

June 18, 2020

Commissioner Michael S. Harrison Baltimore City Police Department 601 East Fayette Street Baltimore, MD 21202

RE: Final Reports - Baltimore Police and Community Input Reports on Community Policing and Engagement

Dear Commissioner Harrison,

In October of 2019, the National Police Foundation (NPF) completed a series of focus groups, interviews, and feedback collection efforts designed to gather input from hundreds of Baltimore Police Department (BPD) staff and Baltimore community members on community policing and engagement in the City, in order to assist in the creation of the BPD's community policing plan. As the focus groups, interviews, and feedback efforts were completed, we shared the feedback with the BPD and the Monitoring Team to ensure that the perspectives of both could be incorporated into the plan, which we understand was accepted by the Monitoring Team approximately 60 days ago, in April of 2020. Today, we are pleased to share the final reports that document the feedback we received.

Our methodology involved a total of 11 focus groups of sworn and non-sworn BPD personnel selected through a randomized process. A total of 131 BPD personnel attended the focus group meetings, including lieutenants, sergeants, patrol officers, detectives, and non-sworn staff members across the nine BPD districts.

To ensure representation and include feedback from a wide range of community individuals and groups, the NPF worked with the BPD, City of Baltimore officials, community members and stakeholders, and contracted with Loyola University Maryland and the No Boundaries Coalition. A combination of three methods of gathering input was used: (1) formal focus groups, (2) mobile field interviews and discussions, and (3) open feedback forms (both in hard copy and electronic forms). In total, we received input from 618 individuals through 12 formal focus groups, 28 mobile field interview and discussion sessions, and 380 individuals who completed open feedback forms. Participants were asked the same questions regardless of the method through which they provided input.



We were encouraged that both BPD and community members expressed similar desires—positive community engagement while enabling the City to address crime and quality of life issues. Many community participants indicated expectations of fair and respectful police response and services. Additionally, community members expressed a desire for increased police visibility (including foot patrol) and more non-enforcement oriented engagement to enhance community safety and the relationship between the community and the BPD. Many of the BPD participants that we solicited feedback from cited a lack of general support for BPD as a significant concern and encouraged improved strategic deployment of sworn and non-sworn BPD staff, as well as support from elected officials, the media, and the public to assist them in being able to engage in more community policing activities.

We want to recognize the Ford Foundation for providing the resources to engage the community in this way and we thank the hundreds of BPD personnel and community members that participated in this effort. The BPD's willingness to support the collection of open and honest feedback from department employees, and incorporate that feedback into the department's community policing plan, is commendable.

We know and appreciate that a significant amount of change has taken place since the data was collected and we understand that more may be forthcoming. We look forward to continuing to support the needs of the BPD as it implements these changes, the consent decree terms, and its community policing strategy.

Respectfully, Jim Burch President

Cc: Danny Murphy, Deputy Commissioner, Compliance Bureau, Baltimore Police Department Shannon Sullivan, Director, Consent Decree Implementation, Baltimore Police Department

# Community Policing in Baltimore: Perspectives from Baltimore Police Department Personnel

March 2019



The internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the date of publication. Given that URLs and websites are in constant flux, the National Police Foundation cannot vouch for their current validity.

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# Introduction

# **Purpose of Project**

On April 7, 2017, the United States, the City of Baltimore, and the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) entered into a consent decree to resolve the findings of a civil rights investigation conducted by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) into the practices of the BPD. According to the DOJ Civil Rights Division report prior to the consent decree, "one of the fundamental causes of the breakdown in the relationship between the Department and the community it serves is that, throughout much of the Department, community policing principles are not being implemented."<sup>1</sup> Therefore, one of the overarching goals of the consent decree is to improve police-community relations through a myriad of strategies.

In an effort to address this, the consent decree requires that the BPD develop a community engagement plan to promote positive interactions between the police and the community. Paragraphs 15-26 of the consent decree detail requirements for improving relationships between the community and the BPD through community policing and engagement. Paragraph 19, specifically, reads, "The City and BPD will, within their respective spheres, develop and implement community-engagement plans for creating opportunities for routine and frequent positive interactions between officers and community members, including those critical of BPD."<sup>2</sup>

The BPD recognizes that an important part of the process of developing the community engagement plans is collecting feedback from department members that regularly interact with the community. To cultivate discussion and optimize input from a variety of sworn (lieutenants and below) and non-sworn BPD members in public-facing roles, the National Police Foundation (NPF) facilitated a series of eleven focus groups from November 7-9, 2018. The focus groups were designed to collect qualitative information from BPD personnel on their perceptions of the department's challenges and areas of change needed for enhanced community policing and engagement.

It is important to note that although many focus group participants expressed frustration and acknowledged that department morale is currently low, there was a clear commitment to the process of providing input and solutions and sense of hopefulness that the department can rebuild trust, strengthen its relationships with the Baltimore community, and ultimately increase safety in Baltimore. BPD members who attended the focus groups were actively engaged in thoughtful dialogue with facilitators and one another, actively participated in the discussions and the voting process, and provided candid and thoughtful feedback.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Civil Rights Division. (2016, August 10). Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department. U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved from <u>https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> <u>https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925056/download</u>

# Methodology

Through funding provided by the Ford Foundation, the NPF facilitated a series of focus groups focused on community policing and gaining input from BPD personnel as the Department develops their community policing strategy. The NPF held a total of 11 focus groups of sworn and non-sworn BPD personnel (one pair of focus groups was combined, but NPF staff sampled for 12 focus groups). BPD participants were selected through a randomized process and were asked to report to the location for their assigned focus group session.

These focus group sessions were held November 7-9, 2018, at BPD headquarters. A total of 131 personnel attended the BPD focus group meetings, but 129 participants finished the focus groups. The groups contained BPD lieutenants, sergeants, patrol officers, detectives, and non-sworn staff members. To the extent possible, the focus groups were differentiated by ranks and sworn/non-sworn status to enable open and honest conversation. A detailed account of the focus group methodology is included in Appendix A of this report.

#### **Findings**

Using nominal group technique (see appendix A), focus groups, participants were asked two specific questions. Participants gave answers in the group setting and then were asked to prioritize them through a voting process. Below is an overview of the topics discussed.

Question 1 asked, "What challenges prevent BPD from engaging in community policing today?" A total of 286 specific items were noted by the participants and documented by NPF staff on flipcharts.<sup>3</sup> After each focus group had its documented list of challenges, the participants were asked to vote, by placing stickers next to the items that they felt were their most important challenges.<sup>4</sup> Many of the same issues were identified across focus groups and a total of 592 votes were placed on specific items. To better organize the items, account for the overlaps, and identify the most important challenges across BPD members based on the vote totals, the specific issues were coded into 15 broader topics:

- Accountability
- Communication
- Culture
- Equipment and Technology
- Lack of Support
- Leadership
- Miscellaneous
- Mission Creep

- Morale
- Performance Measures
- Policies
- Recruitment and Retention
- Safety and Wellness
- Staffing
- Training

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> A full list of the responses can be found in Appendix D of this report.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Each participant was given five stickers for each question and could use their stickers however they wished. Some participants placed multiple stickers next to a single item, while others did not use all five stickers.

When participants were asked to vote on the biggest challenges preventing the BPD from engaging in community policing, *lack of support* received the highest number of votes (n=183, 31 percent of all votes cast). *Lack of support* included support from within the BPD; from the community, the criminal justice system, city officials, and the media; and, lack of citywide funding and resource support. *Staffing*—both in terms of personnel and deployment—was also identified as a common challenge (n=151, 26 percent of all votes cast). These results are displayed in Figure 1 and Figure 2.

| Торіс                 | Total Votes |
|-----------------------|-------------|
| Lack of Support       | 183         |
| Staffing              | 151         |
| Equipment             | 56          |
| Leadership            | 53          |
| Safety and Wellness   | 47          |
| Training              | 34          |
| Accountability        | 24          |
| Morale                | 14          |
| Miscellaneous         | 12          |
| Culture               | 8           |
| Recruitment/Retention | 8           |
| Mission Creep         | 1           |
| Policies              | 1           |
| Communication         | 0           |
| Performance Measures  | 0           |

Figure 1: Total Votes on Topics Raised in Response to Question 1

*Figure 2: Vote Percentages on Topics Raised in Response to Question 1 (n=592)* 



Question 2 asked, "What should the BPD community policing strategies include (activities, philosophies, etc.)?" A total of 205 specific items were noted by the participants and documented by NPF staff.<sup>5</sup> Like the first question, after each focus group had its documented list of activities and philosophies, the participants were asked to vote, following the same method describe above, selecting the items that they felt were most important to include in the community policing strategies. Many of the same items were identified across focus groups and a total of 624 votes were placed on specific items. To better organize the specific items and account for the overlaps, they were coded into 13 broader topics:

- Accountability
- Communication
- Community Engagement
- Culture
- Equipment and Technology
- Increased Support
- Leadership

- Performance Measures
- Policies
- Recruitment and Retention
- Safety and Wellness/Morale
- Staffing
- Training


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> A full list of the responses can be found in Appendix E of this report.

When participants were asked to vote on the most important activities and philosophies to include in the community policing strategies, *Staffing*—both in terms of increasing personnel and more-effectively deploying personnel—received the highest number of votes (n=146, 23 percent of all votes cast). *Community engagement*—including educational, diversion, reentry, and mentoring programs; athletic leagues and social activities; and, other relationship-building opportunities—was also identified as important to include in the community policing strategies (n=122, 200 percent of all votes cast). These results are displayed in Figure 3 and Figure 4.

| Торіс                      | Total Votes |
|----------------------------|-------------|
| Staffing                   | 146         |
| Community Engagement       | 122         |
| Increased Support          | 97          |
| Communication              | 60          |
| Culture                    | 38          |
| Performance Measures       | 32          |
| Safety and Wellness/Morale | 26          |
| Policies                   | 24          |
| Training                   | 20          |
| Recruitment/Retention      | 18          |
| Leadership                 | 16          |
| Accountability             | 14          |
| Equipment                  | 11          |

Figure 3: Total Votes on Topics Raised in Response to Question 2

Figure 4: Vote Percentages on Topics Raised in Response to Question 2 (n=624)



Additionally, the NPF solicited feedback from BPD members regarding the same two questions asked of the focus groups through an open comment box on a password-protected page on the NPF website. Thirty-six (36) comments were provided.<sup>6</sup> To better organize the multiple items mentioned in some of the responses, they were coded into 13 broader topics.

| Торіс                      | Number of Open Comment Box<br>Responses Mentioned |
|----------------------------|---|
| Lack of Support            | 19  |
| Staffing                   | 14  |
| Leadership                 | 10  |
| Culture                    | 5   |
| Miscellaneous              | 5   |
| Accountability             | 4   |
| Communication              | 4   |
| Community Engagement       | 4   |
| Equipment                  | 4   |
| Safety and Wellness/Morale | 4   |
| Training                   | 3   |
| Performance Measures       | 2   |
| Policies                   | 1   |

Figure 5: Number of Open Comment Box Responses that Mention Each Topic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> A full list of responses can be found in Appendix F of this report.

# **Observations**

The National Police Foundation (NPF) team believes it is important to note observations that were not captured in the descriptions of the participants' comments, but were observed by the team during the focus groups:

- BPD members were actively engaged in focus group discussions, exhibiting a desire to improve the department's community policing efforts, despite being skeptical of tangible results. Of note by the NPF team was that all of the participants that attended the focus groups demonstrated a willingness to be involved in moving the BPD forward by providing candid feedback. Everyone engaged in thoughtful dialogue with facilitators and one another, actively participated in the discussions and the voting process, and appreciated the opportunity to contribute. However, many participants expressed frustration that similar focus groups had been held in years past with no substantive results and were skeptical of the likelihood that their input this time would be any different.
- Some BPD members did not exhibit a clear understanding or common definition of the principles of community policing or engagement. During focus groups, the NPF assessment team noted that participants raised questions about the definition of community policing or had vastly different definitions. Many participants also either lacked an overall understanding of the key principles and philosophies of community policing or had different perspectives on what community policing entails. Several of the comments referenced working more with youth.
- Many participants exhibited and described physical and emotional responses to current working conditions, including showing notable levels of fatigue and low morale. Participants in each focus group exhibited a sense of frustration, hopelessness, and demoralization regarding their recent experiences in the BPD. The NPF team also observed physical signs of stress such as fatigue, likely related to drafting and forced overtime. The NPF team observed that participants in some of the focus groups showed little hope that real, sustainable change for the better is possible.

# **Key Themes from Focus Group Discussions**

The thematic areas described below emerged from the conversations during the focus groups. To demonstrate the prominence of each key theme, the top ten—as calculated by the total number of participant votes related to comments in both Question 1 and Question 2—are listed in order of importance, as determined by BPD personnel. To fully understand the aggregate of priority themes and flesh out each of the key themes—as well as the statements captured from BPD focus group participants directly from the flipcharts, in bullet points and italics—the summaries below are combinations of the discussions from both questions. Not all responses to Question 1 road mapped strategy discussions from Question 2, however, the aggregate of key themes across all focus groups demonstrated shared key themes related to community policing in Baltimore. For example, some focus groups identified the department's culture as a challenge preventing the BPD from engaging in community policing in response to Question 1 but did not discuss strategies to change the culture during their responses to Question 2.

# 1. Staffing

With a total of 297 votes, participants in all of the focus groups identified staffing as a general challenge and 10 of the focus groups indicated the need for strategic deployment of sworn and non-sworn BPD members to support the successful implementation of community policing. They indicated that the ineffective deployment of officers was demoralizing, particularly when it appeared to exacerbate the patrol workload. Noting that "[p]atrol is not prioritized" at the BPD, many participants expressed frustration that specialized units were the real priority of the agency and questioned the deployment practices that pull officers out of patrol or appear to use patrol officers inefficiently. Sworn and civilian participants recognized opportunities where civilian or light duty personnel could be used to address the BPD workload more efficiently. Some participants also highlighted certain call-for-service priorities—such as calls about parking enforcement or neighbors dumping trash in back alleys—that could be better addressed by special units of light duty officers or other city agencies, which would free full-duty patrol officer time to focus on other calls. Emerging from these deployment discussions BPD participants suggested that a community policing strategy include:

- Create opportunities for officers to get out of cars not to just clear corners;
- Bring back post officers (held accountable for post, community relations there); <sup>7</sup> and,
- Have officers/time [to] focus on problem solving.

