Preparing for and Responding to Mass Demonstrations and Counter-Demonstrations in Portland, Oregon

A Review of the Portland Police Bureau’s Response to Demonstrations on June 4, 2017, August 4, 2018, and August 17, 2019
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December 2020
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Counter-Demonstrations in Portland, Oregon

The internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the date of publication. Given that URLs and websites are in constant flux, the National Police Foundation cannot vouch for their current validity.

A list of assessment team members and their bios can be found in Appendix C.

Recommended citation:

Submitted: December 2020

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All data collection, writing, and development of recommendations presented in this report occurred prior to the death of George Floyd on May 25, 2020. Since that time, the City of Portland and the Portland Police Bureau along with cities across the country have endured hundreds of days of protests—many peaceful, but also many that have brought with them violence and destruction.

As these incidents continue to evolve, the National Police Foundation encourages communities and police departments to work together to bring peace, to listen to each other and to learn from responses that enable free expression while keeping life and property safe. While the assessment team acknowledges that some of the recommendations in this report may seem outdated due to the incredibly unprecedented incidents of this time, we believe that there are lessons to be learned.
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Acknowledgements

The National Police Foundation (NPF) assessment team would like to thank the City of Portland and Portland Police Bureau (PPB) for supporting this effort. In particular, City of Portland Mayor Ted Wheeler, City Attorney Tracy Reeve, and Paralegal Supervisor Cheryl Noll, as well as PPB Chief Charles Lovell, Assistant Chief Jami Resch, former Chief Danielle Outlaw, and Commander Bryan Parman provided significant assistance and support of the process. This review provides information to assist the PPB and Portland community—as well as other public safety agencies and the communities they serve—as they continue to work together to enhance responses to mass demonstrations.

Thank you to the PPB members and Portland community members and groups who supported this review process, providing us with critical access and insights into the events of June 4, 2017, August 4, 2018, and August 17, 2019. Our thanks extend to the Portland Fire & Rescue Bureau, Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office, U.S. Attorney’s Office, and those who gave their time and input to facilitate this review.
Executive Summary

Serving a city with a strong culture of activism, the Portland Police Bureau (PPB) has a long history of responding to mass demonstrations. Over recent years, the tenor of some major protests in Portland has evolved with the materialization of large, high-profile, and oppositional demonstrations and counter-demonstrations—some of which have resulted in incidents of violence.

The PPB responded to such events on June 4, 2017, August 4, 2018, and August 17, 2019. Throughout this time, the PPB has made efforts to improve their ability to respond to mass demonstrations, learning from these and other demonstration responses in Portland as well as in other places in the United States and internationally. PPB responses on June 4, 2017, and August 4, 2018, were widely criticized by Portland community members, who have perceived these responses as disproportionate and ideologically biased in a way that has eroded community trust.¹ By comparison, the PPB and citywide response to similarly oppositional demonstrations on August 17, 2019, has in large part been viewed favorably.² This difference highlights promising advances the PPB and City of Portland are making in planning, coordination, and messaging to better respond to mass demonstrations in support of public safety and protestors’ First Amendment rights.

This National Police Foundation (NPF) review examines the PPB response to the June 4, 2017, August 4, 2018, and August 17, 2019, demonstrations. The NPF is a non-profit, non-partisan, and non-membership-driven organization dedicated to improving policing. The NPF was engaged by the City of Portland to conduct an independent assessment of PPB’s response to the June 4, 2017, and August 4, 2018, demonstrations. Recognizing that the PPB’s policies, practices, and training have continued to evolve since those events, the NPF assessment team also examined the PPB response to the August 17, 2019 demonstrations. The review draws on a comprehensive analysis of materials, video, interviews, and extensive NPF subject matter expertise and experience conducting reviews of responses to mass demonstrations.³

This analysis is focused on PPB policies, training, procedures, and practices at the time of the events and their immediate aftermath. The analysis is intended to provide objective feedback to the PPB, not to assign blame or criticize, but to contribute to continual evaluation and evolution of the Bureau’s mass demonstration responses. The findings and recommendations are offered

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¹ NPF assessment team interviews with Portland community members and city officials, September 24-25, 2019 and November 23-24, 2019.
³ The NPF has conducted after action reviews of responses to the January 2017 presidential inauguration demonstrations in Washington (DC), September 2017 demonstrations in Charlotte (NC), and late-2015 demonstrations in Minneapolis (MN), and consulted on the review of the response to protest events in Charlottesville (VA). View the NPF Critical Incident Review Library at https://www.policefoundation.org/critical-incident-review-library/.

