arresting officers of their roles and responsibilities to ensure that they understand how they should act while conducting arrests and processing arrestees and the types of criminal behavior—including damaging property, crossing a police line, and harming others—that will not be tolerated. Combine training with MFF operations so that arrest-processing officers are familiar with field protocols and MFF officers gain a better understanding of how these processes work together. More specifically, arrest-processing officers will gain a better understanding of the philosophy of MFF command staff members and be able to adapt their role to complement this function.

### ● *Conduct Arrests Quickly*

Any necessary arrests should be conducted peacefully and prioritize quickly removing unruly individuals. During the 2016 RNC and DNC, both host departments immediately transported arrested individuals to off-site locations for processing to effectively diffuse potentially violent situations during arrests. Additionally, event-related arrest plans and procedures may have to be modified and amended in real-time.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

During the 2016 RNC, arrested individuals were immediately taken off-site, quickly loaded in vans, and kept until a group of 10 was ready to be transported, to maximize efficiencies.

### ● *Develop Protocols for Handling Evidence*

During arrests, an individual will often have personal property that needs to be collected as evidence. Develop protocols for processing, handling, and storing evidence, prior to the event, so that during civil proceedings, such property can be easily tracked and obtained. Also, keep in mind that the volume of personal effects that may need to be taken into custody may be large and require additional resources to adequately transport and stow, and then store, these materials.


### *Toolkit References*

The following resource (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for prisoner processing:

- A.20 Considerations for Processing Prisoners, Page A-71

## 3.13 Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities

In collaboration with interagency partners, coordinate security of critical infrastructure and utilities. Critical infrastructure includes: energy systems, pipelines, utilities, waterways, hotels, communication networks, and mass transit systems.

Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Conduct Infrastructure and Cyber Risk Assessments	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan to Protect Critical Infrastructure	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Request Assistance from the National Guard	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Use Risk Management Software	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Conduct Infrastructure and Cyber Risk Assessments*

Work with city, county, and state stakeholders to conduct a risk assessment of physical and cyber infrastructure prior to the event. Assessments will help planners determine priority assets that must be secured, as well as the resources required to maintain them during the event. For example, in preparation of the 2012 RNC, TPD, in conjunction with DHS, assessed the risk of over 60 critical sites, such as utilities, waterways, and hotels. To accomplish this, TPD used risk

management software and a survey tool developed for a previous Presidential Nominating Convention.

Conduct cyber risk analysis and modeling to determine vulnerabilities and their potential impacts on physical infrastructure and utilities, regional communication characteristics, and resiliency. Planners can develop and give host site entities a resiliency survey tool to assess their infrastructure and determine their strengths and weaknesses.

### ● *Develop an Operational Plan to Protect Critical Infrastructure*

Develop a critical infrastructure operational plan in coordination with interagency partners and include the following elements:

- **Mission and goals:** Describe the purpose of critical infrastructure protection and its importance to event security.
- **Event details and participating agencies:** Include information on the execution of the event and the roles and authorities of various agencies.
- **Primary/Secondary venues, lifeline utilities, and support facilities:** Include details on their location, significance, normal use, capacities, and contingencies/backups should one of these be impacted.
- **Command and coordination:** Include information on activated command centers, command structures, and communication protocols.
- **Interagency partners:** Agencies like the state National Guard can provide assistance with physical infrastructure. Other agencies, like the U.S. Department of Defense and FBI, can provide assistance with cyber infrastructure.
- **Pre-event, event, and post-event support activities:** Outline major event-related activities, such as performing risk-based surveys or identifying key infrastructure points of contact pre-event, staffing infrastructure-protection desks at integrated command centers during the event, or transitioning back to steady-state operations post-event.
- **Resources and staffing assignments:** Detail staffing plans, schedules, and required equipment for critical infrastructure sites.

### ● *Request Assistance from the National Guard*

Local law enforcement agencies can request assistance from their state's National Guard if they require additional personnel, equipment, or capacities to maintain the security of critical infrastructure sites during the event. National Guard assets can be used to fill resource gaps for providing security at key critical infrastructure sites. National Guard assets can also be used to provide maintenance for fixed infrastructure such as venues, electrical lines, natural gas lines and organic assets such as vehicles and weapons. Having additional trained personnel can provide an added layer of situational awareness and intelligence gathering to help properly allocate response assets. Many National Guard units also have supplemental Reaction Response Teams that can be pre-trained and stationed within an hour's distance to aid in responding to potential. It is important to note during the planning and budgeting process that if the lead local jurisdiction plans on using the National Guard, the jurisdiction must budget funds to reimburse the National Guard for their costs, as with any other partner agency since neither the Department of Defense nor the National Guard Bureau includes large-scale events or NSSEs in their standard budgeting

process. Interagency agreements or intrastate funding transfers can be accomplished for reimbursement purposes.

### ● *Coordinate Response Efforts*

Maintaining both infrastructure and utilities throughout an event requires proper coordination. This can be effectively achieved by setting up a non-security critical infrastructure resilience center (CIRC). An established CIRC will also provide additional situational awareness and a more robust common operating picture. City, county, and private-sector representatives from each of the 18 DHS-identified critical infrastructure sectors—including commercial facilities, transportation systems, communications, and information technology should be represented at the CIRC.<sup>37</sup> The CIRC will serve as a single point of contact for information and questions regarding critical infrastructure. A CIRC also allows for additional engagement of representatives from private companies among the same sector to work together with public safety agencies to be involved in the event and identify and solve problems.

### ● *Use Risk Management Software*

Use risk management software to categorize and track incidents according to levels of risk. These software tools can be used by specialized law enforcement units, such as intelligence teams, to track their positions in relation to critical infrastructures. This capability also allows special teams or forces to prioritize suspicious activities that occur near critical infrastructures. If planners decide that a risk management tool is useful for tracking critical infrastructure, they should ensure that all local and out-of-area personnel are trained on how to use it and the protocols for determining the appropriate level of risk when a new incident is submitted.

### *Toolkit References*

The following resource (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for protecting critical infrastructures and utilities:

- A.2 Hazard Vulnerability Assessment, Page A-7

## 3.14 Public Information and Media Relations

It is imperative for law enforcement, event leaders, and public information officers to effectively communicate unified and accurate information to both the public and the media in a timely manner. There are two major types of public information related to special events:

- **General event information about the event:** Examples include when the entrance doors or gates are open, when certain performers or activities begin and end, which VIPs are attending, parking locations, etc.
- **Security information:** What items are and are not allowed into the event, how to evacuate in case of emergency, where first aid services are located, etc.<sup>38</sup>


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<sup>37</sup> There are a total of 18 critical infrastructure sectors, identified by the criteria set forth in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). These include: food and agriculture, defense industrial base, emergency, healthcare and public health, national monuments and icons, banking and finance, water, chemical, commercial facilities, critical manufacturing, dams, emergency services, nuclear reactors/materials/waste, information technology, communications, postal and shipping, transportation systems, and government facilities.

<sup>38</sup> DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, 2007.



Place special attention on identifying lead authorities and developing an operational plan that details strategies for engaging and coordinating public affairs for the public, demonstrators, and the media.

Public Information and Media Relations - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Designate Public Information Officers Early in the Planning Phase	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Manage Public Affairs through a Joint Information Center	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify Your Audiences	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Public Affairs	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Communicate Openly with the Media	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Keep All Stakeholders Informed	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Provide On-site Information	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Designate Public Information Officers Early in the Planning Phase*

Early in planning, the lead agency and the public information/affairs subcommittee should either designate a single point of contact or Public Information Officer (PIO) who will oversee all public affairs matters related to the overall event. The designation of a single authority figure for releasing information can help promote efficiency and uniformity and provide rumor control and corrective messaging. Designating the appropriate person early ensures opportunities for additional training, enhanced coordination between PIOs, and the ability for the PIO to meet with members of the media and potential demonstrator groups long before an event.

### ● *Manage Public Affairs through a Joint Information Center*

Establish an event-based Joint Information Center (JIC) to manage and coordinate public affairs. A JIC is a location where public information officers (PIOs) perform critical emergency information and crisis communications functions. They are primarily responsible for ensuring that local, state, and federal interagency unified messages are disseminated to the media. A jurisdiction may also choose to set up its own local JIC to cover city-specific information needs. A local JIC can be useful in releasing city-wide unified messages that other event entities will not have purview of, such as city or local business services. PIOs from within the city and neighboring localities can be brought in to manage this operation. Local law enforcement and other city partners must be ready to perform the following functions:

- **Maps:** Tracking incidents, traffic, and other information important to the media on a city map.
- **Fact-finding:** Verifying event information/rumors from the media.
- **Status board:** Tracking media-related activities within the JIC.
- **3-1-1:** Answering questions from the community on a public information hotline.
- **Information products:** Developing press releases and information products.



- **Social media:** Watching activity on social networks to identify and address rumors, answer questions, and/or gather information.

When setting up a local JIC, assign single PIOs to particular tasks for the entire event to ensure streamlined operations. Prior to the event, educate PIOs on their responsibilities and communications protocols, and then give them opportunity to participate in field training to improve their understanding of how public information ties into security operations. Each agency in the JIC should have the authority to approve messaging within their agency's purview, but it is still important to share this information with all other JIC participants before this messaging becomes public, to avoid confusion or contradictions. For example, while PPD was the lead agency during the 2016 DNC, if a reporter called to ask about the number of people arrested at a demonstration, PPD and the District Attorney's representative coordinated before the release of that information, since that number could be different than the number of individuals actually charged. The local JIC should also work with other public information nodes and interagency partners to coordinate event-related messages.

### ● *Identify Your Audiences*

Identifying the audiences that need to be communicated with before, during, and after the event is critical to ensuring the success of a public communications plan. To do this, each of the PIOs in the JIC should bring a list of their agency's media contacts and general categories of social media followers—such as researchers, students, public transportation riders, drivers, etc.—to an early planning meeting. Consolidating all of these media points of contact and categories of followers on social media will help the members of the JIC identify who the key audiences are and what information is most important to them. Generally, there will be five critical audiences—media, law enforcement, community members, VIPs, and visitors including attendees and demonstrators.

Once these audiences have been identified, additional focus should be paid to the most effective communication methods to reach each of these audiences and the types of messages that will best resonate with them.

### ● *Develop an Operational Plan for Public Affairs*

Develop a public information operational plan in coordination with local partners including information on the following elements:

- **Mission and goals:** Describe the purpose of public information and media relations and their importance to event security and the objectives of the JIC:
  - **Maintain a common operating picture by sharing information:** JIC shift briefings, Open communication and dialogue, Information tracking – requests, responses, and rumor control;
  - **Provide accurate and timely public information:** Agency pre-approved FAQs and messaging, vetted information from the EOC and or MACC, and one voice policy; and,
  - **Create a public information chain-of-command:** Ensure lead agencies or designees respond to all information requests.

- **Event details and participating agencies:** Include information on the execution of the event and the roles and authorities of various agencies.
- **Information needs of the public:** Detail anticipated information needs, such as traffic plans and road closures, security screening protocols, or prohibited items.
- **Mechanisms for communication:** Describe plans for disseminating information to the public through press briefings, press releases, and/or social media.
- **Strategies for communicating with identified audiences:** Detail activities and various mechanisms that PIOs should engage in to educate, and communicate with, their identified critical audiences. A variety of concepts are listed in Appendix A: 21: “Best Practices for Law Enforcement Public Information Officers,” which can be tailored to different jurisdictions depending on the unique circumstances, geography, and demographics of each venue.

### ● *Communicate Openly with the Media*

Media will be reporting on the event and will be requesting constant information from local public safety officials and PIOs on event security measures, incidents, road closures, and/or traffic detours. Law enforcement representatives can set the media’s expectations regarding the department’s plans and response to the event, releasing critical information, and providing regular updates by holding pre-event meetings with media outlets. It is important to build this rapport and understanding with media outlets prior to the event.<sup>39</sup> Therefore, law enforcement representatives and PIOs should conduct regional meetings to discuss the provision of designated secure areas for media to park satellite trucks and run operations; where they can set up and what access they will be given; when regular updates will be held; and, what the ground rules for attempting to circumvent policies will be. These meetings can also serve as a good platform to maintain some oversight of media operations to ensure that they do not interfere with traffic/event security and demonstrate the police’s attention to media needs.

During the event, PIOs and any other designated points of contact should provide updates to the media through regularly-scheduled press conferences and online. The media will be most interested in details of mass gatherings and demonstrations, any incidents and arrests, and transportation. Regular press conferences also provide public safety leaders the opportunity to share positive stories of their personnel engaging with and helping event attendees or demonstrators and shining a positive light on the jurisdiction.

### ● *Keep All Stakeholders Informed*

Communicate with everyone in the identified audiences equally, providing them regular information before and during the event. Use multiple communication methods and platforms—including press conferences, press releases, interviews with local and national media outlets, social media platforms, and websites—to ensure that all the identified audiences are effectively reached.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Use public information campaigns to provide accurate and timely event-related information to the public and the media.

<sup>39</sup> Braziel, Rick, Devon Bell, and George Watson. 2015. A Heist Gone Bad: A Police Foundation Critical Incident Review of the Stockton Police Response to the Bank of the West Robbery and Hostage-Taking. Police Foundation.

For example, prior to the event, city leaders such as the Mayor and the local Chief of Police should hold town hall meetings to inform community members about march/parade routes, traffic issues, public transportation schedule changes and detours, and general law enforcement and safety concerns. Community meetings should also be held with business owners in areas that will be impacted by transportation and delivery restrictions or may be impacted by security zone perimeters to address what to expect prior to and during the event. These meetings can also be live-streamed and recorded to be posted online, recapped, and shared online so that people unable to attend in person still receive the information.

Additionally, to engage everyone early:

- Develop a website with information regarding business services, transportation, security, lodging, and the event;
- Use multiple social media platforms to release timely and accurate information;
- Create email or mobile phone-notification services for individuals to sign up for to receive alerts, updates, and changes in event plans; and,
- Develop business alerts for local business that will be affected by the event.

Provide regular information updates through the above services, as well as through a public information hotline during the event. These strategies will ensure that the public has ample access to information about the event, which will likely reduce the amount of questions and discourage unwanted rumors. Having someone directly leading the planning efforts who is also accessible to the community will help to build community trust and lessen potential adverse reaction to event operations.

### ● *Provide On-site Information*

Various tactics can be taken in the field to answer inquiries from the media and reduce uncertainty among spectators that can often lead to negative group mentalities. An easily identifiable on-site information center can be set up near event venues to provide attendees with an opportunity to directly receive trustworthy information. These centers can be staffed by knowledgeable civilians from public safety agencies to answer security, medical, or other event-related questions. These staff members can also collect information about the most frequent questions they are asked and any information they receive and share it with the JIC and other relevant centers as part of the information-sharing model. Additionally, mobile PIOs can be established and dispatched—wearing easily identifiable clothing—to provide the public with quick and frequent access to public information. For example, during the 2012 RNC, the CMPD had mobile PIOs with “Public Information Officer” vests.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Deploy Public Information Officers in the field to answer questions from the public.


### *Toolkit References*

The following resource (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations related to public information and media relations:

- A.21 Best Practices for Law Enforcement Public Information Officers, Page A-73

### 3.15 Screening and Physical Security

A critical mechanism for law enforcement to maintain control and public safety during a planned event is establishing security perimeters and checkpoints, and providing security for the airspace, the maritime space, and event venues.

Screening and Physical Security - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
<b>Security Perimeters and Checkpoints</b>		
●	Determine Secure Zones	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Establish Screening Protocols	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Define Staffing Responsibilities	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Acquire Resources and Equipment for Establishing Perimeters	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Collaborate with the USSS for Screening Secure Zones	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Airspace Security</b>		
●	Learn Airspace Security Plans and Protocols	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify and Work in Partnership with Interagency Stakeholders	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Collaborate with the Airspace Operations Center	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Airport Security</b>		
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Airport Security	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Establish Traffic Control Strategies	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Communicate with Stakeholders	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Maritime Security</b>		
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Maritime Security	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Venue Security</b>		
●	Determine Lead Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Engage in Early, Collaborative Planning	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate Venue Security Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

#### *Security Perimeters and Checkpoints*

The primary purpose of setting up security perimeters is to ensure the protection of both people and venues. Secure zones also allow law enforcement personnel to control access and to ensure that only appropriately credentialed personnel and patrons are permitted to access controlled areas. Since large-scale events are often attended by dignitaries and VIPs, there are generally added security challenges. Appropriately established, staffed, and controlled access points aid in

ensuring the safety of these high-profile individuals. Effectively establishing security perimeters and checkpoints requires steadfast attention to several key tasks.

### ● *Determine Secure Zones*

Collaborate early with law enforcement and security stakeholders to determine and negotiate secure zones and perimeters. Since these zones directly impact a variety of other security-related activities—such as staffing assignments; parade routes; and locations for demonstrators, the media, and free speech zones—the earlier these decisions are made the earlier subcommittees and public safety leaders can account for them in their decisions. Secure zones are often set up as multiple rings surrounding the main event venue(s). Available guidance suggests planning access control around main venues in terms of three perimeters—outer, middle, and inner—with greater security checkpoints—such as visual identification checks to credential checks to body/vehicle scans and use of bomb sniffing dogs—as one moves closer to the event venue.<sup>40</sup> Depending on the number of key event venues, there may be several areas of a city that require separate perimeters. Be prepared to continuously adjust secure zones due to the high likelihood of last minute changes and issues, including threats to dignitaries, venue relocations, or event time changes. As part of this process, be sure to engage business owners in areas that will be impacted by transportation and delivery restrictions, may be blocked during parades and other demonstrations, or may have to close entirely.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Work with security stakeholders to establish security requirements that meet the needs of all entities.

Using risk assessments and event information such as the number of expected attendees and dignitaries, local law enforcement and federal interagency partners can adequately determine the number and corresponding security levels that are necessary for the event and event-related activities. This risk assessment must be conducted as a joint local and federal endeavor to leverage resources and knowledge inherent at both of these jurisdictional levels. This risk assessment should be conducted as early as possible in the planning process, as this information will be used to form key planning assumptions necessary to build the operational security plan. The assessment will also have implications for credentialing, so the lead local law enforcement agency should work in partnership with the USSS and the hosting organization to determine what credentials will be needed for each of the zones. These key planning assumptions include identifying the secure zones, determining equipment needs for access control, and developing personnel estimates for access control.

### ● *Establish Screening Protocols*

To secure each perimeter checkpoint, law enforcement officers will need to screen incoming persons and vehicles. Planners should clearly define the level of screening required at various secure zones and the different screening mechanisms that could be required for event patrons, staff, and media personnel. Decide if protocols for exiting and re-entering checkpoints should be established. Conduct exercises to test and time security check-point inspections to determine what cascading impacts—if any—screening time will have on ancillary operations, such as traffic and transportation plans and routes, once protocols have been established. For example,

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<sup>40</sup> DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, 2007.

screening times before delegates could get on buses in Philadelphia during the 2016 DNC exacerbated traffic problems in Center City. Likewise, once at the Wells Fargo Center, the decision to only have certain doors unlocked led to long lines outside and health concerns for some delegates as they tried to get on buses after events. A key aspect to screening is identifying the items that will be prohibited—such as weapons, alcohol, bottles, and backpacks. This list of prohibited items and screening protocols should be widely publicized prior to the event and clearly communicated through signage during the event.

### ● *Define Staffing Responsibilities*

Staffing responsibility will vary for events depending on the priority level identified by the lead credentialing entity. All officers assigned to perimeter checkpoints should be fully trained on screening protocols, such as verification of credentials and screening exemptions for clean vehicles, vendors, and/or deliveries. If private security companies or additional reserve or sworn law enforcement personnel are used for screening, provide them with similar training as sworn law enforcement officers on site to provide assistance, as needed. Station local law enforcement or community volunteers—if possible—who are familiar with the area at each checkpoint to provide directions to the right locations, because much of the federal staffing will consist of personnel from outside the jurisdiction. Establishing a local law enforcement presence at these critical interaction points allows for more effective resolutions to issues in accordance to local custom and personality.

### ● *Acquire Resources and Equipment for Establishing Perimeters*

Work closely with federal partners to determine equipment needs and staffing assignments at checkpoints after perimeters have been determined. Equipment needs include scanning technologies, such as magnetometers or x-ray machines, as well as physical barriers in the form of cones, cement barricades, or fences. Garbage trucks, school buses, and other large city and county vehicles can also be used as physical barriers that can be used instead of purchasing fences and jersey barriers. Careful consideration should be made to ensure that physical barriers cannot be moved or trespassed by event patrons. For example, use anti-climb fences with links that are too small for people to insert their fingers through to gain traction. Additionally, during the event, have technicians on standby in case equipment needs to be repaired. Moreover, ensure that these technicians have all necessary security credentials should the need for on-site maintenance be required during the event.

### ▲ *Collaborate with the USSS for Screening Secure Zones*

For NSSEs, the USSS will establish its own security perimeters and main event zones, known as “hard zones.” Though USSS personnel will be responsible for securing these areas, local law enforcement must coordinate with the USSS local security operations outside of the hard zones. In addition, prior to NSSEs the USSS will conduct sweeps of the venues it is responsible for, for explosive and hazardous materials. Once an area is deemed “clean,” the USSS will lock it down, and event security measures are implemented. Local law enforcement should regularly communicate with the USSS to share security sweep plans and protocols in order to promote situational awareness and coordinate all operations personnel. Law enforcement should also work with the USSS during planning to determine when secure zones will be demobilized and become public space.



## ***Airspace Security***

Airspace security focuses on detecting, identifying, assessing, and mitigating airborne threats to the event and its participants. The USSS and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will be the primary lead for airspace security, requiring assistance from local law enforcement as needed.

### **● *Learn Airspace Security Plans and Protocols***

Become familiar with event airspace security plans that will outline airspace control measures, restrictions including temporary flight restrictions, detection and monitoring strategies and tactics, operations communications and coordination, and an integrated air defense plan that includes the use of military aviation support. Additionally, event airspace security plans should include the public use of unmanned aircraft systems and law enforcement agencies should become familiar with rules and regulations related to their use of UASs during large-scale events.<sup>41</sup> During the event, identify who will handle dispatch of air missions and resource requests at the event's designated interagency operations center, in the event of overlapping security operations.

### **● *Identify and Work in Partnership with Interagency Stakeholders***

Coordination of airspace plans and operations should include airport police, local law enforcement, and other relevant federal stakeholders—including the U.S. Department of Defense, FAA, and Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Working together to identify and communicate about drones that pose threats to the safety and security of the event, those that are deployed by the media and others in an effort to obtain exclusive footage, and those that unintentionally cross into restricted airspace can contribute significantly to situational awareness and air/event safety.<sup>42</sup>

### **▲ *Collaborate with the Airspace Operations Center***

For NSSEs, federal agencies typically coordinate command and control through an Airspace Operations Center (ASOC). The ASOC is responsible for tracking the status of all aviation missions and coordinating authorized flights in the airspace.

## ***Airport Security***

Airport security includes maintaining on-site physical security at local airports, directing traffic through terminals, and coordinating dignitary and VIP travel plans. Such security focuses on ensuring order, safety, and security of individuals' lives, civil liberties, and property at local airports.

### **● *Develop an Operational Plan for Airport Security***

Prior to the event, local airport officials and law enforcement should work together to create a traffic plan for airports, and include the following:

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<sup>41</sup> Valdovinos, Maria, Specht, James, and Zeunik, Jennifer 2016. Law Enforcement & Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): Guidelines to Enhance Community Trust. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. <https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/community-policing-unmanned-aircraft-systems-uas-guidelines-to-enhance-community-trust/>.

<sup>42</sup> For more information, see the FAA's *Law Enforcement Guidance for Suspected Unauthorized UAS Operations (Version 3)*, visit: [https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/law\\_enforcement/media/FAA\\_UAS-PO\\_LEA\\_Guidance.pdf](https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/law_enforcement/media/FAA_UAS-PO_LEA_Guidance.pdf).



- Event resources and staff;
- Anticipated dangers;
- Crowd control protocols;
- Traffic-movement plans;
- Command/control; and,
- Communication/information flows.

In the plan, detail whether additional control measures for airspace security are required—as it relates to passengers, cargo, and general aviation traffic—or if standard procedures are sufficient. For example, address whether Federal Air Marshal Service coverage or Customs and Border Protection passenger screeners need to be increased for the duration of the event. Identifying this need early on—and ensuring that adequate personnel are on hand—will help planners to avoid adverse impacts to other plans such as traffic, transportation, and dignitary protection plans. Avoid deviating from proven and successful traffic control strategies. For example, during the 2012 DNC, the Charlotte Airport Administration had civilians and cones in the road to direct traffic. Due to small terminal frontage space, this caused traffic backups. After recommendation from CMPD, the Airport Administration removed the civilians and cones, reducing the traffic delays for incoming vehicles and allowing traffic to flow without any interruption.

### ● *Establish Traffic Control Strategies*

The influx of people attending a large event will result in airport security having to handle significant increases in travelers. In a large event, such as an NSSE, there is an added component of high-profile persons requiring personal security protection. To effectively control airport traffic, develop strategic traffic plans for roadways and for indoor areas. One strategy to minimize vehicular traffic is to have motorcades staged in nearby lots for transporting dignitaries and VIPs to and from the airports, which will help to alleviate traffic impositions on the general public and event attendees, and will lessen the burdens on those charged with providing dignitary and VIP protection.

Another concern for airport security is heavy crowding inside airports on arrival/departure dates. Be flexible and use creative solutions to make potentially crowded areas more manageable for security. Using flight itineraries of event attendees, planners can estimate the number of travelers by day and develop creative solutions for managing crowds. Work with airlines to allow selected personnel to pre-check bags or work with hotels to allow late check-outs, which will help to prevent personnel from waiting in lobby areas for extended periods of time.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Acquire sufficient personnel to coordinate VIP travel, and expect last-minute itinerary changes.

Plan to provide additional resources at airport facilities on heavy arrival and departure days to ensure smooth operation of vehicle and pedestrian through-fares. Consider adding a Special Response Platoon two days prior to, and one day following the event to deal with the high volume of travelers.

## ● *Communicate with Stakeholders*

State and local law enforcement are primarily responsible for airport security, in collaboration with airport police. Proper coordination and a shared communication channel are critical to airport security operations. This system will allow state and local law enforcement to coordinate with, and provide situational updates to, the airport police on the arrival of VIPs and possible protection details as they move throughout the airport.

Conduct daily briefings to coordinate and exchange dignitary/VIP arrival and departure itineraries, manage traffic, and allocate resources in support of these activities. Key personnel should include airport police, the TSA, and state and local law enforcement.

## *Maritime Security*

Event venues located near major bodies of water will require maritime security, including the establishment and enforcement of water security zones, protection of the Maritime Transportation System (MTS) like commercial vessels and MTS facilities, and the maintenance of Maritime Domain Awareness to expeditiously identify potential threats to the event and to MTS. Especially for NSSEs, maritime security will involve working in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard, which will establish temporary security zones and safety zones.

Key elements for the operation command of maritime security—which should be detailed in an operational plan for maritime security—include safety of all personnel providing security; effective interagency communications; use and safety of search and rescue assets; tactical control coordinated through a maritime operations center; and personnel behaviors and use of force protocols.

### **BEST PRACTICE**

Establish common and clear lines of communication for maritime security units, to ensure situational awareness of maritime security threats.

## ● *Develop an Operational Plan for Maritime Security*

Maritime security operational plans should include the following:

- **Command/control structures:** Include event operations/planning/logistics/finance section chiefs, liaisons, protection units, and/or venue branch managers.
- **Weather forecasts/tides/currents:** Provide forecasts and necessary safety information at the beginning of each operational period.
- **Response objectives:** Include information such as providing waterside security of main venues, protecting the MTS, ensuring safety and security, or maintaining Maritime Domain Awareness to identify potential threats to all potential responders at the beginning of each operational period.
- **Status of major maritime infrastructure:** Include information such as whether traffic or transit is allowed for piers, rivers, bridges, or channels.
- **Assignment lists:** Include information on the locations of primary/peak, off-peak, and back-up personnel.
- **Communications plans:** Define radio, phone, and/or pager contact information for interagency personnel both on the water and on land.
- **Medical plans:** Detail contact information for medical aid stations and hospitals.

- **Contingency plans:** Include plans for severe or heavy weather such as storms or hurricanes and ensure that weather plans account for an adequate number of vessels to continuously secure area bridges.
- **Other related plans:** Include information on decontamination, force protection, or demobilization plans.

## ***Venue Security***

The mission of venue security is to provide a safe and secure environment for main event venues and for attendees staying in hotels.

### ● *Determine Lead Authority*

Identify the lead authority for various event venues to prevent duplicative planning efforts, and to assess any resource needs. During an NSSE, the USSS is in charge of security at the official venues, while local law enforcement is in charge of event venues that fall outside the secure zone and any venues where unofficial events are taking place such as hotels, restaurants, or meeting spaces. In every case, local law enforcement will be called upon to handle disturbances and make arrests in the secure zone, event venues, and throughout the affected area of the event.

### ● *Engage in Early, Collaborative Planning*

Local law enforcement must participate in early planning, in the form of regular or weekly meetings, with federal partners and outside agencies. Early collaboration will allow the planning subcommittees to establish relationships with key stakeholders. Collaboration should include all appropriate stakeholders—such as the local fire department, department of public works, TSA, U.S. Postal Inspector Service, U.S. Department of Defense, state National Guard, and U.S. Department of State—that have assets and infrastructures related to the security of event venues. Planned activities for venue security should include site vulnerability assessments, emergency preparedness, environmental impacts, and the identification of technical and tactical assets. Determine if security perimeters will be established and how they will be maintained—for example, by requiring physical barriers, detection technologies, and/or vehicle sweeps. Include both emergency evacuation and contingency plans in the event of an emergency or overflow of attendees. All of these planning elements should be detailed in the operational plan, which should include timelines for venue security such as when site visits should be conducted, when secure zones will be swept and cleaned, and the location of temporary vehicle and magnetometer checkpoints.