Additionally, participants in five focus groups specifically identified short-staffing as a challenge that has to be addressed in a community policing strategy. Comments from these participants suggested that the BPD does not currently have the number of officers on patrol, nor the time while on duty to conduct proactive community engagement activities. Participants explained that the reduced number of patrol officers is not conducive to proactive police work. With the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Posts are specific geographic areas within a district.

continued practice of drafting<sup>8</sup> and the decrease in officers, those who remain on patrol are expected to answer and clear calls instead of having the time to engage in community policing activities. The recent staffing study completed in August 2018, which indicates that "the number of filled and assigned positions does not meet the needs of the department and the community," matches the officer perceptions.<sup>9</sup> To account for the shortfalls, officers are "drafted" to work overtime patrol on other shifts, which also hampers the proclivity of officers to engage community members. To address the staffing challenges, focus group participants mentioned:

- Have officers be able to respond to all calls appropriately. Lead to credibility and trust;
- Rotating shifts, don't see/interact with community members regularly;
- Can't use technology/training if BPD does not have [the necessary number of deployed] staff to [effectively] engage [with the community]. Then all of the investments are pointless without people to be trained and get the work done; and,
- Look at proper staffing and assignments with real numbers.<sup>10</sup>

Short-staffing and inefficient deployment have contributed to, and compounded, challenges in other areas including leadership, supervision, and officer safety and wellness. As a result of drafting, BPD sergeants and officers are often required to work on different shifts and with different personnel. Participants in several focus groups noted that in many cases, the system of supervision is inadequate to support patrol officers. They suggested that the number of first-line supervisors is not sufficient to handle the workload. They also indicated that there is little consistency in supervision. Officers may be unsure of whether the sergeant during a particular shift is supportive of community policing or not, and whether or not that sergeant will be their supervisor on the next shift. Lack of a departmental understanding of community policing and training combined with inconsistent supervision seems to leave officers unsure of how they should perform their jobs effectively with community-oriented policing principles. The confusion was summarized as:

 Supervision: Sometimes supervisors are not helpful – not backing up – or "oversupervision" – inconsistent messaging in applying supervision of policy and practice. Officers who might question or not to follow supervisor guidance might be denied a day off [or potentially face other consequences];

https://www.baltimorepolice.org/sites/default/files/General%20Website%20PDFs/BPD%20Staffing%20Study%20R eport%20for%20Website.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Drafting is described as, "a BPD staffing process in which patrol officers are required to work overtime after the end of their regular shifts in order to compensate for staffing shortages, or be subject to discipline." For more, see: United States of America v. Police Department of Baltimore City, et. al. (2017, January 12). United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Retrieved from <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925056/download">https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925056/download</a> <sup>9</sup> Baltimore Police Department Staffing Study. (2018, August). Retrieved from <a href="https://www.baltimorepolice.org/sites/default/files/General%20Website%20PDEs/BPD%20Staffing%20Study%20R">https://www.baltimorepolice.org/sites/default/files/General%20Website%20PDEs/BPD%20Staffing%20Study%20R</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> According to the 2017 BPD End of Year Strength Report, the department had 95 sworn vacancies and 77 nonsworn vacancies. These numbers were based on the total funded positions, not the total budgeted positions, which discounts the positions that are frozen. When compared with the budgeted positions, the BPD had 320 sworn vacancies and 78 non-sworn vacancies.

- Not enough supervisors;
- No consistency in ranks, leadership no straight path to follow; and,
- Supervisors don't oversee the same officers in the same areas Span of Control.<sup>11</sup>

# **2.** Increased Support from Elected Officials, the Department, the Community, the Criminal Justice System, and the Media

Participants in all 11 focus groups, 280 total votes, identified the lack of support from supervisors, elected officials, the criminal justice system, the media, and the public as a challenge preventing the BPD from developing community engagement opportunities and doing community policing. While every group mentioned lack of support from at least one relevant stakeholder as a challenge, nine of the focus groups discussed the need for a community policing strategy that includes increased support from these stakeholders.

Increased Support from the Community. All but one of the focus groups identified the lack of support from community members as a challenge prohibiting BPD personnel from engaging in community policing. Some focus group participants noted that the BPD has piloted numerous programs and opportunities to engage community members, but the community has been hesitant to reciprocate because of potential negative impacts of being associated with the police. In other focus groups, participants expressed that incidents that have garnered local and national attention have contributed to the erosion of trust and has increased the division between the police and the communities they serve. Other participants suggested that the lack of respect by community members towards the police have eroded police-community relations and impacted community policing initiatives. Some of these participants perceived that there are community members who are less-inclined to follow officer directions. Additional participants suggested that some in the community do not accept responsibility for their criminal actions, which has led to police officers perceiving that some community members have developed unreasonable expectations of BPD officers. These participants indicated that officers are struggling with multiple community expectations to perform enforcement, respond to calls for service, and positively engage community members—often without the cooperation of the same community members.

Participants in three focus groups suggested that providing opportunities for community members to learn more about policing from the perspective of the BPD, rather than solely from the media and social media, would help to bridge police-community understanding. Participants suggested the BPD should hold the citizens' police academy more frequently and encourage community members—particularly the most-vehement critics—to go on ride-alongs to better understand the police perspective.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Focus group responses suggest that BPD's span of control may be too large for managers to adequately supervise and support their subordinates. Span of control refers to the number of subordinates that directly report to a manager. For example, in the BPD, this could refer to the number of patrol officers that report to a sergeant on any given shift.

- Have citizens take ride-alongs community doesn't want the job of police but the biggest critics won't do ride-alongs and won't take the time to understand why police do what they do. Areas that need ride-alongs are the areas that need the most help – and most unlikely to engage;
- Citizens police academy; and,
- Get community to understand police perspective, support policing on their end.

Increased Support Internally from Supervisors and Command Staff. Participants in six of the focus groups suggested that they do not feel supported by their supervisors and/or command staff to engage in community policing activities. Some sworn personnel indicated that first-line supervisors do not provide guidance, assistance, and support to the patrol officers they oversee. These officers also stated that the relationships between supervisors and patrol officers are so strained that officers are concerned about potential backlash and lack of support and therefore are afraid to take any actions in the community, including engaging community members. Officers who attended the focus groups suggested that supervisors should demonstrate their support of patrol personnel by obtaining and considering their ideas for improving community policing efforts.

- Support from supervisors (Have officer ideas on community policing and needs taken seriously);
- Have department support these activities; and,
- Patrol does not have a voice. Patrol officers feel worthless.

<u>Increased Support from Elected Officials</u>. Participants in six of the focus groups recommended that the BPD community policing strategy include strategies to increase support from elected officials and other City agencies. Some participants noted generally that elected officials do not support the BPD and speak negatively of the department on a regular basis. Others provided more detail, describing that elected officials involve themselves in policing decisions and operations but are also quick to criticize the BPD. Focus group participants proposed that elected officials participate in ride-alongs to better understand policing.

- Less City/Mayoral political interference;
- Have City leaders do ride-alongs (in our uniform); and,
- City Hall needs to understand what BPD does City Council needs to support BPD (they are working against BPD officers by using social media to disparage officers).

<u>Increased Support from the Media</u>. Negative portrayals and coverage by the media were discussed by six of the focus groups. These participants estimated that 99 percent of the time that there is a BPD story, the department is portrayed negatively and that there are no positive stories/coverage about the department by many media outlets. Participants intimated that the constant negativity in the media has had an impact on the perception of the BPD in the community.

- Media: negative comments 99 percent of the time. BPD does not have to be in the media all the time. Does not show enough good stories, not frequent enough;
- Media bashes department; and,
- Bad media coverage leads to no support, all negative perception.

<u>Increased Support from the Criminal Justice System</u>. Focus group participants in four of the focus groups expressed frustration with a perceived lack of support from the State's Attorney's Office and other stakeholders within the criminal justice system. Participants explained that they could affect a felony arrest on an individual, but because of a disconnect with the State's Attorney's Office, individuals are not charged appropriately or prosecuted according to the severity of their crime, leaving individuals free to return to their neighborhoods. Some officers perceived that breaking this cycle and having the support of the State's Attorney's Office would improve their efforts to help address crime in certain communities.

- Break the cycle of revolving criminals coming back to neighborhoods;
- No support from State's Attorney's Office; and,
- Disconnect between BPD and State's Attorney need to be able to charge appropriately people need to be prosecuted according to severity of the crime to reduce crime when those return back to neighborhoods.

# **3. Community Engagement**

Participants in all 11 focus groups identified the need for a community policing strategy that emphasizes meaningful opportunities to engage the Baltimore community, with 122 votes going to comments around community engagement. Focus group participants noted the general need to implement an array of strategies to engage with community members:

- Need opportunities to engage community;
- Get out and walk on foot; and,
- Have events where police and community can engage build relationships.
- No team policing no accountability for your area/sector[/post]; will not meet/know people if there isn't sector integrity; does not allow for stability and building rapport

Focus group participants across the board repeatedly raised the need for the BPD to develop strategies prioritizing building relationships with youth as key to increase trust and improve community-police relationships. This need to enhance engagement with city youth was emphasized with recognition of the BPD's historically complicated relationship with youth. Some participants noted the impact of the demonstrations following the April 2015 death of Freddie Gray on increased negative police-youth relations. To help address this, many participant groups called for a resurgence of organized activities like the Police Athletic League (PAL) program, which was phased out of the city in 2009.<sup>12</sup> Specific comments included:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> In 2009, PAL programs were phased out of the City of Baltimore. In 2018, with funding from the National PAL, the University of Maryland Baltimore Police launched a new PAL program in West Baltimore at their community

- Staff interaction with youth in schools; foot patrol on streets; build relationships with youth on the street;
- Bring Officer Friendly PAL back school-based programs with police at all levels (grades) expose new officers and seasonal officers to school-based programs teach engagement;
- Department needs more resources to engage youth help them make different choices open doors and mentor youth; and,
- Have activities with kids like using K-9s, others to share what police do positively.

Focus group participants also recognized the value of conducting outreach to specific populations within the Baltimore community. Such outreach could help to engage individuals who may otherwise not be receptive to general community engagement strategies. Suggestions included:

- Special outreach homeless, LGBTQ, citywide, faith, youth, reentry team/wrap-around services;
- Some people need to be arrested, but [other outcomes could occur] if police department had alternatives to divert/tools for engagement; and,
- Programs for at-risk people.

Similarly, participants suggested meeting with individuals returning from incarceration and providing diversion programs and mentorship opportunities so that BPD officers have additional opportunities to engage individuals re-entering society in a positive manner:

- Define police role in reentry help people transition back to Baltimore empower those returning back to engage communities; and,
- Reentry Have officers meet with those returning back Do wellness checks (not being punitive, offer services, mentor) Have meetings in a neutral location Partner with parole and probation to disseminate information on services BPD officers can be guest speakers.

# 4. Safety and Wellness / Morale

Garnering 87 votes, nine of the focus groups included discussion about insufficient support for officer safety and wellness, as well as morale. <sup>13</sup> BPD members mentioned that this prevents them from having the time and positive energy to properly engage in community policing. The NPF team noted that while safety and wellness and morale came up in almost all the focus

engagement center. For more, see: Stepner, S. (2018, March 23). New PAL hoping to change lives in West Baltimore. *WMAR Baltimore*. Retrieved from <u>https://www.wmar2news.com/news/region/baltimore-city/new-pal-hoping-to-change-lives-in-west-baltimore</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> One comment from Question 1, with 14 votes, was coded solely as morale for its focus on the lack of competitive pay and was included in the safety and wellness / morale total vote count.

groups, the conversations centered almost entirely on drafting and fatigue and their impact on morale, as opposed to physical safety. The physical signs associated with the stress and fatigue mentioned by focus group participants was also visibly apparent to the NPF team during the focus groups.

Participants discussed officer wellness, with an emphasis on fatigue, and contributing factors like staffing deployment and supervision issues as a challenge preventing BPD members from having the time and energy to engage in community policing. Sworn personnel in the focus groups particularly noted that there are unreasonable expectations placed on patrol. Minimum staffing used to be 22 patrol officers per district per shift, and while that number has been reduced to 12 regular staff and personnel drafted from other shifts, the expectation to clear calls as quickly as possible, so that they can get to the next call, remains. On top of the pressures associated with running from call-to-call, officers suggested that, because of drafting, they are regularly required to work significant amounts of overtime without advanced notice to plan or prepare, which further exacerbates their level of fatigue. The exhaustion reportedly leaves many BPD officers unable or unwilling to spend time focused on community engagement activities. Focus group participants reported challenges like:

- Officers are exhausted "being killed;"
- Drafted, overworked, tired, overtime; and,
- Officer fatigue.

As a result of the fatigue, among other issues, participants expressed that there is a sense of poor morale throughout the department. Participants furthermore perceived that the department has not meaningfully demonstrated a commitment to the wellness of department members, which perpetuates the problem. Participants noted:

- No debriefs post serious incidents (too tired, busy, stat-driven);
- Facilitate officer safety and wellness encourage open communication without retribution; and,
- Need to take care of our own.

Law enforcement officers regularly work long hours in environments exposing them to stressful situations that, when not properly cared for, can be associated with sleep deprivation, on the job accidents and injuries, and other personal and professional challenges.<sup>14</sup> One sworn BPD participant summarized that officers get tired and worn out and start making bad decisions. In addition to creating challenges for police-community engagement, fatigue and poor morale have the potential to create safety issues and exacerbate other departmental challenges.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Office of Justice Programs. (n.d.). Impact of Sleep Deprivation on Police Performance. Retrieved from <a href="https://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/officer-safety/stress-fatigue/Pages/impact.aspx">https://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/officer-safety/stress-fatigue/Pages/impact.aspx</a>

# 5. Leadership

Participants in nine focus groups—with a total of 69 votes—expressed concerns about the capacity and desire of department leadership to model and truly support community policing as a foundational principle of the BPD. The discussion centered primarily on the variability of personnel at the command level—particularly the short and tumultuous tenures of recent commissioners—and the impact turnover has had on the direction and priorities of the department. Participants referenced that with each new commissioner, the command staff is reorganized, and individuals selected by the new commissioner were promoted, creating conflicting messaging regarding the importance and implementation of community policing and other policing strategies:

- Lack of leadership. Department is the biggest challenge;
- Commissioner stability, consistent leadership; and,
- Community policing challenged by command staff (priorities/direction) (i.e. clearing corners).

Some participants expressed frustration with practices like "clearing corners," when they were perceived to inefficiently use staffing resources, contributing to additional strain on staffing and officer fatigue and morale, which can result in negative community contacts. Similarly, another example that emerged in multiple focus groups were "10-7" assignments requiring officers to sit in their patrol car in certain locations after significant violent or disruptive events. During these assignments, officers do not perform enforcement tasks in the area, but simply sit in their patrol vehicle parked in the assigned location. These assignments can last days or weeks, until leadership deems that the area safety is no longer in jeopardy. Assignments such as these—identified as priorities by supervisors and command staff—appeared to some participants to be misguided and disconnected from community policing.

In addition to challenges in leadership continuity, some participants expressed frustration with senior management in the department, and in the city more generally. Participants suggested that command and senior staff in particular have not succeeded in developing and communicating a clear vision for community policing in the City of Baltimore or within the police department. Some participants indicated that lack of support for community policing by department leaders has contributed to a culture in which community engagement activities are not given a high priority or valued, in comparison with performance measures like arrest statistics. In focus groups, participants noted:

- Poor leadership in department, city, and community;
- Department leaders don't understand community policing don't support it; and,
- Need leadership to prioritize community engagement "community policing now is just on paper."