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to identify key areas that the PPB can address to continue in enhancing their planning and responses to mass demonstrations. The findings and recommendations center on planning, preparation, deployment, training, and equipment; incident command; policies, protocols, and strategies; public communication and messaging; and, the after action review (AAR) process.

Major themes of the report include the following:

- **Citywide planning and support for unified responses to mass demonstrations assist in strengthening the overall public safety response, making the response more collaborative, resourced, measured, and effective.** In advance of the August 17, 2019, response, PPB and citywide operational and communications planning significantly increased. PPB and city leaders, and communications stakeholders, framed the response as a citywide issue and responded with a unified message, coordinating resources from throughout the bureau and across city agencies, and attaining the support of community groups and local, state, and federal public safety partners to further create a unified front and elevate messages in the interest of public safety.

- **Continued prioritization of planning, preparation, management, and training for mass demonstration responses is important to strengthen the effectiveness of police responses to demonstrations.** City and PPB leaders must stress that every member has an important role in supporting the public safety mission during demonstration responses. Emphasizing the value and benefits of PPB members and units that serve key roles in planning for and responding to demonstrations would elevate their critical roles. Strong planning and preparation for event responses, appropriate equipment, training members to respond appropriately, and providing sufficient supervision and support for those members is valuable to improve the effectiveness of responses.  

- **Clear, consistent communication with demonstrators and other community members is key to facilitate public safety and build trust.** Consistent and well-communicated messaging prior to, during, and after mass demonstrations assists with establishing mutual expectations for, and respect between, demonstrators and the police. Improved communications planning in advance of August 17, 2019, helped the PPB to proactively relay their intentions and expectations of demonstrators’ behaviors. Cultivating police-community relations and lines of communication, before, during, and after events, is essential to promote public safety during mass demonstrations.

- **Fostering a culture of learning enables organizations to learn from promising practices and lessons learned to continually improve the organization.** Over recent years, PPB members have taken steps to research and learn from past events—in Portland as well as

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https://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/police%20management%20of%20mass%20demonstrations%20-%20identifying%20issues%20and%20successful%20approaches%202006.pdf
other jurisdictions—to improve their AAR process, develop more collaborative relationships, and implement new ideas and strategies to enhance mass demonstration responses. In particular, the PPB’s Demonstration Liaison Team and practice of embedding Portland Fire & Rescue medical personnel with PPB Rapid Response Teams during protest responses represent promising advances in mass demonstration response practices for Portland and the greater public safety field.

Since the writing of this report, the City of Portland has and continues to experience hundreds of days of protests and demonstrations in response to the death of George Floyd in May 2020 in Minneapolis, MN. Like many communities around the country, these protests and demonstrations have challenged departments to identify and deploy responses that preserve freedom of speech and assembly while also protecting life and property. In many instances, protest and demonstration incidents have exposed city governments’ difficulty in coming together to address crisis in their cities, and have highlighted deep wounds in relationships between communities and police. For their part, most community members protest peacefully, while some are determined to commit violence and destruction—illegitimate acts—in the name of legitimate issues.

While this review focuses on events with oppositional demonstrations and counter-demonstrations, lessons can be applied to responses to demonstrations more generally. The lessons in this report also underscore the ongoing importance of continuing to expand PPB planning and responses to demonstrations in an effort to quell violence and destruction—a challenge in light of depleted and exhausted resources. Furthermore, throughout this report, the major themes as well as findings and recommendations are focused on the PPB and City of Portland, but are applicable to jurisdictions, public safety agencies, and communities nationwide. Any public safety agency can learn from this report and adapt the findings and recommendations to better prepare for and respond to mass demonstrations.
Introduction

On June 4, 2017, and again on August 4, 2018, the Portland Police Bureau (PPB) responded to mass demonstrations in Portland, Oregon. Both incidents included multiple groups of demonstrators and counter demonstrators and resulted in civil disturbances and police uses of force. These events exhibit the evolving nature of protests and police responses to demonstrations that have occurred in Portland in recent years.