Conduct site visits and walk-throughs of all event venues in order to plan for daily operations and special circumstances prior to the event.

### ● *Coordinate Venue Security Officers*

Adequately staff critical posts to ensure that law enforcement has oversight of the entire venue and can respond quickly to incidents. Effective strategies for officer assignments may include:

- Placing officers on permanent duty assignments to prevent new officers from having to continuously orient themselves to new venues;
- Assigning local officers to venue security, as they are familiar with the area and can provide directions to outsiders; and,

- Ensuring a sufficient number of personnel to allow for the flexible allocation of resources, especially during VIP visits or during times when potential security problems are anticipated.

### ***Toolkit References***


The following checklists (found in Appendix A) can be used to assess planning and operations of access control:

- A.22 Access Control Planning and Operations Checklist, Page A-81
- A.23 Law Enforcement Venue Assessment Checklist, Page A-83

## **3.16 Tactical Support and Explosive Device Response/Hazardous Materials**

Due to the high-profile nature and mass media attention of large-scale security events, law enforcement must be ready to respond to critical incidents including terrorist threats or attacks. Public safety agencies must be able to respond to, assess, and render safe any hazardous materials, suspicious items and persons, or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during an event.

Tactical support and explosive device response planning should focus on safeguarding life and property, minimizing panic and disruptions to venues, and restoring situations to normal as soon as possible after an incident. Hazardous threats include explosives, chemicals, biological toxins, radiological sources, “military” chemical weapons, and nuclear devices.<sup>43</sup> Prior to the event, law enforcement should use counter-terrorism intelligence and threat assessments to identify potential and propriety threats for the event.

<b>Tactical Support and Explosive Device Response/Hazardous Materials - Planning Checklist</b>		
	<b>Key Steps</b>	<b>Completed</b> 
●	Combine HAZMAT and Explosive Device Response (EDR) Planning	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for EDR/HAZMAT	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs    ▲ NSSEs		

### **● *Combine HAZMAT and EDR Planning***

Collaborate with local partners and with state, regional, and federal agencies to maintain situational awareness of HAZMAT and explosive response actions and protective measures. Agencies should be aware lead federal responsibility for explosives investigations that are terror related fall to the FBI, while non-terror explosives incidents fall to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) to investigate. Both agencies provide useful resources to state and local law enforcement for responding to explosives incidents.

<sup>43</sup> DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, 2007.

## ● *Develop an Operational Plan for EDR/HAZMAT*

HAZMAT and ERD response plans should contain the following elements:

- **Event overview and mission:** Describe the purpose of the event and how HAZMAT operations are important to event security.
- **Primary and secondary venues:** Detail locations of high-risk areas including event venues, large public gathering areas and free speech platforms, hotels, and parking garages.
- **Staffing assignments:** Detail how response teams will be staffed and when they will be operational.
- **Communication protocols:** Describe how interagency teams will communicate with one another, and with other intelligence and event-related centers, and if they will need encrypted channels. Also define common HAZMAT terminology as it relates to the event, including differentiating between the terms “suspicious,” “unattended,” “bomb,” and “incendiary device.” Establish one center number for the All Hazards Desk to receive calls and other reports.
- **Execution protocols:** Include information on how local, state, and federal partners will respond to incidents. Determine if different procedures are required to respond to unattended packages or vehicles and/or suspicious packages or vehicles. Educate and train response personnel such as bomb technicians and canine handlers on these protocols so they can more accurately assess calls and respond appropriately.
- **Command and control:** Detail activated operations centers, bomb management centers, and canine operations areas.
- **Response team protocols:** Describe the mission and activities and who will be staffing the response teams. Use the Render Safe Procedure Teams (RSP) or Hazard Assessment Teams (HAT) to respond to HAZMAT calls and Heavy Decontamination Teams to respond to decontamination/fire calls.
- **Security sweeps:** Detail how security sweeps will be conducted, who will conduct them, and when.
- **Other operational response:** Include information on resources needs including equipment or canines, technology implementation and training, threat responses, render-safe procedures, post-blast responses, intelligence, and tactical medics.

### **BEST PRACTICE**

Consider using Hazard Assessment Teams to quickly respond to and clear suspicious packages.

## *Toolkit References*


The following checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for tactical support and explosive device response planning and operations:

- A.24 Bomb Threat Checklist, Page A-85

## 3.17 Training

Training is a key component for protecting public safety during event operations and has been mentioned throughout this guide. Training is an important way to instill the mission and goals of the agency on all officers, emphasize important policies and procedures, and build skills and to educate staff on the expected roles, responsibilities, and performance when participating in the

event. Work closely with all stakeholders and conduct a training needs assessment to determine the types, levels, and delivery methods of training required for all personnel early in the planning phase and ensure that it is delivered and accounted for effectively, as described earlier in “Test the Operation Plan Prior to the Event.”

Training - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Recommend Federal Incident Management Training	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Extensive Officer-Training Curriculum	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Deliver Training in Various Forms	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Track Training Sessions	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Test Personnel Post Training	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Conduct Drills and Exercises	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Give Training Resources to Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Provide the Community with Training	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Recommend Federal Incident Management Training*

Upon selection to host a large-scale event, all command personnel from the lead local jurisdiction and from agencies providing key areas of support, should be required to participate in Incident Command System (ICS) training as part of the National Incident Management System (NIMS).<sup>44</sup> To the extent possible, command staff from multiple agencies should attend this training together, practice it, and become comfortable with one another before the event, to ensure consistent command and control.<sup>45</sup> This valuable online training tool covers standard, on-scene, all-hazards responses and provides an opportunity for all personnel involved to have a basic understanding of command structures.

### ● *Develop an Extensive Officer-Training Curriculum*

Focus training on educating all officers of the overall security plan for the event, as well as departmental policies and procedures for interacting with crowds and demonstrators. Training is critical to ensure that all officers receive and understand the message. In addition, provide specialized training to officers in their assigned duties, including bike officers and those who are authorized to make arrests. Specialized units, such as bomb squads or Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, may not need additional training, as they are typically required to participate routine training to maintain certification.

<sup>44</sup>DHS/FEMA Incident Command System training resources can be found online at <http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/ICSResource/index.htm>.

<sup>45</sup> Braziel, Rick, Frank Straub, George Watson, and Rod Hoops. 2016. *Bringing Calm to Chaos: A Critical Incident Review of the San Bernardino Public Safety Response to the December 2, 2015, Terrorist Shooting Incident at the Inland Regional Center*. Critical Response Initiative. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Suggested training topics include, but are not limited to, the following:<sup>46</sup>

- Constitutional rights and mass gatherings;
- Tactics for managing and de-escalating crowds (see section 3.4 for more details);
- Command and control structures;
- Communication protocols;
- Legal issues;
- Use of specialized equipment or technologies such as credentialing software or BWC systems;
- Timekeeping and payroll; and,
- Demobilization.

Place careful consideration on the training sequence. Focus training on planned non-confrontational tactics, protocols, and strategies. These strategies will differ from federal training which tends to use worst case scenarios to educate on crowd management tactics. The lead local agency should determine how they want to effectively instill their chosen philosophy for policing for the event.

Provide specific training to supervisors as well. Such training will give supervisors a clear sense of their roles and responsibilities and increase their accountability to ensure that these tactics are adequately implemented by their subordinate staff. This training will also provide a platform for ensuring that supervisors understand the philosophy of enforcement, and the specific expectations of the host department.

### ● *Deliver Training in Various Forms*

Offer trainings at multiple times and through multiple mechanisms to ensure that all officers receive and understand the department's protocols and expectations for crowd management. Trainings should be spread across multiple platforms including: online, classroom and scenario-based tabletop exercises, and in-person drills. To highlight the importance of this training, consider having the Chief or Sheriff provide a direct message that reinforces the department's crowd management primary mission and tactics.

### ● *Track Training Sessions*

Catalogue and track all training activities so that the department can accurately manage who has completed what type of training, the associated personnel hours for payroll, and the times when outside personnel will be in town and require lodging for training sessions. Have subcommittees report to local law enforcement on their scheduled training sessions and the anticipated number of personnel participating in the sessions. Tracking training may also be important after the event to support financial reimbursement or to defend officers and the lead local agency against legal claims.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Develop a mechanism for tracking training sessions to ensure all officers receive the necessary training to perform their job function.

### ● *Test Personnel Post Training*

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<sup>46</sup> See Appendix A for a more detailed list of training courses that can be offered.



The lead local department must ensure that officers fully understand and absorb training on event philosophies, protocols, and plans. Implement post-tests following training sessions to assess officers' comprehension of the material and principles they are taught.

### ● *Conduct Drills and Exercises*

As stated previously in this Primer (in Section 2.2 Develop the Operational Plan), conduct training, drills, and exercises prior to the event in order to provide personnel and operations centers with opportunities to define, test, and learn their roles and proper communication mechanisms. Scenario training and exercises and drills can prepare officers to remain unresponsive to demonstrators that try to bait and elicit negative responses. Online trainings can also ease the burden on providing out-of-town officers before they get on-site and help reinforce the local laws and policies and procedures. Examples for delivering training include presentations, webinars, online course curriculum, or in-person training at an academy. Lesson and instructional training can also include specific scenarios and exercises that resemble actual or probable events. Drills and exercises also allow personnel from various agencies to test the efficacy of the operational plan, to build collaborative relationships, and to ensure that they are aware of their roles and responsibilities.

### ● *Give Training Resources to Officers*

During the event, provide officers with a field or "pocket" guide that they can quickly refer to for answers regarding basic security functions, including the lead local department's use of force policy and arrest procedures; information on medical illnesses; information on identifying and preliminarily addressing hazardous materials; maps depicting the event zone, comfort stations and R&R sites, and the public viewing area; a list of items prohibited citywide; and radio and social media communication protocols. This is valuable in minimizing the amount of questions field supervisors receive from their officers, allowing them to focus on security operations.

Additional references can be provided for information the department feels is critical. For example, for the 2012 DNC and RNC, CMPD and TPD provided every officer with reference brochures and cards that listed the profile of radio channels.<sup>47</sup> This reference material served as a quick guide and as on-the-job training for using the radio and related equipment such as earpieces and microphones, and identifying call signs.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Develop a pocket guide for field officers to provide a quick-reference of important event-related information.

### ● *Provide the Community with Training*

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Conduct a Citizen's Academy to provide the public with the information they need to build a positive perception of the department's security plans and efforts.

Training can also be provided to the public and community stakeholders through an event-specific Citizen's Academy. Tailor this training to a public audience and provide community leaders with the information they need to build a positive perception of the department's efforts

and to ensure public safety during the event. Training can include information lectures and scenario training on the department's mission and goals, as well as tactics and protocols for the security operation. Two weeks prior to the 2012 RNC, TPD hosted a Citizen's Academy to

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<sup>47</sup> These pocket guides can be found in Appendix A: Section 2.17 – Training.

educate community leaders on the department's security operations. The session included scenarios of incidents that have occurred in past protests, and the law enforcement response to these different types of incidents, including the escalating levels of violence.


### ***Toolkit References***

The following references (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for training:

- A.25 Training and Exercise Course Catalogue Checklist, Page A-87
- A.26 Training Request Form, Page A-91
- A.27 Law Enforcement Pocket Guides. Page A-93

## **3.18 Transportation and Traffic Management**

Transportation is critical to security for a large-scale event and is often one of the major elements that will quickly impact attendees' impressions of the event's organization, security, command, and control.

<b>Transportation and Traffic Management - Planning Checklist</b>		
	<b>Key Steps</b>	<b>Completed</b> 
●	Collaborate with Other Stakeholders	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Transportation	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Be Flexible	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Separate Traffic Command into Smaller Activities	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Use Officers, Signage, and Other Resources to Guide Traffic	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate Specialized Transportation for VIP/Delegate Buses	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### **● *Collaborate with Other Stakeholders***

The impact on a jurisdiction's transportation system can be effectively minimized through comprehensive and early planning. Transportation planners, likely led by the local Department of Transportation, city/regional public transportation providers, and police department, must work together to coordinate motorcade and waterway route security for the safe transportation of VIPs and event participants, as well as to develop a plan for the control, diversion/rerouting of pedestrian and commercial traffic, and to continue deliveries and services such as garbage, cleaning, maintenance, etc. to the event venue and other companies and businesses in the secure zone. Planners should hold meetings and have direct access to stakeholders with operational areas affected by transportation to ensure proper coordination of transportation needs. This may include collaboration with sworn officers and civilian entities from the following:

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Work with other subcommittees to understand their transportation needs, and the impact that these needs will have in developing the transportation plan.

- **Crowd management, civil disturbance, or arrest processing** for demonstrators blocking roads.
- **Intelligence/counter surveillance** for intelligence on changing routes.
- **Dignitary/VIP protection** for managing and coordinating their routes.
- **Explosive device response/HAZMAT** for responding to suspicious packages found on routes.
- **Fire/health/medical personnel** for event patrons or officers with heat exhaustion and/or dehydration.
- **Interagency communications** for maintaining coordinated communication and situational awareness with public transportation and deliveries and services such as garbage, cleaning, maintenance, etc. to the event venue and other companies and businesses in the secure zone.
- **Venue security** for effective and efficient access to event venues.
- **Airspace security** for effective and efficient access to airports.

#### BEST PRACTICE

Work with city traffic engineers to design rolling detours and/or road closures.

In addition, planners can use the expertise of city traffic personnel, particularly local traffic

engineers, for designing rolling detours and/or road closures. While local law enforcement works with city traffic planners, it should be mindful that city traffic planners are not police officers and do not recognize the challenges police face in terms of staffing for a change in roadway patterns.

### ● *Develop an Operational Plan for Transportation*

Transportation and traffic plans will depend on the area perimeters designated by the lead law enforcement agency as secured zones. The following traffic considerations should be detailed in plans:

- **Road closures:** Include plans for secure “hard zones” and equipment/signage needed for rolling detours and/or road closures. Produce user-friendly maps and websites, FAQs, and hold town hall meetings to educate outsiders of planned road closures.
- **Transit assets:** Determine operational status of mass transit systems, ride-sharing services such as Uber and Lyft, bike-rental services, and other transit assets that will be used to transport attendees and demonstrators; and, nearby parking facilities. Additionally, consider emerging transit possibilities such as autonomous vehicles and how they will affect transportation. Designate parking lots within the “hard zones” for housing buses used for VIP and delegate transportation.
- **Staffing plans:** Detail plans for traffic posts and directing traffic. Evaluate how many officers are required and what key intersections need to be staffed. Remember that controlling traffic is a basic function that volunteers, civilian staff, reserve officers, or police officers from outside of the area can manage. Also consider staffing plans for outside route security to protect delegates/VIPs staying farther from main event areas.
- **Command and control:** Designate a site where traffic commanders will control and monitor traffic. During the 2016 DNC in Philadelphia, the Transportation Cell had a customized dashboard that included information regarding where each DNC bus was, the traffic flow in and around Philadelphia, the number of available ambulances and their locations, and other pertinent Fire/EMS information.

- **Technologies:** Detail the use of camera and GPS systems for traffic surveillance.
- **Communications plans:** Detail protocols and mechanisms for personnel to communicate during the event. If radios will be provided to bus drivers, ensure that someone in the Transportation Cell and/or EOC has the ability to contact each of the radios and ensure that bus drivers and security personnel have their radios on and respond while on duty.
- **Contingency plans:** Design a number of contingency or alternate traffic routes in the event of demonstrations, significant traffic, or other roadblocks. During the 2016 DNC in Philadelphia, the Transportation Cell partnered with the City of Philadelphia's Department of Transportation to devise multiple traffic plans for the event. Decisions regarding how to control traffic and expected movement of delegates, with considerable attention to bus movement, were factored into the traffic plans. Traffic officers particularly around the Wells Fargo Center, had multiple ways to direct buses to and from the event.
- **Transportation of large groups of VIPs or delegates:** Create secure motorcade routes early on, using educated estimates of anticipated traffic activities. Develop protocols to sweep VIP or delegate buses to ensure that they are clean. Make sure vehicles are accessible to individuals with special access and functional needs.

### ● *Be Flexible*

During the event, flexibility and frequent communication are critical for efficient real-time operations, and facilitate command-level decision making. The use of mobile relief squads on motorcycles or patrol cars can speed up responses to traffic-specific needs.

### ● *Separate Traffic Command into Smaller Activities Overseen by a Single Lead*

Traffic operations encompass a multitude of widely differing activities. Break up the following traffic functions into separate subcommittees, each with a single commander: traffic management, motorcades, and buses for VIPs. This will allow commanders to focus their attention to activities related to a single function and will prevent particular incidents from being overlooked. However, assign a single traffic lead to oversee all of the smaller activities. While breaking up the traffic functions allows commanders to focus their attention to activities related to a single function, there should be an individual that oversees all decisions to ensure that decisions made by one commander don't conflict with those of another commander, that all traffic operations are coordinated, and that all contractors and stakeholders have one individual with whom to communicate. That person should have direct connections and communication with the Transportation Cell and the overall EOC, and should be stationed in one of the two during the event.

### ● *Use Officers, Signage, and Other Resources to Guide Traffic*

Strategically disperse volunteers, civilian staff, reserve officers, and/or traffic officers at street intersections to help guide traffic. Provide each officer with detailed maps and directions informing them of major street closures, one-way streets, checkpoints, and designated parking lots for different vehicles and purposes. This will help guide officers who are unfamiliar with the local area or new traffic protocols, thus promoting smooth flows of traffic. It is important to ensure that enough staff is assigned to producing advanced materials prior to the event. Station adequate signage to direct traffic to checkpoints and exits and use physical barriers, such as jersey barriers and large vehicles like garbage trucks or school buses, to cordon off street

traffic. Strategically placed barriers and signs can effectively inform and direct vehicles trying to navigate the area and prevent traffic back-ups that could compromise the safety of the event environment.

### ● *Coordinate Specialized Transportation for VIP/Delegate Buses*

VIPs or delegates—in the case of national political conventions—will require secure transportation. When coordinating such transportation, local law enforcement should work closely with event planners and private companies hired to transport VIPs, to ensure that all parties fully understand transportation plans, protocols, equipment like GPS and radios, and routes.

Develop protocols to sweep VIP or delegate buses to ensure that they are clean and safe prior to the event. Work with event planners to ensure that vehicles are accessible to individuals with access and functional needs, to avoid complications with having to identify additional secure resources to transport these individuals during the event.

In some cases, law enforcement may need to help coordinate transportation. It is important that field commanders are on-hand with proper communication mechanisms to mitigate travel problems.

### *Toolkit References*

The following template (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations to manage transportation and traffic:


- A.26 Traffic and Transportation Plan Template, Page A-107

An additional reference that contains useful information for planning for transportation and traffic management:

- U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, *National Special Security Events: Transportation Planning for Planned Special Events*, Washington, D.C., May 2011.

## 3.19 Preparing for Emerging Technologies and Possibilities

In order to fully prepare for a large-scale security event, law enforcement should carefully evaluate all aspects of the potential uses and implications of cutting-edge and emerging technologies and applications (apps). Whether agencies are considering leveraging these technologies or apps, or accounting for the impacts they may have on various plans and enforcement, myriad possibilities must be thoughtfully vetted and considered.

Emerging Technologies and Possibilities - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Prepare/Plan for Law Enforcement Use	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Prepare/Plan for Community Use	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Prepare/Plan to Counter Illicit Use	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

## ● *Prepare/Plan for Law Enforcement Use*

New and emerging technologies are constantly advancing the capabilities and operations of law enforcement. During the RNC, the Cleveland Division of Police used body worn cameras (BWCs) to improve transparency as they protected the Convention. To remain relevant in an ever-changing environment, law enforcement must do its due diligence to determine if leveraging cutting edge s technologies during large-scale security events makes sense, and if so, which technologies they will use and how. For example, small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) have the ability to, “among other benefits, help find lost persons, protect police officers during searches for armed suspects...and aid in disaster relief and recovery.”<sup>48</sup> During Super Bowl XLV in 2011, the Arlington (Texas) Police Department utilized a sUAS to conduct security and to visually inspect the roof of AT&T Stadium before and during the game. While neither of the Presidential Nominating Convention host cities used sUAS, they are technologies that could have considered to conduct security of their arenas, provide situational awareness to their EOCs, and keep both officers and the community safe.<sup>49</sup> Going forward, another technology to consider for use are autonomous vehicles that have the potential to expand the capacities of law enforcement by delivering resources without requiring an officer to transport them. During LSSEs, autonomous vehicles can transport pallets of water from the Forward Logistics Base to officers throughout the city, and to demonstrators in some cases, without requiring additional personnel.

### **BEST PRACTICE**

The 2016 RNC was the first national convention in which police officers were equipped with body worn cameras (BWCs). All CPD officers are standard issued BWCs and were required to wear them when working RNC events. CPD kept its standard BWC policy and procedure in place for the large event, but ordered specially designed mounts so that crowd management and arrest team officers could also wear BWCs that could accommodate their protective equipment.

BJA provides a variety of valuable resources for law enforcement using BWCs. The toolkit can be found at <https://www.bja.gov/bwc/topics-gettingstarted.html>.

However, as with the implementation of any new technology law enforcement agencies must prepare and plan for more than just use and cost. Especially prior to an LSSE, agencies must account for the additional time and resources needed to develop and vet detailed policies, procedures, and operating guidelines; conduct the necessary trainings; and, involve the community in meetings regarding their use.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid. Downloaded from <https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/UAS-Report.pdf>.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> A full checklist for developing policy and procedures can be found beginning on page 45 of <https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/UAS-Report.pdf>. Additionally, the International Association of Chiefs of Police developed a Technology Policy Framework that includes nine universal principles for, “the development of specific agency policies and operating procedures that comport with established constitutional, legal, and ethical mandates and standards,” which can be found at, <http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/documents/pdfs/iacp%20technology%20policy%20framework%20january%202014%20final.pdf>.



### ● *Prepare/Plan for Community Use*

With the emergence of any new technology, it is also important for law enforcement agencies, in particular, to prepare for the ways in which community members may use technologies and apps, and plan for the potential impacts of their use. For example, although ridesharing apps—such as Uber or Lyft—provide an additional mode of transportation, their method of matching a vehicle to the requesting user can cause difficulties for traffic enforcement plans. During the 2016 DNC, the Philadelphia Police Department provided a specific parking lot in the Wells Fargo Center complex for taxi use. However, since ridesharing companies were only approved a couple of days before the DNC, inclusion of them was not considered in traffic plans.<sup>51</sup> Instead of drivers being directed to a specific parking lot, riders met their driver based on their phone's GPS, regardless of where they were located. This resulted in situations where multiple rows of drivers were waiting for their riders, and riders walked through multiple lanes of traffic attempting to find their drivers. This created not only a safety concern, but also significant delays in the flow of traffic around the Wells Fargo Center, which impacted other methods of transportation. Similarly, autonomous vehicles that have the physical location of a particular venue will not be able to read directions to specific parking lots and should be accounted for in law enforcement plans once they become used frequently by the public. Technology will continue to evolve leading up to the 2020 Presidential Nominating Conventions and other LSSEs. Law enforcement must account for how the public will use these technologies as they relate to these events.

### ● *Prepare/Plan to Counter Illicit Use*

Finally, law enforcement agencies must prepare and plan for countering the use of technologies and apps that can be leveraged for illicit purposes. While autonomous vehicles have numerous positive attributes, an individual or group looking to do harm to a large number of individuals could use autonomous vehicles to cause mass damage to an LSSE venue or to a nearby crowd of attendees. Likewise, UASs may be used in various ways to surveil, transport contraband or cause damage. Identifying specific protocols for countering these possibilities will be an important process for local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies working together to address.

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<sup>51</sup> Democratic National Convention – After Action Review (AAR). City of Philadelphia. September 19, 2016.



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# Section 4: Post-event Considerations

## 4.1 Demobilization

At the end of a large-scale security event, it is important to ensure that demobilization plans are in place to prevent out-of-town personnel from not checking out properly and for local agencies to not close down their operations prematurely. In fact, properly closing operations and bringing business back to normal is critical for ensuring community safety.

Begin demobilization efforts during the planning stages and continue throughout the event life-cycle. Law enforcement agencies must decide on a logical order to release and out-process officers and to collect resources coming back in from the field including their equipment, supplies, and any vehicles. Designate a point of contact to release personnel and resources. In addition, as officers are out-processed, they should be required to submit completed timecards and travel information, so that local law enforcement and the SAA can accurately complete payroll for visiting personnel.

### LESSON LEARNED

Exit interviews with out-of-town personnel should occur prior to relieving the agency.

In addition, barricades, fences, and other resources used to secure perimeters and mobile command or medical sites must be disassembled in a timely manner and temporary adjustments to critical infrastructure must be made so that normal city operations can resume.

## 4.2 After-Action Analysis

### BEST PRACTICE

After-action analysis should begin in the planning phase. The City of Philadelphia and USSS were able to continue best practices and implement lessons learned from the Papal Visit/World Meeting of Families in 2015 to their plan for the DNC in 2016 as a result of conducting a stakeholder-wide debrief. The need for a single Traffic Lead also came out of conducting an after-action analysis of hosting the DNC.

The after-action process is a critical step to evaluate and better understand a host jurisdiction's performance—including strengths and areas for improvement—following any major event or large operational activation. Begin the evaluation process in conjunction with other pre-event planning activities. Evaluators and subject matter experts (SMEs) and executive staff from previous large-scale events and NSSEs should participate in the pre-event design discussions to ensure that the post-event analysis accurately captures all phases of the planning and operational processes. For the most accurate evaluation, evaluators, SMEs, and executive staff should come from both internal and external sources, to ensure a diverse perspective. This should include both City and

out-of-state law enforcement and non-law enforcement personnel, and government and community members. Evaluators should be chosen based on their expertise in operational activities or the standard operating procedures for the venue/site that they will observe.

Evaluators will observe the event at specific venues/sites that have roles and responsibilities related to the host jurisdiction's objectives or areas of focus. At each site, evaluators will need to record performance capabilities and capture any unresolved issues. They will also ensure that data is collected whenever possible to support their after-action analyses. The City of

Philadelphia was able to learn a lot about its communication and consideration of local businesses through debriefs and engagement with business owners and community members following the 2015 Papal Visit/World Meeting of Families. Some of these lessons learned were addressed during the DNC.

Following the event, evaluators should take part in a hotwash and/or de-briefing, which consists of a facilitated discussion held immediately after an event. This hotwash will allow the evaluators the opportunity to capture feedback about any issues, concerns, or proposed improvements. It is also an opportunity for all individuals involved in the event to express their opinions, which will later be incorporated into the overall after-action report. Doing the debrief immediately after an event allows for people to remember specific details and incidents before they are forgotten or seem to be irrelevant. Additionally, too far after the event people may have more pertinent concerns and not attend the debrief. The team of evaluators will compile and analyze all of the data collected to assess outcomes related to pre-identified operational areas. The data will include the evaluators' notes, details from the information-sharing portal—both 2016 Presidential Nominating Convention cities used Knowledge Center—and any other materials or documents produced at their location that may add to the analysis process. Data-consolidation is an important first step in the analysis, and it documents what happened during the exercise. It also supports the evaluators in determining *why* events happened, by providing the necessary data to determine root causes.<sup>52</sup> The analysis will highlight all observations deemed most relevant for the jurisdiction to have the best overall report of their activities throughout the event process.

The main products of the evaluation process and analysis are a timeline, or reconstruction, of key events and an after-action report (AAR). The timeline record consists of key events, decisions, and resource deployments, which may prove important post-event. The AAR captures observations of the event and will include recommendations, best practices, and lessons learned for post-event improvements.

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<sup>52</sup> A “root cause” is the causal factor of an identified issue, as uncovered during detailed analysis, toward which the evaluators can direct recommendations.

## Section 5: Conclusion

Operations of previous large-scale events such as NSSEs have provided valuable lessons learned and best practices that can inform, prepare, and better equip planners, senior leaders, and decision-makers hosting events in their own jurisdiction. These events pose the potential for large gatherings and demonstrations, clashes between police and demonstrators, and an increased risk to officer safety. Recognize that different tactics, strategies, and a common philosophy should be used to ensure the safety of attendees, demonstrators, and officers assisting in the response. The strategic vision should focus on local law enforcement's ability to effectively maintain security and public safety, with special attention paid to minimizing disruptions caused by demonstrators, avoiding unnecessary arrests, and preserving Constitutional rights and civil liberties.

### Build a Foundation for Success

To establish a foundation of success for this vision, it is critical that law enforcement begin with early planning, clear leadership, and a comprehensive operational plan that incorporates the needs and response efforts of all participating stakeholders. Planning should include the identification of core operational areas applicable to the event, 18 of which were outlined in this report. These core areas will guide the agency as it determines staffing requirements and recruits police officers both from within and outside of their jurisdiction. These officers are vital to providing safety to event venues, critical infrastructure sites, delegates/VIPs, and event attendees. As planning proceeds, maintain coordinated and open lines of communication and a flexible mentality toward expected changes during planning and operations.

### Highlighted Strategies

Some of the notable strategies discussed in this report highlight the importance of using both traditional and non-traditional approaches to policing, include:

- Develop a strategic vision that combines engagement, protection of civil rights and liberties, and public and officer safety and effectively communicate it to officers and the public
- Use bicycles and bicycle officers as a more welcoming and approachable law enforcement presence and to guide demonstrators
- Leverage on-site personnel (both uniformed and undercover), information and intelligence gathered by operations centers, and technology (body-worn, dashboard, security, surveillance, and news cameras; social media and the Internet; and, information-sharing software) to maintain situational awareness and make real-time response and resource-allocation decisions.
- Promote a shift in officer training for crowd control and non-confrontational strategies to maintain officer composure. In addition, training is crucial for ensuring that all law enforcement offices and other stakeholders understand their strategic vision to minimize arrests; deescalate situations whenever possible; and provide a safe, secure environment for all who choose to operate within those parameters.