## 6. Equipment

Participants in 10 focus groups—with a total of 69 votes—provided comments related to equipment, including data management technologies. Participants cited multiple types of equipment and technology that, if improved upon, could help to support their workload and ultimately provide more time for members to engage in community policing activities. As described in the *BPD Technology Resource Inventory*, the BPD largely relies on manual and disparate data tracking systems.<sup>15</sup> Participants recommended improving technology, like records systems, to support administrative functions and enable the BPD to be more effective. Beyond data management systems, participants spoke specifically to lack of standard equipment. These participants expressed that insufficient cars prevented effective deployment of officers even when the staffing was available. In recent months, the BPD has rolled out mobile data terminals in patrol cars and smartphones for personnel; however, participants still report limitations in the technology and more areas for improvement. Focus group comments included the following.

- Equipment:
  - Lack of equipment (uniforms, vehicles, radios); and,
  - BPD is an antiquated department City has not provided the tools for police officers to do their jobs effectively (pocket cops/GPS in cars) - increases lack of accountability - free range - not efficient reporting systems in the field.
- Technology:
  - Paperwork is large redundant unnecessary!;
  - Lotus Notes Databases don't talk to each other. Labor intensive because systems don't connect;
  - Not using technology to reduce work and create efficiencies;
  - Computers in cars not working properly, not saving time, no WiFi connection in certain areas;
  - Officers are not taking care of equipment; and,
  - Still handwriting tickets.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Baltimore Police Department. (2018, June 8). BPD Technology Resource Inventory. Retrieved from <u>https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59db8644e45a7c08738ca2f1/t/5b32720b88251bbafaff7440/15300326589</u> <u>22/Exhibit+1+BPD+Final+Tech+Inventory+Study.pdf</u>

# 7. Communication

Receiving 60 votes, communication issues were mentioned in all focus groups and participants in nine of those groups specifically identified that the BPD community policing strategy should address communications challenges between the BPD and community members. These communications issues were related to both BPD media messaging and everyday interactions between officers and community members.

<u>Department Media</u>. The BPD Office of Public Information (OPI) manages general media inquiries and relations with local and national media outlets and maintains the BPD website; social media accounts (including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and NextDoor); and, mobile application on behalf of the department. Additionally, district commanders may develop their own communications efforts to engage members of their district communities, such as by creating their own district social media accounts like Facebook and NextDoor to connect with district residents.<sup>16</sup>

While the OPI leverages traditional and social media, focus group participants spoke of the need for the BPD to make a more concerted and coordinated effort to highlight positive stories and to use compelling stories of individual officers to foster community relationships, support morale within the department, and assist with recruitment:

- Need positive PR plan need to explain, tell community the good stories, take control of our own stories;
- Have BPD officers tell their stories about why they are officers (positive campaign) to mentor and open doors to BPD; and,
- Create a public awareness campaign department would drive the message not just talk about shootings, focus on good work of BPD officers.

<u>Officer-Community Member Interactions</u>. Additionally, focus group participants identified communication challenges in everyday interactions between officers and community members. Focus group participants' feedback indicated that some BPD personnel struggle to effectively communicate and treat members of the community members with respect when engaging them while on duty and pointed to poor communication as having an impact on the department's ability to build trust and working relationships in neighborhoods. This mirrors the findings of the DOJ Civil Rights Division investigation which, "revealed numerous instances in which officers spoke in an unnecessarily rude or aggressive manner when interacting with suspects, witnesses, and the general public."<sup>17</sup> Participants also perceived that some district personnel have not identified who the community leaders in their area are and how to engage them to act as unofficial force multipliers to identify community needs and help provide crime-solving information. Issues identified during focus groups included:

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Baltimore Police Department. Baltimore Police Department Community Engagement Inventory. (2018, August).
<sup>17</sup> Civil Rights Division. (2016, August 10). Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department. U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved from <a href="https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download">https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download</a>

- Get back to basics treat people with respect understand who their audience is and adjust communication style negative communication impacts all officers and has a ripple effect to other police officers who respond next;
- Need officers to talk to people, go to them, develop relations and trust; and,
- Communicate with community members on scene.

# 8. Training

Nine of the focus groups identified issues related to training, giving related comments 54 total votes. Issues largely stemmed from the lack of comprehensive understanding throughout the department on the definition of community policing and how its principles should translate into practice. Noting multiple times that "Baltimore is unique," participants also suggested that more of an orientation is needed for police recruits from out of state to learn about Baltimore's communities. Participants recognized that understanding the culture of the city and its people are important to better prepare new officers for their jobs and ultimately enhance police-community relations. Some participants recommended that specific trainings on community policing, cultures within Baltimore, sensitivity, and leadership development could help to bolster community policing at the BPD. Participants called attention to the importance of experienced trainers, and some noted that some instructors at the Training Academy are not held accountable for the integrity of their instruction. Focus groups participants identified:

- Need to understand what community policing is;
- Not tapping officers who can teach about community policing rotate officers to those who can teach;
- Officers are coming from PA, DE, NY don't understand policing in Baltimore not prepared to do the work; people treat this like a job, not a passion; need to create cultural competency focused on Baltimore's unique characteristics; without cultural orientation officers cannot do their jobs properly - need to focus on how to best address the different neighborhoods across the city;
- Community policing strategy would start with training Scenario-based training (teach officers to prepare mentally/physically respond to different types of cases); and,
- Cultural competency for Baltimore Understand the divisions within Baltimore (lots of different tribes).

# 9. Culture

Participants in nine focus groups addressed issues related to BPD culture and 46 votes were given to culture-related comments. Eight focus groups noted that the recent BPD culture has resulted in a department where priorities are not aligned with national community policing and engagement practices. Participants suggested that the BPD has chosen not to develop and implement long-term strategies to successfully engage community members. One of the primary concerns expressed by participants was that instead of being a proactive agency that

values collaborative partnerships and supports community policing, the patrol division is not able to be proactive as specialized unit operations are prioritized over patrol functions. Participants recognized that in Baltimore, unlike other departments nationally, the patrol division is not considered to be the 'backbone' or priority of the department. Participants shared that patrol must run from call-to-call and that officers are expected to clear calls as quickly as possible, instead of having opportunities to engage community members and spend time working together to address some of the local community challenges. Specific comments noted during discussions included:

- Stop using patrol as a punishment should be the backbone of the department;
- Asked to interact not engage, we've stepped away from policing; and,
- Have strategy that engages community, not just homicide focus.

Participants also described a culture that is resistant to change and only focused on the shortterm. Despite the changes mandated by the consent decree, many of which should support the ability of officers to interact with and engage community members, participants in three focus groups indicated that they were not aware of any changes being made and/or if any changes had been made. Some mentioned that they believed the consent decree has not motivated department leadership to expedite any changes. These individuals discussed craving a longterm strategy and plan that includes innovative ideas and provides opportunities for patrol officers to engage with community members to identify and address their priorities and needs:

- Stop talking take action to make change "changes need to happen fast" show results;
- Two years of consent decree no action no change no communication;
- Need long-term plan/strategy; and,
- Get rid of "community policing" units make patrol, everyone focused on community policing.

# **10. Accountability**

Participants in eight focus groups mentioned accountability and comments related to accountability received 38 votes. Some participants emphasized the importance of holding members of the department accountable for misconduct, to assist in building community trust. Memory of these "bad apples" who were not held accountable—whom the community may have seen in the media or dealt with directly—continues to contribute to the community's negative perception of BPD and impacts community trust in the Baltimore police today. Comments included:

- Stigma by officers who have not been held accountable (from community); and,
- Allowing bad apples to not be accountable creates lack of trust.

Other participants, from multiple groups, perceived overuse of Blue Team, BPD's internal affairs (IA) tracking system, as an accountability measure has made officers hesitant to engage in enforcement activities. These participants explained that because the new definition of use of force appears to include any instances of placing "hands on people" during an arrest, they are concerned about being the subject of an IA investigation. Participants noted that these cases required lengthy investigations, weighing on officers' minds because of the potential impact on their personnel record. Participants suggested that these changes have created an environment where officers may avoid engagement:

- Change how Blue Team is used; and,
- Fear to police (put hands on people), get in trouble.

Participants also suggested that some sergeants and lieutenants are recording cases in Blue Team that could be handled more efficiently through the typical supervisory process. Some supervisors in the focus group sessions are too busy entering and reviewing cases to be on the street providing support in potentially-challenging situations. Expanding upon their perception that their ability to use discretion with those they supervise had been taken away, some supervisors suggested they feel compelled to enter any use of force into Blue Team instead of providing coaching or training. Additionally, the lengthy cases added to the workload of supervisors who have the responsibility to input and review the cases. Participants indicated:

- Overreaction internal affairs investigation processes everything in Blue Team; and,
- Too much use of Blue Team, slow case review.

# **Key Themes from Online Feedback**

Additionally, the National Police Foundation (NPF) solicited feedback from all Baltimore Police Department (BPD) members regarding the same two questions asked of the focus groups through an open comment box on a password-protected page on the NPF website. The website address and password to access the comment box were sent in an email by Acting Commissioner Tuggle to all BPD members on December 11, 2018. Reminders were also sent throughout the department at the beginning of January 2019. The open comment box, which was accessible for 32 days, allowed BPD members to submit their responses anonymously.

A total of 36 comments were submitted, many of which contained input focused in several different topic areas.<sup>18</sup> The comments mirrored the input gathered during the focus groups. To better organize the multiple items mentioned in some of the responses, the responses were analyzed and coded into 13 broader topics.

| Торіс                      | Number of Open Comment Box |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|
|                            | Responses Mentioned        |
| Lack of Support            | 19                         |
| Staffing                   | 14                         |
| Leadership                 | 10                         |
| Culture                    | 5                          |
| Miscellaneous              | 5                          |
| Accountability             | 4                          |
| Communication              | 4                          |
| Community Engagement       | 4                          |
| Equipment                  | 4                          |
| Safety and Wellness/Morale | 4                          |
| Training                   | 3                          |
| Performance Measures       | 2                          |
| Policies                   | 1                          |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> A full list of responses can be found in Appendix F of this report.

# Conclusion

Paragraph 15 of the consent decree requires the BPD to, "ensure its mission statement reflects its commitment to community-oriented policing and agrees to integrate community and problem-oriented policing principles into its management, policies and procedures, recruitment, training, personnel evaluations, resource deployment, tactics, and accountability systems." These requirements are supported by national-level research, which indicates that increased engagement and strong police-community relations are two of the most-frequently-cited successful strategies for addressing violent crime.<sup>19</sup>

An integral part of implementing sustainable change, and developing thoughtful, informed strategies to improve community police relations in Baltimore is listening to department members and ensuring their feedback is reflected in strategies developed. During the focus groups, sworn and non-sworn BPD members provided thoughtful and candid insight. They gave open and honest feedback during the discussions and the same was true of the online feedback responses. While acknowledging that department morale is currently low, the overwhelming majority of focus group attendees engaged in the process in support of moving the BPD toward developing a community policing strategy that will strengthen relationships with the Baltimore community, reduce violence and increase safety in the city.

BPD has begun to inventory the community policing and engagement strategies already in place within the department; and since the focus groups, has begun making changes. For example, BPD recently changed officer scheduling to allow officers to more-regularly work the same post, to shift community policing efforts from headquarters to the nine districts, to provide a more-clear department-wide understanding of community policing, and to emphasize good community policing stories in each of the districts. A committee/working group of BPD members has also been established to provide ongoing feedback throughout the process of developing the BPD Community Policing and Engagement. Finally, in February 2019, Baltimore City Councilman Isaac "Yitzy" Schleifer surveyed BPD members on some of the same issues discussed in focus groups and found similar themes. Those findings and comments can be found in the <u>2019 Baltimore Police Department Survey</u>.<sup>20</sup>

BPD and the Baltimore community continue to show a shared commitment to enhancing police-community engagement and continuing to protect and serve the City of Baltimore and its community members.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Robinson, M., and C. Smith. (2018). Rank and File: Reflections on Emerging Issues in Law Enforcement. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Retrieved from <u>https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0868-pub.pdf</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Isaac "Yitzy" Schleifer. (2019). Baltimore Police Department Survey. Baltimore City Council. Retrieved from <u>https://www.scribd.com/document/399716609/BPD-Survey-2019</u>

# **Appendix A. Detailed Methodology**

The Baltimore Police Department (BPD) solicited the National Police Foundation (NPF) through funding provided by the Ford Foundation—to facilitate a series of focus groups related to community policing and the development of a community policing strategy. The NPF facilitated a total of 11 focus groups of sworn and non-sworn BPD personnel (one pair of focus groups was combined, but NPF staff sampled for 12 focus groups). The focus groups were held during November 7-9, 2018 at BPD headquarters. A total of 131 personnel attended, and 129 completed, the BPD focus group meetings. The groups contained BPD lieutenants, sergeants, patrol officers, detectives, and non-sworn staff members. To the extent possible, the focus groups were differentiated by ranks and sworn/non-sworn status to enable open and honest conversation.

# Sampling

NPF staff members received three documents from the BPD to conduct the random selection of sworn and non-sworn members: 1) a PDF file containing patrol rosters—which included lieutenants, sergeants, and officers—separated by date (for each of the dates of the focus groups), shift, and district; 2) an Excel file containing the full roster of investigations personnel; and, 3) an Excel file containing the full BPD staff roster with positions noted to identify civilian members.

Nine focus groups were comprised of sworn BPD personnel: five for officers, two for detectives, one for lieutenants, and one for sergeants. To randomly select the individuals for the five officer focus groups, the PDF file of patrol personnel broken down by date, shift, and district was converted into an Excel file. Each individual was then assigned a number using the random number generator function in Excel. For each date and shift, the two patrol officers from each district with the highest numbers were assigned to participate.<sup>21</sup> If an officer that was randomly selected was unavailable, the district was asked to send another officer in their place. A similar methodology was used to randomly sample the detectives for their two focus groups. Each detective included in the Excel file containing the full roster of investigations personnel was assigned a number using the random number generator function in Excel. The 40 detectives with the highest randomly-generated numbers were then divided into two focus groups of 20 each. If a detective was unable to participate in their focus group, they were not replaced. To randomly select the sergeants, NPF staff used the same Excel file as the one used for the officer focus groups. The sergeant from each district with the highest number that was available on the date and shift of the scheduled focus group was assigned to participate. In addition to these nine district sergeants, 11 sergeants were randomly selected from the Excel file containing the full roster of investigations personnel. The exact same methodology was utilized for one focus group that was scheduled to be comprised entirely of lieutenants.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> If a sergeant or lieutenant received one of the two highest numbers, they were skipped.

Since the purpose of the focus groups was to gather department feedback and potential strategies related to community policing, one focus group was comprised of a mix of non-sworn and sworn BPD personnel in predominately community-focused roles. NPF staff used the Excel file containing the full BPD staff roster with positions to identify the non-sworn Community Service Officers. Each Community Service Officer was then assigned a number using the random number generator function in Excel. The officers with the 10 highest numbers were then assigned to participate in this focus group. If they were unavailable, they were not replaced. In addition to the 10 Community Service Officers, five personnel (four sworn and one non-sworn) volunteered to participate in this focus group.