## **Public Information and Media Relations**

Since large-scale events can draw media attention and demonstrators from across the nation, carefully planned security operations are critical to maintaining a safe environment for event goers and for deescalating potentially violent situations.

Gathering and disseminating information in real-time and using multiple communications channels (including press releases, press conferences, conference calls, and social media) to do so can facilitate timely and unified sharing of information. Clear and consistent public information is crucial for ensuring that demonstrators exercise their right to free speech, while also functioning within clearly defined parameters, and for satisfying the media. Create a city JIC to streamline these communications and ensure rapid response to media outlets and the public.

## **Additional Resources, Templates, and Checklists**

Proper security planning and multi-agency coordination throughout the entirety of the event (before, during, and after) are paramount to local law enforcement's ability to maintain a safe environment and to conduct a successful event.

Law enforcement agencies nationwide can benefit from the lessons learned and best practices that are documented in this Planning Primer. An interactive toolkit is provided in **Appendix A**, which serves as a useful instrument for developing operational plans. By having solid plans in place, law enforcement will be better prepared for incidents and to achieve event goals, such as reduced response times, reduced civil unrest, and a heightened sense of public safety throughout a large-scale event.

## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

# Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies





# Appendix A. Planning Toolkit

This Planning Toolkit provides considerations, templates, and checklists for local law enforcement to use when planning and conducting operations for a large-scale security event. Local law enforcement planners should remember that these templates and checklists serve as guides and, in some cases, should be scaled to the event and tailored to the specific needs of the agency.

The information provided in this toolkit was gathered through a number of resources, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/ Federal Emergency Management Agency's 2010 document, *IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*<sup>1</sup>; the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs' *Office of the Chief Financial Officer 2015 Financial Guide*<sup>2</sup>; and planning material developed by local law enforcement and the U.S. Secret Service that was used in the 2016 Republican National Convention and the 2016 Democratic National Convention.

**Table A. Planning Tool Kit References**

Core Operational Area	Applicable Planning Checklists and Forms	Appendix Page #
Planning	A.1: Pre-event Planning Matrix A.2: Hazard Vulnerability Assessment <sup>3</sup> A.3: Operational Plan Template <sup>4</sup>	A-5 A-7 A-11
3.1 Administrative and Logistics Support	A.4: Logistic Information Survey A.5: Food Vendor Information Sheet A.6: Inspection Checklist for Vendors A.7: Hotel Survey Questionnaire	A-13 A-15 A-19 A-23
3.2 Command and Control	A.8: Incident Organization Chart Template A.9: Organization Assignment List Template	A-31 A-33
3.3 Credentialing	A.10: Credentialing Checklist	A-35
3.4 Crowd Management	A.11: Considerations for Managing Crowds	A-39
3.5 Dignitary/VIP Protection	A.3: Operational Plan Template <sup>5</sup>	A-11

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, updated 2010 (original 2005) <https://www.hsd1.org/?view&did=759939> (accessed January 26, 2017).

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of Justice/Office of Justice Programs, *2015 DOJ Grants Financial Guide*. 2015. <https://ojp.gov/financialguide/DOJ/index.htm> (accessed January 26, 2017).

<sup>3</sup> The checklist in Section A.2 applies to two core operational areas: Pre-Event Planning and Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities.

<sup>4</sup> The checklist in Section A.3 applies to multiple core operational areas: Pre-Event Planning, Dignitary/VIP Protection, and Non-Event Patrol.

<sup>5</sup> For a list of typical risks and hazards to consider, see page 2-2 in *Special Events Contingency Planning: Job Aids Manual*, updated 2010 (original 2005) <https://www.hsd1.org/?view&did=759939> (accessed January 26, 2017).



## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Core Operational Area	Applicable Planning Checklists and Forms	Appendix Page #
3.6 Financial/Grant Management	A.12: Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Special Event Funding Guidance A. 13: Financial Provisions and Policies A.14: Post award Requirements: Grant Fraud, Waste, and Abuse	A-47 A-51 A-55
3.7 Fire/ Emergency Medical Services (EMS)/ Hospitals/ Public Health	A.15: EMS Venue Assessment Checklist	A-59
3.8 Intelligence/ Counterterrorism/ Counter surveillance	A.16: Intelligence/Counter Surveillance Planning and Operations Checklist	A-61
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3.11 Non-Event Patrol	A.3: Operational Plan Template <sup>6</sup>	A-11
3.12 Arrest Processing	A.20: Considerations for Processing Arrestees	A-71
3.13 Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities	A.2: Hazard Vulnerability Assessment <sup>7</sup>	A-7
3.14 Public Information and Media Relations	A.21: Best Practices for Law Enforcement Public Information Officers	A-73
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3.18 Transportation and Traffic Management	A.28 Traffic and Transportation Plan Template	A-111
3.19 Preparing for Emerging Technologies and Possibilities	N/A	N/A

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, Updated 2010 (original 2005)  
<https://www.hsd1.org/?view&did=759939> (accessed January 26, 2017).

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## A.1 Pre-Event Planning Matrix

*Because responsibilities vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, certain risks or hazards are not always handled by only one agency. This matrix is designed to determine the risks and hazards to which your agency is held. Refer to the corresponding page in the Job Aids Manual.<sup>8</sup>*

*If more than one agency is tasked to respond to the risk or hazard, some overlap of responsibility may occur. One way to handle this is to place a “P” in the primary agency position and an “S” in the support agency position. The responsibilities of each agency must be discussed and decided in the planning stages, not when an incident occurs.*

**Table A.1-1: Pre-event Planning Matrix**

	County Agency	EMS	Emergency Management	Federal Aviation Administration	Federal Bureau of Investigation	Fire	Law Enforcement	Public Health	Public Works	State Agency	U.S. Secret Service	Utilities	Promoter/Sponsor
Abandoned Vehicles													
Airspace Encroachment													
Assault on County Official													
Assault on Federal Official													
Assault on State Official													
Suspicious Package													
Bomb Threat													
Building Inspection													
Cancellation of Event													
Civil Disturbance w/Demonstration													
Communications													
Credentials													

<sup>8</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, updated 2010 (original 2005) <https://www.hsd1.org/?view&did=759939> (accessed January 26, 2017).

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	County Agency	EMS	Emergency Management	Federal Aviation Administration	Federal Bureau of Investigation	Fire	Law Enforcement	Public Health	Public Works	State Agency	U.S. Secret Service	Utilities	Promoter/ Sponsor
Crowd Control													
Demonstrations													
Dignitary Protection													
Emergency Medical Services													
Environmental Hazards													
Evacuation of Area													
Fire													
First Aid Stations													
Food Handling													
Food Waste													
HazMat													
Hostage w/o Terrorism													
Human Waste													
Kidnapping													
Lost Child													
Lost and Found													
Media Relations													
Motorcades													
Parking													
Permitting													
Potable Water													
Power Interruption													
Security/Governor													
Security/State Department													
Security													
Structural Collapse													

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	County Agency	EMS	Emergency Management	Federal Aviation Administration	Federal Bureau of Investigation	Fire	Law Enforcement	Public Health	Public Works	State Agency	U.S. Secret Service	Utilities	Promoter/ Sponsor
Terrorist Act													
Terrorist Threat													
Ticketing													
Traffic Control													
Weather Hazards													
WMD: Chemical													
WMD: Biological													
WMD: Radiological													
WMD: Nuclear													
WMD: Explosive													

### A.2 Hazard Vulnerability Assessment<sup>9</sup>

*Consider conducting a hazard vulnerability assessment. Local/state emergency management agencies can assist with conducting a vulnerability analysis. These assessments are important to the development of operational and contingency plans.*

#### Frequency Distribution

The planning team should assign a frequency distribution for each type of hazard identified in the Hazard Rating Worksheet (Table A.2-3 below). A frequency distribution categorizes the jurisdiction's exposure to each hazard (that is, the likelihood of occurrence for each type of hazard). Exposure can be assessed in terms of cycles, hours, or years. The definitions of frequency distribution are shown in Table A.2-1 below.

**Table A.2-1: Frequency Distribution**

Exposure	Frequency
Highly likely = 3	The potential for impact is very probable (near 100 percent) in the next year.
Likely = 2	The potential for impact is greater than 10 and less than 100 percent within the next year.  Or  There is at least one chance of occurrence within the next 10 years.
Possible = 1	The potential for impact is between 1 and 10 percent within the next year.  Or  There is at least one chance of occurrence within the next 100 years.
Unlikely = 0	The potential for impact is less than 1 percent in the next 100 years.

#### Severity Ratings

The planning team should use historical and analytical data to assign a severity rating to each type of hazard that the team identifies in the Hazard Rating Worksheet (Table A.2-3 below). The severity ratings selected should quantify, to the degree possible, the damage to be expected in the jurisdiction as a result of a specific hazard. The definitions of the severity ratings are shown in Table A.2-2 below.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, updated 2010 (original 2005) <https://www.hsd1.org/?view&did=759939> (accessed January 26, 2017).

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**Table A.2-2: Severity Ratings**

Population/Poverty Level of Severity	Definition
Catastrophic = 3	Multiple deaths. Complete shutdown of critical facilities for 30 days or more. More than 50 percent of property is severely damaged.
Critical = 2	Injuries and/or illness result in permanent disability. Complete shutdown of critical facilities for at least 2 weeks. More than 25 percent of property is severely damaged.
Limited = 1	Injuries and/or illness do not result in permanent disability. Complete shutdown of critical facilities for more than 1 week. More than 10 percent of property is severely damaged.
Negligible = 0	Injuries/or illness are treatable with first aid. Minor quality of life lost. Shutdown of critical facilities and services for 24 hours or less. No more than 1 percent of property is severely damaged.

### Ranking the Hazards

Using the severity and frequency distribution definitions, identify potential hazards for the event and rank them in the Hazard Rating Worksheet (Table A.2-3 below).

**Table A.2-3: Hazard Rating Worksheet**

Hazard	Frequency	Potential Impact on Population	Potential Impact on Property	Level of Coverage in Emergency Operations Plan	Point Total
	0 = Unlikely 1 = Possible 2 = Likely 3 = Highly Likely	0 = Negligible 1 = Limited 2 = Critical 3 = Catastrophic	0 = Negligible 1 = Limited 2 = Critical 3 = Catastrophic	0 = None 1 = Limited 2 = Sufficient 3 = Comprehensive (annex)	
	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	
	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	
	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	
	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	
	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	
	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	

### Recording the Information

Using the information from the Hazard Rating Worksheet (Table A.2-3), complete the Profile Worksheet (Table A.2-4) below to assess each hazard.



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**Table A.2-4: Profile Worksheet**

Hazard Profile Worksheet
<b>Hazard:</b>
<b>Potential Magnitude:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Catastrophic: Can affect more than 50 percent of the jurisdiction.</li><li>• Critical: Can affect between 25 and 50 percent of the jurisdiction.</li><li>• Limited: Can affect between 10 and 25 percent of the jurisdiction.</li><li>• Negligible: Can affect less than 10 percent of the jurisdiction.</li></ul>
<b>Areas Likely to be Most Affected (by sector):</b>
<b>Probable Duration:</b>
<b>Potential Speed of Onset:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• More than 24 hours warning will probably be available.</li><li>• Between 12 and 24 hours warning will probably be available.</li><li>• Between 6 and 12 hours warning will be available.</li><li>• Minimal (or no) warning will be available.</li></ul>
<b>Existing Warning Systems:</b>
<b>Vulnerability Analysis:</b> <p>[Using the information gathered in the above tables, and with the assistance from your local/state management agency, complete a Vulnerability Analysis]</p>

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### A.3 Operational Plan Template<sup>10</sup>

*An operations plan serves as the blueprint for the joint strategy, within a particular functional discipline, for resolution of an incident or ongoing problem, as well as overall event-support management.*

#### [Name of Subcommittee/Working Group]

##### **Situation:**

- Nature and significance of event
- Venue(s) information
  - Location
  - Special significance
  - Normal use
- Security infrastructure, if applicable to subcommittee/working group
- Significant dates pertaining to event, including set-up and tear-down of command centers, if applicable

##### **Mission:**

- Clear and concise statement of intended purpose of the operation in support of the event
- During normal event operations
- During an incident pertaining to the particular functional discipline

##### **Execution:**

This is the bulk of the document. It includes the full details of the subcommittee/working group's operational plan:

- Resources allocated to the event and surrounding area
- Manpower allocated to the event and surrounding area
- List of specific tasks by operational and support assets relative to:
  - The event during normal operations
  - Any incidents at the event
- Specifics of how each task will be accomplished
- Specific information regarding hazards or dangers that may impede response to an incident
- Transition, if any needed, from normal event operations to incident-response mode

##### **Administration:**

- Subcommittee/working group member agencies
- Recipients of plan and any identified caveats (e.g., “Official Use Only” or “Law Enforcement Sensitive”)

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<sup>10</sup> This operational plan template was provided to TPD by the USSS to assist the subcommittee groups in developing their operational plan.

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- Locations of command centers and staging areas relevant to the particular functional discipline
- Staffing and scheduling of manpower and assets

#### **Command/Coordination:**

- Command structure within the particular functional discipline
- Coordinating instructions to personnel
- All communications logistics
  - Radio frequencies and assignments
  - Phone and fax numbers for command centers and staging locations
- Detailed information-flow plan for normal event operations
  - To provide ongoing situational awareness to the Multi-Agency Command Center (MACC) throughout the event period
  - Among operational elements
  - To/from the MACC, Joint Operations Center (JOC), or other operational center
- Detailed information flow plan in the event of a request for assistance
  - To another functional discipline
  - To the MACC, JOC, or other operational center
  - *Ex: “If I am responsible for securing a dignitary hotel and need an ambulance or fire truck, how do I call for that?”*

#### **Appendices:**

- Any certifying body’s standards or interagency agreements for how the subcommittee/working group’s mission is accomplished.

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### A.4 Logistics Information Form<sup>11</sup>

*Use this form to identify what resources will be needed from each subcommittee/working group.*

**Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

**To:** Logistics [Working Group/Subcommittee]

**From:** \_\_\_\_\_ [Working Group/Subcommittee]

\_\_\_\_\_, Chair/Co-Chair

**Brief Description of Training Need:** \_\_\_\_\_

#### 1. Transportation

a. What types of vehicles/modes of transportation do you need to be rented and/or acquired (gap between anticipated resources and operational plan)?

- Passenger Vans?
- Cars?
- Buses?
- Storage Trucks?
- Other?

b. What are your anticipated fuel requirements? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

#### 2. Personnel

a. Number of personnel currently outlined in your Draft Operational Plan? \_\_\_\_\_

b. Will you need relief items delivered to fixed post personnel? \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, updated 2010 (original 2005)  
<https://www.hsd1.org/?view&did=759939> (accessed January 26, 2017).

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#### 3. Equipment

- a. What special equipment/supplies will the [Working Group/Subcommittee] need in order to close any gaps between anticipated resources and resources required under Draft Operational Plan? (e.g., generators, large items, fencing, flex cuffs)

\_\_\_\_\_

- b. Will this equipment be managed by the Logistics [Working Group/Subcommittee]?

\_\_\_\_\_

#### 4. Support

- a. Is there any additional support that the [Working Group/Subcommittee] will need to operate beyond anticipated available resources? (e.g., shuttles w/driver, portable toilets, trash disposal) \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

- b. Will you require a first aid station or medical support beyond what the [Working Group/Subcommittee] can currently provide?

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

#### 5. Housing for Mutual Aid

- a. Will incoming personnel require hotel rooms? \_\_\_\_\_

- b. How many days will the rooms be needed? \_\_\_\_\_

#### 6. Food

- a. Please list the dates and times the [Working Group/Subcommittee] will require meals.

\_\_\_\_\_

- b. Please list the anticipated number of personnel per meal. \_\_\_\_\_

- c. Would you prefer a centralized feeding location? \_\_\_\_\_

- d. Are there any additional needs? \_\_\_\_\_

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### A.5 Food Vendor Information Sheet<sup>12</sup>

*Use this checklist when identifying food vendors. This checklist will assist in quickly distinguishing if a food vendor is able to meet the needs of the event.*

**Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Name of Vendor:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Business Address:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Business Phone:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Business Fax:** \_\_\_\_\_

1. Indicate which of the following foods you sell directly or will be using as ingredients:

- Milk/milk products      \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No
- Poultry      \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No
- Salads/rice dishes      \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No
- Egg products      \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No
- Fish/fish products      \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No
- Raw meat      \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No
- Ice cream      \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No
- Shellfish      \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No
- Cooked meat      \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No

Other (specify): \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>12</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, updated 2010 (original 2005)  
<https://www.hsd1.org/?view&did=759939> (accessed January 26, 2017).



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2. Indicate the type of operation:	
• Stall	___Yes ___No
• Mobile Unit	___Yes ___No
• Stand	___Yes ___No
• Tent	___Yes ___No
Other (specify): _____	
3. Indicate the type of equipment to be provided/used on-site:	
• Refrigerator	___Yes ___No
• Freezer	___Yes ___No
• Oven	___Yes ___No
• Deep fryer	___Yes ___No
• Microwave oven	___Yes ___No
• Sink	___Yes ___No
• Wash hand basin	___Yes ___No
• Grill	
Other (specify): _____	
4. Are fire extinguishers provided at each site? YES/ NO	
If YES, what kind/type? _____	
5. Indicate power sources:	
• LPG (propane)	___Yes ___No
• Electrical generator	___Yes ___No
Other (specify): _____	
6. Is the food to be prepared or stored on premises other than in the temporary food premises or vehicle? ___Yes ___No	
If YES, please state the address: _____	
7. Will food be delivered to the site by a separate supplier? ___Yes ___No	
If YES, what arrangements will be made for receipt of those goods? _____	
_____	

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8. Have you or any of your staff completed a food handler hygiene course? \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No

If YES, when and where: \_\_\_\_\_

Vendor Point of Contact signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Location of vendor in event footprint: \_\_\_\_\_

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### A.6 Catering Inspection Checklist for Vendors<sup>13</sup>

*The establishment of a temporary catering facility can mean working in less than ideal conditions. The following checklist will provide guidance on minimum requirements for this type of event catering.*

**Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Name of Vendor:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Business Address:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Business Phone:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Business Fax:** \_\_\_\_\_

#### Setting Up

1. Food service operation is licensed or registered in accordance with state/local requirements. \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No
2. The appropriate permit has been obtained from the state/local authority where the event is to be held. \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No
3. The area is clear for which the permit is valid (i.e., the location where the vendor can set up). \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No

#### Training Staff

1. Staff is trained in food handling and food safety. \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No
2. Staff has been instructed on machinery operation, food preparation routines, and occupational health and safety matters. \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No
3. Clear guidelines are in place for staff about what to do if problems occur (whom to contact, appropriate contact numbers). \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No

#### Handling Food

1. All food handlers wash their hands thoroughly and regularly, particularly:
  - Before commencing work and after every break \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, updated 2010 (original 2005)  
<https://www.hsd1.org/?view&did=759939> (accessed January 26, 2017).

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- After visiting the toilet \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- After handling raw food \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- After using a handkerchief or tissue or touching nose, hair or mouth \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- After handling trash \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- After smoking \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 2. Correct food temperatures can be—and are—maintained. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 3. Food is cooled rapidly under refrigeration in trays not more than 4 inches deep. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 4. Tongs are provided and used where possible for food handling. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 5. Gloves, if used, are changed regularly. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 6. Food is thoroughly cooked. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 7. Food is protected from dust, insect pests, and other contaminating matter. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 8. Staff wear suitable and clean clothing, and have long hair tied back. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 9. Food on display on counters is protected from contamination from the public by use of covers or guards. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 10. The condiment area is checked and cleaned regularly. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No

#### Storing Food

- 1. Sufficient refrigeration space is provided to cope with peak demand. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 2. Refrigerator storage temperatures can be maintained during peak loads. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 3. Raw foods are stored below cooked or ready-to-eat foods. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 4. Food containers are covered. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 5. Food is stored off the floor on pallets or shelving. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 6. Frozen food is thawed on the bottom shelf in the refrigerator or under cold running water. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 7. Dry food storage space is adequate for peak loads. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 8. Dry foods are protected from dust, insects, pests, and rodents at all times. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 9. Hot food storage is in accordance with applicable standards. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
- 10. Cold food storage is in accordance with applicable standards. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No

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#### **Transporting Food**

1. Transport times are kept to a minimum. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
2. Food temperatures are met at all times during transport. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
3. All foods are protected from dust, pests, chemicals, and other contaminating matter. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No

#### **Cleaning and Sanitizing**

1. Cleaning cloths are replaced frequently. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
2. Equipment and surfaces used for the preparation of raw foods are cleaned and sanitized before further use. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
3. Sanitizers are appropriate for use in the food industry and are used in accordance with the manufacturers' directions. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No

#### **Packaging and Labeling**

1. All prepackaged foods are labeled in accordance with U.S. Food and Drug Administration's nutritional requirements. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No

#### **Managing Waste**

1. Waste is removed regularly from food preparation areas. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
2. Putrescible (decomposable) waste removed from food preparation areas is placed in bins with tight-fitting lids. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
3. Capacity to store sewage is adequate or connection to the sewer is maintained without leakage. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No

#### **Avoiding Infectious Diseases**

1. All staff are required to report any gastrointestinal-type illness to the supervisor. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
2. A register of staff illness is kept by the supervisor. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No
3. Staff are not permitted to work while they have symptoms of gastrointestinal illness or are in the acute stage of a cold or flu-like illness. \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No

#### **Ensuring Safety**

1. The workplace is safe (i.e., there are no trip hazards, no unprotected hot zones, and no unguarded equipment). \_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No

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2. Fire precautions are followed, and fire safety devices are to the satisfaction of the fire authorities. \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No
3. Food handlers have contact details for all necessary personnel in case problems occur. \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No
4. A list of appropriate contact details is maintained by supervisors and is accessible. \_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No

Ex:

- Event organizer
- Environmental health officer
- Plumber
- Electrician
- Refrigeration mechanic
- Alternative refrigeration suppliers

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### A.7 Hotel Survey Questionnaire<sup>14</sup>

*This checklist will assist planners in quickly distinguishing if a hotel/rooming establishment is adequate and able to meet the needs of the event.*

**Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Hotel Name:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Address:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Website:** \_\_\_\_\_

#### Companies and Contacts

**Who is your:**

General Manager? Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

Rooming Manager? Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

Maintenance and Engineering Manager? Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

Security Manager? Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

**Do you have a(n):**

Information Technology department? ☐ Yes ☐ No Company: \_\_\_\_\_

Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

Email Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Remote access? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Fire alarm company? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Company: \_\_\_\_\_

Corporate Risk Management Department? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

Fire alarm company? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Company: \_\_\_\_\_

After-hours emergency number: \_\_\_\_\_

Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

Sprinkler company? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Company: \_\_\_\_\_

After-hours emergency number: \_\_\_\_\_

Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

Hood system company? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Company: \_\_\_\_\_

After-hours emergency number: \_\_\_\_\_

Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

Elevator company? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Company: \_\_\_\_\_

After-hours emergency number: \_\_\_\_\_

Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

Clean-up company for spills? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Company: \_\_\_\_\_

After-hours emergency number: \_\_\_\_\_

Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

Fire restoration company? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Company: \_\_\_\_\_

After-hours emergency number: \_\_\_\_\_

Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

Glass and door company? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Company: \_\_\_\_\_

After-hours emergency number: \_\_\_\_\_

Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

Plumbing contractor? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Company: \_\_\_\_\_

After-hours emergency number: \_\_\_\_\_

Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

Electrical contractor? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Company: \_\_\_\_\_

After-hours emergency number: \_\_\_\_\_

Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

HVAC contractor? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Company: \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>14</sup> This questionnaire was created by CNA for the original *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies*. <https://www.bja.gov/Publications/LSSE-planning-Primer.pdf>.



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After-hours emergency number: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_  
Security camera company? ☐ Yes ☐ No Company: \_\_\_\_\_  
After-hours emergency number: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

#### General Building Information

Building Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Building Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Number of Stories: \_\_\_\_\_ / Subfloors \_\_\_\_\_

Main Building Size? \_\_\_\_\_ (Square Feet)

How are the building floors numbered? \_\_\_\_\_

Are there floor plans available for each floor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If yes, is a digital version available? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Is the ground floor "1" or "Lobby"? ☐ 1 ☐ Lobby

Is there a 13<sup>th</sup> floor? ☐ Yes ☐ No

#### Sprinkler System

Is the building covered by sprinklers? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Partially ☐ Wet ☐ Dry ☐ Combination

Describe partial/combination (floors covered): \_\_\_\_\_

Where are the Sprinkler Zone valves (to cut off specific areas or floors) located? \_\_\_\_\_

Does the building have a fire pump? ☐ Yes ☐ No How many? \_\_\_\_\_ Where? \_\_\_\_\_  
☐ Gasoline ☐ Diesel ☐ Electric

#### Standpipe System

Does the building have standpipes? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Partially Date of last test? \_\_\_\_\_

Describe partial/combination (floors covered): \_\_\_\_\_

Class of Standpipe: ☐ I ☐ II ☐ III

Class I: 2 ½" hose connections for FF only

Class II: 1 ½" hose cabinets with hose

Class III: 1 ½" hose cabinets with hose AND 2 ½" hose connections for FF only

Type of Standpipe: ☐ Wet ☐ Dry ☐ Dry (Fire Department-supplied only)

Does the building have: ☐ Pressure-restricting Device (PRD)? ☐ Pressure-reducing Valve (PRV)? ☐ No

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Type/Brand of PRD: \_\_\_\_\_ Type/Brand of PRV: \_\_\_\_\_

If PRV's do they contain check valves? ☐ Yes ☐ No

What is the pressure? \_\_\_\_\_ Is the PRV fireground adjustable? ☐ Yes ☐ No

On what floors do the PRVs/PRDs stop? \_\_\_\_\_

#### Fire Department Connections

Are there multiple FDCs for the building? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Where are FDCs located? \_\_\_\_\_

Are the sprinkler and standpipe connections combined or separate? \_\_\_\_\_

Are they located together/on the same side of the building? ☐ Yes ☐ No If not, how are they split? \_\_\_\_\_

Are the FDCs set up in zones for floors? ☐ Yes ☐ No How are they set up? \_\_\_\_\_

#### Utility Systems

Do you have a power company vault on the property? ☐ Yes ☐ No Company: \_\_\_\_\_

Do you have a backup generator? ☐ Yes ☐ No

What is the fuel source? ☐ Diesel ☐ Gasoline ☐ Natural Gas

Is the fuel stored on premise? ☐ Yes ☐ No Location: \_\_\_\_\_

How long can you operate on backup power? \_\_\_\_\_

Is/Are the generator(s) equipped with an electric shunt disconnect? ☐ Yes ☐ No

What is powered from the backup?

☐ HVAC ☐ Security system

☐ Elevators Which ones are? \_\_\_\_\_ Which ones are not? \_\_\_\_\_

☐ Lights Which ones are? \_\_\_\_\_ Which ones are not? \_\_\_\_\_

☐ Doors Which ones are? \_\_\_\_\_ Which ones are not? \_\_\_\_\_

☐ Fire Alarm System

What other systems are or are not powered by the backup generator? \_\_\_\_\_

Do you have a ground-level HVAC air intake? ☐ Yes ☐ No Location: \_\_\_\_\_

Is your smoke control system tied to the HVAC? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Do you have a radio repeater system? ☐ Yes ☐ No

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Who provides you with the following?

Gas: \_\_\_\_\_

Shut-off location: \_\_\_\_\_

Water: \_\_\_\_\_

Shut-off location: \_\_\_\_\_

Electric: \_\_\_\_\_

Sewer: \_\_\_\_\_

Telephone: \_\_\_\_\_

Internet: \_\_\_\_\_

### Security Information

Do you have proprietary/private security? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Are they employed by you or another company?

Company: \_\_\_\_\_

Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_

Are they uniformed or plainclothes? ☐ Uniform Number of uniform: \_\_\_\_\_

☐ Plainclothes Number of plainclothes: \_\_\_\_\_

Total number of private security personnel: \_\_\_\_\_

Is security on site 24 hours a day/7 days a week? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Are they armed? ☐ Yes ☐ No

☐ Firearm ☐ Taser ☐ OC/ Pepper Spray \_\_\_\_\_

Where is their office located on the premises? \_\_\_\_\_

Typical responsibilities: \_\_\_\_\_

Do you have plans for additional security during the event week? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Do you have security cameras? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Where can the cameras be accessed? \_\_\_\_\_

Are they recorded? ☐ Yes ☐ No How long is the retention period? \_\_\_\_\_

Can the cameras be accessed remotely outside the facility? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Does the city, county, or state have cameras mounted outside your facility? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Location: \_\_\_\_\_

Do you have a "zone map" for your fire alarm and burglar alarm system? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Do you have a "zone map" for your security cameras? ☐ Yes ☐ No

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#### Additional Information

Where is the nearest fire station? \_\_\_\_\_

What is their response time? \_\_\_\_\_

Where is the nearest Emergency Medical Services? \_\_\_\_\_

Where is the nearest acute care hospital? \_\_\_\_\_

Do you have a pool? ☐ Yes ☐ No

What pool chemicals are stored on site? \_\_\_\_\_

Are they in a secured location? \_\_\_\_\_

Do you have a chute that would typically be used for laundry or garbage? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Locations: \_\_\_\_\_

Is there any location that 24-hour staff could not access with keys on hand? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Location: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact with access: \_\_\_\_\_

Location: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact with access: \_\_\_\_\_

Estimated event-week occupancy (staff and guests):

	Weekday	Weekend
Day		
Night		

#### Elevators

*(Make additional copies of this page, as needed)*

Elevator: \_\_\_\_\_ Car number: \_\_\_\_\_ Bank Number: \_\_\_\_\_

This elevator is typically used for: ☐ Passenger ☐ Service ☐ Freight

and services floor \_\_\_\_\_ to floor \_\_\_\_\_

What Phase does this elevator have: ☐ No fire service ☐ I ☐ II and recalls to floor \_\_\_\_\_

Phase I: The key switch will be outside the car on the recall floor or in the control room.

Phase II: The key switch will always be in the elevator car.

Is this a blind shaft elevator? ☐ Yes ☐ No Blind shaft from floor \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

Elevator manufacturer: ☐ Otis ☐ ThyssenKrupp ☐ Schindler

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Connected to Network?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
Where is/are the elevator key(s) located?	_____	
-----		
Elevator:	Car number:	Bank Number:
This elevator is typically used for: <input type="checkbox"/> Passenger <input type="checkbox"/> Service <input type="checkbox"/> Freight		
and services floor _____ to floor _____		
What Phase does this elevator have: <input type="checkbox"/> I <input type="checkbox"/> II <input type="checkbox"/> No fire service and recalls to floor _____		
Phase I: The key switch will be outside the car on the recall floor or in the control room.		
Phase II: The key switch will always be in the elevator car.		
Is this a blind shaft elevator?:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No Blind shaft from floor _____ to _____
Elevator manufacturer:	<input type="checkbox"/> Otis <input type="checkbox"/> ThyssenKrupp <input type="checkbox"/> Schindler	
Connected to Network?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
Where is/are the elevator key(s) located?	_____	

## Stairwells

(Make additional copies of this page, as needed)

Stair:	_____
Label:	Location:
Floors Served:	Does this stairwell lead to the outside of the building? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Standpipes? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Is this stairwell pressurized? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Does this stairwell access the roof?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Can you <i>enter</i> the stairwell from the ground floor?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Type of Stair:	<input type="checkbox"/> Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Scissors <input type="checkbox"/> Fire Tower
-----	
Stair:	_____
Label:	Location:
Floors Served:	Does this stairwell lead to the outside of the building? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Standpipes? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Is this stairwell pressurized? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Does this stairwell access the roof?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Can you <i>enter</i> the stairwell from the ground floor?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No

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Type of Stair: <input type="checkbox"/> Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Scissors <input type="checkbox"/> Fire Tower	
-----	
Stair: _____	
Label: _____ Location: _____	
Floors Served: _____	Does this stairwell lead to the outside of the building? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Standpipes? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Is this stairwell pressurized? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Does this stairwell access the roof? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Can you <i>enter</i> the stairwell from the ground floor? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Type of Stair: <input type="checkbox"/> Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Scissors <input type="checkbox"/> Fire Tower	

## **Managing Large-Scale Security Events**

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### A.8 Incident Organization Chart Template<sup>15</sup>

**Purpose:** *The Incident Organization Chart is used to indicate what Incident Command System (ICS) organizational elements are currently activated, as well as the names of personnel staffing each element. The template below is an example of the kind of organizational chart used with the ICS. Personnel responsible for managing organizational positions would be listed in each box, as appropriate.*

**Preparation:** *The organizational chart is prepared by the logistics/resources unit and posted with other displays at the Incident Command Post. A chart is completed for each Operational Period and updated when organizational changes occur.*


**Distribution:** *When completed, the chart is posted on the display board located at the Incident Command Post.*

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<sup>15</sup> This template was modified by CNA for the original *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies*. <https://www.bja.gov/Publications/LSSE-planning-Primer.pdf>. The original ICS Organization template can be found at <https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/jobaids.htm>.

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### A.9 Organization Assignment List Template<sup>16</sup>

**Purpose:** *The Organization Assignment List provides event personnel with information on the units that are currently activated, as well as the names of personnel staffing each position or unit. It is used to complete the Incident Organization Chart (see Appendix A.8), which should be posted on the Incident Command Post display after completion.*

**Preparation:** *The list is prepared and maintained by the logistics/resources unit under the direction of the Planning Section Chief.*

**Distribution:** *The Organization Assignment List is duplicated and given to all recipients of the Operational Plan.*

**Instructions:** *An Organization Assignment List may be completed any time the number of personnel assigned to the incident increases or decreases, or when a change in assignment occurs. See the table below for further instructions related to each section of the Organization Assignment List.*

**Table A.9-1: Instructions for Organization Assignment List**

Item Number	Item Title	Instructions
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the incident.
2.	Data Prepared	Enter the date prepared (Month Day, Year).
3.	Time Prepared	Enter the time prepared (24-hour clock).
4.	Operational Period	Enter the time interval for which the assignment list applies. Record the start time and end time, and include date(s).
5. through 10.		Enter the names of personnel staffing each of the listed positions. Use at least first initial and last name. For units, indicate the Unit Leader; for divisions/groups, indicate the Division/Group Supervisor. Use an additional page if more than three Branches are activated.
	Prepared By	Enter the name of the logistics/resources unit member preparing the form. Attach the form to the Operational Plan.

<sup>16</sup> This template was modified by CNA for the original *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies*. <https://www.bja.gov/Publications/LSSE-planning-Primer.pdf>. The original ICS Organization Assignment List template is Form 203, which can be found at <https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/icsforms.htm>.

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### Organization Assignment List

1. Incident Name		Chief		
2. Date	3. Time	Deputy		
4. Operational Period		<b>a. Branch I Division/Groups</b>		
<b>Position:</b>	<b>Name:</b>	Branch Director		
<b>5. Incident Commander and Staff</b>		Deputy		
Incident Commander		Division/Group		
Deputy		Division/Group		
Safety Officer		Division/Group		
Information		Division/Group		
Liaison Officer		Division/Group		
<b>6. Agency Representative</b>		<b>b. Branch II Division/Groups</b>		
Agency	Name	Branch Director		
		Deputy		
		Division/Group		
		Division/Group		
		Division/Group		
		Division/Group		
<b>7. Planning Section</b>		Division/Group		
		<b>c. Branch III Division/Groups</b>		

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## A.10 Credentialing Checklist<sup>17</sup>

*The mission of special events credentialing is to design and produce badge identification to ensure the greatest possible level of security for personnel and property, and to enhance the ability of law enforcement personnel to control access to secure areas, facilities, and events.*

A credential identifies specific individuals who require access to a venue(s) to perform an operational role or function, whereas a ticket is issued to spectators or other members of the general public who do not perform an operational role or function. In essence, a credential is equivalent to an “Incident Badge.” A “ticket” is NOT a “credential.”

Credentialing provides sufficient information to verify the identity of the bearer and his or her level of access, and should include security features to prevent counterfeiting and assist in credential verification.

Consider the following questions:

- Who will be credentialed?
- Will credentialed personnel require police record checks?
- Who will conduct the record checks?
- What criteria will be used for various levels of access?
- Who will have the final decision on who will or will not be credentialed?
- Who will be responsible for credential production?
- Who will authorize credential production?
- What is the format for the receipt of the information necessary to produce the credential (e.g., electronic, paper)?
- Will a photograph be needed?
- Where will the credentialing center be located? (The credentialing center should be located outside of the secure zone and should be accessible to those requiring credentials.)
- Who will secure this location and provide security for personnel and equipment?
- How will the security of the credentialing database be maintained?
- How, and to whom, will credentials be distributed?

### Other Considerations

- Personnel who should receive credentials can include:
  - Security agents (U.S. Secret Service [USSS]/other U.S. Government details/foreign security);
  - Plainclothes law enforcement officers (LEOs) whose duties *require* them to be within the perimeters of the NSSE venues;

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<sup>17</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, updated 2010 (original 2005) <https://www.hsd1.org/?view&did=759939> (accessed January 26, 2017). Information from the U.S. Secret Service/Information Resources Management Division’s “Credential Distribution System Brief” was also used in the production of this checklist.

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
- Uniformed LEOs/ Public Safety personnel who will receive a non-photo credential distributed by supervisory personnel; and/or
  - Delegates, vendors, and media.
- Personnel who should not receive credentials can include:
  - Security agents/ LEOs/ Public Safety personnel who are not assigned to a National Special Security Event (NSSE) venue, such as:
    - Hotel staff;
    - Motorcade route security;
    - Maritime assets; or
    - Consequence-management personnel.
- Types of credentials include:
  - Law Enforcement and Public Safety
    - Officers and agents with routine duties within the perimeter of an event venue
  - Emergency Response
    - Public Safety personnel dedicated to respond in the event of an emergency
    - Pre-staged outside the perimeter
    - Examples: Fire Department HAZMAT, Bomb Squad, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams
  - Media
  - Vendors
- Types of vehicle placards include:
  - Official Vehicle
    - Allows vehicle through a perimeter checkpoint
  - Motorcade Vehicle
    - All vehicles in an official motorcade, regardless of agency (USSS/others)
  - Emergency Response
    - Bomb Squad, Initial Fire Department/ Emergency Medical Services response, SWAT

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### Figure A.10: USSS Credential-Distribution System

Web Application Process Diagram



## **Managing Large-Scale Security Events**

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### A.11 Considerations for Managing Crowds<sup>18</sup>

*In the planning process for a forthcoming event, organizers must have an understanding of both individual and crowd dynamics, as well as how these elements interrelate. While this is a preliminary guide to crowd control problems that organizers most frequently encounter, planners need to expand upon the particular issues for each crowd and venue. All of this information will assist in predicting potential problems that agencies can then address in the planning process.*

#### General Issues for Consideration

1. Major crowd issues that the planning process should address include:
  - *Size* – Maximum numbers permitted are often established by regulation for safety reasons.
  - *Demographics* – Consider the composition of the audience, including the age and gender mix. If you identify in advance that young children will constitute a high proportion of the audience, consider additional facilities, such as childcare, family bathrooms, and rental strollers. Audiences made up of young children or elderly people tend to require additional medical facilities, and children and the elderly are more susceptible to crush injury than teens or adults.
2. Different kinds of events may attract certain types of spectators that require special attention. Consider the following:
  - Rock concerts, in contrast to other types of concerts, may experience a higher number of incidences with drug and alcohol abuse, underage drinking, and possession of weapons.
  - Religious and “faith healing” events may attract a significant number of ill and infirm people, which may increase the need for on-site medical care.
  - Events for senior citizens may also require higher levels of health services.
  - Certain sports events may attract over-reactive and violent supporters.
  - Cultural events may require special arrangements, including the provision of interpreter services; special food services; and multilingual signposting, brochures, and announcements.
  - For outdoor concerts or events, consider:
    - Control and distribution of spectators in the field;
    - Suggested minimum space allocation of 4 to 5 square feet per person on grounds with no seats; and
    - Some form of sectoring and barrier management by security.

#### Crowd Issues

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<sup>18</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, updated 2010 (original 2005) <https://www.hsd1.org/?view&did=759939> (accessed January 26, 2017).

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#### 1. Crowds are complex social structures.

##### Crowd roles:

- Active Core: carry out action of crowd
- Cheerleaders: provide oral support for leaders
- Observers: follow actions but rarely take part

##### Significance of crowds:

- Increase the probability of a dangerous occurrence
- Increase the potential number of victims
- Make communication slower and more difficult
- Make changes in action slower and more difficult
- Diffuse responsibility (someone else will do it)

#### 2. Panics and Crazes

*Panic* in a group is the flight from a real or perceived threat from which escape appears to be the only effective response. What appears to be panic is usually the result of poor inputs (especially communications, or the lack of) and previous knowledge and experience.

*Craze* in a group is the temporary, short-lived competitive rush by a group toward some attractive object. A craze tends to occur on entering an event, and may be exacerbated by the lack of information.

#### 3. De-individualization

*De-individualization* is a loss of self-awareness and evaluation apprehension in group situations that foster anonymity. Behavior may include:

- Mild lessening of restraint (e.g., screaming during a concert);
- Impulsive self-gratification (e.g., theft, vandalism, molestation); or
- Destructive social explosions (e.g., group violence, rioting and torturing).

#### 4. Defusing

The tedium that may be created by waiting and/or by the perception that other gates are being opened first, or later arrivals are being admitted first, can create problems. The following can help defuse the situation: appropriate music, the use of humor, food and beverage services moving through the group, cheerful security staff moving through the group, and good communication that includes a public address system.

### Crowd Types

One crowd may exhibit all or part of these types; therefore, you must consider each category (as described in Table A.11-1 below), or at the least the most likely categories, in your plan.

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**Table A.11-1: Crowd Type**

Crowd Type <sup>19</sup>	Description
Ambulatory	Walking, usually calm
Disability/Limited Movement	Crowd has limited or restricted movement; requires additional planning
Cohesive/Spectator	Watching specific activity
Expressive	Emotional release (e.g., cheering movement in unison)
Participatory	Involved in actual event (e.g., community fun runs)
Aggressive/Hostile	Initially verbal, open to lawlessness
Demonstrator	Organized to some degree (e.g., pickets, marches)
Escape/Trampling	Danger may be real or imaginary
Dense/Suffocating	Reduction of physical movement
Rush/Looting	Attempt to acquire/obtain/steal something
Violent	Attacking/terrorizing

### Crowd Composition

When you understand what you are dealing with, then brief ALL personnel on what to look for and how they should respond while they are performing their duties (as described in Table A.11-2 below).

**Table A.11-2: Crowd Composition**

Assessment <sup>20</sup>	Description
Organizational structure	For example, walking to venue versus running or marching
Leadership	For example, if a crowd has no leadership and/or they are spontaneous
Cohesiveness	For example, the degree of bonding between demonstrators
Unity of purpose	For example, some demonstrators may be focused and/or others may have their own agenda (e.g., moshing or slam dancing)
Common motive for action	Note: The distinction between performing the same action (e.g., cheering) and the motive for the same action (e.g., leaving the venue)
Psychological unity	For example, crowds at benefits are typically psychologically united for good; however, demonstrators could pose problems if antagonized
Emotional intensity	Note: Much of this depends on the event and or special effects taking place
Volatility	For example, the degree to which the crowd reaches an explosive point

<sup>19</sup> Table modified from Berlonghi, Alexander E., "Understanding and Planning for Different Spectator Crowds," Engineering for Crowd Safety. Ed. R.A. Smith and J.F. Dickie. Elsevier Science Publications B.V, 993.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

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Assessment <sup>20</sup>	Description
Individual behavior	For example, the level at which individual control and responsibility are being exercised. Note: The more this is evident, the more restrained the crowd.
Group behavior	For example, the degree to which individuals are dominated by the group. Note: The more this is evident, the closer to “mob mentality.”
Degree of lawlessness	Note: The level of criminal behavior taking place.
Level of violence	Note: This can be assessed historically and/or by current observations.
Level of property damage	For example, the likelihood of property damage occurring, and where (e.g., parking area, toilets, walkways).
Likelihood of injury or death	For example, certain places at certain times (e.g., major sporting event) and at certain events (e.g., motor races) affect the likelihood of injury or death.
Need for crowd control	Note: The plan must be discussed with experts and experienced persons; the more detailed and complex the plan, the more expensive and resource-intensive the commitment.

## Other Considerations for Managing Crowds

### Entrances and Exits

#### 1. Considerations for Spectator Entry and Exit

- *Entrances* – The primary function of entrances is to provide:
  - For supervision, marshaling, and directing crowds;
  - Access for emergency services;
  - Egress and evacuation routes; and
  - Initial surveillance and inspection of attendees (i.e., magnetometers).
- Entrances should also:
  - Be clearly signposted;
  - Be in working order;
  - Be compliant with the Americans With Disabilities Act; and
  - Provide for separation of pedestrian and vehicular traffic.

#### 2. Entrance Management

Event organizers should:

- Permit flexible opening and closing times (however, advertised times are recommended);
- Stagger entry times by providing supporting activities;
- Keep entrances clear of all other activities;
- Keep lines away from entrances;

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- Ensure there are sufficient numbers of suitable barriers, fences, gates, and turnstiles;
- Locate ticket sales and pick-up points in line with (but separate from) entrances;
- Arrange to have a public address system or alternative communications system to provide information and entertainment to the crowd waiting at the entrance;
- Consider the potential need for medical and security personnel presence;
- Provide sufficient numbers of personnel who are appropriately trained;
- Ensure that control points for searches to detect prohibited items, such as alcohol, social drugs, glass, metal containers, and weapons are in place and do not affect movement;
- Provide a secure area for the storage of confiscated goods;
- Provide toilets, if lines are expected to be long; and
- Apply metering techniques, as appropriate.

#### 3. Exit Management

Event organizers should:

- Ensure that exit doors are not locked (if personnel are concerned about illegal entry, then doors could be fitted with alarms);
- Ensure that exit doors open in the direction of escape and are confirmed as operational;
- Check the placement, function, and signposting of exits;
- Ensure that doors that do not lead to an exit are so marked, preventing “dead end” entrapment and the potential for panic;
- Ensure that all exit corridors are free of all impediments to crowd movement;
- Ensure that turnstiles are freewheeling or can operate in reverse; and
- Ensure that cords, which can create trip hazards, do not cross exit corridors (if this precaution is unavoidable, the cord should be marked, insulated, and secured to the floor to prevent damage and potential electrical risks).

#### 4. Escalator Management

Event organizers should provide for:

- Staff control at the top and bottom, including an emergency stop button; and
- Meter the flow at both ends.

#### 5. Stairway/Corridor Management

Event organizers should provide for:

- Control of both ends if the crowd is large; and
- Metering that may be required for safety.

### Ticketing

Ticketing is the first means of achieving crowd control. Essential matters to address include the following:

- If advance ticketing is possible, it is preferred, as it allows organizers to anticipate audience numbers and plan accordingly. It also enables them to pass on information

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about needed services (e.g., parking, traffic patterns, first aid, water sources, toilets, and personal needs) to ticket-holders before the event.

- When multiple entrances to the venue are provided, directing spectators to arrive via specific entrances can reduce congestion.
- If it is feasible, stagger crowd arrival by specifying entry times, which reduces congestion at entrances.

### Barriers

Effective use of barriers can prevent many problems, including congestion in thoroughfares and walkways. Questions that you should consider in the planning phase include the following:

- What types of barriers are required? Is a solid physical barrier required, or would a psychological barrier, such as barrier tape, suffice? The use of psychological barriers is suitable only for orderly crowds. Any physical barrier must be able to withstand crowd surges.
- How will personnel respond if the barrier is breached?
- Can barriers be used to section the crowd and create passages for emergency personnel to evacuate ill or injured spectators?
- Will barriers be used to create a “pit” between the crowd and the stage, which can be used to facilitate the evacuation of injured spectators?
- Can barriers be easily dismantled by the crowd and used for other purposes?

There are physical structures designed for use in areas of egress that, in the event of an emergency where evacuation is required, collapse to allow for the maximum pass-through.

### Defusing Crowd Tension

The tedium that is created by an extended wait in line for tickets or admission can be a precursor for crowd control problems. Such boredom can create or magnify tempers, particularly if, with little distraction, those in line perceive other doors being opened first or other patrons getting in at the head of the line.

The following means of defusing anger have been used with success in different venues:

- Up-tempo music (of a type consistent with the age group of the crowd) played over the public address system
- A humorous, animal-costumed individual, such as a mascot, walking up and down the line giving handshakes, pats, and waves
- A large inflated beach ball, which is lobbed back and forth over (and by) the spectators
- Food and beverage sellers moving through the group
- Cheerful security staff passing up and down the line, talking to people, and communicating event information (e.g., wait times or directions)

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Introducing some of these same distractions inside an event can calm a potentially agitated crowd. For example, a mascot conducting a spectator sing-along to up-tempo music or a ticket or program number draw on the field for the last ball used at a sporting event can alleviate tension in a crowd.

Whenever possible, spectators should be informed before an event of any special conditions or arrangements for the event, such as parking, clothing, food and drink, sunscreen, shelter, and alcohol restrictions. Notice of special conditions or arrangements may be distributed via advertisements or in leaflets accompanying tickets.

Outdoor events, sometimes spread over large areas, can require further considerations, such as:

- Toilet facilities located outside gates and between disembarkation points and the venue;
- Shelter; and
- Telephone facilities.

The venue should allow sufficient regulation of crowd movement, such as adequate exiting from ticketed seating areas and sectoring and flow barriers, including barriers to separate vehicles from pedestrians.

Spectator overflow areas should be available to prevent crushing. Contingency plans are required in case spectator turnout significantly exceeds expectations. This phenomenon is common at rock concerts. This may be more of an issue for outside venues, as life safety codes for inside venues may help address maximum crowd attendance.

### Restricted-viewing Locations

Clear lines of vision for spectators are important to reduce the likelihood that crowds will move to get a better view of the stage. Also, a wide angle of view helps to reduce crowd densities in front of the stage. If restricted viewing is unavoidable, tickets for spectators in those sections should note this fact.

### A.12 Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Special Event Funding Guidance

*This document is intended to provide general guidance for use of federal funds that have been appropriated to support extraordinary law enforcement and related security costs for an event, including those designated as National Special Security Events (NSSEs). This information is intended to help guide planning efforts and may not be all-inclusive for all scenarios.*

#### Pre-event Planning:

- **Pre-Appropriation questions and concerns.** Federal agency program and budget staff can assist with general programmatic or financial questions, but cannot provide any official guidance or approval prior to the appropriation of funds. Funds may only be expended from the time of appropriation; any expenditure prior to this timeframe may not be reimbursable.
- **Develop a detailed budget early.** The budget review process can be lengthy and may involve multiple communications among BJA, the OJP Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO), and the applicant in order to clarify costs. Be prepared to provide cost breakdowns and a narrative justification for all requested items.
- **Establish partnerships.** Grantees should develop working groups with relevant mutual aid partners and other planning entities as soon as notification of the event occurs. Partners may include entities from the state (such as State Administrative Agencies or emergency management agencies) or the military (such as state National Guard forces).

The coordinating agency must have an open and transparent process in place to ensure that all mutual assistance agencies receive reimbursement for security costs related to the event security plan.

- **Leverage funding.** Explore other funding sources that can also be used to support event expenses.
- **Involve agency personnel with grants management experience.** Grantees should consider involving agency staff with grants management experience, if those staff exist and are available, to handle the day-to-day grants management activities.
- **Financial Training** – Have key grants management complete DOJ Grants Financial Training either on-line or in-person.

#### Application Period:

- **Submit an application as soon as possible.** An agency will have up to 30 days to submit an application through the online Grants Management System (GMS). The sooner an application is submitted, the sooner BJA can begin the review process.
- **Prepare written requests for waivers.** Some costs require waivers, which will be identified in the application guidance and/or DOJ Grants Financial Guide; all requests for waivers must be submitted with the application in GMS. These waivers must address all issues at hand (i.e., food and beverage, lodging costs, specialized vehicles, etc.) and approval is at the discretion of the BJA Director. Examples of items requiring waivers may include SUVs, mobile command posts, armored response



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- vehicles, boats, aircraft, and any other types of vehicles outside of police cruisers, police boats, and police helicopters. Jurisdictions will also need to provide justification as to why any specialized equipment cannot be borrowed from another jurisdiction and must be purchased separately. As well, these documents must include a justification for why the equipment must be purchased rather than provided through a rental agreement.
- **Establish a list of partners to be reimbursed through the grant.** This process should include neighboring jurisdictions, mutual aid partners, state entities, private sector, or non-profit partners as applicable. Use a fair and transparent process when determining those entities to be considered for payment under the grant.
  - **Minimization of Conference Costs.** The Office of Justice Programs (OJP) has established guidance on the use of funds for conference-related costs ([www.ojp.gov/funding/confcost.htm](http://www.ojp.gov/funding/confcost.htm)). As many of these costs must be pre-approved, plan ahead for all conference and training activities that may be needed for the event.

### Award Period:

- **Office of the Inspector General (OIG) training.** Consider inviting OIG staff to conduct fraud, waste, and abuse training prior to the event.
- **DOJ Grants Financial Guide.** Refer to the DOJ Grants Financial Guide early and often for guidance on draw-downs, contracts, travel and associated financial issues. (The DOJ Grants Financial Guide can be found on the OJP website at: <https://ojp.gov/financialguide/DOJ/index.htm>.)
- **Operational Security Plan (unclassified version) and law enforcement agency list.** Provide an Operational Security Plan and list all state, local, tribal, or private security agencies that may provide officers for the event.
- **Supplanting/Mutual Aid Funding Plans.** Fully explore other non-federal funding streams to ensure that federal funds are being used to supplement, and not supplant, available state, local or other sources and obtain required Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). Develop and implement written mutual aid agreements with all law enforcement and public safety partners specific to the event and ensure grant funds to all authorized mutual aid partners are disbursed in a timely manner.
- **Additional Reporting.** In addition to other required reporting forms, plan to submit monthly expenditure and progress reports to BJA.
- **Reimbursement procedures.** Special circumstances sometimes exist in which grant funds may not be accessible immediately and will only be provided on a reimbursement basis for a certain time period. When this is the case, grantees must adhere to cash-on-hand guidance in the DOJ Grants Financial Guide and plan accordingly.
- **Procurement.** Make plans to streamline your processes given the timeline and volume of required procurements. Fully understand Federal procurement regulations and how they work together with local guidelines. Ensure that adequate time is provided for all procurement actions including any non-competitive (sole source) requests.

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#### Closing the Award:

- **Site Visits and Audits.** Maintain and keep readily available thorough documentation, as site visits and/or audits will likely occur.
- **Memorandum of Understanding.** Ensure all grant related MOUs are collected and kept on file for future requests by BJA or audits.
- **Closeout requirements.** Grantees should plan to follow the existing closeout procedures identified in the current DOJ Grants Financial Guide, including the use of the liquidation period to finalize expenditures and prepare a written closeout plan and timeline.

#### **SAMPLE TIMELINE (Appropriation passage through award closure)**

*\*The Office of Justice Programs “Grant Application Review Process” can be viewed online (<https://ojp.gov/funding/Apply/GrantProcess.htm>); a flow chart graphic outlining the review process is also included in the Appendix. This sample timeline uses BJA as an example of one federal agency’s funding process. The timeline is subject to change.*

- **Appropriation Passage:** An appropriation is passed (varies by fiscal year), approving funds for the event (i.e. Presidential Nominating Conventions).
- **BJA Funding Announcement:** Within 60-90 days of the authorization of funds (approved appropriation) BJA finalizes application guidance and the local agency is invited, via email, to apply for funding.
- **Grantee Application Submission:** Within 30 days of the funding announcement, application(s) are submitted to BJA, by the eligible applicant(s), via GMS.
- **BJA Initial Application Review:** Within 10 business days of application receipt, BJA completes a cursory review of the application and either sends the application back to the grantee with requested changes or moves the application forward in GMS and requests a budget review.
- **Budget Review:** Within 10 business days of notification from BJA that the budget is ready for review, the financial office completes a thorough budget review and issues a budget clearance that moves the application forward to the award processing stage. Based upon the type of budget clearance issues, the applicant may be required to submit additional information before receiving a final approval of the budget, also called a Final Financial Clearance. Receiving a final approved budget can take up to one month.
- **BJA Award Process:** Within 10 business days of receiving a Final Financial Clearance the award begins to move through other OJP components. As part of the award process, BJA completes a final review of the entire application.
- **OJP Award Process:** All awards must be approved by all other OJP components including the Office of General Counsel (OGC), Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO), Office of the Assistant Attorney General (OAAG), and Office of Communications (OCOM). *In some circumstances, (for example a large-scale, high-profile event) BJA and OJP components will work to expedite the grant award as quickly as possible. In these situations, the BJA and OJP award processes can be shortened by several days.*

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- **OJP Award Notification:** Once all OJP components have approved the award package, OCOM issues formal award notification and the applicant receives email notification that it has 45 days to accept the award at which time the grantee may begin to obligate and expend grant funds.

### A.13 Financial Provisions and Policies<sup>21</sup>

*This guide includes references to the provisions and policies that are issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which is the largest division of the Executive Office of the President. OMB is responsible for implementing and enforcing the President's policies across the entire federal government. These policies are detailed in OMB circulars and the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) and are identified as government-wide common rules applicable to grants and cooperative agreement. In concurrence with the OMB policies applicable across all federal agencies, each federal agency also has supplemental policies described in the CFR that are applicable to grants and cooperative agreements.*

**Table A.12-1: Office of Management and Budget Circulars/Code of Federal Regulations**

Where can I find...	If I am part of a(n)...	Resources from:	
		OMB	U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
Administrative Requirements	Educational Institution	Title 2 CFR, Part 215 (OMB A-110) <sup>22</sup>	Title 28 CFR 70 <sup>23</sup>
	State or Local Unit of Government or Tribal Organization	OMB A-102 Replaced by Uniform Administrative Requirements, also known as “common rule”	Title 28 CFR 66 <sup>24</sup>
	Nonprofit Organization	Title 2 CFR, Part 215 (OMB A-110) <sup>25</sup>	Title 28 CFR 70 <sup>26</sup>
Cost Principles	Educational Institution	Title 2 CFR, Part 220 (OMB A-21) <sup>27</sup>	U.S. DOJ Administrative Requirements Reference Cost Principles in 28 CFR 66.22 and 28 CFR 70.27
	State or Local Unit of Government or Tribal Organization	Title 2 CFR, Part 225 (OMB A-87) <sup>28</sup>	

<sup>21</sup> U.S. Department of Justice/ Office of Justice Programs Office of the Chief Financial Officer, *2015 DOJ Grants Financial Guide* <https://ojp.gov/financialguide/DOJ/index.htm> (accessed January 26, 2017).

<sup>22</sup> Title 2 CFR, Part 215 (OMB A-110) can be found online at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title2-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-title2-vol1-part215.pdf>.

<sup>23</sup> Title 28 CFR 70 can be found online at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title28-vol2/pdf/CFR-2010-title28-vol2-part70.pdf>.

<sup>24</sup> Title 28 CFR 66 can be found online at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title28-vol2/pdf/CFR-2010-title28-vol2-part66.pdf>.