Finally, two focus group were comprised of entirely non-sworn BPD personnel. NPF staff used the Excel file containing the full BPD staff roster with positions. Since non-sworn Community Service Officers were separated from the rest of the civilian positions, the remaining non-sworn personnel were assigned a number using the exact same methodology as the other positions. The 40 non-sworn personnel with the highest numbers were separated into two focus groups of 20 and assigned to participate.

In addition to the randomly selected participants, the BPD Compliance Unit conducted outreach to BPD personnel who serve as Neighborhood Coordination Officers, support the Community Collaboration Division, or are involved in the Homeless Outreach Team or Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) team to elect to participate. Based on their availability and rank, these volunteers were added to the scheduled focus groups.

The sampling and volunteer process resulted in a total of 228 focus group participants. Ultimately, 131 members attended the sessions. Of the 131 people that attended:<sup>22</sup>

- 130 remained after reading the informed consent form, which informed individuals of their rights, including that they were able to leave the focus group at any time.
- 129 remained for the entirety of the focus group meeting.


NPF and BPD team members recorded gender (Figure 6) and observed race breakdowns for 128 attendees<sup>23</sup> (Figure 7). While specific ranks and assignments of attendees were not recorded, Figure 8 also displays the sworn and non-sworn breakdown of attendees for 10 of the 11 focus groups.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> The 131 attendees includes four (4) individuals who showed up to their respective focus groups after discussions had begun, but remained after reading the informed consent form.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> The racial composition of one focus group of three (3) participants was not noted.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> One focus group included sworn and non-sworn Community-Focused Officers, but the NPF team was unable to determine which of these individuals were sworn versus non-sworn.

Figure 6: Gender Composition of Focus Group Attendees



Gender (N=128)

Figure 7: Observed Race Composition of Focus Group Attendees





Figure 8: Sworn and Non-Sworn Focus Group Attendees



Sworn and Non-Sworn Personnel (N=125)

### **Focus Group Structure**

All focus groups were held at BPD Headquarters. The focus groups were scheduled throughout the day—7:30 am, 9:30 am, 2:00 pm, 4:30 pm, and 10:30 pm—and participants were assigned to a particular focus group.

While participants were asked by the department to report to BPD Headquarters for their assigned focus groups, once the focus groups began attendees were given the option of participating in the discussion or not by the group facilitator and by an Informed Consent document provided to each participant.<sup>25</sup> No sign-ins were conducted and NPF team members did not know the names, badge numbers, or randomly assigned numbers of the officers in the groups. Nominal Group Technique (NGT) was used during the focus groups to gain input from participants. "NGT gathers information by asking individuals to respond to questions posed by a moderator, and then asking participants to prioritize the ideas or suggestions of all group members."<sup>26</sup> Focus group attendees were provided five dots to place next to the items they felt were the most important; however, some chose not to participate or put multiple dots next to the same item. All attendees were given with the assurance that while input was documented verbatim and would be included in this report, no names or other attribution would be given to participants.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> A full copy of the Informed Consent form can be found in Appendix B of this report.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Department of Health and Human Services. *Gaining Consensus Among Stakeholders Through the Nominal Group Technique*. (2006, November). Retrieved from www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/evaluation/pdf/brief7.pdf

When attendees arrived for their focus group, the room was set up in a U-Shape where officers sat during the focus group discussion. Each group was staffed by a combination of NPF and BPD team members—a group facilitator, a co-facilitator (tasked with documenting input on flip-charts) and a note-taker who took notes on a computer. Focus group facilitators included Chief (Ret.) Darrel Stephens and Chief (Ret.) Rodney Monroe. Each focus group ran essentially the same way as outlined below:

*Introduction.* The NPF and BPD team members introduced themselves, and the facilitator gave a short background of their experience and an overview of the NPF. The facilitator then explained the purpose of and process to be used for the focus group, and ensured the group understood. The facilitator then provided time for each group to read the Informed Consent form. The facilitator then answered any other questions posed by the group.

Brainstorming Question 1. The facilitator then asked Question 1 and the co-facilitator posted it on a piece of flipchart paper. The question was, "What challenges prevent BPD from engaging in community policing today?" The facilitator explained as necessary and allowed up to 5 minutes of silence for everyone to think about the question and jot down ideas. The facilitator then invited each person to provide one item, going in a sequential order, until all items were recorded. The co-facilitator recorded all items, in words as close as possible to those used by the contributor, on flipchart paper. The facilitator checked back with participants to ensure the item was captured accurately. No discussion or evaluation of ideas was conducted during this time. The group continued to generate and record ideas until all participants confirmed they had no additional ideas.

*Discussion Question 1.* Once all input was collected, the group discussed, combined, and reorganized each item. Wording changed only when the item's originator agreed. The discussion clarified meaning, explained logic or analysis, raised and answered questions, or stated agreement or disagreement.

*Prioritization of Question 1 Ideas.* Once a comprehensive list was complete, all participants were provided with five dot stickers. They were then asked to place their stickers on the items that they believe to be the most important items on the flipchart. The group note-taker then tallied items with stickers and how many each item had, resulting in the priority of each item.

*Repeat for Question 2.* The group was then given a short break, after which they repeated the entire process above with Question 2, which was **"What should the BPD community policing strategies include (activities, philosophies, etc.)?"** 

Once all input was recorded and prioritized and all discussions concluded, the facilitator took final questions, thanked officers for their participation and excused them.

# **Thematic Coding of Topics**

After the focus groups, NPF staff typed the information and number of votes each item received from the flipcharts into in an Excel spreadsheet. Items in this spreadsheet were grouped into broader underlying topics. The first round of coding was completed by three members of the NPF team and were then reviewed by the rest of the team.

For Question 1, a total of 286 specific items were noted by the participants and documented by NPF staff. Many of the same items were identified across focus groups.<sup>27</sup> To better organize the items and account for the overlaps, the specific items were coded into 15 broader topics—listed alphabetically below—with some containing multiple subcategories that were used to differentiate the larger topics.

- Accountability
- Communication
- Culture
- Equipment and Technology
- Lack of Support
- Leadership
- Miscellaneous
- Mission Creep

- Morale
- Performance Measures
- Policies
- Recruitment and Retention
- Safety and Wellness
- Staffing
- Training

For Question 2, a total of 205 specific items were noted by the participants and documented by NPF staff.<sup>28</sup> Like the first question, many of the responses to this question were similar across the focus groups. To better organize the items and account for the overlaps, the specific items were coded into 13 broader topics—listed alphabetically below—with some containing multiple subcategories that were used to differentiate the larger topics:

- Accountability
- Communication
- Community Engagement
- Culture
- Equipment and Technology
- Increased Support
- Leadership

- Performance Measures
- Policies
- Recruitment and Retention
- Safety and Wellness
- Staffing
- Training

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> A full list of the responses can be found in Appendix D of this report.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> A full list of the responses can be found in Appendix E of this report.

#### **Online Comment Box**

The NPF solicited feedback from BPD members regarding the same two questions asked of the focus groups through an open comment box on a password-protected page on the NPF website. The website address and password to access the comment box were sent in an email by Acting Commissioner Tuggle to all BPD members on December 11, 2018. Reminders were also sent throughout the department at the beginning of January 2019. The open comment box, which was accessible for 32 days, allowed BPD members to submit their responses anonymously. A total of 36 comments were submitted.<sup>29</sup> The comments mirrored the input gathered during the focus groups. To better organize the multiple items mentioned in some of the responses, the responses were analyzed and coded into 13 broader topics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> A full list of responses can be found in Appendix F of this report.

# **Appendix B. Informed Consent Form (Provided to all Focus Groups Participants)**



#### Informed Consent for Department Members Organizational Survey and Focus Groups: Baltimore Police Department November 2018

#### Overview of the Project

Paragraphs 15-26 of the 2017 Consent Decree lays out requirements for building relationships between the community and the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) through community policing and engagement. Paragraph 19, specifically, reads, "The City and BPD will, within their respective spheres, develop and implement community-engagement plans for creating opportunities for routine and frequent positive interactions between officers and community members, including those critical of BPD." As part of the effort to build those plans, the BPD Compliance Office has created a strategy to gather information from BPD members and the community to help guide direction for the plan through focus groups and other strategies. The focus groups are designed to cultivate discussion and optimize input from BPD staff.

#### About Your Participation

Your participation in this 60 - 90 minute focus group is entirely voluntary. If you agree to participate, you will be asked questions about your experiences with community policing, community engagement, your job, and the department. The project team from the Police Foundation will not be collecting personally-identifying information during the meeting. Please note that we will do everything possible to ensure that input and comments provided during these focus groups are not attributed to any particular BPD member. Additionally, the Police Foundation will encourage all participants to keep everything said in the room confidential. However, because you are likely to know at least some of the other members in the room (or they may know you), we cannot guarantee that what you say will not be shared publicly by other participants. If for any reason, you feel uncomfortable sharing information with any or all the other participants in the focus group, please only share that which you feel safe providing.

#### By participating in this interview/focus group, I agree to the following:

I have been informed that as with any focus group, I may perceive advantages and disadvantages of participation. The focus group does require a commitment of my time and a willingness to provide honest information whenever possible.

In any written reports or oral presentations of the results, my name will not be associated with statements and opinions I provide, unless I give my explicit permission and provide my name for this purpose. I understand that the Police Foundation will use the information I provide for general assessment purposes only and I acknowledge that the focus group team plan to present aggregate or summary results only. This means that any reported results will include analysis and interpretation of responses based only on groups large enough to where no person can be individually identified (for example, male officers). I have been advised by the Police Foundation that they will not disclose information that would identify me to anyone in BPD, the City, or anyone else outside of the project without my permission. At the same time, I have been informed that the Police Foundation team cannot control what other participants disclose after the focus group session, so I will be careful not to say anything that I would not want repeated outside the room.

Also, I have been informed herein that if I agree to participate in the focus group, I may withdraw at any time, or choose to not answer some questions.

I have been assured that if I choose to withdraw<sup>30</sup>, I will not be asked to provide any more answers to additional questions, except for the reason for my withdrawal (and even then, I do not have to answer that question).

<u>There will be no penalties or negative consequences if I decide to skip any questions or stop</u> <u>participating altogether</u>. If I choose to stop participating during the session I am free to leave.

If I have any questions, concerns, or complaints, I may feel free to contact any of the people listed below by email or phone during regular business hours.

#### CONTACTS

If your concern is about the research, the focus group, or your participation, please contact:

Blake Norton Senior Vice President Principal Investigator (PI)/ Project Director Police Foundation 1201 Connecticut Ave, N.W. Suite 200 Washington D.C. 20036-2636 <u>bnorton@policefoundation.org</u> Tel: 202-833-1460

If your concern is with the focus group team themselves, or any privacy/confidentiality concerns, feel free to contact your agency representative or the Chair of the Police Foundation's Institutional Review Board that ensures the privacy and confidentiality of data.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> If I choose to withdraw, I may elect to call or email or leave a voice message for Blake Norton.

Professor Dick Bennett, IRB Chairman American University c/o Police Foundation 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 <u>bennett@american.edu</u> <u>Tel: 202-885-2956</u>

## **Appendix C. Focus Group Facilitator Biographies**

### Chief (Ret.) Darrel Stephens

Darrel Stephens currently serves as a consultant and an Executive Fellow with the Police Foundation. He is an accomplished police executive with 48 years of experience. His career began as a police officer in Kansas City, Missouri in 1968. In addition to his police experience, he served for 2 years as the City Administrator in St. Petersburg, Florida—a community of 250,000 people—where he was responsible for a work force of approximately 3,000 employees and a budget of \$380 million. He has 22 years of experience in a police executive capacity including almost nine years from September 1999 to June 2008 as the Chief of Police of the 2,100member Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD). He served as the Executive Director of the Major Cities Chiefs Association from October 2010 through October 2017.

Perhaps best known for advancing innovative approaches to policing, Stephens has earned a national reputation as a leader in policing. He served as the President, Vice President and Legislative Committee Chair of the Major Cities Police Chiefs Association while Chief in Charlotte. Throughout his career, he has taken on difficult and challenging opportunities, and championed strategic technology investments to enhance employee productivity. He is frequently called on to provide guidance on policing issues. He served as a technical advisor to the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing. He has served as a member of the Innocence Project Board of Directors from 2011 through 2016. He has authored a number of publications on various topics related to policing and has served as a consultant and speaker promoting progressive policing approaches. He received the Police Executive Research Forum's Leadership Award and was elected as a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration in 2005. In 2006, he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate of Law Degree from Central Missouri State University. In 2010 he was inducted into the Evidence-Based Policing Hall of Fame and received the Distinguished Achievement Award in Evidence-Based Crime Policy, both presented by George Mason University's Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy. In 2017 he received the Sir Robert Peel Medal for Evidence Based Policing from the Police Executive Program at Cambridge University. He also received the Major Cities Chiefs Association 2017 Leadership Award.

### Chief (Ret.) Rodney Monroe

Retired Chief Rodney D. Monroe began his career as a police officer with the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington DC, retiring as an Assistant Chief of Police after 22 years of service to the citizens of the District of Columbia. In 2001 he was appointed Chief of Police for the city of Macon Ga, as the first African American Chief of Police. After spending four years as chief, he was recruited and appointed as the Chief of Police for the city of Richmond Va. in 2005. As in his previous assignment, he achieved significant reductions in violent crime to include the lowest number of homicides over the past 34 years.

Recognized as an innovator and practitioner of community policing, he was appointed Chief of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department in 2008. Under his leadership, the Department has refocused its efforts on crime fighting and crime prevention through a more accountable organizational structure, new technology and an enhanced strategy of community policing. His efforts once again led to a historical reduction in violent crime and homicides.

Chief Monroe has been recognized for his continued success in engaging ex-offenders in various efforts to stem the tide of violence in several communities. He has established partnerships with a number of not-for-profit organizations addressing youth/gang related violence. Chief Monroe has planned, organized, and commanded several major special events to include the Million Man March, Presidential Inauguration, and the 2012 Democratic National Convention.

Chief Monroe holds a bachelor's degree in Interdisciplinary Studies from Virginia Commonwealth University and a bachelor's degree in Criminal Justice from University of Phoenix. He is a graduate of the FBI National Academy and the National Executive Institute. He has served as an Executive Committee member for the International Association of Chiefs of Police, member of Major Cities Chiefs and the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives.

# Appendix D. Full List of Responses to Question 1—Items Organized by Topic

The following represents a full list of the responses to Question 1, **"What challenges prevent BPD from engaging in community policing today?"** Items are organized by topic.

| Accountability   |
|--|
| Allowing bad apples to not be accountable - creates lack of trust                              |
| Lack of accountability for department members and community                                    |
| Not my district - not going to touch it - news story   |
| Recordings lead to more reserved   |
| Stigma by officers who have not been held accountable (from community)                         |
| Internal Affairs   |
| Overreaction - internal affairs investigation processes - everything in Blue Team              |
| Fear to police (put hands on people), get in trouble   |
| Not giving police ability to police  |
| Fear to engage   |
| Too much use of Blue Team, slow case review  |
| Communication  |
| Communication both ways  |
| Department isn't highlighting the good officers are doing                                      |
| Department media is bad too  |
| Inappropriate messaging from BPD on social media   |
| Lack of public education on policing and law   |
| Need to listen to the community  |
| No engagement before they become juveniles   |
| No eye contact with citizens   |
| Staff are not prepared to engage - have officers who can only "text" - no communication skills |
| Understand the anchors in the neighborhood - renters and home owners                           |
| Culture  |
| Department is broken - needs to be healed - can't move forward without doing this work         |
| Stop talking - take action to make change - "changes need to happen fast" show results!        |
| Baltimore is in limbo - know the past to know the future                                       |
| No incentive for officers who have been "on" to go to specialized units                        |
| Asked to interact not engage, we're stepped away from policing                                 |
| Department does not allow - to engage in community policing (rank-and-                         |
| file/community/media)  |
| Department History   |
| Hard to transfer - "who you know"- cliques, favoritism - no upward mobility unless connected   |
| Internal resources for training and leadership - void  |
| Internally afraid of change  |
| Lack of internal trust with BPD staff  |
| Needs to build a relationship  |
| Officers are out for themselves - More pronounced since 2015                                   |
| Short-term responses to problems   |

| -      |  |
|--------|--|
|        | Stop using patrol as a punishment - should be the backbone of the department                       |
|        | Stop with feelings, failure, cliques   |
|        | Transparency has cast a dark shadow on those who are doing the right thing                         |
| -      | Two years of consent decree - no action - no change - no communication                             |
| ,      | We destroy things that work in the department - "span of control" - post cars,                     |
|        | sectors/supervisors  |
| Equipm | ent  |
|        | Lack of equipment (uniforms, vehicles, radios)   |
|        | Technology: Paperwork is large - redundant - unnecessary! Lotus Notes - Databases don't talk       |
|        | to each other. Labor intensive - because systems don't connect. Not using technology to            |
|        | reduce work and create efficiencies. Computers in cars - not working properly, not saving          |
|        | time, no Wi-Fi connection in certain areas. Officers are not taking care of equipment. Still       |
|        | handwriting tickets.   |
|        | Lack of equipment - don't have the tools to be effective (no cars)                                 |
|        | Bad facilities, computers  |
|        | Equipment - no cars  |
|        | Spend time writing reports multiple times, no database syncs, automation/be able to send           |
|        | from a car/computer  |
|        | Lack of latest technology  |
|        | Not enough vehicles - riding doubled up  |
|        | Lack of technology resources   |
|        | No cars  |
|        | BPD is an antiquated department - City has not provided the tools for police officers to do        |
|        | their jobs effectively (pocket cops/GPS in cars) - increases lack of accountability - free range - |
|        | not efficient reporting systems in the field   |
|        | Need technology for enforcement: E-tickets - more efficient if they had it. Without tech,          |
|        | officers spend too much time on admin reports, not time to engage in community policing.           |
|        | Need technology to support administrative functions (still doing run sheets, computers are         |
|        | not fully functioning, citizen contact sheets are handwritten, must print reports for              |
| :      | supervisors to review)   |
|        | 2018 - just got computers in cars  |
|        | Give Pocketcop number  |
|        | nsufficient patrol cars, routers   |
|        | No citizen voicemail system  |
|        | Not enough vehicles  |
|        | Officers don't maintain equipment - dirty cars look like they have been in junk yard               |
|        | Police facilities are neglected by City - "years of neglect" - dust, mold, poor working conditions |
|        | Support  |
| BPD    | Support  |
|        | Don't have command support   |
|        | Officers not listened to   |
|        | Lack of support for officers   |
|        | Relationship with community - no. Internal relationships - no. Used to have solid relationships    |
|        | Commanders don't respect personnel, no support   |
|        | No support from leadership/command   |
|        |  |

|     | At the end of the day - police officers are always wrong even doing the job legally within     |
|-----|--|
|     | guidelines - need supervision and guidance, backing officers, provide assistance, not judging  |
|     | Mental health services - not adequate for BPD personnel officer safety and wellness - not      |
|     | taking care of their own   |
|     | Need proper supervision to support patrol officers - first line supervisors need to build      |
|     | relationships with officers  |
|     | Officers - no support for stress/trauma from BPD work - traumatic calls                        |
|     | Officers are afraid to take action - afraid of backlash from supervisors                       |
|     |  |
|     | ystem  |
|     | Judges   |
|     | No support from State's Attorney's Office  |
|     | Accountability - other criminal justice agencies/city departments                              |
|     | Broken relationships with states attorney office   |
| Cor | nmunity  |
|     | BPD community engagement not accepted by community   |
|     | Disrespect from some community members out of control  |
|     | No trust from community/peers - "officers out for themselves"                                  |
|     | Aggression toward police   |
|     | Bad perception of police among community, no trust   |
|     | Disrespect/misunderstanding  |
|     | Lack of community interest to work with police   |
|     | Lack of rapport with community   |
|     | No trust from community - without trust nothing can be done                                    |
|     | Breakdown between community and police - no respect from youth towards officers - youth        |
|     | have no fear anymore   |
|     | Lack of trust of police by community   |
|     | Lack of trust: Must reconcile issues with the community/city on the whole, not just the PD -   |
|     | Needs to rebuild trust - Longstanding mistrust of the police - Need to repair relationships    |
|     | Lost community respect and credibility   |
|     | Negative view of police  |
|     | No sense of community anymore - no community accountability - parents looked out for kid       |
|     | and created safety and oversight   |
|     | People fear having a relationship with police officers - don't want to be seen as a "snitch" - |
|     | worried about negative repercussions from neighborhood (i.e. dial 911 meet me three block      |
|     | away)  |
|     | Policing is not a pretty job - combat job  |
|     | Society has become too involved in law enforcement policy and practice. Too much influence     |
|     | from national events to focus on local practice - further erodes trust and creates division.   |
|     | Society glamorizes police in a negative way - perpetuates distrust                             |
|     | Accountability of parents  |
|     | Citizens don't talk to us - need their support   |
|     | Community culture: Does not engage with police - Does not want to snitch/cooperate -           |
|     | Community wants PD to tone it down and rely on the fact that officers are more passive -       |
|     | Community has unrealistic expectations of police role  |
|     | Community fear   |
|     | Community is not collaborative to work to suppress crime - all focused on selves               |

|        | ifficult to balance different community expectations  |
|--------|---|
|        | ack of community interest (i.e. in police meetings)   |
|        | ack of community understanding of police role - disconnect                                    |
|        | low calling police is a threat - not to serve and protect                                     |
|        | fficers are stymied - "I'm going to call my lawyer" response from community - change laws     |
|        | eer/Community pressure - not to support the police even if they want to engage/work with      |
|        | ne police   |
| Т      | rust with community   |
| Medi   | ia  |
| N      | 1edia bashes department   |
| N      | legative media portrayal of BPD - no good stories - real time information - instant news      |
| В      | ad media coverage leads to no support, all negative perception                                |
| N      | ledia: negative comments - 99 percent of the time. BPD does not have to be in the media all   |
| tł     | ne time. Does not show enough good stories, not frequent enough                               |
| N      | legative media coverage   |
| N      | legative news coverage  |
| N      | lo positive media coverage  |
| N      | lo positive stories   |
| Politi | ical Support  |
| С      | ity leaders speak ill of police   |
| N      | lo political support  |
| С      | ity leaders making decisions that should be police  |
|        | o support from City officials   |
| N      | legative city support   |
| С      | ity interfering in policing   |
|        | oliticians: Whatever they put out citizens believe twist the story                            |
| C      | ity /Mayor not listening/supporting officers  |
| Р      | olitical influences - dictating charges/police reports depending on who makes a call to the   |
| N      | 1ayor's office  |
| C      | ity and department decisions  |
| N      | leed support from City Hall/agencies for officers to do jobs - i.e. vacant houses, drugs,     |
| h      | omelessness. Need to coordinate on crime reduction strategies                                 |
| Reso   | urces   |
| P      | AL Center funding gone - needs to come back - positive effect with youth engagement -         |
| CI     | reates trust  |
| N      | o more PAL, other similar   |
| Li     | ack of forum for police-community interactions  |
|        | ack of funding  |
|        | lo resources  |
|        | fficer Friendly - engage kids/families  |
|        | ommunity facilities with police support   |
|        | AL programs gone - foot patrol gone - transition to zero tolerance - change in policy does no |
|        | ncourage engagement   |
|        | PD financial resources  |
|        | ity resources to support policing lacking or misappropriated                                  |

|         | Most common concerns are not police issues - need to educate citizens about how to bring  |
|---------|---|
|         | change in neighborhoods on now police issues  |
|         | No resources  |
|         | Got rid of PAL  |
|         | More money on trash cans/beautification - no investment in policing   |
|         | Need more in city for community building generally (not just police)  |
|         | No place for kids to go   |
|         | No resources for community programs   |
|         | Not enough resources to do community policing (funding)   |
|         | Youth are on drugs - too glamorized - overdose is insane (go back to "Just Say No"; need  |
|         | enhanced community resources)   |
| Leaders | hip   |
|         | Poor leadership in department, city, and community  |
|         | Need leadership to prioritize community engagement - "community policing - now is just on   |
|         | paper"  |
|         | Supervision: Sometimes supervisors are not helpful - not backing up - or "over-supervision" -                                     |
| i       | nconsistent messaging in applying supervision of policy and practice. Officers who might  |
|         | question or not follow supervisor guidance might be denied a day off.   |
|         | Department leaders don't understand community policing - don't support it   |
|         | Fear of command staff   |
|         | Leadership is misplaced. Staff are not assigned by skills - people need to work where skills,                                     |
|         | experience best match for the position. Not working with friends  |
|         | Sergeant leadership   |
|         | Community policing challenged by command staff (priorities/direction) (i.e. clearing corners)                                     |
|         | Corruption at top   |
|         | Officers, sergeants, lieutenants not listened to and don't see follow-through   |
| Con     | tinuity   |
|         | Commissioner stability, consistent leadership   |
|         | Command staff stability (need the leadership)   |
|         | No stability in Command   |
|         | Lack of leadership. Department is the biggest challenge   |
|         | No consistency in ranks, leadership - no straight path to follow  |
|         | Supervisors don't oversee the same officers in the same areas - Span of Control   |
|         | No stability  |
| Miscell |   |
|         | City corruption   |
|         | No more/few communities   |
|         | High crime  |
|         | Need to find right balance of community policing but be firm and enforce laws   |
|         | 'We pay taxes too"  |
|         | Gang interference   |
|         | We stopped enforcement of some crimes, not supporting quality of life   |
| Missior |   |
|         | •   |
|         | BPD should focus on police work - City services should take a leadership role on homelessness and trash - Too much on BPD's plate |
|         | Need clinicians to respond to people in crisis - Baltimore needs to invest in this - Not PD role                                  |
|         | weed chinicians to respond to people in crisis - baltimore needs to invest in this - NOLPD fole                                   |

| Marala   |  |
|----------|--|
| Morale   |  |
|          | Iorale: lack of competitive pay, scared to do their jobs - no support/backing of officers - fear |
|          | f states attorney  |
|          | ance Measures  |
| A        | lways go back stats - can't be a community policing officer and run stats. Stat driven means     |
| n        | ot focused on community policing.  |
| F        | ocus too much on statistics  |
| Policies |  |
| P        | olicy - because of lack of accountability - if cops do job - they are now "using force" - match  |
| p        | olicy and practice   |
| B        | ad use of force definition   |
| D        | epartment policy changes don't have internal input   |
|          | olicies, laws, practice - not aligned for officers to do job                                     |
|          | olicies: what is use of force - what is police work - (arrest - cuff = now use of force),        |
|          | ocumentation is important - in the field to cover officer actions vs. too much documentation,    |
|          | ot efficient - unnecessary paperwork is not helping  |
|          | nent/Retention   |
|          | ew hires leave soon, high turnover   |
| -        | ecruitment   |
|          | iring standards low  |
|          | ifficers do not understand Baltimore - Officers come to BPD for the wrong reasons - Need         |
|          | etter recruitment/vetting to ensure officers are going to be able to work at BPD                 |
| -        | ecruitment   |
|          | etention   |
|          | xperienced people leaving  |
|          | ecruit those who are community-oriented  |
| -        | ecruitment   |
|          | etention   |
|          | nd Wellness  |
| -        | ifficer fatigue  |
|          | o debrief post serious incidents (too tired, busy, stat driven)                                  |
|          |  |
| Mora     |  |
|          | ow morale  |
|          | o morale   |
|          | ime/being tired  |
|          | rafted, overworked, tired, overtime  |
|          | ime  |
|          | ow morale  |
|          | fficers are exhausted - "being killed"   |
|          | Hurt people hurt people"   |
|          | fficer fatigue   |
|          | fficer morale  |
| Staffing |  |
| Deplo    | oyment   |

| Staffing: Pull from patrol - and give newly graduated officers - have people into specialized  |
|--|
| units leave patrol without enough officers - not enough people on shift - and calls roll over to   |
| next shift   |
| Management and creation of "special" units   |
| Not managing people well - redundancy of roles; over-specialization, no more flex squads   |
| Patrol is not prioritized  |
| Bring back more foot beats, bike patrols, to build sector/post integrity/familiarity with specific   |
| neighborhood issues/strengths/relationships/power brokers in the community   |
| Questionable deployment plans  |
| Decentralization - more resources to the district - align appropriate resources to promote   |
| better police services   |
| Need to play defense for patrol  |
| Officers are assigned to admin units where civilians can do the work - put officers back on the  |
| street   |
| Drafting: Only effects patrol - can manipulate schedules to not get drafted - specialized units  |
| not drafted or affected by this. Regular lowering of the constant -instead of increasing   |
| <br>staffing.  |
| Got rid of posts   |
| No team policing - no accountability for your area/sector; will not meet/know people if there  |
| <br>isn't sector integrity; does not allow for stability and building rapport  |
| <br>No time to handle calls and community engagement   |
| Officers are not assigned consistently to sectors - not able to stay long enough to create   |
| relationships - not consistent in assignments to engage  |
| Pulling from patrol for special units/projects   |
| <br>Specialized units necessary but also need patrol staffing  |
| <br>7-8 years patrol not a priority - too many specialized units - not enough in patrol - 10th district  |
| <br>Call volume is overwhelming and bad priorities   |
| <br>Calls are not prioritized by community concerns  |
| <br>Department - Does not have consistent post cars - keep people moving from post to post   |
| <br>Don't know people on the streets after post changes<br>Don't know your post - no consistency in assignment, no geographic responsibilities |
| <br>Drafting makes officers tired/worn out - officers then make bad decisions - "no time to  |
| engage!"   |
| <br>Many roles/assignments not conducive to community policing (i.e. traffic unit)   |
| <br>Not short - where are officers in cozy position "on medical" - not ready to return due to being  |
| on leave   |
| Not using staffing resources appropriately (i.e. light duty officers, special corner staffing)   |
| Patrol cars are not regularly patrolling neighborhoods (want foot patrols, want to have them   |
| get out of the cars, want sustained presence in neighborhoods even if there isn't violence   |
| taking place)  |
| Redundancy of Tasks: 2 officers review a report - then it goes to a civilian - Why not just have   |
| the civilian review?   |
| Right people - right skills - right assignment   |
| Rotating shifts, don't see/interact with community members regularly   |
| Sector assignments - not district wide. Not good use of resources  |
| Sitting on blocks, no benefit (10-7)   |