<sup>25</sup> Title 2 CFR, Part 215 (OMB A-110) can be found online at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title2-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-title2-vol1-part215.pdf>.

<sup>26</sup> Title 28 CFR 70 can be found online at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title28-vol2/pdf/CFR-2010-title28-vol2-part70.pdf>.

<sup>27</sup> Title 2 CFR, Part 220 (OMB A-21) can be found online at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title2-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-title2-vol1-part220.pdf>.

<sup>28</sup> Title 2 CFR, Part 225 (OMB A-87) can be found online at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title2-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-title2-vol1-part225.pdf>.

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Where can I find...	If I am part of a(n)...	Resources from:	
		OMB	U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
	Nonprofit Organization	Title 2 CFR, Part 230 (OMB A-122) <sup>29</sup>	
Audit Requirements	Educational Institution	OMB A-133 <sup>30</sup>	U.S. DOJ Administrative Requirements Reference Cost Principles in 28 CFR 66.26 and 28 CFR 70.26
	State or Local Unit of Government or Tribal Organization		
	Nonprofit Organization		

### Government-Wide Common Rules

The uniform administrative requirements for grants and cooperative agreements to state and local units of government (also known as “Grants Management Common Rule for State and Local Units of Government”) for the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) are codified at Title 28 CFR Part 66.<sup>31</sup> The uniform administrative requirements for grants and cooperative agreements with institutions of higher education, hospitals, and other nonprofit organizations for DOJ are codified at Title 28 CFR Part 70.<sup>32</sup>

Additional government-wide requirements:

- Government-wide Debarment and Suspension (Non-procurement) is codified at Title 2 CFR Part 180, with DOJ-specific rules at Title 2 CFR Part 2867.
- Government-wide requirements for drug-free workplace (grants) rules are codified at Title 28 CFR Part 83.<sup>33</sup>
- Restrictions on lobbying are codified at Title 28 CFR Part 69.<sup>34</sup>

For additional information on grants management and to obtain copies of current circulars, please visit the OMB website at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars\\_default](http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_default). The most recently updated version of the CFR can be found on the U.S. Government Printing Office’s website at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collectionCfr.action?collectionCode=CFR>.

### Office of the Inspector General Fraud Hotline

<sup>29</sup> Title 2 CFR, Part 230 (OMB A-122) can be found online at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title2-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-title2-vol1-part230.pdf>.

<sup>30</sup> OMB A-133 can be found online at: [http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a133/a133\\_revised\\_2007.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a133/a133_revised_2007.pdf).

<sup>31</sup> Title 28 CFR Part 66 can be found online at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title28-vol2/pdf/CFR-2010-title28-vol2-part66.pdf>.

<sup>32</sup> Title 28 CFR Part 70 can be found online at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title28-vol2/pdf/CFR-2010-title28-vol2-part70.pdf>.

<sup>33</sup> Title 28 CFR Part 83 can be found online at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title28-vol2/pdf/CFR-2010-title28-vol2-part83.pdf>.

<sup>34</sup> Title 28 CFR Part 69 can be found online at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title28-vol2/pdf/CFR-2010-title28-vol2-part69.pdf>.

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Grantees should report any allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse of grant funds to the Customer Service Branch (CSB) of the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) via email to [ask.ocfo@usdoj.gov](mailto:ask.ocfo@usdoj.gov). In addition to or instead of reporting allegations to the OCFO CSB, you may report them to the DOJ Office of the Inspector General online at <https://oig.justice.gov/hotline/> or by calling the fraud hotline at 1-800-869-4499.

### Other Available Resources

- The OJP procurement guide: “Procurement Procedures for Recipients of DOJ Grants” found online at: [http://www.ojp.gov/financialguide/PDFs/New%20Procurement%20Guide\\_508complaint.pdf](http://www.ojp.gov/financialguide/PDFs/New%20Procurement%20Guide_508complaint.pdf)
- Post-award Instructions for OCFO grant recipients and sub-recipients found online at: <https://ojp.gov/funding/Implement/Resources/PostAwardInstructions.pdf>
- Federal government regulation information, which is accessible at: <http://www.regulations.gov>
- Grant information related to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which is available at: <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/recovery/>
- Grants Management System (GMS) Training and Technical Assistance, which can be found at: <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/training/gmstraining.htm>
- The GMS HelpDesk, which is available via email at: [GMSHelpdesk@ojp.usdoj.gov](mailto:GMSHelpdesk@ojp.usdoj.gov) or by phone at 202-514-2024
- The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act, which is available at <https://www.fsrs.gov>

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### **A.14 Post-award Requirements: Grant Fraud, Waste, and Abuse<sup>35</sup>**

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) awards federal grant funds to recipients and sub-recipients for specific purposes and requires them to use the funds within established guidelines. Unfortunately, some recipients and sub-recipients have misused award funds in multiple ways, ranging from award mismanagement to intentional criminal fraud. With this chapter, we aim to help you avoid misuse of award funds and the resulting penalties.

#### **Detection of Grant Fraud**

You are encouraged to:

- Be aware of common grant fraud schemes. This knowledge is the best way to reduce or even eliminate the risk of fraud.
- Adopt effective fraud risk-management efforts within your organization, and encourage other recipients or sub-recipients of your award to do the same in order to prevent and detect fraud as early as possible.

#### **Penalties of Grant Fraud**

If you are found guilty of grant fraud, you may be subject to any or all of the following:

- A ban from receiving future funding;
- Administrative recoveries of funds;
- Civil lawsuits and criminal prosecution; and
- A combination of all or some of these remedies.

#### **Fraud Indicators**

The indicators or markers of fraud, waste, and/or misuse of award funds are varied and can be due to a range of causes. Follow-up on all such concerns is important.

#### **Common Grant Fraud Schemes**

Most misuse of funds falls into one or more of three general categories:

- Conflicts of Interest
- Failure to Properly Support the Use of Award Funds
- Theft

We will examine each of these categories in the sections that follow.

#### **Conflicts of Interest**

You are required to use federal funds in the best interest of your award program. Your decisions related to these funds must be free of hidden personal or organizational conflicts of interest, both in advice and in appearance.

- **Advice.** In the use of award funds (direct or indirect), a recipient or sub-recipient should not participate in any decisions, approval, disapproval, recommendations, investigation decisions, or any other proceeding concerning any of the following people or groups:

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<sup>35</sup> DOJ/Office of Justice Programs. Office of the Chief Financial Officer, *2011 Financial Guide*.



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- An immediate family member;
  - A partner;
  - An organization in which they are serving as an officer, director, trustee, partner, or employee;
  - Any person or organization with whom they are negotiating or who has an arrangement concerning prospective employment, has a financial interest, or for other reasons can have less than an unbiased transaction with the recipient or sub-recipient.
- **Appearance.** In the use of award funds, you and your sub-recipients should avoid any action which might result in, or create the appearance of:
  - Using your official position for private gain;
  - Giving special treatment to any person;
  - Losing complete independence or objectivity;
  - Making an official decision outside official channels; or
  - Affecting negatively the confidence of the public in the integrity of the government or the program.

Typical conflict-of-interest issues include:

- Less-than-arm's-length transactions—the act of purchasing goods or services or hiring an individual from a related party, such as a family member or a business associated with an employee of the recipient.
- Not using fair and transparent processes for sub-recipient decisions and vendor selection. These processes must be free of undue influence, and fair and transparent. Most procurement requires full and open competition.
- Consultants can play an important role in award programs; however, as a recipient or sub-recipient, you must ensure that their work for you conforms to all regulations governing a fair consultant selection process, reasonable pay rates, and specific verifiable work product.

**Table A.14-1: Fraud Case Example #1**

Background	Possible Fraud Indicators	Scheme Identified	Result
Individual was assigned to purchase equipment using a federal award	Circumvention of the established procurement process; vendor complaints	Individual stole over \$100,000 by directing contracts to bogus companies that he had established	240-month prison sentence

#### Failure to Properly Support the Use of Award Funds

A federal award agreement is a legally binding contract. As a direct recipient or a sub-recipient, it obligates you to:

- Use your award as outlined in the agreement;
- Act with integrity when applying for and reporting your actual use of funds; and
- Properly track the use of funds and maintain adequate supporting documentation.

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If you or your sub-recipient fails to comply with the terms and conditions of an award, including civil rights requirements, whether stated in a federal law, regulation, assurance, application, or notice of award, the awarding agency may take one or more of the following actions against you or your sub-recipient:

- Temporarily freeze payments of the award
- Disallow federal and matching funds for all or part of the award
- Wholly or partly suspend or terminate the current award
- Withhold further awards
- Take any other remedies legally available

Typical issues involving failure to properly support the use of award funds include:

- Deliberate redirection of the use of funds in a manner different from the purpose outlined in the award agreement;
- Failure to adequately account for, track, or support transactions, such as personnel costs, contracts, indirect cost rates, matching funds, program income, or other sources of revenue.

**Table A.14-2: Fraud Case Example #2**

Background	Possible Fraud Indicators	Result
Recipient received a federal award for specific purposes	An inability to provide sufficient and verifiable supporting documentation concerning the actual use of those funds	Recipient paid the federal government over \$300,000 to settle civil fraud allegations

### Theft

Theft is the most common issue in almost all organizations—including those that receive federal awards. You are encouraged to keep the following in mind:

- People who embezzle funds can be extremely creative, while often appearing very trustworthy. These abilities are precisely why they can do so much damage to an organization and remain undetected for extended periods of time.
- Poor or no internal controls provide an opening for theft. A lack of proper separation of duties is one of the most common weaknesses.

**Table A.14-3: Fraud Case Example #3**

Background	Possible Fraud Indicators	Scheme Identified	Result
Nonprofit received \$2.7 million in federal award funds to assist underprivileged children	Unsuccessful program, lack of internal controls, unexplained income	Funds had been diverted to pay for a wedding reception, building construction, plasma TV, and personal credit card bills, with an	36- and 66-month prison sentences and full restitution

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		estimated total loss of \$450,000	
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### Ways to Reduce the Risk of Fraud

There are several things that you can do to reduce or even eliminate the risk of fraudulent use of your federal award:

- Examine your operations and internal controls to identify your fraud vulnerabilities.
- Implement specific fraud-prevention strategies, including educating others about the risks. The more people are aware of the issues, the more they can help prevent problems or detect them as early as possible.
- Maintain a well-designed and -tested system of internal controls.
- Ensure all financial or other certifications and progress reports are adequately supported with appropriate documentation and evidence.
- Identify any potential conflict-of-interest issues and disclose them to the awarding agency for specific guidance and advice.
- Follow a fair and transparent procurement process, especially when using consultants. Ensure that the rate of pay is reasonable and justifiable, and that the work product is well-defined and documented.

Contact the DOJ Office of the Inspector General at

<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/home/contactus.htm> for more information.

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### A.15 Emergency Medical Services Venue Assessment Checklist<sup>36</sup>

*Use this checklist when identifying the level of emergency services needed.*

**Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Name of Venue:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Address:** \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

#### **Event Type**

Hazards: \_\_\_\_\_

Vulnerabilities: \_\_\_\_\_

#### **Environment**

Indoor/Outdoor: \_\_\_\_\_

Climate: \_\_\_\_\_

Numbers: \_\_\_\_\_

Alcohol/Drugs: \_\_\_\_\_

#### **Demographics of Spectators and Participants**

Age: \_\_\_\_\_

Mobility: \_\_\_\_\_

Numbers: \_\_\_\_\_

Attitude: \_\_\_\_\_

VIPs: \_\_\_\_\_

#### **Transportation**

Access/Egress: \_\_\_\_\_

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Compliance: \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>36</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security/ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Special Events Contingency Planning: Job Aids Manual*, updated 2010 (original 2005)  
<https://www.hsd1.org/?view&did=759939> (accessed January 26, 2017).

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Internal/External: \_\_\_\_\_

### Facility

Visibility/Lighting: \_\_\_\_\_

Fixed or Festival Seating: \_\_\_\_\_

Layout: \_\_\_\_\_

ADA Compliance: \_\_\_\_\_

### Communications

Internal: \_\_\_\_\_

External: \_\_\_\_\_

### Aid Station on site

Yes\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_

Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Staffed for the event?

Yes\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_

### Mobile teams to be used

Yes\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_

Foot: Yes\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_ Number:\_\_\_\_\_

Bike: Yes\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_ Number:\_\_\_\_\_

Carts: Yes\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_ Number:\_\_\_\_\_

Other: Yes\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_ Number:\_\_\_\_\_

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### A.16 Intelligence/Counter Surveillance Planning and Operations Checklist<sup>37</sup>

Use this checklist to ensure that the IOC is adequately established and meets the needs of all the key stakeholders.

Task	Task Completion
1. Coordinate the Intelligence Operations Center (IOC) process with all related supporting agencies. This includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>— <i>Establishing clear standard operating procedures and division of responsibility between the agencies involved.</i></li></ul>	___Yes ___No
2. Key stakeholders in the area of responsibility are actively represented in the IOC process. This includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>— <i>Assigning liaison personnel to the IOC from all key departments, agencies, and organizations in the jurisdiction, either on a full or part time basis; and</i></li><li>— <i>Ensuring that diverse subject matter expertise is present in the IOC.</i></li></ul>	___Yes ___No
3. Security measures are in place for the facility and meet all relevant standards and regulations. This includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>— <i>Developing, publishing, and enforcing a security plan; and</i></li><li>— <i>Ensuring that personnel are familiar with the facilities security protocols.</i></li></ul>	___Yes ___No
4. Security measures are in place for data and personnel, and meet all relevant standards and regulations. This includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>— <i>Ensuring that the IOC meets all physical and clearance requirements to receive, store, and control secret/secure information; and</i></li><li>— <i>Ensuring that key decision-makers and relevant personnel have appropriate security clearances.</i></li></ul>	___Yes ___No
5. The IOC maintains technical and procedural connectivity with intelligence/information sources at all levels of classification, using appropriate technological redundancy. This includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>— <i>Ensuring that the center has electronic access to relevant networks, classified and unclassified;</i></li><li>— <i>Ensuring that connectivity is sustained and readily available; and</i></li><li>— <i>Establishing simple access to and from the IOC for those responsible for gathering information.</i></li></ul>	___Yes ___No
6. Personnel demonstrate ability to receive, extract, or collect information from all available sources, including all relevant databases and systems, on a continuous basis. This includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>— <i>Familiarizing personnel with the use of relevant systems and databases;</i></li></ul>	___Yes ___No

<sup>37</sup> This checklist was modified by CNA for the original *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies*. <https://www.bja.gov/Publications/LSSE-planning-Primer.pdf>.

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Task	Task Completion
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>— <i>Ensuring that personnel use appropriate systems and databases for a given scenario/investigation; and</i></li><li>— <i>Recording the volume of use of these networks.</i></li></ul>	
7. Analysts are able to blend, reconcile, and deconflict data, information, and intelligence received from multiple sources and are able to identify patterns and trends that may indicate an emerging, immediate, or long-term threat condition.	___Yes ___No
8. Analysts use any and all relevant and useful analytic tools and software that provide a more comprehensive and useful product.	___Yes ___No
9. Personnel produce briefings, reports, and/or alerts that provide clear, credible, and detailed information on actions or activities that may be indicative of an emerging threat.	___Yes ___No
10. Tear-line formats are appropriately used, and unclassified products are developed to ensure that state, local, and/or tribal officials with varying levels of clearance have access to useful information.	___Yes ___No
11. The IOC uses standard terminology/lexicon to eliminate agency-to-agency terminology confusion.	___Yes ___No
12. Products are adequately vetted and reviewed prior to distribution.	___Yes ___No

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#### A.17 Incident Radio Communications Plan Form<sup>38</sup>

**Purpose:** *The Incident Radio Communications Plan Form provides information on all radio frequency assignments in one location for each operational period. Information from the Incident Radio Communications Plan on frequency assignments is normally placed on the appropriate radio assignment list.*

**Preparation:** *The Incident Radio Communications Plan is prepared by the Communications Unit Leader and given to the Planning Section Chief.*

**Distribution:** *The Incident Radio Communications Plan is duplicated and given to all recipients of the Operational Plan, including the Incident Communications Center. Planners should include information from this communication plan in the Organization Assignment Lists (see Appendix A.9).*

**Instructions:** *See the table below for instructions related to each section of the Incident Radio Communications Plan.*

**Table A.17-1: Instructions for Completing the Incident Radio Communications Plan**

Item Number	Item Title	Instructions
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the incident.
2.	Date/Time Prepared	Enter date (Month Day, Year) and the time prepared (24-hour clock).
3.	Operational Period Date/Time	Enter the date and time interval for which the Incident Radio Communications Plan applies. Record the start time and end time, and include date(s).
4.	Basic Radio Channel Utilization System/Cache	Enter the radio cache system(s) assigned and used for the incident (e.g., Boise Cache, FIREMARS, Region 5, Emergency Cache).
	Channel	Enter the radio channel numbers assigned.
	Function	Enter the function each channel number is assigned (i.e., command, support, division, tactical, and ground-to-air.)
	Frequency	Enter the radio frequency tone

<sup>38</sup> This template was modified by CNA for the original *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies*. <https://www.bja.gov/Publications/LSSE-planning-Primer.pdf>. The original ICS Organization Assignment List template is Form 205, which can be found at <https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/icsforms.htm>.



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Item Number	Item Title	Instructions
		number assigned to each specified function (e.g., 153.400).
	Assignment	Enter the Incident Command System organization assigned to each of the designated frequencies (e.g., Branch I, Division A).
	Remarks	Include narrative information regarding special situations.
5.	Prepared By	Enter the names of the Communications Unit Leader preparing the form.

### Incident Radio and Communications Plan Form

<b>Incident Radio and Communications Plan</b>		<b>1. Incident Name:</b>		<b>2. Date/Time Prepared:</b>	<b>3. Operational Period Date/Time:</b>
<b>4. Basic Radio Channel Utilization</b>					
<b>System/Cache</b>	<b>Channel</b>	<b>Function</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Assignment</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
<b>Prepared By:</b>					

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### A.18 Legal Affairs Checklist<sup>39</sup>

*Use this checklist in determining the level of involvement and role of the legal affairs group. This checklist will allow planners to identify and prepare for the various aspects of the event that might present legal issues.*

- ☐ Liability for injuries
- ☐ Liability for actions or omissions
- ☐ Liability for impact on normal emergency operations
- ☐ Liability for other financial obligations incurred in responding to major emergencies occasioned by the event
- ☐ Permit for parades
- ☐ Permit for the sale and consumption of alcohol and food items
- ☐ Permit for pyrotechnics
- ☐ Permit for road and street closures
- ☐ Permit for the mass gathering
- ☐ Inspection for fire safety
- ☐ Inspection for public health
- ☐ Fee structures and charges for the services provided by local and state authorities
- ☐ Fee structures and charges for the “User Pays” policy for the services provided at some sporting and entertainment events
- ☐ Bonds or liability insurance for costs of responding to any emergencies related to the event
- ☐ Bonds or liability for venue cleanup
- ☐ Bonds or liability for traffic/crowd control
- ☐ Bonds or liability for additional policing functions

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<sup>39</sup> Domestic Preparedness.com. *Pre-event Planning Checklist*, 2012.  
[https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/site/assets/files/6985/preevent\\_checklist.pdf](https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/site/assets/files/6985/preevent_checklist.pdf) (accessed January 30, 2017).

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### A.19 2012 Convention Event Ordinances

The temporary “Event Zone” ordinance passed by the City of Tampa for the 2012 Republican National Convention can be found at:

<http://www.remappingdebate.org/sites/default/files/Tampa%20RNC%20Ordinance.pdf>.

The following is the extraordinary event ordinance passed prior to the 2012 Democratic Convention.

January 23, 2012  
Ordinance Book 57, Page 501

ORDINANCE NO. 4814

#### AMENDING CHAPTER 15

#### **AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER 15 OF THE CHARLOTTE CITY CODE ENTITLED “CHAPTER 15 – OFFENSES AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS”**

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**WHEREAS**, the City of Charlotte has a significant governmental interest in protecting the health, safety and welfare of the general public and preserving the public order; and

**WHEREAS**, G.S.160A-174 allows a city by ordinance to define, prohibit, regulate, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions, detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of the public; and

**WHEREAS**, the City has a significant governmental interest in maintaining the aesthetics, cleanliness and proper sanitation of city property; and

**WHEREAS**, the City has a significant governmental interest in maintaining the safety of persons who use city property; and

**WHEREAS**, the City has a significant governmental interest in reducing the risk of liability arising from the use of city property.

**BE IT ORDAINED** by the City Council of the City of Charlotte, North Carolina, that:

Section 1. Chapter 15 of the City Code is amended by adding a new Article XIV to read as follows:

#### **“Article XIV. Extraordinary Events**

##### **Sec. 15-310. Definitions.**

The following words, terms and phrases, when used in the section, shall have the meanings ascribed to them in this subsection, except where the context clearly indicates a different meaning:

*Extraordinary event* means a large-scale special event of national or international significance and/or an event expected to attract a significant number of people to a certain portion of the City.

##### **Sec. 15-311. Declaration of extraordinary event.**

The City Manager may declare an extraordinary event, fix the location or boundaries of the extraordinary event, and establish the period of time of the extraordinary event.

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## A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

January 23, 2012  
Ordinance Book 57, Page 502

### **Sec. 15-312. Permits.**

Upon declaration of an extraordinary event, the city manager, or designee(s), may: (i) identify those permits for which a large number of applications are expected for activities that will take place during the extraordinary event; (ii) set deadlines for submittal of applications for the various permits so identified, which deadlines may deviate from those specified elsewhere in this code; and (iii) establish and administer a fair and content-neutral process for issuing permits when multiple applications are submitted for the same period of time and/or location.

### **Sec. 15-313. Regulations.**

(a) During the period of time and within the boundaries of an extraordinary event, it shall be unlawful for any person, other than governmental employees in the performance of their duties to push, pull or transport any, vehicle, cart, or float, unless a permit specifically authorizes the use of that item(s).

(b) During the period of time and within the boundaries of an extraordinary event, it shall be unlawful for any person, other than governmental employees in the performance of their duties, to throw any item unless a permit specifically authorizing such throwing.

(c) During the period of time and within the boundaries of an extraordinary event, it shall be unlawful for any person, other than governmental employees in the performance of their duties, to willfully or intentionally possess, carry, control or have immediate access to any of the following:

- (1) A bar, chain, shaft, staff, cable, wire, lumber, or plastic pipe capable of inflicting serious injury to a person if thrown at or struck upon another, except as permitted by City Code Sec. 19-303(d);
- (2) A container or object of sufficient weight that may be used as a projectile, or that contains objects that may be used as a projectile, that could inflict serious injury to a person or damage to property;
- (3) An aerosol container, spray gun or soaker device;
- (4) A paint gun, etching materials, spray paint container, liquid paint or marker containing a fluid that is not water soluble;
- (5) A backpack, duffle bag, satchel, cooler or other item carried with the intent to conceal weapons or other prohibited items;
- (6) A glass or breakable container capable of being filled with a flammable or dangerous substance carried with the intent to inflict serious injury to a person or damage to property;
- (7) A sharp or bladed objects such as a box cutter, utility knife, ice pick, axe, or any other object defined in City Code Sec. 15-14;
- (8) A hammer or crow bar;
- (9) Pepper spray, mace or any other irritant carried with the intent to delay, obstruct or resist the lawful orders of a law enforcement officer;
- (10) Body armor, shield, helmet, protective pads, or gas masks carried or worn with the intent to delay, obstruct or resist the lawful orders of a law enforcement officer;

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January 23, 2012  
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- (11) A mask or scarf worn with the intent to hide one's identity while committing a crime;
  - (12) A police scanner;
  - (13) Rocks, bottles, objects, bricks or pieces thereof that are of sufficient weight or design as to cause serious injury to a person if thrown at or struck upon another;
  - (14) A device used to shoot, hurl or project a missile of any description capable of inflicting serious injury to a person;
  - (15) A "sock" or "pocket" containing material of sufficient weight as to cause serious injury to a person if thrown at or struck upon another;
  - (16) Fireworks, smoke bombs, sparklers, and stink-bombs;
  - (17) An animal unless specifically allowed under the terms of a permit issued in City Code Sec. 19-313 or is a service animal used to assist a person with a disability.
- (d) The following factors shall be a defense to prosecution for a violation of subsection (c):
- (1) The defendant was engaged in, or on the way to or from, an activity in which he or she legitimately used the device or object; and
  - (2) The defendant possessed that object for that legitimate use; and
  - (3) The defendant did not use or attempt to use the object as a weapon or to injure another person or damage property."

Section 2. This ordinance shall become effective at 12:01 a.m. on January 30, 2012.

Approved as to form

  
City Attorney

#### CERTIFICATION

I, Stephanie C. Kelly, City Clerk of the City of Charlotte, North Carolina, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and exact copy of an Ordinance adopted by the City Council of the city of Charlotte, North Carolina, in regular session convened on the 23<sup>rd</sup> day of January, 2012 the reference having been made in Minute Book 132, and recorded in full in Ordinance Book 57, Pages (501-503).

WITNESS my hand and the corporate seal of the City of Charlotte, North Carolina, this the 27<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2012.



  
Stephanie C. Kelly, MMC, City Clerk

## **Managing Large-Scale Security Events**

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### **A.20 Considerations for Processing Prisoners<sup>40</sup>**

*In planning for a large-scale event, planners should consider using the following considerations in developing their prisoner processing operational plans. These considerations should be scaled to the event and may not always be applicable.*

#### **Elements of Prisoner Processing**

- Initial response of mobile field forces/crow control units
- Transport to courthouse for staging / processing
- Continue to jail for booking
- Process for booking
- Enter into court immediately after booking
- If not released or bonded, enter into housing
- Remain at jail throughout incarceration

#### **Considerations for transporting prisoners**

- Designate vehicles to transport prisoners from each sector/secure zone. The number of vehicles assigned to each sector should be determined by the number of arrestees expected.
- Hold additional transport assets in reserve and on standby.
- Assign transport vehicles specifically for emergency transport.
- Hold transport assets in reserve and on standby that are compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act.

#### **First Contact Procedures**

- Monitor radio channels assigned to mobile field forces/crow control units.
- Call for assets to respond to determined location
- Survey arrestees for injury / trauma.
- Remove/account for and barcode all arrestee property.
- Take pictures of officer and arrestee with CRA number.
- Attach copies to the CRA for the officer and transport, along with the barcode.
- Apply a wrist-band with barcode.
- Complete a search, check restraints, and place the arrestee into a van.
- Account for arrestees, property, and personnel.
- Depart for the Transfer-Waiting Area at the courthouse.

#### **Transfer-Waiting Procedures**

Once in the Transfer-Waiting area:

- Separate and secure arrestees;
- Play a looped DVD explaining the process to the arrestees;
- Medically triage arrestees;
- Account for property;

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<sup>40</sup> The Tampa Police Department provided these prisoner-processing procedures, which were used during the 2012 Republican National Convention.



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- Collect initial data on each arrestee;
- Upload media cards;
- Prepare the transport list;
- Scan/load arrestees for transport to the jail; and
- Send the list of arrestees to the jail for arrival preparation once the buses depart.

#### **Transfer to the Jail Procedures**

- Scan the bus for departure to the jail.
- Assign a lead car for each bus.
- Determine and assign identifiers for alternate routes.
- Monitor all buses continuously at the Command Post that are equipped with GPS.
- Play pre-recorded instructions while en-route to the jail.
- Enter the first gate for clearance upon arrival to the jail.
- Enter into the existing sally-port and unload arrestees.

### A.21 Best Practices for Law Enforcement Public Information Officers

*Developed by the TPD Public Information Office*

#### **Public Affairs**

The Tampa Police Department determined that it must reach four critical audiences in order to have a successful political convention in its city. Those were media, law enforcement, demonstrators and the community at large. In the year leading up to the event, all PIO activities were designed to influence one of these four groups. This is a suggested guideline for a public information office that is preparing for a political convention or any other large-scale event in its city. Most of the concepts listed below can be tailored to different cities depending on the unique circumstances, geography and demographics of each venue.

#### **Media Outreach**

**Hold Regional PIO Meetings** - Hold the first regional PIO meeting approximately 18 months before the event. This will help engage all agencies that will be affected by the convention. In addition to public safety, this should include hospitals, school districts, public transportation, the airport, visitor's bureau and any other agencies that will receive media calls about the event. This sets a tone of regional cooperation and information sharing. It's also a step toward ensuring the public is getting a consistent message about issues related to the event that will impact the larger region. Some of these issues include traffic, school closures or an adjustment of school hours, access to public buildings and services, changes to public transportation routes, hotel availability and more. The release of information on these issues can adversely impact the security plan, so it is prudent to have good relationships and information sharing in place for consistent messaging. It's recommended to hold another regional meeting six to nine months before the event and then again right before the convention.

**Establish a Public Affairs Subcommittee** - Begin holding monthly meetings one year before the event. There should be a PIO representing each agency that is part of the Executive Steering Committee that oversees all security planning for a political convention. This subcommittee creates the media plan for the convention. The United States Secret Service PIO and the PIO from the lead local law enforcement agency co-chair this subcommittee. While there are certain public affairs guidelines established by the U.S. Secret Service, the lead local agencies will also need to create a plan for generating proactive positive coverage and how to respond to inquiries. The agencies on the subcommittee will staff the Joint Information Center during the event. However, in Tampa, we found it productive to have a limited number of the agencies involved that may not actually staff the JIC such as the airport, hospitals, etc. Each member must be approved by the Executive Steering Committee.

**Review the Federal Budget** - Since a series of convention related expenditures would require city council approval, it would be advantageous to work with your chief, legal department and the purchasing department to bundle these expenses allowing a large number to go before council simultaneously. It's also critically important to establish a system for releasing public

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records related to these expenditures to all media at the same time. If a system is not established, the high volume of requests will keep the PIO in a reactive mode which is disruptive to the daily workload. These budget requests will begin 18 months to a year before the event.

**Establish a City Joint Information Center** - the Federal JIC template for political conventions only allows one seat for local law enforcement so it may be necessary to set up a city JIC to work jointly with the federal one. It would be ideal if they were located in the same building. Another option would be expanding the number of seats for local law enforcement to work inside the federal JIC.

**Conduct “Show and Tell” News Events** - Hold one proactive media event each month to establish the regional partnership and to give the community a sense of safety and security. These should start at least six months before the event. Select visual topics that set a positive tone for the event versus a heavy handed law enforcement image. This could be based on a training class for a specialized area that is part of the security force. Bike or Mounted Patrols are options for a softer public safety images. K-9 and Marine (if applicable) are options that can give federal agencies an opportunity to showcase their involvement. All topics and talking points should be preapproved by the Executive Steering Committee through the Public Affairs Subcommittee.

**Hold a Media Round Table(s)** - This meeting with top law enforcement leaders is an opportunity for the media to share its concerns and logistical challenges of covering the event. This is NOT for the department to release information or even answer questions. Newsroom decision makers should be invited; news directors, assistant news directors, assignment editors, executive producers, beat reporters, editors. This meeting allows the media to have its voice heard and be part of the process. Once you get this media feedback, the PIO and subcommittee members can fold the new information into the media plan. This meeting also creates a spirit of cooperation between law enforcement and media that can only benefit the department. It establishes that the department is interested in the best possible coverage of the coverage that is balanced, factual and based on substance.

**Establish a Media Lot** - Create an area for members of the media to write, edit and broadcast live. It must be in line of sight of the event and close to the \*\*speaker’s stage and protest area. During Tampa’s roundtable discussion with the media, the department learned the media was fearful of being targeted by protestors and requested a safe place to work near the event. This task was logistically difficult and very time consuming. The following list includes some of the logistics involved. It would be ideal to start this project four to six months before the event. We asked for a news director to volunteer to act as the point person for coordinating some of the logistics with the other stations. This helped save time and simplified the process. In the end, the media lot became a source of information for law enforcement. PIO’s assigned to the lot would have informal interaction with reporters and photographers and then shared the story angles and issues of concern. This information was used to help prep the chief on what issues may come up at the next daily briefing.

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1. Identify location - may have to lease space from a private owner or the political party hosting the event.
2. Provide fencing, flatbed trucks for live shots, private security for controlling access, set up electricity and bathrooms on the site. The department collected checks from the media outlets and paid the vendors for these services with a bundle of media checks. Media covered all infrastructure costs.
3. Determine access routes and times. This lot was on the edge of the vehicle exclusion zone. We established a window between 2:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. that vehicles could leave to gas up or new trucks could arrive.
4. Issue media lot credentials to all media outlets that paid for the infrastructure of the lot.
5. Hold a lottery with local and national media to establish where each media outlet would park its live truck and where they would broadcast live from on the flatbed trucks.
6. Have media outlets sign a legal waiver that releases the city of any liability at the media lot.

\*\* Speaker's Platform-a stage and audio system provided for groups to voice their opinions. In Tampa, the groups applied for permits through City Hall to schedule their time on the stage.

**Conduct Chief Media Visits** - In the six weeks before the event, the chief should visit all major local media outlets for "OFF the RECORD" presentations and question and answer sessions. This is the follow up to the media roundtable held at the department. The PIO should ask larger media outlets to host smaller radio stations, weekly papers, news web services. This ensures the chief speaks directly to every media outlet. Tampa's Police Chief presented a compelling photo and video-driven PowerPoint on the department's philosophy of policing the event. It also contained visuals of violence and destruction that occurred at prior conventions. These meetings were extremely beneficial because for the first time the media understood the law enforcement perspective. The opportunity to ask the chief candid questions in a relaxed environment showed the media that the department was transparent and earnest in its efforts to do the right thing with demonstrators and members of the media.

**Establish Chief's Daily Briefing Schedule** - It is very important that the media has access to the top law enforcement officer during the event to maintain public confidence and transparency. It is ideal to have at least two briefings daily. If possible release the time and location of these briefings during the Chief's media visits. This will give the media time to plan for live shot logistics, assigning crews and other challenges. In Tampa, the department set up a live satellite window with CNN during our daily chief briefings. This resolved a limited parking issue because any station in the country could down link the news conference from the satellite free of charge. The PIO office set up a pool camera rotation with the local stations to provide a live feed of the news conferences. The department worked with the local 24-hour news station to provide a locked down live truck to uplink the news conferences live daily. These efforts ensured the department's perspective was well represented in the news coverage. The demonstrators were readily available and Tampa felt the department's point of view should be as well. These regular briefings also significantly reduced the number of media calls to the JIC since the media knew it could get its questions answered at a predetermined time.

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**Establish a Social Media Presence** - Establish a social media team that will proactively post police photographs and videos on the department's Facebook and Twitter accounts during the event. Having a strong plan in place for the mainstream media is only half of the equation. It is imperative to have an experienced social media team since this is a dominant form of communication for the public. The Tampa Police Department recruited outside LEO PIOs to handle social media posts during the event. One was assigned to riding with the chief and other commanders during the protests. This PIO took pictures and videos of police actions that were eventually picked up by the mainstream media. A second PIO was stationed in the JIC to oversee the department's social media accounts and monitor demonstrators' posts. This PIO would respond with the facts of a situation when erroneous rumors began circulate. A third PIO monitored the department's closed-circuit television system and downloaded photos and videos to post on social media. If trouble makers posted any negative videos of law enforcement, this PIO was prepared to search the CCTV system for a more complete video of the incident for possible release to the media and on social media. This team captured countless acts of kindness by officers. Images of officers giving overheated protestors water, pumping air into a demonstrator's baby jogger, helping a protestor back into her wheelchair went viral or were picked up by the mainstream media. It is also important the team goes through training so they are familiar with the department's social media guidelines and objectives.

**Hire an Event Photographer** - This is imperative for documenting the event. It's also another source of photographs and videos to release to the mainstream media and post on social media.

**Acquire a Media Truck for Protests** - Setting up a truck for media covering protests provides reporters and photographers with a good vantage point. TPD used a flatbed truck and allowed the media to get on and off the truck during the largest march. This truck followed the lead law enforcement car and ensured the media could video tape and take photographs of the long line of protestors involved in the march. This goodwill gesture was very popular with the local media and some national outlets as well.

**Establish a Reporters' Committee for Freedom on Information** - Set up a conference call with this group involving your chief, police attorney and field force commander. This committee sets up a hotline for the media to call if they are arrested while covering large-scale political events in the United States. A local media firm is retained to answer these calls. It will be very important to meet with this firm several times leading up to the event and to include them on this conference call. The meetings and conference call gives law enforcement an opportunity to share its progressive approach to policing the event. It's also a chance to learn about media challenges at past conventions or political events.

**Establish a Media Arrest Notification System** - Establish a media arrest notification system. In Tampa, if a member of the media was detained or arrested, a text would be sent to the department's command staff. This would allow the appropriate supervisor to vet the arrest. They would determine if the member of the media violated the law and should go to booking or if he or she was detained with a large group and should be released to return to work. No members of the media were arrested in Tampa.

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**Conduct Joint Information Center Training** - The City JIC will have numerous personnel who are not familiar with the National Incident Management System utilized by law enforcement. They will need to be trained to assist during the event. Many jurisdictions have certified JIC trainers in their fire department or emergency management department. In Tampa, two trainers were recruited from neighboring jurisdictions.

**Establish News Release, Photograph and Video Approval System** - Work with the Mayor's Office, Chief's Office and Legal to set up a streamline system for releasing material to the media in a timely fashion. Tampa utilized a live web portal through NC4 called ESponder for this process. All approved talking points and news releases were posted on this system for call takers to utilize as well.

**Include News Release Dissemination as Part of the Operational Plan** - Part of the department's plan for sending alerts to the local and national media, included the use of software called Collabria. Two months before the event, the PIO sent an email to all of its media contacts encouraging them and their colleagues to sign up for the notification system. The PIO used the web-based two-way communication tool to push out news releases and updates via email and text. It proved to be an effective resource for building a media distribution list and providing time-sensitive information directly to reporters in the field.

**Establish Media Monitoring System** - Set up an automated system in the months prior to the event. Assign the task of downloading the coverage daily to support staff in the JIC. In Tampa, this coverage was uploaded into NC4's ESponder software so it was available for commanders to view.

**Develop a Media Blitz and One Voice Policy** - Two weeks before the event, the chief should become the single voice for the department. This establishes a strong, consistent image for the department. TPD set up a series of one-on-one interviews with the chief during this time period. This ensured the community was aware of the department's year of planning, preparing and training to have a smooth and safe event. Many of the interviews were saved to run during the event since the chief was too busy for one-on-one interviews during the operational period.

### *Law Enforcement Outreach*

**Create a Training Video** - Create a video of top law enforcement officers such as the chief and/or sheriff, to play before the Field Force training. This should contain the department's philosophy and sets the tone for policing the event.

**Create Training Curriculum** - The PIO should contribute to the training curriculum for the supervisors overseeing the day to day operations of the RNC. This is an opportunity to reinforce the importance of relying on their supervisory discretion if media is facing arrest. Unless the activity threatens another person's safety or could result in property damage, the arrest may do more harm than good. The PIO can utilize videos or photographs of past cases that demonstrate this point. Unless the PIO is sworn with rank, this training should be presented by a commander. By utilizing visuals from past conventions and political events, the PIO segment of the training can highlight how demonstrators attempt to bait law enforcement

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into overreacting to create an iconic YouTube moment. This training should focus on how one single image or video of an officer's actions can mar the city's image on a global scale.

### *Community Outreach*

**Release a Transportation Plan** - Although the USSS releases the transportation plan, this is an opportunity for the city to show the public all the measures or services it is putting in place to help its citizens during the event. In Tampa, the plan was released five weeks before the event. Tampa Police attempted to create a mobile app that people could check before leaving their house to learn if there was a temporary road closure due to the event; however, it was unsuccessful. Instead, we established transportation web page along with a frequently asked questions page to keep citizens up to date. This was very effective for dealing with any last minute transportation adjustments during the event.

**Conduct a Police Citizen's Academy** - From after action reports, Tampa Police learned citizens in other cities often complained that they had no idea what to expect before a convention and therefore were alarmed by the strong police presence. Two weeks before Tampa's event, TPD loaded 70 business and community leaders onto a coach bus and transported them to the police academy for a one day RNC Citizen's Academy. This reviewed the extensive training involved in preparing for the event and the department's unique approach of tolerant but ready. Video from past conventions were played so the community would understand why a swift police response may be necessary to keep the city safe. Officers dressed in the RNC uniform with hard gear and put on a demonstration that utilized many of the newly purchased assets, showcased the training and highlighted the different levels of policing the event. In addition to the field force team, it involved bike patrols, mounted patrols, the regional bomb team and the marine patrol. Media was invited to cover the RNC Academy and social media was utilized to show the rest of the community what to expect during the event.

**Hold Town Hall Meetings** - Help the mayor's office set up these public meetings in the areas of town that will be most dramatically impacted by the event. In Tampa, the speakers included the mayor, police chief, fire chief and transportation director. This allows the public to get their questions answered and express their concerns before the event.

**Establish a Citizen Notification System** - Tampa Police launched a campaign to sign up citizens for its Alert Tampa system that replaced Reverse 911 several years ago. This system allows commanders to send email or text messages to citizens about RNC activities that may impact their commute, etc. The department doubled the number of users in the months before the RNC from 8,000 to 16,000.

**Establish a Business Community Notification System** - TPD set up a notification system for property and security managers of downtown high rises. NC4 amended its program to establish two-way communication with the users. TPD also signed up business and community organizations for a total of 104. The community embraced the program so well that it has continued after the event.

## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

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**Establish a See Something Say Something Campaign** - Work with the Department of Homeland Security to utilize its campaign material connected to your event.

### ***Demonstrators Outreach***

**Hold ACLU Forums** - Arrange for the chief, field force commanders and police attorney to take part in the ACLU forums either via WebEx or in person. These take place several times in the year leading up to a political convention. This is an opportunity for the leaders to set a tone of tolerance and patience with demonstrators' theatrics as long as it doesn't cross over into criminal activity. These may help law enforcement leaders establish a rapport with protest leaders prior to the event.

**Develop a Demonstrator's Pamphlet** - Create a user friendly map that highlights the parade route and services available along it such as bathrooms, water stations and shaded covered areas. Tampa's pamphlet provided ACLU tips for dealing with law enforcement during a protest. It also gave an overview of the city's event ordinance that established rules and regulations for demonstrations outside of the event. Finally, it provided tips for avoiding heat stroke in Florida's August weather.

**Provide Weather Reports for Protestors** - A goodwill gesture for reaching out to demonstrators is providing weather reports on the department's long range acoustic device known as ELRAD. Tampa Police set up a plan in advance to obtain a weather report daily from one of the local station's meteorologist. This was broadcast during the marches. All but one of the five local stations provided weather reports. The stations appreciated the promotional opportunity while the department reached out to demonstrators with the service.



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### A.22 Access Control Planning and Operations Checklist<sup>41</sup>

Use this checklist to develop an access control operational plan. This checklist is a guide that can be customized depending on the event.

Task	Task Completion
1. Identify and establish an event perimeter and secure zone. This includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>— <i>Completing a scene survey;</i></li><li>— <i>Controlling access to the incident command post, staging, and other incident command facilities;</i></li><li>— <i>Establishing an inner operational area perimeter; and</i></li><li>— <i>Establishing an outer perimeter.</i></li></ul>	___Yes ___No
2. Identify and provide staff for event control zones/check-in points.	___Yes ___No
3. Identify security zone requirements. These include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>— <i>Coordinating with incident command/unified command;</i></li><li>— <i>Identifying the “Hot Zone” location if a HAZMAT/Weapon of Mass Destruction incident were to occur;</i></li><li>— <i>Identifying the number of personnel needed to secure and maintain zone(s);</i></li><li>— <i>Identifying other resources needed based on the scale of the event; and</i></li><li>— <i>Initiating coordination/communication with other responding/supporting agencies.</i></li></ul>	___Yes ___No
4. Establish force protection capacity integrated within the Incident Command System. This includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>— <i>Coordinating with specialized Law Enforcement teams and other responding/supporting agencies;</i></li><li>— <i>Assigning personnel to maintain force protection;</i></li><li>— <i>Identifying potential threats/hazards to responding/supporting personnel; and</i></li><li>— <i>Implementing measures to counter any potential threats/hazards.</i></li></ul>	___Yes ___No
5. Provide force protection for emergency personnel to allow them to operate safely. This includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>— <i>Assigning personnel to maintain force protection;</i></li><li>— <i>Searching event venues for the presence of explosive devices or other immediate/secondary hazards; and</i></li><li>— <i>Neutralizing or removing any threats from the site and restricting access during an incident.</i></li></ul>	___Yes ___No
6. Implement and maintain a system to manage personnel identity. This includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>— <i>Establishing a check-in point for all responding/supporting personnel;</i></li></ul>	___Yes ___No

<sup>41</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program: Exercise Evaluation Guide- Public Safety and Security Response*. 2010.

## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

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Task	Task Completion
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>— <i>Ensuring accountability for all units and personnel at the event;</i></li><li>— <i>Ensuring that all units and personnel properly display or wear official identification; and</i></li><li>— <i>Documenting all personnel entering and exiting the secure zone(s).</i></li></ul>	
<p>7. Provide and plan for access to the event for skilled support teams (e.g., SWAT teams, Explosive Device Response teams). This includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>— <i>Coordinating with specialized law enforcement teams;</i></li><li>— <i>Identifying and establishing controlled entry points;</i></li><li>— <i>Providing these skilled support teams with accessible and safe routes of ingress and egress; and</i></li><li>— <i>Conducting credential checks of all personnel entering/exiting the event location/secure zone(s).</i></li></ul>	<p>___Yes ___No</p>

## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

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### A.23 Law Enforcement Venue Assessment Checklist<sup>42</sup>

*Use this checklist to assist in identifying the law enforcement personnel needed.*

**Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Name of Venue:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Address:** \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

#### **Crowd Control/Site Security**

Access by the public: \_\_\_\_\_

Access by VIPs: \_\_\_\_\_

Access by emergency services: \_\_\_\_\_

Secondary route: \_\_\_\_\_

Security concerns: \_\_\_\_\_

#### **Demographics of Spectators and Participants**

Age: \_\_\_\_\_

Mobility: \_\_\_\_\_

Numbers: \_\_\_\_\_

Attitude: \_\_\_\_\_

VIP's to attend: \_\_\_\_\_

#### **Patrols**

Uniformed: \_\_\_\_\_

Non-uniformed: \_\_\_\_\_

Other security: \_\_\_\_\_

Intelligence contact: (Joint Terrorism Task Force, etc.) \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>42</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15 Special Events Contingency Planning: Job Aids Manual*, updated 2010 (original 2005)  
<https://www.hsd1.org/?view&did=759939> (accessed January 26, 2017).

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\_\_\_\_\_

### Traffic

Control (access/egress): \_\_\_\_\_

Concerns: \_\_\_\_\_

### Alcohol

*(Circle one)*

- None
- Limited access (such as beer gardens): \_\_\_\_\_
- Distributing locations on event footprint

### Incident Command Post

Location and contact information: \_\_\_\_\_

Closest mutual aid resources if required: \_\_\_\_\_

Promoter background investigation completed? \_\_\_\_\_

Surveillance (closed-circuit television, locations, etc.): \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Credentialing required? \_\_\_\_\_

Meals/lodging arrangements made for staff, if required? \_\_\_\_\_

Overtime considerations addressed? \_\_\_\_\_

Arrest/booking process identified? \_\_\_\_\_

Special teams required? (SWAT, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, K-9, etc.)

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

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### A.24 Bomb Threat Checklist<sup>43</sup>

*This form can be provided to dispatchers before and during the event. This form identifies the sets of questions that should be asked by the dispatcher and/or person taking the call.*

Exact date and time of call: _____
Exact words of the caller: _____
<b>Questions to ask</b>
1. When is the bomb going to explode? _____
2. Where is the bomb? _____
3. What does it look like? _____
4. What kind of bomb is it? _____
5. What will cause it to explode? _____
6. Did you place the bomb? _____
7. Why? _____
8. Where are you calling from? _____
9. What is your address? _____
10. What is your name? _____
<b>Caller's Voice</b> (please circle appropriate terms)

<sup>43</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15 Special Events Contingency Planning: Job Aids Manual*, updated 2010 (original 2005)  
<https://www.hsd1.org/?view&did=759939> (accessed January 26, 2017).

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calm	disguised	nasal	angry	broken
stutter	slow	sincere	lisp	rapid
giggling	deep	crying	squeaky	excited
stressed	accent	loud	slurred	normal
If the voice is familiar, whom did it sound like? _____				
Were there any background noises? _____				
Remarks: _____				
Person receiving call: _____				
Telephone number where call was received: _____				

## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

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### A.25 Training and Exercise Course Catalogue Checklist<sup>44</sup>

*These tables provide comprehensive lists of training courses and exercises that should be provided for law enforcement personnel in preparation for a large-scale event.*

Training Course Title	Description
Active Shooter Security Training	Training supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance response to an active shooter event by educating participants on the history of active shooter events, describing common behaviors/conditions/situations with active shooters, and fostering communication between critical infrastructure owners/ operators/ law enforcement response teams
Active Shooter/Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Training	Training from commanders on their personal experiences regarding an active shooter/IED event, including information on IEDs, tactical integration, and investigations
Airplane Explosive Response Training	Training on responding to airplane explosives
ATF Advanced Post Blast Investigation Techniques Training	Training by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) on advanced post-blast investigation techniques
ATF Basic Post Blast Investigations Training for Bomb Technicians	Training by the ATF on post-blast investigation techniques for bomb technicians
BioWatch Sample Collection Training	Training for local firefighters on the proper techniques for BioWatch sample/filter collection
Bomb-Making Awareness Program Training	Training by DHS for law enforcement, fire, and Emergency Medical Services personnel focused on increasing awareness of homemade explosives
Bomb Squad Advanced Electronics Training	Training to improve the understanding of advanced electronic circuitry for bomb disablement
Bomb Squad Large-Vehicle Bomb Countermeasures Training	Training on large-vehicle bomb-displacement tactics and strategies
Bombing Prevention IED Counterterrorism Training	Training from the Office of Bombing Prevention designed to increase resilience while enhancing bomb-prevention capabilities; training designed to enhance the knowledge of state/local law enforcement and public-/ private-sector

<sup>44</sup> This checklist was based off of the training catalogue produced by training security planners for the 2012 Democratic National Convention.

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Training Course Title	Description
	stakeholders by providing exposure to key elements of the IED threat, surveillance detection methods, and soft target awareness
Building Emergency Planning Capabilities Training	Training on how to incorporate key elements on successful incident management into planning efforts, including communicating with employees, building familiarity with local responders, coordinating with first responders, and integrating public affairs
Civil Disturbance Training	Training conducted in support of the civil disturbance subcommittee
Commercial Vehicle Counterterrorism Training	Training designed to train law enforcement officers responsible for the enforcement of commercial vehicles traveling on the nation's highways on how these vehicles can be used in committing an act of terrorism, either as a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) or transporting materials to further a terrorist cause
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Biosecurity Training	Training by the FBI on potential biosecurity risks, information and skills needed for a successful attack on research institutions, and warning signs to look for
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Emergency Management Institute Training	Training via the web on emergency management
Field Force Extrication Tactics Training	Training to provide emergency responders with knowledge and skills regarding the tools and information necessary to extricate an individual safely from a protester device, including briefings and practical exercises
Hazardous Devices Response Unit Training	Training for state and local law enforcement on advanced diagnostics for radiation physics and explosive devices.
Integrated Emergency Management Course Training	Training (exercised-based) that places Emergency Operations Center personnel under realistic crisis situations within a structured learning environment
Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Training	Training on the new dimension attack threat seen in the Mumbai Attack, and lessons learned from other cities
Local/federal Special Weapons and Tactics	Training for SWAT teams on motorcade tactics and team-transition scenario exercises



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Training Course Title	Description
(SWAT) teams, Joint Motorcade Training	
Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) Training	Training by the Federal Air Marshals to provide law enforcement, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Fire/HAZMAT, and Airport Operations with an update on MANPADS – covering surface to air missiles
Motorcade Training	Motorcycle dignitary–detail training
Munitions Instructors Course Training	Training for law enforcement, corrections, military, and licensed security trainers to train other officers on OC/pepper spray aerosol projectors, less lethal impact munitions, and chemical munitions
Protective Detail Training	Training given by U.S. Secret Service (USSS) on protection for state and local police, motorcade operations and support, USSS special teams, USSS counter-surveillance, terrorist trends and tactics, and threat assessment
Public Safety WMD Response Training	Training on specific fundamentals and skills associated with an emergency response to a WMD incident, including detailed technical information and hands-on practice of actions required for emergency responders in such situations
Quick Clearance Training	Training by state highway patrol
Radical Element during NSSE Training	Training for command-level personnel on dealing with radical elements
Regional Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigations Training	Training (including joint agency tabletop scenarios/exercises) on WMD notification protocols, capabilities of various agencies, threat assessments, roles of epidemiologists/FBI/ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/law enforcement, and sampling and laboratory issues
State and Local Anti-terrorism Training (SLATT)	Training for all personnel who participate in anti-terrorism activities, given by the SLATT Program and the FBI
State Emergency Management Training	Training officered by the state emergency management division
Surveillance Detection Training	Training on surveillance detection for municipal, state, and local law enforcement

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Exercise Course Title	Description
Command-Level Tabletop Exercise (TTX)	Tabletop and functional exercise(s) co-sponsored by USSS and FEMA to allow commanders to clarify roles and responsibilities, validate existing plans and procedures, and review operational decision-making and interagency coordination
Consequence Management TTX	Tabletop exercise for participating departments and agencies to assess draft consequence management plans, policies, and procedures, including scenarios
Integrated Emergency Management Command TTX	Tabletop exercise to build awareness of how and why federal, state, and local emergency management systems function most effectively through teamwork
Joint Medical Operations Center (JMOC) TTX	Tabletop exercise to evaluate the current capabilities and gaps of a JMOC while maintain operational security
Operational Commanders TTX	Tabletop and functional exercise(s) co-sponsored by USSS and FEMA to allow operational commanders to clarify roles and responsibilities, validate existing plans and procedures, and review operational decision-making and interagency coordination
Senior Leadership TTX	Tabletop and functional exercise(s) co-sponsored by USSS and FEMA to allow senior leaders to clarify roles and responsibilities, validate existing plans and procedures, and review operational decision-making and interagency coordination

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### A.26 Training Request Form<sup>45</sup>

*Use this form to submit subcommittees' request for training. Using this, or a similar form, will allow for personnel to track the training provided and reassess training needs.*

<b>Date:</b> _____			
<b>To:</b> Training [Working Group/Subcommittee]			
<b>From:</b> _____ [Working Group/Subcommittee] _____, Chair/Co-Chair			
<b>Brief Description of Training Need:</b> _____ _____			

Recipient(s) of this Training: _____ _____			
Type of Training or Course Name: _____			
Training Provider: _____			
Cost of Training: \$ _____		\$ _____	
Known		Estimated	
Number of Training Sessions Anticipated: _____			
Desired Location(s) of Training: _____			
Date(s) of Training or To Be Completed By: _____			
Attachments: Please attach any course, training provider, and cost information,  Upon conclusion of the training please provide a copy of training certificates to the Training [Working Group/Subcommittee].			
<i>(To be completed by Training [Working Group/Subcommittee])</i>			
Date Received: _____			
Request	Approved	Denied	(Reason: _____)
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

<sup>45</sup> This form was used by the TPD during the 2012 RNC by subcommittees requesting training.

## **Managing Large-Scale Security Events**

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## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

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### A.27 Law Enforcement Pocket Guides

Below are the pocket guides provided by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department and the Tampa Police Department for the 2012 conventions.

#### Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department Pocket Guide

##### Democratic National Convention

##### Law Enforcement Handbook

Operational Period

August 30 – September 7, 2012



Anthony Foxx, *Mayor*

**City of Charlotte**

Rodney D. Monroe, *Chief of Police*

**Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department**

# Managing Large-Scale Security Events

## A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

### Message from the Chief of Police

You are about to face one of the most challenging assignments of your careers by helping to maintain the safety of those involved in the **2012 Democratic National Convention (DNC)**.

The level of commitment to this event is demanding. The hours will be long and even stressful at times. There will be occasions that your patience will be tried, but I know you always will display the highest level of professionalism which is the hallmark of our law enforcement officers.

I encourage you to be mindful, understanding, and most importantly, respectful of those exercising their Constitutional right to assemble peacefully. All your actions and reactions will be witnessed locally and worldwide. Therefore, I cannot emphasize enough the importance of courtesy while interacting with the thousands of visitors to our city.

I want to personally thank each and every one of you for adjusting your schedules and for taking time away from your families to help provide security for the DNC. Your hard work and dedication is appreciated. I'm honored that I have the privilege of working with you during this historic event.

Best Regards,



Rodney Montoe  
Chief of Police

### KEY REMINDERS

- Always maintain a professional demeanor.
- Maintain neutrality on lawful forms of expression.
- Don't be baited into overreacting.
- Keep a watchful eye for those individuals intent on committing violent acts.
- Keep your Chain of Command fully advised of objective signs of potentially violent behavior.

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### Crowd Management Strategies for Large Scale Events

*"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."*

— First Amendment to the United States Constitution

*"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."*

— Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

*"...nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."*

— Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

*"As a law enforcement officer, my fundamental duty is to serve the community; to safeguard lives and property; to protect the innocent against deception, the weak against oppression or intimidation, and the peaceful against violence or disorder; and to respect the Constitutional Rights of all to liberty, equality and justice."*

— CMPD Code of Ethics

# Managing Large-Scale Security Events

## A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

We recognize that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution promotes, encourages and protects the right of free speech and the right of persons and groups to assemble peacefully. We further recognize that protected speech includes not only verbal statements, but other non-verbal expressive actions such as placards, large displays, and various performances. In addition, we recognize that the Fourth Amendment and our State's laws protect individuals from unreasonable governmental intrusion into their persons, houses, papers and effects. Whether demonstrating, protesting, counter protesting, or showing support for a cause, individuals and groups have the Constitutional right to peacefully gather and express themselves without interference from law enforcement as to the content of their message.

Our overall goal during large scale demonstrations is to strike a balance between participants' First Amendment rights and our need to protect persons and property from injury or damage. To this end, the following overall strategy will guide us as we ready ourselves for the DNC.

- **Crowd Management Strategy.** During a large scale assembly or demonstration, we can expect the following activity to occur: Lawful Assembly, Non-Violent Civil Disobedience, Isolated Violent Behavior, and in some circumstances behavior that constitutes an Unlawful Assembly. In response to the particular behaviors exhibited during a demonstration, we will rely on various crowd management strategies.

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- **Media access / persons recording police activity.** The media has the right to be present and record activity including police action. Anyone, including the media, may record a police officer's actions. If individuals are recording your actions such as an arrest and they are physically interfering with the arrest, you should warn them to stand back and if feasible direct them to a location where they can continue to record the event while you perform your duties. You cannot prohibit the press or anyone else from recording your actions simply because you do not want to be recorded.

### o **Isolated unlawful acts during a Lawful Assembly**

- **Minor non-violent offenses.** Officers will attempt to obtain voluntary compliance by issuing warnings and communicating information through the Chain of Command so that we can work with event organizers. Due to the size of the crowd, limited resources and tactical concerns, it may not be possible or advisable to take enforcement actions such as an arrest. Remember it is crucial that officers relay information to their COC before making an isolated decision to arrest someone for minor non-violent offenses such as blocking a street or sidewalk.