|            | ors don't have time to be on the street (too much admin)                               |
|------------|--|
| We have    | people - remove from admin - Patrol should be a priority                               |
| Personnel  |  |
| Personne   | el shortage  |
| Amount     | of manpower  |
| Understa   | affing   |
| Lack of st | taffing  |
| No manp    | bower  |
| · · ·      | ugh staffing   |
|            | Short - run to run - not time to engage with community                                 |
|            | er: Impossible to engage with community - big districts - run to calls, need to write  |
|            | tag BWC footage - can't engage unless related to a case                                |
|            | not enough to develop relationships (run call-to-call; or they don't respond to calls, |
| -          | n't care" from the community; breeds contempt)   |
|            | unit staffing  |
|            | me is tremendous - "90 calls on hold" - not enough staff to respond to calls           |
|            | ate allocation of resources - put officers on the street, out of desk jobs             |
|            | ugh supervisors - not training, other staffing issues                                  |
|            | nandling 50 calls in 2 nights often alone  |
| High call  |  |
|            | to talk to community after incidents anymore   |
|            | opportunity to engage  |
|            | ugh officers   |
|            | ugh sworn positions  |
|            | ugh time to engage   |
|            | e to answer priorities sometimes (G3) - can't address / show to address lower          |
| priorities |  |
| Patrol is  |  |
|            | call to call, no time  |
|            | is - causes drafting so officers are sent to high-call areas                           |
|            | Inning from call to call   |
| Training   |  |
| U          | - Need to be trained in the area officers need to work in - in the community - urban   |
| -          | Need qualified trainers who have been in the field - who have recruit relevant         |
| -          | ce; Train in schools with community - understand culture                               |
|            | understand what community policing is  |
|            | are coming from PA, DE, NY - don't understand policing in Baltimore - not prepared to  |
|            | ork; people treat this like a job, not a passion; need to create cultural competency   |
|            | on Baltimore's unique characteristics; without cultural orientation officers cannot do |
|            | s properly - need to focus on how to best address the different neighborhoods across   |
| the city   |  |
|            | community cultural disconnect  |
|            | line at the Academy for quality instruction ("very objective")                         |
|            | hity policing training   |
|            | - can't get approval for training because of shortage - has been waiting several years |
| -          | eded training - specialized units get priority   |
|            | each raining perpirited and perpirity  |

| Academy needs to be torn down and retooled - Needs to educate and train officers - Officers<br>are "sitting" in academy, not learning anything - Need actual training, classroom, scenario-<br>based - Should get an Associate Degree at the end - In-service should be real training - FTO<br>training try to acclimate officers to different cultures in Baltimore, focus on getting officers<br>home safely |
|--|
| New policies, tech, plans, strategies - no training or transition - need time to learn the new way of doing business - not a quick fix or process  |
| No recertification for FTOs - No time  |
| Training needed  |
| Younger officers - 5 years down in specialized units - no skills. Not enough experience to be in patrol.   |
| Academy does not teach anything - "recruit in-service" (community policing is an add-on)   |
| Cultural training for officers   |
| Culture shock for people out of town. Don't understand the communities   |
| Entry level training   |
| Get technology, teach yourself to use it. Department does not roll out training to support the   |
| technology rollout, i.e. CAD.  |
| How to balance tactics and community policing to be safe   |
| In-service training is a "joke" (don't know what they are talking about) (credit union and FOP)  |
| (did not teach anything about community policing)  |
| Lack of training to use tech (i.e. phone app)  |
| Many new officers not from Baltimore - not prepared  |
| Need better training - Learn to communicate with citizens - Learn to de-escalate   |
| Need training on new rules, i.e. body worn cameras   |
| No follow-up/No consistency with calls   |
| Officers - Newly-graduated are not always prepared - Lack discipline - Not ready for   |
| community policing - Can run as a paramilitary organization, but need to be trained with ride-   |
| alongs - Putting training back in neighborhood (experiential)  |
| Officers need to know how to manage calls - Work as partners - Not escalate  |
| Rush community policing training in the academy - Push people out to the streets   |
| Training needed  |
| Training scheduling  |
|  |

# Appendix E. Full List of Responses to Question 2—Items Organized by Topic

The following represents a full list of the responses to Question 2, "What should the BPD community policing strategies include (activities, philosophies, etc.)?" Items are organized by topic.

| ccountability  |     |
|--|-----|
| Those in patrol are accountable - only ones who log on "they know what patrol does"  |     |
| Internal Affairs   |     |
| Change how Blue Team is used   |     |
| Communication  |     |
| Communications plan, social media  |     |
| Consistent message about community policing  |     |
| Campaign to promote positive policing  |     |
| Put energy into media news stories - whole team devoted to positive stories for BPD - inter  | nal |
| and external audiences   |     |
| All officers are community officers - even if not deliberate - informed community engageme<br>by "taking things a little bit further" - for community it's "all about choices" but making good<br>choices can be difficult<br>BPD does not tell their stories/successes internally or externally |     |
| External   |     |
|  |     |
| Need officers to talk to people, go to them, develop relations and trust<br>BPD needs to control the positive story - and dedicated team to push information out   |     |
| Communicate with community members on scene  |     |
| Create a public awareness campaign - department would drive the message - not just talk  |     |
| about shootings, focus on good work of BPD officers  |     |
| Don't know how to talk to people   |     |
| Need positive PR plan - need to explain, tell community the good stories, take control of our own stories  | r   |
| Need to have officers communicate with citizens - shouldn't have to train people to be<br>civil/polite - should be common sense  |     |
| Get back to basics - treat people with respect - understand who their audience is and adjust<br>communication style - negative communication impacts all officers and has a ripple effect to<br>other police officers who respond next   |     |
| Publicize community activities   |     |
| Surveys need to go to right people   |     |
| Have BPD officers tell their stories about why they are officers (positive campaign) to mento<br>and open doors to BPD   | ٦٢  |
| Must expand knowledge of community resources - put on the website - unit/contact info ar<br>someone must answer the phone  | ۱d  |
| Promotional videos   |     |
| Go out and talk to community   |     |
| Greetings  |     |
| Put BPD on Maryland Public Television or Baltimore television station - showcase resources   |     |

| Use local celebrities to send positive messages - find local influencers to increase BPD supp<br>Internal |
|---|
| Internal  |
|   |
| Consistency of communication use through time and throughout department                                   |
| Peers don't know each other's efforts   |
| Community Engagement  |
| Have events where police and community can engage - build relationships                                   |
| Community activities  |
| Special outreach - homeless, LGBTQ, citywide, faith, youth, reentry team/wrap-around                      |
| services  |
| Relationship building   |
| Get out of car and engage   |
| Treatment of community members  |
| Business and school checks  |
| Get out and walk on foot  |
| Need opportunities to engage community  |
| Diversion   |
| Survival of the fittest - for community, committing crimes - need alternatives for offenders:             |
| crime reduction. Need to be in schools, show kids positive role models.                                   |
| Agreed - some people need to be arrested, but if police department had alternatives to                    |
| divert/tools for engagement   |
| Programs for at-risk people   |
| Education   |
| Activities that educate about police  |
| Cross training for BPD/community (i.e. "shoot/don't shoot") - Need to widely publicize/use                |
| social media to bring citizens in on cross training   |
| Meetings  |
| Encourage community engagement (including at meetings with community)                                     |
| Bring BPD/community for effective problem solving   |
| Have officers attend community meetings   |
| Mentoring   |
| Department needs more resources to engage youth - help them make different choices - o                    |
| doors and mentor youth  |
| Mentorships with community  |
| Focus on creating deliberate mentoring opportunities - Coaches (football, basketball) -                   |
| created mutual respect and built relationships with youth, ex-offenders, etc officers going               |
| into schools to check on grades - "Officer Norman: Social media" - Choose the right people                |
| mentor  |
| Reentry   |
| Monitor community service activities  |
| Reentry - Have officers meet with those returning back - Do wellness checks (not being                    |
| punitive, offer services, mentor) - Have meetings in a neutral location - Partner with parole             |
| and probation to disseminate information on services - BPD officers can be guest speakers                 |
| Define police role in reentry - help people transition back to Baltimore - empower those                  |
| returning back to engage communities  |
| Social  |

|    | Continue to invite community into BPD facilities (like the Halloween Open House) to               |
|----|---|
|    | humanize officers/build relationships   |
|    | Adopt-a-block, block parties  |
|    | Go beyond National Night Out - Develop community events not just focused on existing              |
|    | neighborhood associations - Bring BPD recruiters  |
| V  | Police athletic activities  |
| ŶĊ | buth  |
|    | Have activities with kids like using K-9s, others to share what police do positively              |
|    | PAL, DARE, other police-community teams   |
|    | Bring Officer Friendly - PAL - back - school-based programs with police at all levels (grades)    |
|    | expose new officers and seasonal officers to school-based programs - teach engagement             |
|    | Rec centers   |
|    | PAL program needs to come back - positive role models   |
|    | Bring back PAL, recreation centers  |
|    | Instead of running from call to call: Bring back PAL centers; get out of cars - talk to youth, pl |
|    | ball; do more things to kids in the community; get to know people in community; one office        |
|    | in each sector report to a school each day - shift officers rotate to get to know youth.          |
|    | Officers in schools, youth programs - Officer Friendly  |
|    | More police in schools and positive youth outreach  |
|    | School police need to be involved in BPD community policing strategies                            |
|    | Explorers program should grow   |
|    | Have officers in schools  |
|    | More tabletop exercises - bring the community with a focus on youth to create conversatio         |
|    | regularly, not only after a crisis  |
|    | PAL, similar community programs   |
|    | School police have a great relationship with youth - Merge school police with Baltimore PD        |
|    | develop SROs to build community policing  |
|    | Auxiliary program   |
|    | Bring back DARE   |
|    | Bring back Explorers/Cadets as a recruiting tool  |
|    | Focus on juveniles - Develop opportunities to engage with elementary schools (not just            |
|    | middle and high schools) - Officers reading to youth in schools along with school checks          |
|    | PAL program   |
|    | Activities in schools   |
|    | Bring back PAL  |
|    | Community changes - closing of a school and diverting students creates challenges for             |
|    | community and trickles down to police to deal with community who is now adapting to the           |
|    | larger community changes - unintended consequences - "new crime"                                  |
|    | More PAL programs - Youth engagement, Officer Friendly not enough                                 |
|    | Offer skills classes for youth  |
|    | Outward Bound - Good place to start but not enough to change minds and build trust - "Jus         |
|    | one day"  |
|    | School police back in schools   |
|    | Staff interaction with youth in schools; foot patrol on streets; build relationships with youth   |
|    | on the street   |
|    | Walbrook criminal justice courses taught by officers - Teach youth life skills                    |

| Culture   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| Need long-term plan/strategy  |  |  |
| Addressing quality of life issues including more minor crimes   |  |  |
| Incorporate change and new ideas  |  |  |
| Have strategy that engages community, not just homicide focus   |  |  |
| Use problem-oriented approach   |  |  |
| Need cultural shift   |  |  |
| Get rid of "community policing" units - make patrol, everyone focused on community policing   |  |  |
| Officers would like to speak directly to command staff - leadership - about disfunction at BPD  |  |  |
| Can't make people "be good" - it has to come from within - can create policy to be  |  |  |
| empathetic/good   |  |  |
| Long term planning related to consent decree  |  |  |
| Now not prepared if there was another riot, officers won't take sh*t the next time  |  |  |
| Stability of org/priorities   |  |  |
| Equipment   |  |  |
| Computers - not working in dead zones with Verizon sim cards  |  |  |
| Mismanagement of funds - allocation of funds not consistent in investments. More computers  |  |  |
| in headquarters than in districts.  |  |  |
| Allocation of equipment to new officers "new guys." Tenured officers don't get resources -  |  |  |
| everything for "new guys"   |  |  |
| Buying technology - equipment - lowest bidder - not necessarily better  |  |  |
| Better tracking mechanisms, equipment - data management   |  |  |
| Move away from handwritten reports  |  |  |
| Too much in cars - drains the battery - lights go out. Don't take care of the cars - "Not my car"   |  |  |
| Increased Support   |  |  |
| Lose-lose: Officers can't win. From reduce crime, lock people up, then too aggressive.  |  |  |
| Community wants violence reduction  |  |  |
| BPD Support   |  |  |
| Support from supervisors (Have officer ideas on community policing and needs taken  |  |  |
| seriously)  |  |  |
| "Patrol does not have a voice." Patrol officers feel worthless  |  |  |
| Lack of trust to be backed by superiors when actions are justified  |  |  |
| Have department support these activities  |  |  |
| BPD/Political   |  |  |
| Commanders need to come out with officers to see/know what they do/are faced with - City  |  |  |
| Hall needs to understand what BPD does - City Council needs to support BPD (they are  |  |  |
| working against BPD officers by using social media to disparage officers)   |  |  |
| CJ System   |  |  |
|   |  |  |
| Disconnect between BPD and state's attorney - need to be able to charge appropriately -<br>people need to be prosecuted according to severity of the crime - to reduce crime when those |  |  |
| return back to neighborhoods  |  |  |
| -   |  |  |
| Break the cycle of revolving criminals coming back to neighborhoods   |  |  |
| Community   |  |  |
| Get community to understand police perspective, support policing on their end   |  |  |
| Citizens police academy   |  |  |
| Promote ride alongs   |  |  |

| Have sitizans take ride alongs, community descript want the jab of radius, but the bi   |
|---|
| Have citizens take ride alongs - community doesn't want the job of police - but the biggest   |
| critics won't do ride alongs and won't take the time to understand why police do what they do Areas that need the most help - and most unlikely to                          |
| do. Areas that need ride alongs are the areas that need the most help - and most unlikely to  |
| engage.<br>Political  |
|   |
| More city support   |
| Less City/Mayoral political interference  |
| Other city agencies need to step up, not just police responsibility   |
| Expectations for police are not consistent by district - double standard - interference from<br>Mayor's office, then circles back to BPD after citizens call Mayor's office |
|   |
| City needs to care about community policing   |
| Have city leaders do ride-alongs (in our uniform)   |
| Resources   |
| All hands need to be on deck in crime reduction. Other city agencies - to provide resources to  |
| create safe neighborhoods   |
| Community resources are not well organized - fragmented - no cohesion on community  |
| engagement in the department  |
| BPD should engage other city entities as they develop policy and practice - create more global  |
| understanding of department functions (i.e. Housing, Fire, Health and Human Services) - work  |
| in relationships to create better outcomes for community policing - create trust and  |
| accountability  |
| Fragmented outreach - not aligning resources to maximize community outreach   |
| Funding to adequately develop a community policing plan   |
| City resources directed toward city support, services (not just police)   |
| Leadership  |
| Give commanders power to handle their shift   |
| Because of lack of organization - officers get it done - because they are boots on the ground -   |
| they get it done  |
| Commanders in white shirts don't understand that arrest isn't always the key  |
| Commissioner - from BPD? (yes); outside? (yes, if a good manager)   |
| Sometimes officers don't know who their boss is   |
| Supervisory standards - take a test after 3 years on  |
| Continuity  |
| Command staff does not have the right direction. No consistent leadership.  |
| No consistent leadership - not who you are, but who you know  |
| Performance Measures  |
| Community policing cannot be stat-driven  |
| Community policing should be used to evaluate performance   |
| Less emphasis on some stats (i.e. arrests) over others  |
| Focus on making strategies less political and not driven by stats/CompStat numbers that are   |
| not realistic. Use workload analysis to drive staffing not be subjective. Instead of the numbers  |
| game.   |
| Can't arrest our way out of problems - Does not work and builds resentment  |
| Change priorities to focus on investments in staff and programming to develop community   |
| policing strategies, not only focus on crime suppression  |
| Policies  |

| -        | Policies need change   |
|----------|--|
|          | Limit public body worn camera footage  |
|          | Discretion to divert - Put back the power of officers to do this (within legal limits)   |
|          | Have more discretion   |
|          | Develop policies focused on formal diversion - Woman squatting with five kids in an  |
|          | abandoned house, no options to help the woman - Not arresting people, give them a record,  |
|          | keep them from getting good jobs - If diversion is an appropriate way to respond   |
| Recruit  | ment/Retention   |
|          | Recruitment efforts need to be better  |
|          | ncrease recruitment  |
|          | Recruitment/Hiring: Must recruit those who want to police in Baltimore (2); residency  |
|          | requirement; create cultural orientation for officers who are not familiar with  |
|          | Baltimore/urban policing; not everyone can be a police officer in Baltimore, how to recruit  |
|          | effectively (1)  |
|          | Have police representatives (recruiters) present appropriately   |
|          | Recruitment: why is this a challenge? Always hiring but leave quickly - they get experience and                                      |
| 1        | eave   |
| Safety a | and Wellness   |
|          | Need to take care of our own   |
|          | People are tired - too much overtime/drafting - not enough staff   |
| -        | Facilitate officer safety and wellness - encourage open communication without retribution  |
| Mor      |  |
|          | Morale building  |
|          | After riots. Team building? Not team building - this is when morale dropped, was at the  |
|          | owest. Not prepared for the riots, no gear   |
|          | Internal morale - pay raises; contracts (stick to the contract or don't but be transparent);   |
|          | permanent staffing (civilians, provide the appropriate staff); parity for pay across the board                                       |
|          | (civilians)  |
|          | Education - criminal justice degree, but if you want to work outside of CJ, subject by command                                       |
|          | staff - "Who can go?"  |
| Staffing | -  |
|          | loyment  |
|          | Bring back foot patrols and post officers - keep them on their post/neighborhood   |
| -        | Call screening and management  |
|          | Bring back post officers (held accountable for post, community relations there)  |
|          | Decentralization   |
|          | Have posts and post integrity  |
|          | Hire people based on strengths and then assign officers based on skills - some people are  |
|          | better in community engagement, some are better responding to calls  |
|          | Bring back posts   |
|          |  |
|          | Post integrity, district integrity   |
| -        | Civilians do more than just admin<br>f RRD could datail people from patrol to go see the other side – pat always looking at criminal |
|          | f BPD could detail people from patrol to go see the other side - not always looking at criminal<br>element                           |
|          | בוכוווכוונ   |

|         | Evaluate allocation of resources - "10-7" cars for day assignment, best way to staff?        |
|---------|--|
|         | Community sees officers in 10-7 cars not being proactive, creates negative community         |
|         | perception.  |
|         | Have officers/time who can focus on problem solving  |
|         | Create opportunities for officers to get out of cars not to just clear corners               |
|         | Foot patrol/posts - officers know homeowners, businesses. Now we're "just runners" going     |
|         | call to call   |
|         | Not using staffing resources effectively   |
|         | Provide time/opportunity for officers to engage  |
|         | Time for community policing  |
|         | Foot patrol  |
|         | Have officers be able to respond to all calls, appropriately. Lead to credibility and trust. |
|         | Have time and support to follow up on smaller crimes - meet community expectations           |
|         | Match skills to officer deployment   |
|         | Put all community engagement programs/officers under one umbrella - to create cohesion       |
|         | Strategies/Borders for posts need to change - Redraw to be smaller                           |
|         | Better call management   |
|         | Decentralize   |
|         | If we are going to bring back community policing, we must be in the community                |
|         | Multiple units with same function but different name - duplicative. Too many specialized     |
|         | units.   |
|         | NCOs - another fraction of community policing  |
|         | Officer time not used appropriately  |
|         | Use retired officers, light duty   |
| Per     | sonnel   |
|         | Have the manpower and time to engage community   |
|         | With proper staffing: SROs have DARE training, certification; build relationships with       |
|         | community; right sized sectors so officers can engage; add cars to proactive patrols; have   |
|         | officers be problem solvers; be able to follow cases through - focus on clearing cases and   |
|         | reducing crime   |
|         | Can't use technology/training if BPD does not have staff to engage. Then all of the          |
|         | investments are pointless without people to be trained and get the work done.                |
|         | Look at proper staffing and assignments - with real numbers                                  |
|         | Staff for Neighborhood Coordination Officers   |
|         | Stronger support, more community resource officers   |
|         | Need more officers to create space to engage   |
| Trainin | g  |
|         | Train and allow officers to be problem solvers   |
|         | Not tapping officers who can teach about community policing - rotate officers to those who   |
|         | can teach  |
|         | So much talent within BPD - expand talent from within - understand what resources the BPD    |
|         | staff bring to the department (i.e. trauma informed care instructors in house)               |
|         | 911 dispatchers need better training   |
|         | FTOs - some have 16 months on the street   |
|         | nmunity Policing   |
| Con     | initiality i oneing  |

| Cultural   |
|--|
| Sensitivity training   |
| Community policing strategy would start with training - Scenario-based training (teach officers to prepare mentally/physically respond to different types of cases) - Cultural competence for Baltimore - Understand the divisions with Baltimore (lots of different tribes) |
| Expose officers to different cultures so officers can work in all areas (know language/dress)  |
| Some officers are scared - not from Baltimore, doesn't understand urban policing - "culture shock"   |
| Leadership   |
| BPD does not provide training to develop leadership and expertise to promote community policing and a healthy police department  |

## **Appendix F. Full List of Responses to Online Comment Box**

#### **Online Open Comment Box Responses**

Two things of focus (tried, tested and wildly proven successful) need to be foundational in building community policing trusted strategies. 1) Relational Equity has clearly been depleted not just between the police and community but within the community itself. There are principles and initiatives that were utilized in The Eastern District from 2008 to 2012 and in implementing those initiatives crime dropped to an astounding 40 year plus low. The success was so applauded by communities that district commanders sought out those strategies, implemented portions in their pen districts and the city went to a 30-year crime low. 2) The philosophy of "An Engaged Presence brings Reduction" proved 100% correct. What was interesting was that presence did not have to be a police but rather it could be a community presence and proven to be just as if not more successful. The was having the right trusted police leader by the community to train the community and officers on how to collaboratively and singularly implement those strategies.

The internal efforts to do community efforts work are simply to fragmented, separated and operated within silos. There is no Unity of Command for all the work being done and unfortunately too much selfish competitive efforts keeping resources and manpower separate and not as effective as if they would be united. Additionally, internally we are not utilizing those who have proven to be most knowledgeable, effective and trusted by communities to lead the charge. Rather we waste funding on bringing alleged outside experts to create a system and structure that has repeatedly failed while our proven internal experts are left untapped and not trusted to help BPD as a whole reach community trust and collaboration at a much quicker pace. anything outreach should fall under one span of control and not be spread out in various divisions and units duplicating and working at minimums. I believe if was patrol was staffed and organized to 2014 posts and sectors, you could hold post officers and supervisors accountable for community engagement. Right now patrol officers are dispatched to the next call, where ever in the district it is. We need the SAO and judges to get on board with the needs of the city. We shouldn't have to repeatedly arrest the same individuals.

1 - The challenges that prevent the BPD from engaging in the community include the department not being able to make amends with the police officers that serve the community. Countless surveys have shown that the members of the Baltimore City Police Department do not feel supported nor can they trust that the city trusts them, respects them and will protect them. Lack of patrol officers on the street has always prevented me from a long and meaningful interaction with my patrol post and sector. Officers are not invited nor encouraged to attend community meetings, the meetings are between command staff (the most removed and delusional member of the department from the street and current police work). I am in my 10th year of police service and I have always been on the midnight shift and I would love the ability to interact with the community as long as it can be a true and honest discussion about their community. 2. - I believe the Baltimore Police Department should have either physical or electronic suggestion/comment boxes for each post in the city. The patrol officers should then be able to see and respond to these questions and concerns as to better understand and engage with the community. I believe once a year officers should have to attend some form of town hall or community meeting or meet and greet for the district in which they serve. I believe the BPD should take a handful of officers and have them become community relations officers that patrol and respond to community concerns (this unit would work all three shifts and would patrol the entire city (omnipresence) and could work off of the citywide channel). This way overworked patrol units will not insult, misinform and or upset the community with their lack of knowledge or understanding of the issues faced by the community). The officers in the BPD are normally so embarrassed and angry with the city that it transfers over to the citizens and it is not fair

or appropriate. One community relations officer for an entire district is an insult to the community. There should be a minimum of one per sector. There should be a local business unit in the city that helps and educates local businesses on local laws and any and all information that would assist the business thrive in the community and work hand in hand with the BPD. The BPD should look into building and or providing space of volunteer citizen groups that want to assist in community matters but may not have a safe location to do so. (Opening an area in each district that can be utilized by volunteers to assist in local community matters.) I firmly believe that if the BPD continues to just deploy units to dangerous locations and continues to neglect the small community pockets that we do have then eventually the entire city will implode. Officers should be engaged with neighborhood associations on a one on one level not thru command staff. The community should hold the rank and file accountable not the head of the district that is normally locked in an administrative function and does not understand the limitations and lack of resources that patrol has. (Each command staff member has their own personal vehicle, command staff should be forced to see what the men and women who serve underneath them have to deal with each and every day such as cars, equipment and broken systems that MUST be utilized to do police work.) In my opinion the BPD is not committed to improving because there is no need to improve, The Mayor and City Council and the Command Staff of the BPD all receive their paychecks and pensions regardless of crime and community outrage all the while trying to blame a schedule and or the rank and file for failing to serve. Thank you for listening.

One of the primary challenges the agency faces is tension lack of trust between the agency and the State's Attorney Office. The unwillingness to prosecute cases and inability to obtain convictions hurts more than just the morale of BPD it puts citizens who've helped with cases in the direct line of fire for retaliation from those arrested. The lack of executive command who truly believe in community engagement and community policing is recognized by those lower in the chain of command. The urgency needed to address the community in its current paradigm is problematic on multiple levels. The message for a desire to rebuild trust and accountability is present, but the follow up is nearly non-existent. The foundational make-up of the agency, primarily officers from other states, creates a lack of understand and mistrust from the officers and the communities. 2. BPD's community policing strategy must include a component of foot patrol, it's essential in rebuilding the trust and presence needed in all communities. The separation of various community related activities throughout the agency should be centralized to allow a unified front and consistent message throughout the agency. Monthly community town hall meetings should place throughout the city, allowing citizens to voice their concerns as well as provide a platform to share intel with the agency. The mindset of Officer Friendly being a program as opposed to a mindset needs to change. Each District Commander should be tasked with creating a monthly community related event targeting the high crime areas within their respective district. There should be a community relations budget established to assist the District Commanders and the centralized unit to provide financial support for their initiatives. Challenges to community policing are on both sides of the fence in Baltimore. I believe that in many communities it has become the cultural norm to dislike police whether or not you have had a negative encounter with a police officer. In Baltimore the media often portrays the police as the enemy of the community. While there is not much that the BPD can do to immediately change the culture of the city and the media bias, there are a few things we can do as an agency. The CompStat model as it is currently utilized creates an adversarial atmosphere within the agency. For years it has seemed as though the it was the District Commanders and below versus upper command, versus the community. District Commanders are overwhelmed with preparation for CompStat and conference calls. This constant need to be prepared for any and all questions leaves District Commanders with little time to actually lead their personnel. There definitely is a need for an inspection component, but stuffing the entire command structure into a room once a week to browbeat commanders in

front of one another is not the way to do this. This not only breeds micromanagement but it also stifles free thinking, no one wants to share if they don't have to, CompStat for most is avoiding attention from upper command. There also is a need for an inspections unit to ensure that officers are following policy so that rules and regulations do not fall by the wayside. When Officers who follow the rules constantly see those that do not skate by it can be demoralizing, and will soon cause them to adopt the same behavior. First line supervisors do play a role in ensuring officers adhere to policy, but there also needs to be a unit that is independent of those districts and units that will ensure that policy is being followed. As for community policing the BPD has to start with what effects the everyday citizen in that particular area, whether it be armed persons in the Western District, or larceny from auto in the Southeast and Central District, these efforts cannot be halfhearted, assigning two officers to a "task force" will not be effective. These efforts will have to use all legal means available and work in conjunction with the SAO to ensure they are legal and effective. The BPD also needs to win back the common areas, i.e. stores, parks, open spaces. This does not have to be a heavy-handed effort, presence is half of the battle. Also, ensuring that businesses that are open late at night and attract the most violence have the proper permit to be open, and have the proper attention from district and citywide units. Most violent crime in Baltimore city will happen in or around a liquor store or carry out at night. A four to six person foot/bike unit to patrol shopping centers where violent crime has historically occurred is another important step that could be taken. If the foot unit's presence alone reduces crime, then they should not be badgered to produce proactive stats, this will often put these officers under pressure to adopt a "zero tolerance" mentality which could be counterproductive with the community who are there to shop and conduct business. Another way to improve relationships with the community is too establish at least two, two person patrol vehicles in each sector. Many use of force situations occur because officers are alone and they are engaging a hostile subject or group. Generally, a show of force will reduce the likelihood of a use of force. Lastly each district should have a drone/camera surveillance unit, which on the face is a hard sell and does not seem like a community policing effort, but when you put it up against just dumping officers in a violent area and telling them to make arrest it's a more effective option, and lessens the chances of a law abiding citizen being harassed because of where they live or work. It will also make cases stronger against offenders to increase the likelihood of them being extracted from the community.

Current command staff pushing stat driven policing. Officers are unable to actively patrol their assigned areas and deal with problems because they are being pressured to complete initiatives and other unproductive activities simply to produce "numbers."