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### o **Lawful Assemblies**

- **Cooperation with Event Organizers.** We will cooperate in both the planning and management of large scale and other lawful demonstrations with the event organizers. We will communicate both prior to and during the activity with the event organizers to hopefully resolve such issues as parade routes or the changing dynamics of the activity.
- **Tolerance.** In most cases, we have to remember that time is on our side. Most of the people participating in large scale demonstrations do so not with the intent to commit acts of violence, but to support a cause that they strongly believe in. It is important that officers remain tolerant. It is anticipated that a small, but well trained number of "professional" agitators will take every opportunity to disrupt lawful assemblies by using several tactics - one of which includes taunting officers in hopes that officers overreact, thereby turning a crowd against officers. Officers should be on their guard and not let themselves be baited into overreacting to verbal challenges, taunts, jeers and insults. Although offensive, such tactics are designed to get you to lose control and are not in and of themselves a violation of the law.

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### • **Violent behavior against persons and property.**

Curtailling violence is a high priority. Officers will rely on several tactics depending on the size of the crowd and location of the violent acts. In some circumstances, selected officers will track groups involved in illegal behavior for the purpose of documenting and collecting evidence for a successful prosecution. Not every arrest must be made immediately and a decision to arrest will depend on factors other than the fact that an offense occurred. Such factors include the size of the crowd and whether the crime involves an imminent threat to demonstrators or police.

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# Managing Large-Scale Security Events

## A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Crowd Management, Intervention & Control Strategies			
Lawful Assembly	Non-Violent Civil Disobedience	Isolated Violent Behavior	Unlawful Assembly
<p>• Lawful assembly is a constitutionally protected activity. It is the gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p> <p>• Lawful assembly is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p> <p>• Lawful assembly is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p>	<p>• Traditional non-violent civil disobedience is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p> <p>• Traditional non-violent civil disobedience is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p> <p>• Traditional non-violent civil disobedience is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p>	<p>• Isolated violent behavior is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p> <p>• Isolated violent behavior is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p> <p>• Isolated violent behavior is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p>	<p>• Unlawful assembly is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p> <p>• Unlawful assembly is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p> <p>• Unlawful assembly is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p>
Police Presence Monitoring	Police Presence Limited Intervention	Police Presence Isolated Arrests	Crowd Control Arrest and Dispersal
<p>• Establishing a police presence is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p> <p>• Establishing a police presence is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p> <p>• Establishing a police presence is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p>	<p>• Limited intervention is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p> <p>• Limited intervention is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p> <p>• Limited intervention is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p>	<p>• Isolated arrests are a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p> <p>• Isolated arrests are a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p> <p>• Isolated arrests are a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p>	<p>• Arrest and dispersal is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p> <p>• Arrest and dispersal is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p> <p>• Arrest and dispersal is a form of peaceful expression of opinion. It is a gathering of a group of people for a common purpose, such as a protest or demonstration. It is a form of peaceful expression of opinion.</p>

### Incident Command System

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department will operate under the Incident Command System (ICS) as a means to coordinate the efforts of multiple departmental divisions or outside agencies as they work toward the common goal of stabilizing an incident. Many incidents, whether major (such as hazardous material spills or civil disorders), minor (such as vehicle crashes and utility outages), or disasters (such as tornadoes, hurricanes, and earthquakes), require a response from a number of different resources. Regardless of the size of the incident or the number of agencies involved in the response, all incidents require a coordinated effort to ensure an effective response and the efficient, safe use of resources.

CMPD will operate under the Incident Command System when dealing with the following:

- Emergency situations where the Emergency Mobilization Plan is utilized.
- Situations where a departmental response is required under the Charlotte-Mecklenburg All Hazards Plan.
- Situations involving personnel from different divisions and units where the event is expected to last longer than 24 hours.
- Situations requiring coordination with outside agencies.
- Situations that require activation of the CMPD Command Center.
- Other situations where the ICS would prove beneficial.

The ICS organization comprises six major functional areas: command, operations, planning, logistics, finance/administration, and intelligence.

Command is responsible for all incident or event activity. Although other functions may be left unfilled in the Command area, there will always be an Incident Commander. The command staff positions under the Incident Commander are:

- PIO Officer
- Safety Officer
- Liaison Officer

At a minimum, the Incident Commander will address the following, if necessary:

- Activate the Incident Command System;
- Establish a command post;
- Initiate the notification and mobilization of additional agency personnel;
- Obtain additional support from outside agencies;
- Establish staging areas;
- Provide for public information and media relations;
- Maintain the safety of all affected personnel; and
- Be responsible for preparing a documented after action report.

The Operations Section is responsible for directing the tactical actions to meet incident objectives.

- Divisions and groups are established within the Operations Section when the number of resources exceeds the Operations Section Chief's manageable span of control.
- Divisions demarcate physical or geographical areas of operation within the incident area.
- Groups demarcate functional areas of operation for the incident such as rescue, law enforcement, or fire.

At a minimum, the Operations Function will address the following, if necessary:

- Establish perimeters;
- Conduct Evacuations;
- Maintain Command Post and Scene Security;
- Provide for detainee transportation, processing, and confinement;
- Direct and control traffic; and
- Conduct post-incident investigations.



# Managing Large-Scale Security Events

## A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

### Medical Treatment and Hospitals

All on duty police and fire personnel who sustain non-critical injuries during the event will be transported to the nearest trauma center.

Facility Name	Phone No.	Address
Carolinas Medical Center	704-355-2000	1000 Blythe Blvd.
CMC – Mercy	704-304-5000	2001 Vail Ave.
CMC – Pineville	704-667-1000	10628 Park Road
CMC – University	704-863-6000	8800 North Tryon St.
Presbyterian Hospital	704-384-4000	200 Hawthorne Lane
Presbyterian Hospital – Huntersville	704-316-4000	10030 Gilead Road
Presbyterian Hospital – Matthews	704-384-6500	1500 Matthews Township Parkway

### Enforcement Guide

Following is a list of helpful statutes and ordinances involving public peace issues. This list is not intended to be all-inclusive and is provided as a reference guide only. Please consult the appropriate statute/ordinance prior to charging, in order to ensure that the offense being cited is appropriate.

### Pertinent Statutes and Ordinances Violent Behavior

#### • Misdemeanor Riot. G.S. 14-288.2

- A person is guilty of misdemeanor riot if he/she
  - willfully assembles
    - with two or more other persons; and
    - engages in a public disturbance
  - that by
    - » violent conduct or
    - » the imminent threat of violent conduct
  - causes injury or damage to persons or property or
  - creates a clear and present danger of such injury or damage.

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#### • Felony Riot G.S. 14-288.2

- A person is guilty of a Class F Felony if he/she
  - willfully assembles
    - with two or more other persons and
    - engages in violent conduct
  - that results in
    - » property damage in excess of \$1,500.00; or
    - » serious bodily injury; or
    - » damage or injury to persons or property or a clear and present danger and
    - » the person possesses a dangerous weapon or substance

#### • Failure to Disperse on Command G.S. 14-288.5

- A person is guilty of a Class 2 Misdemeanor if he/she
  - fails to comply with a command to disperse
  - given in a manner reasonably calculated to be heard by the assembly
  - by a police officer or public official responsible for keeping the peace
  - When the officer believes that a riot is occurring

*Note: Commands to disperse will be given by the command staff on scene. Once given, officers must not block the dispersal route and give the public a reasonable amount of time to disperse.*

#### • Assault on emergency personnel during state of emergency or riot

- It is a Class I felony for anyone
  - to commit an assault
  - on emergency personnel
  - which inflicts injury on emergency personnel
  - during a state of emergency or
  - within the immediate vicinity of a riot or when a riot is imminent
- It is a Class F felony for anyone
  - to commit an assault
  - on emergency personnel
  - with a dangerous weapon or substance
  - causing injury and
  - during a state of emergency or
  - within the immediate vicinity of a riot or when a riot is imminent

#### • Weapons at Demonstrations G.S. 14-277.2

- It is a Class 1 misdemeanor for anyone who
  - willfully or intentionally;
  - possesses or has immediate access to any dangerous weapon;
  - while participating, affiliated or present as a spectator at any;
    - parade
    - funeral
    - picket line, or
    - demonstration upon any private health care facility or public place owned or controlled by state or local government.

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# Managing Large-Scale Security Events

## A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

### • **Trespass on a Public Utility G.S. 14-159.12**

- Effective September 1, 2012, it is a Class A1 misdemeanor for anyone to
  - trespass on a
  - electric power supplier, a public water system, any natural gas facility public or privately owned
  - Where the person entered the building, or it was necessary for the person to climb over, go under or surmount a fence or other barrier to reach the facility
- It is a Class H felony for anyone to
  - trespass on a public facility, and
  - with the intent to disrupt the normal operation of the facility and
  - the trespass involves an act that places either the offender or others on the premises at risk of serious bodily injury.

### City of Charlotte Ordinances

#### • **City Code Sec. 15-27**

- Possession of obstruction devices; placing objects in roadway, public right of way prohibited.
- Unlawful to place obstruction object or instrument with the intent to obstruct a public road, public sidewalk, public right of way, entrance or exit to private property or other area open to the public.

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- Unlawful to throw, emit, or cause to be used as a projectile, or otherwise disperse any noxious substance.
- Noxious substance means any substance that is harmful or destructive or foul or offensive to human beings, such as but not limited to garbage, trash, refuse, animal parts or fluids, manure, urine, feces, or other organic waste by-products.

#### • **City Code Sec. 15-29**

##### **Police lines and barricades**

- Officers of CMPD are authorized to establish police lines and barricades to preserve the public peace, arrest offenders and to protect the rights of person and property.

#### • **City Code Sec. 15-30**

##### **Kindling bonfires**

- Unlawful to set a fire on any public street, avenue, highway, public property or right of way unless expressly allowed by a permit.

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- Obstruction object or instrument means a device commonly known as a lock box or sleeping dragon or any components of those devices including but not limited to: pipes, tubes wire, handcuffs, chains, carabineers, or padlocks, or containers either weighted or not.

#### • **City Code Sec. 15-27**

- Placing objects in roadway, public right of way prohibited.
- Unlawful to place any tripod, bipod, or other pole or object with the intent to obstruct pedestrian or vehicular movement on a public road, public sidewalk, public right of way, entrance or exit to private property, or any other area open to the public.
- Unlawful for anyone to attach themselves to another person, building, vehicle, or fixture with the intent to obstruct pedestrian or vehicle movement on a public road, public sidewalk, public right of way, entrance or exit to private property, or any other area open to the public.

#### • **City Code Sec. 15-28**

- Possession and dispersal of noxious substances
- Unlawful to possess any noxious substance with the intent to use the noxious substance to interfere with a lawful assembly or to interfere with the emergency services or to interfere with a person's right of entry or right to leave a place.

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#### • **City Code 15-31**

##### **Attachments to public and private property**

Unlawful to hang, fasten, or attach, any rope, wire, chain, sign, banner, or electrical device or power cord to any public or private property including buildings, bridges, overpasses, vehicles, construction equipment, memorials, utility poles or artwork unless express permission has been granted by the owner or manager of the property.

#### • **City Code 15-313**

- Extraordinary Event Ordinance – prohibited items – examples:
  - o It is illegal to possess certain items within the extraordinary event zone such items as metal shaft, cable or plastic pipe capable of inflicting injury;
  - o A container of sufficient weight that may be used as a projectile and cause serious injury;
  - o Body armor, helmets, gas masks with the intent to delay or obstruct officers;
  - o Fireworks, smoke bombs, sparklers, and stink bombs

*Note: Officers should seek voluntary compliance first before making an arrest. Remember in some circumstances it may not be tactically feasible to make an arrest. Arrests should not occur in isolation but involve chain of command.*

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# Managing Large-Scale Security Events

## A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

### Required Equipment

Based on your assignment, all patrol personnel at the rank of sergeant or below will carry:

- Service weapon with magazine
- Radio
- Handcuffs
- OC aerosol spray
- Collapsible baton
- Personal armor
- Traffic control vest
- Riot helmet
- Gas mask

Prohibited equipment includes, but is not limited to:

- Blackjacks
- Brass knuckles
- Ammunition other than department issued for departmental weapons
- Gloves that do not cover the entire hand, wrist, and fingers, i.e., driving gloves
- Mirrored sunglasses

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If you discover an unattended or suspicious package the following steps should be taken:

1. DO NOT TOUCH OR MOVE THE PACKAGE.
2. Evaluate the probability factors by asking questions such as, "Where did the item come from?" "Where was it placed?" "How long has it been there?" "Is the item a typical or normal item which would routinely be found in the area?" (Homeless person's effects?)
3. Examine the exterior of the package for suspicious indicators it may contain, does it look out of place? Wires, odors, noises, etc.
4. Attempt to identify and contact owner /sender to inquire of package contents.
5. If you are still unable to resolve the situation contact the bomb squad.

### Use your senses & common sense.

You can contact the bomb squad for assistance or response in several ways:

- Radio - CMPD Communications (Any dispatched Channel on CMPD Radio)
- Calling 911 or CMPD Command Center

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### Bomb Threats and Explosive Devices

#### Response to Unattended & Suspicious Packages or IED's

The primary responsibility of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department is to ensure the safety of persons and the security of the affected area. Any movement or investigation of a suspect explosive device should be left to the Bomb Squad's authorized explosives ordnance disposal personnel.

#### Definitions:

##### Unattended Package/Item

A package or item(s) that has been left in a location, by an unknown person or entity, with no indications or available intelligence that raises the threat level to a "suspicious/suspect package."

##### Suspicious/Suspect Item

A package or item possibly containing: energetic, chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material. It is deemed to be unusual due to physical indicators, design, placement or intelligence information received. A suspicious package/item will require a response of the Bomb Squad personnel.

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### Arrest Processing

The role of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department is to maintain law and order and ensuring the safety of the public. Officers will arrest and take into custody those individuals engaging in criminal conduct.

#### Mobile Field Forces

Mobile Field Forces will be issued pre-packaged arrest kits for use in all arrests related to the DNC event. Each kit contains a preprinted wrist band, a sheet of peel-off barcode labels, property bags and arrest paperwork. Once an arrestee is secured, the arresting MFF officer will:

- attach the provided wrist band to the arrestee
- attach the provided barcode labels to property bags and arrest paperwork
- hold until arrival of Prisoner Transport Van or other designated vehicle

#### Prisoner Transport

Vans or buses specifically configured for prisoner transport will be utilized for transporting arrestees. These vehicles will be available at the designated arrest collection points. Officers assigned to prisoner transport will for each arrest:

- scan both the barcode of the arresting officer and the arrestee
- take a digital photograph of the arresting officer and his/her arrestee
- submit this data electronically via the assigned mobile device

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## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

### A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

- transport arrestees to the Temporary Emergency Arrest Staging Area (TEASA) located at the Jail North Intake Center
- upon turning over arrestees to TEASA personnel, drop off any collected property at the property collection point also located at the Jail North Intake Center
- return to the designated staging area or arrest collection points as needed

#### Temporary Emergency Arrest Staging Area (TEASA)

The TEASA will be utilized to facilitate the safe and orderly processing of all DNC related arrestees. Personnel assigned to the TEASA will:

- meet the arriving prisoner transport vehicle at the designated gate and assist arrestees in exiting the vehicle in a safe manner
- take possession of the arrestees' paperwork from the transport officers
- escort arrestees into the TEASA facility where the arrestees will be searched and photographed
- arrestees will be escorted and then placed into one of the holding cages
- the arrestees' paperwork will be taken and handed over to one of the CRU data entry stations

- once the MCSO Intake Deputies indicate they are ready to process arrestees, the arrestees will be taken from the holding cages, photographed and escorted to the arrest processing center where they will be transferred to the control of MCSO deputies
- once the arrest processing has been completed and the arrestees are to be released then the MCSO will notify the TEASA, who will then escort the arrestees to the release point and have final photographs of the arrestees taken
- TEASA will provide instructions to the arrestees for the retrieval of any property that was taken during the arrest

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#### Cooperation With the Media


##### Joint Information Center (JIC) -704-342-7850

CMPD recognizes that a spirit of cooperation and openness is an essential component in fostering the trust and support of the community it serves. It is generally appropriate to release information unless it would be detrimental to the investigation or prosecution of a crime, or is of a confidential nature according to public records law. The Public Affairs Office will support and assist staff in working with the media and coordinate the appropriate communication of timely and accurate information.

The media has the right to be present and record activity including police action. Anyone, including the media, may record a police officer's actions.



If individuals are recording your actions, such as an arrest, and are physically interfering with the arrest, you should warn them to stand back and if possible direct them to a location where they can continue to record the event. You cannot prohibit the press or anyone else from recording your actions simply because you do not want to be recorded.

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


## A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies



# Managing Large-Scale Security Events

## A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies



### Logistical Information

Please utilize your radio channel for additional details on the following:

- Resting areas
- Feeding areas
- Transportation

You may also contact Public Affairs at **704-432-6053** for any general questions.

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Function	Talkgroup	Zone	Monitored by Dispatcher	Monitored by Command Center Rep
CMPD/CFD Communications Center Conference	CLT Wide	23	YES	YES
Interagency Command	CLT Command-1	23-25	NO	YES
CMPD Command Center to the MACC	CLT Command-2	23-25	NO	YES
CMPD Command Talkgroup	CMPD CMD1	22	NO	YES
CMPD Command Talkgroup (SPARE)	CMPD CMD2	22	NO	As Needed
Mobile Field Force (MFF) Primary	CEU-1	13	YES	YES
MFF Secondary	CEU-2	13	As Needed	As Needed
MFF Conference	CEU-3	13	NO	NO
MFF: Warrants and inquiries	CEU-4	13	YES	NO
SWAT/Tactical Primary	SWAT-1 (CMPD)	12	As Needed	As Needed
SWAT/Tactical Secondary	SWAT-2 (CMPD)	12	As Needed	As Needed
SWAT/Tactical Tertiary	SWAT-3 (CMPD)	12	As Needed	As Needed
Venues: Events (Arena, Stadium, and Conv Center)	PS-TAC1	25	YES	YES
Venues: Events (Arena, Stadium, and Conv Center)	PS-TAC2	25	YES	YES
Delegate Buses / Traffic / Motorcycles / Foot Patrol	PS-TAC3	25	YES	YES
Special Response Units / Arrest Processing	PS-TAC12	25	YES	YES
Motorcades	PS-TAC5	25	As Needed	As Needed
SPARE	PS-TAC6	25	NO	YES
SPARE	PS-TAC7	25	NO	YES
SPARE	PS-TAC8	25	NO	NO
Airport Operations	PS-TAC9	25	NO	NO
Special Events - North/ Hotels	PS-TAC10	25	YES	YES
Special Events - South	PS-TAC11	25	YES	YES
Dignitary Protection	PS-TAC12	25	NO	NO
SPARE	PS-TAC13	25	NO	NO
SPARE	PS-TAC14	25	NO	NO
SPARE	Ward1	23	NO	NO
SPARE	Ward2	23	NO	NO
SPARE	Ward3	23	NO	NO
SPARE	Ward4	23	NO	NO
Logistics 1	CMPD1	21	NO	NO
Logistics 2	CMPD2	21	NO	NO
Site Security - JC Smith University	Metro	1 or 3	YES	NO
Site Security - Johnson & Wales	Central	1 or 2	YES	NO
Interagency Hazmat/EOD - Dispatch	HAZ-OPS1	23	YES	YES
Interagency Hazmat/EOD - Conference/Spare	HAZ-OPS2	23	As Needed	As Needed
Fire Dispatch	CITY-DISP	24	NO	YES
CMUD - Support Services - garbage, water, debris	Evts-PW1 / Evts-PW2	18	NO	NO

### Acronyms

(ARC) American Red Cross  
(ATF) Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco Firearms and Explosives  
(BMC) Bomb Management Center  
(CFD) Charlotte Fire Department  
(CMPD) Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department  
(CMUD) Charlotte-Mecklenburg Utilities Department  
(DHS) Department of Homeland Security (Federal)  
(DNC) Democratic National Convention  
(DNCC) Democratic National Convention Committee  
(EMS) Emergency Medical Services  
(EOC) Emergency Operations Center  
(EOD) Explosive Ordnance Device  
(EPA) Federal Environmental Protection Agency  
(FBI) Federal Bureau of Investigation  
(FEMA) Federal Emergency Management Agency  
(HazMat) Hazardous Materials  
(ICS) Incident Command System  
(IOC) Intelligence Operations Center  
(JHAT) Joint Hazard Assessment Team  
(J-HERT) Joint Hazardous Explosive Response Team  
(JIC) Joint Information Center  
(JOC) Joint Operations Center (FBI)  
(MACC) Multi-Agency Communications Center  
(MCSO) Mecklenburg County Sheriffs Office  
(NIMS) National Incident Management System  
(NSSE) National Special Security Event  
(OEM) Office of Emergency Management  
(PIO) Public Information Officer  
(PPE) Personal Protective Equipment  
(TESEA) Temporary Emergency Arrest Staging Area  
(TSA) Federal Transportation Safety Agency  
(USSS) United States Secret Service  
(WMD) Weapons of Mass Destruction

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## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

### A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

#### Mission Statement

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department will build problem-solving partnerships with our citizens to prevent the next crime and enhance the quality of life throughout our community, always treating people with fairness and respect.

We value:

- Our Employees
- People
- Partnerships
- Open Communications
- Problem Solving
- Integrity
- Courtesy
- The Constitution of North Carolina
- The Constitution of the United States



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Office of Justice Programs

## Tampa Police Department Pocket Guide

### 2012 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

Tampa, Florida  
August 26-30, 2012



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – DO NOT RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC

The Republican National Convention is the largest special event that the Tampa Bay Area has ever hosted and is one of the biggest challenges of our careers. More than 50,000 visitors from around the world will arrive in Tampa in August to attend the RNC. In addition, it is expected that there will be an additional 15,000 members of the media and an estimated 15,000 individuals who will travel here to express their opinions through demonstrations during this five day event.

We are confident that your law enforcement experience and the specialized RNC training you have received will ensure the flawless handling of this event. We appreciate your dedication to making this the best political convention to date. In order to accomplish this mission, we ask you to remember your training, and understand that your actions must be appropriate and in the best interest of the operation. Everything that we do will be viewed across the nation and around the world. Let's show the world what makes our state law enforcement the best.

Thank you for your dedication, patience and positive attitude during the next few days.

God bless and stay safe. Also, remember to drink plenty of water and wear sunscreen!

**COMMUNITY INFORMATION REGARDING RNC:**  
(866)762-8687 or [www.tampagov.net/rnc](http://www.tampagov.net/rnc)

**OFFICER SUPPORT/QUESTIONS:**  
(813) 231-6135

# Managing Large-Scale Security Events

## A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

### WHAT TO DO IN CASE OF ON-THE-JOB INJURY

All accidents must be reported to your supervisor immediately! If no supervisor is available, report the claim to Chartist by calling toll free (800) 242-2418 x 72239 policy # 015-11-0348 for work related injuries during normal business hours (8 am – 5 pm). Medical services may be obtained from one of the medical facilities listed below. For after hours care, go to the nearest hospital emergency room (listed below):

<b>Med Express Urgent Care Urgent Care Center/ Walk-In</b> 206 E Brandon Blvd Brandon, FL 33511 813-681-5571	<b>Med Express Urgent Care Urgent Care Center/ Walk-In</b> 13856 N Dale Mabry Hwy Tampa, FL 33618 813-264-1885	<b>Med Express Urgent Care Urgent Care Center/ Walk-In</b> 13610 Bruce B Downs Blvd Tampa, FL 33613 813-977-2777
<b>Med Express Urgent Care Urgent Care Center/ Walk-In</b> 2810 W Dr MLK Jr Blvd Tampa, FL 33607 813-877-8450	<b>AFTER HOURS CARE Florida Hospital Carrollwood</b> 7171 N Dale Mabry Hwy Tampa, FL 33614 813-971-8000	<b>St. Josephs Hospital</b> 3001 W Dr Martin Luther King Jr Blvd Tampa, FL 33607 813-870-4000
<b>Florida Hospital</b> 3100 E Fletcher Ave Tampa, FL 33613 813-971-6000	<b>CRISIS CARE Tampa General Hospital</b> 1 Tampa General Circle Tampa, FL 33606 813-844-7000	

### Medical

### DECONTAMINATION PROCESS

A typical decontamination process consists of:

**Evaluation-** Determines the threat, contamination potential, and need for decontamination

**Method-** The degree of decontamination that is determined

**Clothing Removal-** For the purpose of physically removing contaminants

**Wash-** Water is an excellent solution to physically remove contaminants from the body

**Soap-** Mild soap might be provided as a surfactant to lock onto the contaminant

**Rinse-** removes all soap, debris, and contaminant

**Garment-** A disposable garment to be worn following decontamination

**Re-evaluation-** Determines if you can be released or should seek further medical treatment.

### SIGNS OF HEAT EXHAUSTION

Heat exhaustion often begins suddenly, sometimes after excessive exercise, heavy perspiration, and inadequate fluid or salt intake. Signs and symptoms: Feeling faint or dizzy, nausea, heavy sweating, rapid, weak heartbeat, low blood pressure, cool, moist, pale skin, low-grade fever, heat cramps, headache, fatigue or dark-colored urine. Steps to dealing with heat-related issues should be taken in the following order:

- Call 911 – and provide relevant information about the person
- Get the person out of the sun and into a shady or air-conditioned location
- Lay the person down and elevate the legs and feet slightly
- Loosen or remove the person's clothing
- Have the person drink cool water or other nonalcoholic beverage without caffeine
- Cool the person by spraying or sponging with cool water and fanning
- Monitor the person carefully. Heat exhaustion can quickly become heatstroke

### CPR REMINDERS

#### Universal Precautions

Use glove and mask

**Step 1 (CAB) Check for responsiveness.**

Circulation / Breathing / Airway

Look for signs of life (rise and fall of chest)

Check pulse /10 seconds

**Step 2 Absence of pulse, start Compression @ Rates**

100 comp/min - 30 compressions/2 breaths single rescuer Adult, Child and Infant.

100 comp/min - 30/2 two rescuers Adult and Child (Infant 100 comp/min @ ratio 15/2)

**Step 3 Pulse present, but no breathing.**

Provide rescue breaths as follows:

Adults- 1 breath every 5 to 6 seconds.

Child/Infant - 1 breath every 3 to 5 seconds.

**Compression Depths**

Adults: 2"

Child: 2" or 1/3 chest diameter

Infants: 1 ½" ¼ chest diameter



# Managing Large-Scale Security Events

## A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

### LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. It is legal for you to be audio/video recorded by anyone during your duties at the RNC. Expect it to be constant. Ignore it.
2. 1st Amendment involves Free Speech and Right to Peaceably Assemble. Almost all 1st Amendment expression is legal, except words that are clearly obscene or true threats/inciting violence (riotous speech, although the mere advocacy of force or violence is insufficient).
3. Any regulation of speech must be content-neutral, and a person may not be silenced based upon an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction.
4. All aspects of the 4th Amendment still apply during RNC - consensual encounters, "Terry" stops, articulation of reasonable suspicion for a pat down for weapons. Any detention must be brief and cursory.
5. Independent probable cause must exist for each arrest (can't be based on proximity to others suspected of criminal activity).
6. Any force used must be "objectively reasonable" in light of the circumstances confronting the officer at the time.
7. Before arresting any protestor, consider, "What law is being broken?" "What charge do I have?" and "Is arrest necessary to accomplish your goal?"
8. Be aware, most lawsuits arise from RAWOV and disorderly conduct/ breach of the peace when no other charge is present. Be familiar with the elements, and include sufficient facts, documentation, and witnesses.

### Arrests

#### USE OF FORCE POLICY

The department's policy is that "excessive" force on the part of the police officers will not be tolerated. The guidelines are as follows:

1. Officers are allowed to use only such force as is necessary to complete the arrest.
2. This department expects all officers to defend themselves from physical attack while engaged in the performance of their official duty. If the person being arrested offers no resistance, then no force is required and none will be used.
3. Use of force can be used if an officer must defend himself from physical attack. Use of force is also acceptable if there is no physical attack on the officer, but is needed to overcome resistance in carrying out the police mission.
4. Officers, when not in uniform, must take steps to clearly identify themselves prior to a use of force.
5. Action taken by an officer in self-defense or in defense of others, up to and including the death of the assailant, or any action taken by an officer in apprehending a suspect, will be considered warranted and justified if there is sufficient cause, as would appear real and reasonable to a prudent police officer, to fear the life or safety of the officer or another.
6. Officers shall not carry any weapon not issued or approved by their department or with which they have not received training and demonstrated their proficiency.

### ARREST AND ARREST PROCEDURES

Orient Road Jail at 1201 Orient Rd is the official site for the booking, processing, retention, and release of all prisoners associated with the RNC event. All other prisoners will be directed to the Falkenburg Road Jail facility. Remote booking will be conducted by H.C.S.O. at the Hillsborough County Courthouse. Defendants will make initial appearance in video court conducted from the Orient Road Jail facility.

Any use of force will be fully documented as soon as practicable, but in any event no later than the end of the officer's shift or extra duty assignment.

The Report Writing Center will be located in the Rivergate Tower, 5th Floor, 400 N. Ashley. The Center will have a Conference/ Situation Review room, 20 computers for data entry, Internet access for officers to check their email, phone service.