The main challenge that prevents BPD from engaging in community policing is the community itself. There are two separate cultures in Baltimore. The well to do areas are completely different world than the areas from which the criminal activity mainly originates. The more poverty stricken areas maintain a culture wherein people are determined that the police are always wrong or corrupt. I've ridden through neighborhoods where a 5(ish) year old child waved at me, then got yelled at by his mother because "the police are bad, they beat up little black boys." When you teach your children that the police are inherently bad, there's not going to be a good relationship between the community and the police. There is also the tendency of criminals loved ones to deny that their loved one did anything wrong. If your son is a drug dealer then he's a drug dealer. He's not a good boy who made some mistakes. Sure, he can change, but he still made his living harming the community and is in no way shape or form a "good person." If your daughter goes around carjacking people, she is a bad person and doesn't need to be defended as a misguided individual who just needs some help. People who damage other people and the community for personal gain are not good people. You can love them, want the best for them, and support them without pretending like they're some lost little lamb being wrongfully persecuted by the police. On the other end of the spectrum, last year

everyone in the well to do communities knew that the homicide rate was tragic, but no-one got up in arms about it until a white guy got killed in a nice neighborhood. The city is not united. People don't care about the problems unless they are directly affected, and even then they just fuss about it and expect someone else to fix it. We can't "engage in community policing" because the community itself is often corrupt, crying for change but refusing to change and grow itself.

Before the 2015 riots, there was a passion for policing in the BPD. Yes, certain officers are inherently reactive while others are inherently restless, but there was a time when diligence was considered a worthwhile virtue among BPD officers. That time is gone. Officers for various reasons seem convinced that even the slightest ounce of effort beyond what is required is a risk that could result in frivolous yet career-ruining charges being filed against them. All semblance of institutional trust is gone from the rank and file. Unfortunately, this means community engagement has taken a huge hit, as officers believe that the vast majority of the public do not want them to be visiting businesses or engaging with citizens on the street. At this juncture, the only strategies that can improve things while working within existing guidelines are post officer integrity, supervisors pushing follow-ups, and business checks. Only by seeing citizens with at least some positive stake in police efforts will patrol officers develop a bond and stake with their own posts. However, to save the agency will require more, namely strong, fair leadership and some sort of dramatic gesture to make officers feel like their agency and local government values them and doesn't crave their failure. Until then, community policing is a losing battle as the agency will never attract or retain enough officers to keep things stable or positive.

There should be a balance between the police and the community. The role of the police should not be activity based with the community. The police should oversee that the laws are followed. Period. If you break the law there is a consequence. It should be up to the officer to gauge the severity of the breach with the intended consequence. The police are not intended to be your friend, they are there to protect the innocent from the small portion of individuals who prey on the community. The City of Baltimore has been heavily democratic for several generations. There is no balance to policy and zero political accountability. There is even less accountability for the communities themselves. It is no up to the police to clean up a community, it is the community itself! The police should assist the community in enforcing the LAW. The system in Baltimore is broken. There needs to be more jobs, there needs to be an end to unnecessary public assistance when it is a never-ending cycle, children need fathers (not police role models) and the community needs to understand that the crime is internal. Unlike the biased DOJ reports from a democratic administration, the police target where crime is occurring. The crime statistics themselves show who are committing and who are the victims of crimes. Policing areas like Federal Hill which have a different demographic than Sandtown are statistically based due to the violence that is occurring. Politics should have no role in policing and drastically get in the way of what is necessary to make Baltimore a safer place. There is a double standard and without the communities having personal accountability there will NEVER be a change. Every major democratic City in the United States is an example of the failure of liberal policy. There are more than enough opportunity, but there is no accountability to take advantage of those opportunities. Outward bound, Youth Circles, Community Picnics with the Police do nothing. The philosophies that the City leaders should be pushing are stricter hiring standards for police officers and accountability for each community member.

Commanders continued disrespect and disconnect from the rank and file. The overall feeling that they do not care about our health and well-being. If maybe they cared about us, we in turn would care about their wishes to engage the community. The rank and file believe that if even doing the right thing, if something goes wrong, there will be no support from the command staff and that they will be made examples of. Discipline will be swift and hard and that they will be doing anything possible to

save stay out of jail and save their jobs. This is a real fear spread throughout all of patrol. If this is not fixed, there will be no community engagement.

"Community policing" isn't going to happen when officers are constantly being exposed as career criminals, drug dealers, and thieves. We need to clean house. Show that what officers are left have an ounce of integrity, and attempt to move forward. It's also kinda hard to see putting effort into "community policing" when patrol is IN SERIOUS NEED OF OFFICERS. When your officers are dead on their feet, tired, and disgruntled....you're not gonna have any positive interaction with the community. You need to staff patrol first.

I strongly suggest introducing a Corporal rank to relieve the Use of Force Burden on Sergeants and Lieutenants. This would allow another permanent rank supervisor to sign reports, complete administrative duties, and provide a path to future leadership. By relieving this burden, it could assist with "lack of time" for members to engage in community policing activities. Reintroducing sectors as they were previously before most districts added a sector would also work better with the 8 hr. schedule.

In my opinion at least for the Central District is the amount of calls the patrolman and patrolwoman have to answer on a daily basis. The officers barely have time to eat their lunch or even use the restroom. If the Central District had more officers Maybe officers will have time to engage with the community. I can only speak for myself and for the officers that I have witnessed. At least in sector 2 and sector four of the central we walk foot we talked to the community on a daily basis. We conduct numerous business checks when not responding to a call.

The concept of "community policing" is a feel good buzz phrase that does not mean anything in essence, nor is it an effective crime fighting strategy. "Community policing" should be targeted toward making sure the "community" isn't getting killed, not focusing on having cookouts and dance contests.

The Challenge for the Baltimore Police Department in engaging the community is the patrol officer do not have the time to conduct community policing with the volume of calls for service. The BPD should have several small unit in the district to help engage the BPD.

What challenges prevent BPD from engaging in community policing today? One large challenge the Baltimore Police Department faces is man power shortages. These shortages do not allow officers sufficient time to engage in positive ways with the city. Also, officers constantly being pressured to produce stats. One answer to these problems is increased technology with a heavy emphasis on quality cameras throughout the city.

I feel that the command staff and many supervisors in the department are still lacking a solid understanding of the law as well as departmental policies. There is still a culture of retaliatory behavior against officers trying to improve conditions in the department or in their individual units, officers that stand up for their rights become targeted or threatened with transfers. The department is known for mistreating its officers and abusing their rights, which in turn causes the high turnover rate. It is not necessarily the streets chasing our officers away, it's the toxic environment within the department. I believe the agency needs to make many changes within before it can be successful changing the city in a positive way.

the problems with implementing community policing in Baltimore City has been the acceptance of the Baltimore police department to change focus to a more community based approach due to the amount of crime in the city along with lack of full participation from the communities to shift towards this change. For BPD when you remove officers from the crime fight in one of the most violent and crime ridden cities in the whole country to do more community based events u cause a void in the problematic area not having the coverage of police officers to reduce the crime in that area. If the department had enough officers to both cover the violent, crime ridden areas and also send officers

to community based events this system could work. instead the department is depleted of resources when you focus on community events over crime reduction. right now, BPD is at a staggering crime rate and every officer needs to be utilized to focus on lowering crime and then can slowly become more community based due to less of a need to keep so many officers in violent, crime ridden areas. The community for Baltimore city has seen multiple scandals and police officer misconduct in the past several years. This has in turn caused a state of not trusting and respecting the officers still in the BPD. The community judges most officers on the actions of a few when most BPD are great police and people. Until this culture is changed and the community wants to meet and educate themselves with the officers working their area there is no end in sight for this issue.

True community policing involves preventing and solving crimes as well as knowing the identities of criminals on one's post. Developing relationships with law abiding community members is helpful but is of secondary importance. Honest citizens will respect and cooperate with Police as long as crime is being dealt with decisively and effectively. In order to engage in community policing, the BPD has to abandon its long standing practice of over specializing. Patrol should be where the vast majority of Officers, Sergeants and Lieutenants are assigned. If every district were capable of deploying at least four supervisors and twenty five officers on every shift, we would finally have the personnel to respond to calls for service in a timely fashion, conduct through investigations and interact with community members, both criminal and law abiding. Our call volume has increased approximately 60 percent since 2012 yet the number of Officers actually on patrol in a patrol car has dropped by roughly that same percentage. All administrative positions in the department should be turned over to civilians and the Officers in those positions put back on the street or forced into retirement. Those who refuse to return to patrol without enough time on to retire should be fired. Another major problem is the lack of political support. Baltimore City is one of the most violent cities in the world, not just in the United States. Our use of force and vehicle pursuit policies do not reflect this. Officers should be permitted to engage in any lawful and constitutional tactic required to prevent and control crime. There should be no departmental policies which are more stringent than law. Political support is also essential and we currently have none. The State's Attorney's Office had collapsed over the last several years due to the loss of veteran prosecutors. As a result, she couldn't prosecute most of the cases we bring her even if she wanted to (which she doesn't). Our political leaders must make clear that criminals who fight police or run from police will be fought and pursued in return without apology.

The Challenges is that neither DOJ or THE POLITICIANS have a clue. The Baltimore y've gave the criminals power, and demonize the one entity that supposed to protect, and serve the law-abiding citizens and the wonder why the crime rate is out of control and why the community policing isn't working. It's "INSANITY"

The fact that the laws are constantly changing to hinder the efforts of police

Unfortunately, the obstacles that BPD faces in trying to engage in community policing are centuries old and I do not see a quick solution to fixing them. The department should forgo trying any community policing models and focus on removing violent criminals from the streets.

There isn't enough officers in Patrol for community policing or for the officers to even feel safe themselves. You have one officer to a car many times. No software to track officers and to track engagement efforts. There is no funding for extra community engagement. All these ideas are great but where is the money.

I don't have a response really in reference to the community but what about the department as a whole. I work in a unit where I feel I have been segregated as a civilian. Coming from a previous employment at Johns Hopkins where I felt like was TEAM working along with Doctors, Nurses and

other medical staff here I feel like it's the civilian and the officers there is no team, no communication, no morale!

Not enforcing loitering and trespassing law harms the community and gives an appearance of a free pass for drug shops to work with freedom.

1. The old-school mentality is alive and well. There are lots of efforts to change this but it is entrenched. 2. Focus on quality of life crimes more - yes, violent crimes are of course important but the average citizen in Baltimore doesn't feel like their burglary or car break in is important and therefore the police don't care.

The community makes very little effort to stabilize police relations. BPD command staff is out of touch with their officers so how can they be expected to stabilize relations with the community?

The two major shifts have diminished BPD effectiveness to engage its community policing over the years a) ZERO TOLERANCE ERA. In its wake it has left a mindset and rooted tactics as part of a new policing culture with officers at all levels of rank that never experienced a successful community policing and only a few previous officer friendly community policing style era. Thus as a whole you don't know what you don't and the outcome is resistance to the former effective style. AND unfortunately, the few remaining active officers that where successful prior to ZT are overlooked and thought of as being outdated. b) TECHNOLOGY as necessary as it is has been over utilized socially taking the place of tangible human interaction. As a result even most of the modern day officers struggle to simple remove themselves from their vehicles to say hello to a stranger let alone a group of young black males on a corner or old men sitting in a lot playing checkers. BONUS c) Over the years there has not been enough officers hired that come from the city they're asked to police. 25-30 years ago the vast majority were hired from the city while today less than 20% have any connection to the city. This in itself is problematic if you understand that the best people to police a community come from the community. SOULUTIONS 1) BPD needs a homegrown police commissioner that has come through the ranks of BPD and along the way has gained the trust of the community and officers with a policing style balanced with Protect and Serve track record. 2) BPD needs to support and resource a citywide Community Division that is deliberate, engaging and able to connect the community and police through innovative initiatives that connects both sides in an environment designed to build and restore relational equity and trust. THIS MODEL AND LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN WITNESSED, TRIED, TESTED AND SUCCEEDED BY BPD LEADERSHIP AND THE COMMUNITY AT LARGE BUT AGAIN BECAUSE OF THE POLICE CULTURE AND MINDSET TODAY IT HAS BEEN REJECTED BY LEADERSHIP WHILE EMBRACED AND DESIRED BY THE COMMUNITY AT LARGE.

The high turnover rate of District Commanders is the biggest challenge to the BPD actively engaging in meaningful community policing. District Commanders should manage the same district at least 3 years, like they used to back in the 1980's & 1990's. This will allow them to build a strong, sustainable relationship with the communities they serve. And District Commanders who ask for a demotion, transfer or retire with less than 3 years at one location should ordered to reimburse the department \$5,000.

1. One major challenge that prevents BPD from engaging in community policing is the mindset of some of the individuals within the community what it comes to police officers. Many individuals within the community have ill thoughts towards police officers, often because of the fact that they saw one police officer do something wrong. 2. The BPD community policing strategies should include showing the public that police officers do good within the community. This could be done by holding meet and greets, etc. to show off what good the BPD is doing for the community.

unnecessary limitations posed by the agency and city hall

The fact that the officers policing the communities in Baltimore are not from the community they are policing or are not familiar with the diversity of a large city. It is a melting pot of people with different

histories and backgrounds and I believe in order to create some sort of understanding between the officers and the community officers should be made familiar with the history of the city and neighborhoods with tour guided being city residents. I think officers should be familiarized with the systematic causes of poverty and crime, and that they should have some sociology courses.

This box is too small to answer two open ended questions, AND I've had my answer deleted twice now trying to deal with it. Also, you never defined "Community Policing" in question prompt above. That would seem to be a necessary first step for both me providing feedback and for the department as a whole to come up with a plan that isn't amorphous.

One of the first challenges that the Baltimore Police Department faces is defining what Community Policing is, or will be, inside of the City of Baltimore. Community Policing, in the broadest term applicable to any Law Enforcement entity, is, in my mind, the following: Working with the community in order to remove the criminal element. That is, it. This is a fairly simple concept that, in my observations, loses focus when implemented by municipalities. Community policing is the implementation of crime fighting tactics that seek to use the resources embedded in the community which is being policed: Citizen contacts that create rapport building, leading to intelligence gathering, crime prevention seminars to educate individuals on how not to be targets of crime, the establishment of block watcher programs, and youth interaction in order to counteract the idea that all police are "bad." Community policing is NOT barbecues, aftercare programs, etc. These are not law enforcement functions, and all studies have shown that when law enforcement attempts to become social workers, they fail. Community policing is also about educating the public on what are, and what are not, police responsibilities. Social engagement on a services level for basic human needs, if it does not involve fighting crime, is NOT a law enforcement responsibility. It is a community responsibility better served through other governmental programs. One of the biggest challenges that the BPD faces is that no one is defining the POLICING part of the term "Community Policing."

Attitude of police and intel officers. Their negative views, attitudes, words, reflect BPD which doesn't help the gap between police and community.

## **About National Police Foundation**

The National Police Foundation is America's oldest non-membership, non-partisan police research organization. We were founded in 1970 by the Ford Foundation to advance policing through innovation and science. We integrate the work of practitioners and social scientists to facilitate effective crime control and the progress of democratic policing strategies. We have a wide breadth of projects throughout the U.S. and Mexico. Among other efforts, we conduct scientific evaluations of policing strategies, organizational assessments, critical incident reviews, police data projects and issue timely policing publications critical to practitioners and policymakers. We also have a strong interest in officer safety and wellness, preventable error in policing and helping policing enhance community trust and confidence, especially in the area of police use-of-force.



### **National Police Foundation**

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