**Potential Law Violations** - The following may not be commonly known/utilized, but may be relevant during the RNC and are punishable by arrest/NTA, unless otherwise noted:

Ordinance/Statute	Description
Tampa 2012-56	Tampa "Event Zone" Ordinance (use section and subsection when citing)
Tampa Ord. 14-112	Discharging BB gun/air gun in City limits
Tampa Ord. 14-205	Diving/Jumping from bridges where signs are posted.
Tampa Ord. 3-42	Consumption of Alcohol on Premises Zoned for Off-Premises Consumption
Tampa Ord. 3-44	Consumption of Alc. w/i 500 ft of Premises Zoned for Off-Premises Consumption
Tampa Ord. 14-46	Aggressive Panhandling (Threat or Intimidation)
Tampa Ord. 25-173	Solicitation in the Right of Way
Tampa Ord. 27-521	Sale of Alcohol w/o a Permit
Tampa Ord. 3-40	Open Container (Civil Citation ONLY)
Tampa Ord. 3-41	Alcohol in the Park (Civil Citation ONLY)
Tampa Ord. 14-49	Possession of GLASS bottles on City streets/public prop. (Civil Citation ONLY, but failure to leave property or dispose of bottle and contents = RAWOV per City Code)
F.S. 316.2035(3)	Unlawful to obstruct street (non-moving infraction)
F.S. 316.2045	Obstruction of public streets, highways and roads (pedestrian violation)

## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

### A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

F.S. 784.07	Batt. LEQ/EMT/Firefighter
F.S. 790.161	Making, possessing, throwing, projecting, placing or discharging any destructive device or attempt to do so
F.S. 790.163	False report about planting bomb, explosive, or weapon of mass destruction
F.S. 790.166	Manufacture, possession, sale, delivery, display, use, or attempted or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction or hoax weapon of mass destruction
F.S. 790.19	Shooting or Throwing Deadly Missiles into a Building or Vehicle
F.S. 806.111	Fire Bombs
F.S. 810.10	Posted land; removing notice unlawful
F.S. 810.115	Breaking or injuring fences
F.S. 843.03	Obstruction by disguised person
F.S. 843.12	Aiding escape
F.S. 843.19	Offenses against police dogs, fire dogs, or police horses
F.S. 861.01	Obstructing Highway
F.S. 861.011	Obstructing Transportation Facility
F.S. 870.01	Riot
F.S. 870.02	Unlawful Assemblies
F.S. 876.12, et. seq.	Wearing mask, hood or other device on public way- Merely wearing a mask in public is not illegal, nor is possession of a mask. Utilize ordinance prohibition on masks in event zone. These masks statutes should accompany an additional crime.
F.S. 876.52	Public Mutilation of Flag -DO NOT USE THIS STATUTE AS IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

#### BOMBS, BOMB THREATS, HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AND SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES

A vacant building that appears to be a safe house or hazardous device storage area should be considered dangerous as protestors may have counter-surveillance or booby traps in place. Do NOT make entry on your own. This will likely be a Tactical Response Team (TRT) entry. Your main job, once you identify these places, is to note what you observed without going back into the area.

Precursors to look for: Pipes, end caps, powders, bottles, gasoline, fuels, fertilizer, brake fluid, Vaseline, ice/cold packs, various household chemicals in unusual amounts, incendiary devices, fragmentation (nuts/bolts/ball bearings/nails etc), chemical odors, gloves/beakers/glass/ice (cooling baths).

Incendiary devices (such as Molotov cocktails) were used by protestors at the 2008 RNC and did result in fires in the City of Minneapolis. Typically, these devices are self-igniting, which means that no flame is necessary. They are designed to ignite when the glass is broken and the chemicals inside touch the chemicals outside. A Bomb Squad response is required for these devices. They are considered a destructive device and need to be documented and treated as such. Do NOT handle these devices! Do not attempt to pour the contents out!!! Evidence collection is crucial and will be handled by the responding EOD team.

CALL for an immediate EOD response. Be prepared to advise them of the following: How many devices, approximately how large (1 liter, 2 gallons, etc), description of device, any suspect, arrestee, witnesses, or information.

#### HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

Indicators of Hazardous Substance Exposure include: Skin irritation, dry or sore throat, nose bleeds, skin discoloration, shortness of breath or dizziness.

Isolate Contaminated Personnel from non-contaminated personnel, remove all clothing and equipment for wash down of contaminated area of body, place all clothing and equipment in sealed containers, seek medical treatment as soon as possible.

Collect information for incident reporting. Do not begin until area has been decontaminated. Evidence should NOT be disturbed until evaluated and recorded. Participate as necessary with other agencies. Provide all available information and assistance to other agencies involved in investigation.

Evidence should NOT be disturbed until evaluated and recorded. Participate as necessary with other agencies. Provide all available information and assistance to other agencies involved in investigation.

#### Hazardous Materials








# Managing Large-Scale Security Events

## A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

BOMB THREAT STAND-OFF CARD					
Threat Description	Explosives Capacity	Mandatory Evacuation Distance	Shelter-in-Place Zone	Preferred Evacuation Distance	
Pipe Bomb	5 lbs	70 ft	7'-1159 ft	+1200 ft	
Suicide Bomber	20 lbs	110 ft	11'-1639 ft	+1700 ft	
Briefcase/Suitcase	50 lbs	150 ft	15'-1849 ft	+1850 ft	
Car	500 lbs	320 ft	32'-1839 ft	+1900 ft	
SUV/Min	1,000 lbs	400 ft	40'-2399 ft	+2400 ft	
Small Delivery Truck	4,000 lbs	640 ft	64'-3799 ft	+3800 ft	
Container/Water Truck	10,000 lbs	860 ft	86'-5099 ft	+5100 ft	
Semi-Trailer	60,000 lbs	1570 ft	157'-9299 ft	+9300 ft	




**Food & Water**





## A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies



## EVENT ZONE

## EXHIBIT A



## Event Zone

PROHIBITED ITEMS CITY-WIDE [TAMPA ORD. 2012-56 (7)(A)(1-7)]

The following regulations shall be applicable throughout the entire City of Tampa, but only on public property that is owned, operated, managed, or leased by the City. Possession of the items requires an intent to cause injury, harm or damage to person or property:

<p>Pointed wood or wood filled w/ any material –liquid or gas</p>	<p>blasting caps, club, bludgeon</p>	<p>hatchet, ax, slingshot, BB gun, pellet gun, wrist shot, slingshot, stove, blackjack, metal knucklers, nun chucks, mace, iron buckle, chain</p>	<p>Projectile launchers, including supersoakers, water guns &amp; water cannons</p>
<p>Lumber greater than 1/4" thick and 2" width; if not rectangular, then not greater than 3/4" thick at thickest part</p>	<p>Wood, metal or plastic containing liquid or gas</p>	<p>Metal, plastic 1/8" wall thickness</p>	<p>Any container filled w/ liquid, solid or gas</p>
<p>Flammable</p>	<p>Flammable</p>	<p>Flammable</p>	<p>Flammable</p>

(A)(8) Unlawful for any person to throw, project, hurl or launch any object with the intent to cause intimidation, apprehension, injury, harm or damage to any person or property.

(A)(9) Unlawful for any person to set, light or use a fire, campfire, bonfire, or fire pit on public property, except by permit, or on private property with the prior written consent of the property owner.

### City Wide

### PROHIBITED ITEMS IN THE EVENT ZONE [2012-56 (7)(B)]

The items prohibited City-wide also apply, regardless of the person's intent to cause injury, harm, or damage to person or property. It shall be unlawful to possess the following items upon any public property within the Event Zone:

Rope, chain, cable, strapping, wire, string, line tape or similar material w/ greater than 30lb tensile strength & greater than 6ft length	Frangible/ breakable containers including, glass bottles, ornaments, light bulbs, ceramic vessels	LOCKS- including, padlocks, bicycle locks, chain locks	Material designed for a portable shield, NOT including fabric umbrellas w/o metal tips	Masks or device where face is hidden; Gas Masks; Sleeping Dragons
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Note: prohibition on gas masks shall not apply to any person wearing a medical oxygen mask that fits over the nose and mouth of the person and provides oxygen from an oxygen tank to the person.

The lock prohibition does not include (i) an integral component of a conveyance or structure; (ii) locks when utilized by the owner of private real property to secure permanent or temporary fencing; or (iii) locks attached to a bicycle;

The prohibitions do not apply when the person or his/her employer is licensed to do business in Hillsborough County, and the possession of the item is in the normal course of the person's business or law enforcement personnel or employees possessing a prohibited item in the course of their authorized duties; or any licensed medical professional in the performance of their medical duties.

## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

### A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies


Pursuant to **Section 9** of the ordinance, possession of obstruction devices is prohibited, as is placing objects in the right-of-way, sidewalk or roadway. This includes possessing or placing any tool, object, instrument or combination thereof, that is adapted, designed or intended to be used for obstructing the public's ability to freely move about, and includes a "Sleeping Dragon," tripods, bipod, pole, any sections of pipe or containers filled with or wrapped in weighted material such as concrete and/or containing handcuffs, chains, carabiners, padlocks or other locking devices. Unlawful for any person to inhibit the movement of emergency equipment on streets or sidewalks or rights of way or to place any instrument, tripod, bipod or other pole or object with the intent to obstruct the public's ability to freely move about on rights-of-way, sidewalks, entrance and exit to private property, or any other area to which the public has access. It shall be unlawful for any person to attach themselves to another person, building, vehicle or fixture with the intent to obstruct the public's ability to freely move about in areas to which the public has access.

**Section 10 - Prohibits Camping and Temporary Shelters on any City property, including parks, rights-of-way and sidewalks. City may remove shelter, bedding or belongings.**

**Section 11 - Prohibition on Urination and Defecation and disposal thereof**

**Section 12 - Prohibits Rappelling or climbing on any pole, tree, building, parking structure, bridge, overpass, crane or tower.**

**PUBLIC VIEWING AREA AND PARADE ROUTE**



**Public View Area**

#### **PROHIBITED IN THE PUBLIC VIEWING AREA (TAMPA ORD. 2012-56 (7)(C))**

In addition to the items prohibited City-Wide and in the Event Zone, the following items are **NOT ALLOWED** in the public viewing area:

Aerosol cans	Any weapon as defined in Event Zone	Camping gear	Coolers	Fireworks	Lasers	Non-plastic containers
Bottles	tripods	sticks	Ice chests	ladders	Monopods	bipods
Sticks, poles greater than dimensions set forth in City-Wide regs	Umbrellas with metal tips	Cans and thermoses	Any other item that law enforcement personnel determines to be a clear and present danger.			

**Masks are prohibited in the Event Zone but not in the Public Viewing Area or on the Parade Route.**

## **Managing Large-Scale Security Events**

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A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

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### A.28 Traffic and Transportation Plan Template<sup>46</sup>

*The Traffic and Transportation Plan should be released to the public two weeks to a month before the event. This will allow the public to review the plan and make preparations, as needed.*

*Placeholders for law enforcement agencies to fill in with the necessary information are identified with brackets [ ].*

**Title:** Law Enforcement and Public Safety Agencies Announce Security Restrictions and Transportation Plan for the [event].

**Contact Information:** [List contact information for all event-planning agencies and related stakeholders]

The [event] will be held in [city, state] from [dates]. The event has been designated as a [list designation].

Security and transportation plans for the convention and its events have been developed by a partnership of local, state, and federal law enforcement and public safety agencies. Every effort has been made to minimize the impact of these safety measures.

This plan provides the general outlines for road closures, vehicular and pedestrian restricted zones, and public transportation. Specific questions regarding this transportation plan should be directed to the participating agencies as identified.

In addition to the identified road closures and parking restrictions near event venues in [event venue locations], there will be intermittent traffic delays and temporary closures on interstate roads and throughout the area, beginning on [start date] until [end date], to allow [special transportation vehicles (e.g., motorcades)] to travel to and from event sites.

#### **Road Closures, Parking and Pedestrian Restrictions**

Road closures, parking restrictions, and changes to public transportation routes and public works services will be necessary during the [event] near [event venue locations]. The public's cooperation and patience in abiding by these restrictions is appreciated.

Parking-restricted areas will be posted with "Emergency No Parking" signage. Fencing, other physical barriers, and uniformed law enforcement officers will also be used to enforce vehicle and pedestrian restricted zones. Maps of the restricted areas in [event locations] are attached.

[Continue by outlining the parking restriction and road closures in each of the event's locations and/or affected areas.]

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<sup>46</sup> This template was derived using the 2012 RNC Transportation Plan.

## **Managing Large-Scale Security Events**

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A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

### **New Traffic Patterns and Pedestrian Restrictions**

[Include information on new traffic patterns and pedestrian restrictions.]

### **Parking Garages**

[Include information on closures/limited access to parking garages near the event venue(s).]

### **Access to city parks and services**

[Include information on closures/limited access to city parks, landmarks, and city services.]

### **Airspace Restrictions**

[If applicable, include information on airspace restrictions.]

### **Marine/Waterway Restrictions**

[If applicable, include information on marine/waterway restrictions.]

### **Public Transit**

[If applicable, include information on the impact to local public transit services.]

### **Online Information**

[Provide the public with web links and additional resources where they can obtain additional information and updates about the event.]

### **Appendices/Attachments**

[Include maps for all road closures, pedestrian restrictions, parking restrictions, etc.]



## Appendix B. Summary of Key Planning Checklists

Below is a summary of planning checklists according to each core operational area, including pre-planning elements.


Initiating Internal Department Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Review Lessons Learned from Previous Large-Scale Events	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Begin Planning Immediately; Do Not Wait for Federal Guidance	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop a Strategic Vision	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify a Lead Planner for the Department	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine Authorities of Participating Agencies	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Establish a Local Core Planning Team	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Understand that Operational Plans will Remain in Flux	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		


Developing the Operational Plan Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
▲	Staff and Engage in Subcommittees	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate and Participate in Planning Groups	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify and Include Supporting Agencies and Organizations	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop Scalable Plans	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Test the Operational Plan Prior to the Event	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		


Administrative and Logistics Support Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Engage in Collaborative Planning	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Work with Federal Grant Partners	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Acquire an Appropriate Number of Personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Obtain Necessary Equipment	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Focus Resources on Proven Systems and Technologies	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Logistics	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Practice Plans and Protocols	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine Staffing Requirements, and Track and Demobilize Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>


## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Administrative and Logistics Support Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Collaborate with Vendors and Ensure Accountability	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Provide Fixed and Mobile Nourishment Sites for Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate Lodging for Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Arrange for Officer Transportation	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

Command and Control Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Establish a Command Structure with Appropriate Leadership	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop a Professional Relationship with Agency Leaders	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate Response through a Unified Operations Center	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Coordinate Response with the MACC	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Maintain Situational Awareness	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Keep Open Lines of Communication	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Structure Operations Similar to Traditional Patrol Operations	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

Credentialing Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
▲	Abide by USSS Credentialing Protocols	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine the Type and Level of Credentials Required	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine if Vehicle Credentials are Needed	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Detail Credential Specifications	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Provide Specific Guidance to Individuals Requesting Credentials	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Process Credential Information in an Organized and Timely Fashion	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop Protocols for Creating and Distributing Credentials	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Ensure that Officers Understand Credential Protocols	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

Crowd Management Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Anticipate Crowd Behaviors and Actions	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Collaborate with Other Organizations	<input type="checkbox"/>

## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies


Crowd Management Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Use Data to Support the Development of Crowd Management Deployment	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop a Policing Strategy that is Focused on Non-Confrontational Tactics Centered on Team Policing	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify the Most Appropriate Resources for the Mission	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine Officer Dress	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Manage Demonstrator Activities	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Train Officers on the Policing Strategy	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Inform the Public of Response Tactics	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Create Mobile Response Teams	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Position Commanders in the Field	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		


Dignitary/VIP Protection Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine Who Needs Protection	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine Your Protection Strategy	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Acquire and Train Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for VIP Protection	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Minimize Officer Fatigue	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		


Financial Management Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop a Comprehensive and Detailed Budget	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Understand How NSSEs may be Financed	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Engage the State Administering Agency (SAA) for State-wide Resources as Needed	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Maintain Open Lines of Communication with Financial Stakeholders	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Prepare for Federal Site Visits and Post-event Audits	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		


## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Fire/ Emergency Medical Services/ Hospitals/ Public Health Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Obtain Necessary Personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Outline Operational Activities in Response Plans	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Collaborate During Steady-State Operations to Prepare for a Health Event Response	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate Joint Responses to Encourage Situational Awareness	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Train Medical Response Personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

Intelligence/ Counterterrorism/ Counter Surveillance Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Conduct Threat and Risk Assessments	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Intelligence	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Collaborate with Field Operations	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Leverage Technologies to Provide Real-Time Information	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Conduct Traditional and Non-Traditional Crime Analysis	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Use Intelligence Sources with Mobile Technologies	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Strategically Integrate Intelligence Sources	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

Interagency Communications and Technology Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Interagency Communications	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify Communication Technologies	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Test Communication Mechanisms	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Establish a Coordinated Communications Center	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Create Communication Strike Teams	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

Legal Affairs Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Include Law Experts in Early Planning	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Ensure that Plans are Constitutionally Sound	<input type="checkbox"/>

## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Legal Affairs Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Prepare and Thoroughly Review Contracts	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify Strategies to Mitigate Litigations Risk	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Ensure Outside Officers have Legal Jurisdiction	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		


Non Event Patrol Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Maintain Staffing and Resource Levels	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Manage Non-Security Event Responses	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Prepare for Large Emergencies	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		


Arrest Processing Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Focus Strategies on Deterring Arrests	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Prisoner Processing	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Conduct Pre-Event Exercises and Training	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Conduct Arrests Quickly	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop Protocols for Handling Evidence	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Conduct Infrastructure and Cyber Risk Assessments	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan to Protect Critical Infrastructure	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Request Assistance from the National Guard	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Use Risk Management Software	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

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Public Information and Media Relations Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Designate Public Information Officers Early in the Planning Phase	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Manage Public Affairs through a Joint Information Center	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify Your Audiences	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Public Affairs	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Communicate Openly with the Media	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Keep All Stakeholders Informed	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Provide On-site Information	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

Screening and Physical Security Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
<b>Security Perimeters and Checkpoints</b>		
●	Determine Secure Zones	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Establish Screening Protocols	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Define Staffing Responsibilities	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Acquire Resources and Equipment for Establishing Perimeters	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Collaborate with the USSS for Screening Secure Zones	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Airspace Security</b>		
●	Learn Airspace Security Plans and Protocols	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify and Work in Partnership with Interagency Stakeholders	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Collaborate with the Airspace Operations Center	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Airport Security</b>		
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Airport Security	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Establish Traffic Control Strategies	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Communicate with Stakeholders	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Maritime Security</b>		
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Maritime Security	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Venue Security</b>		
●	Determine Lead Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Engage in Early, Collaborative Planning	<input type="checkbox"/>

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Screening and Physical Security Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate Venue Security Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

Tactical Support and Explosive Device Response/ Hazardous Materials Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Combine HAZMAT and Explosive Device Response (EDR) Planning	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for EDR/HAZMAT	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		


Training Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Recommend Federal Incident Management Training	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Extensive Officer-Training Curriculum	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Deliver Training in Various Forms	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Track Training Sessions	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Test Personnel Post Training	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Conduct Drills and Exercises	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Give Training Resources to Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Provide the Community with Training	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

Transportation and Traffic Management Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Collaborate with Other Stakeholders	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Transportation	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Be Flexible	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Separate Traffic Command into Smaller Activities	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Use Officers, Signage, and Other Resources to Guide Traffic	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate Specialized Transportation for VIP/Delegate Buses	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		



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Emerging Technologies and Possibilities Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Prepare/Plan for Law Enforcement Use	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Prepare/Plan for Community Use	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Prepare/Plan to Counter Illicit Use	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

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## Appendix C. Acronyms

AAR	After-Action Report
ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
ASOC	Airspace Operations Center
ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
BJA	Bureau of Justice Assistance
BWC	Body Worn Camera
CCC	Interagency Coordination Communication Center
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CDOC	Cleveland Division of Corrections
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CIRC	Critical Incident Response Center
CMPD	Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department
CNA	Center for Naval Analysis
CPD	Cleveland Division of Police
CRS	Community Relations Service, US Department of Justice
CSB	Customer Service Branch
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DNC	Democratic National Convention
DOJ	U.S. Department of Justice
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EDR	Explosive Device Response
ESC	Executive Steering Committee
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAQ	Frequently Asked Question
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FFATA	Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act
FSRS	Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act Subaward Reporting System
GIS	Geographic Information System
GMS	Grants Management System
GPS	Global Positioning System
HAT	Hazard Assessment Team
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials
HVAC	Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
ICS	Incident Command System

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IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IOC	Intelligence Operations Center
JIC	Joint Information Center
JMOC	Joint Medical Operations Center
JOC	Joint Operations Center
LEO	Law Enforcement Officer
LSSE	Large-Scale Security Event
LTE	Long Term Evolution
MACC	Multi-Agency Command Center
MDT	Mobile Data Terminal
MFF	Mobile Field Force
MTS	Maritime Transportation System
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NSSE	National Special Security Event
OCFO	Office of the Chief Financial Officer
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OJP	Office of Justice Programs
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
PIO	Public Information Officer
PPD	Philadelphia Police Department
R&R	Rest and Rehabilitation
RISS	Regional Information Sharing Systems
RNC	Republican National Convention
SAA	State Administering Agency
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
TPD	Tampa Police Department
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
UAS	Unmanned Aerial System
USSS	U.S. Secret Service
UTV	Utility Terrain Vehicle

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# Appendix E. Police Foundation Team Bios

**Jennifer Zeunik, *Director of Programs***, provided project oversight for all work completed and ensured that all deliverables are completed on time and within budget. Ms. Zeunik has twenty years of public sector and nonprofit project management experience, working closely with all levels of government, currently playing a pivotal role in the Police Foundation's training and technical assistance projects. In her previous role as a law enforcement consultant, Ms. Zeunik provided strategic management expertise to international, federal, state, and local criminal justice clients. Her work focused on justice policy research, business development activities, program management, strategic planning, training and technical assistance management, and development of strategic communications. She has served as a writer on numerous published reports, including the COPS funded Police Foundation [\*Community Policing & Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Guidelines to Enhance Community Trust\*](#); [\*Maintaining First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North Minneapolis\*](#); [\*Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of the St. Louis County Police Department\*](#) and the International Association of Chiefs of Police ([\*IACP National Policy Summit Report on Community Police Relations: Advancing a Culture of Cohesion and Community Trust\*](#)). Ms. Zeunik holds a Bachelors Degree in Psychology and Criminology from Florida State University, and a Masters of Public Administration from the University of Georgia, School of Public and International Affairs.

**Chief Frank Straub, Ph.D. (Ret.), *Police Foundation Director of Strategic Studies***, also a non-resident Fellow at the Combatting Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, served as the Cleveland/RNC Team Lead. Dr. Straub, a 30-year veteran of law enforcement, served as Chief of the Spokane Police Department for three years. Spokane is the second largest city in the state of Washington and serves a community of 210,000 residents. During his tenure, the SPD dramatically reduced serious crime and the use of force by its officers, expanded community policing initiatives, and implemented a department-wide body worn camera program. Dr. Straub also served as the Public Safety Director in Indianapolis, where he led 3,200 sworn and civilian personnel assigned to the Department of Public Safety's police, fire, homeland security and other divisions. In that capacity he was responsible for planning and implementing all public safety operations for Super Bowl XLVI, the Indy 500, NFL & NBA playoffs, and NCAA Final Four competitions. Prior to that, he was the Public Safety Commissioner in White Plains, New York for seven years, directing 435 sworn and civilian personnel. During his tenure with the NYPD, Dr. Straub also served on the FBI/NYPD joint terrorism task force (JTTF) for six years. Dr. Straub holds a Bachelors of Arts in Psychology from St. John's University, a Master of Arts in Forensic Psychology from John Jay College of Criminal Justice, and a Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from the City University of New York.

**Chief Hassan Aden (Ret.), *Police Foundation Senior Advisor on Policing***, served as the Philadelphia/DNC Team Lead. Chief Aden has over 28 years of law enforcement executive leadership and service. He previously served as the Director of Research and Programs at the International Association of Chiefs of Police, overseeing a large portfolio of operational programs and research projects aimed at advancing police services, promoting enhanced



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administrative, technical, and operational police practices and policies. Chief Aden continues to serve on numerous national advisory groups including the National Academies of Science's Proactive Policing Committee, Department of Justice-sponsored groups, and others. Chief Aden's police experience includes serving as the Chief of Police with the Greenville (NC) Police Department. He has extensive experience in the administrative, investigative and operational aspects of policing, and has demonstrable success in working with questions such as crime control policies, community engagement, and strategic planning. Prior to his appointment as Chief of Police for the Greenville (NC) Police Department, he served in the Alexandria (VA) Police Department for 26 years, rising to the rank of Deputy Chief. He is a graduate of American University's School of Public Affairs, earning a Master of Public Administration degree.

**Chief Jane Castor (Ret.), *Law Enforcement Subject Matter Expert***, served on the Philadelphia Detail to develop the revised Planning Primer and "quick look" document. Chief Castor joined the Tampa Police Department in 1983 and in 2009 became the first woman to be named chief of the Tampa Police Department (TPD). Over the course of her career, Chief Castor built a reputation for working side by side with residents, community leaders, business owners and neighboring law enforcement agencies to reduce crime and improve the quality of life in Tampa. Those community partnerships are the foundation of TPD's dynamic crime reduction strategy, "Focus on Four." The department has smoothly handled many large-scale, national and international events under her command, including Super Bowl XLIII and the 2012 Republican National Convention. Chief Castor developed a progressive policing strategy that avoided the classic confrontations associated with political conventions. Chief Castor testified on the topic of officer safety before President Obama's Task Force on 21st Century Policing in February 2015 and serves on the board of the Major City Chiefs Association and on Harvard's Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety. She was named Woman Law Enforcement Executive of the Year in 2009 by the National Association of Women in Law Enforcement. A Tampa native, Chief Castor received a Bachelor of Science degree in Criminology from the University of Tampa. She received Master of Public Administration from Troy State University and is a graduate of the FBI National Academy.

**Deputy Commissioner Nola Joyce (Ret.), *Law Enforcement Subject Matter Expert***, served on the Philadelphia Detail to develop the revised Planning Primer and "quick look" document. Ms. Joyce has 25 years of public sector experience, serving as the Deputy Commissioner for the Philadelphia Police Department, the Chief Administrative Officer for the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C. and the Deputy Director of Research and Development for the Chicago Police Department. Ms. Joyce serves in a number of positions focused on improving the quality of policing. She was appointed to the National Academy of Science's panel on Modernizing the Nation's Criminal Statistics and has been invited to testify in front of President Obama's Task Force on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing. In Philadelphia, Ms. Joyce helped manage and direct changes in policies, processes, and procedures for Commissioner Charles H. Ramsey. She directed the department's support services, including training, personnel, technology, administration, policy, research and planning, analysis and mapping, grants, and strategic planning. With the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C. from 1998 to 2007, she guided the expansion of the community-policing model, the alignment of the budget with

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strategic initiatives, and the implementation of significant changes in the department's organizational structure. In her six years as the Deputy Director of the Research and Development Division for the Chicago Police Department, Ms. Joyce helped develop and implement the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), one of the most studied community policing initiatives in the country and a nationally recognized community policing model. Ms. Joyce has three Masters degrees and is currently a doctoral degree candidate in criminal justice at Temple University. Her degrees are in Homeland Defense and Security from the Naval Postgraduate School, in Urban Affairs and Public Policy from Southern Illinois University, and in Sociology, with a specialization in research methodology and statistics, from Southern Illinois University.

**Chief Rodney Monroe (Ret.), *Law Enforcement Subject Matter Expert***, served on the Cleveland Detail to develop the revised Planning Primer and “quick look” document. Chief Monroe has over thirty-seven years of law enforcement experience serving in various positions and overseeing a vast array of specialized commands, eventually serving as Chief of Police in several major cities. He has over twelve years of senior executive level experience as Chief of Police for the Cities of: Macon (GA); Richmond (VA); and Charlotte (NC). Prior, Chief Monroe served as a seasoned manager with senior executive level experience for the Metropolitan Police Department. Chief Monroe has significant experience in law enforcement, financial planning, personnel logistics, major criminal investigations, planning and managing initiatives to implement Community Policing strategies with emphasis on youth development and engagement, and special events within three major police agencies. Chief Monroe has significant experience planning, organizing, and managing LSSEs, including the 2012 Democratic National Convention, the 1995 Million-Man March, and the 1997 Presidential Inauguration.

**Commissioner Robert Haas (Ret.), *Law Enforcement Subject Matter Expert***, served on the Cleveland Detail to develop the revised Planning Primer and “quick look” document. Commissioner Haas served as the chief executive of the Cambridge Police Department from 2007 to 2016. Prior to this, he was the Massachusetts state Executive of Public Safety from 2006 to 2007, and served as the state Undersecretary of Law Enforcement and Homeland Security from 2003-2006. He was Chief of the Westwood (MA) Police Department from 1991 to 2003, and served in various positions in the Morris Township Police Department from 1976 until 1991. Commissioner Haas received a Masters of Arts in Criminal Justice Administration from Rutgers University and a Bachelor of Science Degree from William Paterson College of New Jersey. He has completed course work for a Ph.D. in Law, Policy and Society at Northeastern University. He has served on many boards and commissions, and is currently a member of the U.S. Attorney's Multi-disciplinary Threat Assessment and Intervention Working Group.

**Ben Gorban, *Policy Analyst***, provided on- and off-site input and project support as well as document writing, review, and editing. Mr. Gorban is a policy analyst with more than eight years of experience supporting law enforcement-related projects including the provision of technical assistance and policy analysis support on projects related to countering violent extremism, community policing, and the role of social media in law enforcement. Mr. Gorban's areas of expertise include policy analysis, resource and strategy development, and communications and

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information dissemination. He has served as a writer on multiple published reports and articles, including the COPS Office funded [\*Maintaining First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North Minneapolis\*](#); and [\*Managing the Response to a Mobile Mass Shooting\*](#) and [\*Lessons Learned from the Police Response to the San Bernardino and Orlando Terrorist Attacks\*](#). He received his MS in Justice, Law, and Society from American University in 2011 and his BA in both Philosophy and Justice, Law, and Society from American University in 2009.