Scope & Goals of Review

In July 2019, the City of Portland contracted with the National Police Foundation (NPF) to conduct an independent assessment of the PPB’s response to recent mass demonstrations, particularly those occurring on June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018. Goals of the project were to:

- Independently assess the PPB’s response to mass demonstrations and First Amendment assemblies on June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018, as well as other incidents as agreed upon, from a variety of perspectives to include PPB personnel, community groups and members, and other stakeholders.
- Conduct analysis of focus areas, including where improvements in PPB policy, planning, practice, training, tactics, staffing and resources may be needed to better align the department with national best and promising practices.
- Identify ways in which communications and relationship building with demonstrators and community members can be strengthened to improve public safety during First Amendment assemblies.
- Identify focus areas from PPB responses to mass demonstrations and First Amendment assemblies that provide promising practices and lessons learned for the broader law enforcement community.

Recognizing that the PPB’s policies, practices, and training have continued to evolve since those events, the NPF assessment team also examined the PPB response to the August 17, 2019 demonstrations as part of this independent assessment. Begun under PPB Chief Danielle Outlaw, this review was continued with the support of Assistant Chief Jami Resch and Chief Charles Lovell.

This review identifies opportunities for the PPB to continue to improve policies, procedures, training, tactics, staffing, and resources to be better prepared to respond to demonstrations. Effective demonstration responses ensure that community members are able to fully and safely exercise their First Amendment rights. This involves both the avoidance of unnecessary use of police force against demonstrators and the ability of the city and police to manage events to be able to support public safety. The analysis, findings, and recommendations contained in this report are intended to provide objective feedback and lessons learned, based on national best practices, from which to advance. Additionally, the City of Portland and PPB intended for this
report to contribute to the growing body of literature for other public safety agencies and communities preparing for responses to demonstrations and large-scale events nationwide.

Methodology

To conduct this review, the NPF assembled a team of subject matter experts with extensive experience in law enforcement accountability and responses to mass demonstrations and First Amendment assemblies. From July 2019 through June 2020, the NPF assessment team:

- conducted interviews and focus groups with over 90 PPB sworn and civilian staff throughout the bureau; City of Portland officials including the mayor, city attorneys, and city commissioners; personnel from the Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office and US Department of Justice; and community members;
- directly observed the PPB response to the August 17, 2019 events;
- reviewed materials including audio and video from the events, policies and procedures, and other related reports;
- examined open source media related to the incident;
- researched national standards, model policies, and best and promising practices; and,
- studied after action reviews from previous responses to demonstrations to provide a basis for this report.

The NPF assessment team had access and reviewed confidential information and documentation provided by the City of Portland and PPB as part of this review. Some documentation made available to the NPF assessment team has been protected under a non-disclosure agreement and is not listed here.

Based on the analysis of this body of information, the NPF assessment team developed the findings and recommendations contained in this report. A full list of the findings and recommendations can be found in Appendix A and a full detailed methodology can be found in Appendix B.

Report Organization

This report begins with background information and a description of Portland’s environment, which are critical to understand Portland’s unique context and challenges. The next section provides incident and response descriptions for the June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018 mass demonstrations and First Amendment assemblies. The following section provides an incident and response description for the August 17, 2019 incident, separated from the first incident descriptions to underscore their differences. This report then analyzes PPB planning, preparation, and training; incident command; policies, protocols, and strategies; public communication; and,

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5 Full bios of assessment team members can be found in Appendix C: About the Assessment Team.
after action review process. The final section summaries the key themes identified during the review and areas for future consideration by the City of Portland, PPB, and community members.
Background

With more than 650,000 people, the City of Portland is Oregon’s largest city and is the 25th largest city in the nation. Portland is frequently a center for marches, demonstrations, and rallies where participants have exercised their First Amendment rights on a variety of social and political issues including racism, police accountability, and political activism. In recent years, however, the tenor of some major protests has shifted with the emergence of large, high-profile demonstrations that have drawn far-right and anti-fascist demonstrators and counter-demonstrators—some of which have resulted in incidents of mounting violence.

Surrounding these specific protest events, Portland’s unique governance structure, culture, and history of police-community relations have influenced the City of Portland and Portland Police Bureau’s (PPB) responses to mass demonstrations. This chapter provides a description of the environment in which the PPB operates to serve as contextual background for the report.

Governance Structure

Portland has a city commission government system—the last commission form of government in use among large cities in the United States. Under this system, the Portland people elect six city officials through staggered elections: the mayor, four commissioners, and the auditor. Each of these elected officials are elected at-large and serve four-year terms without term limits.

The mayor and commissioners form the Portland City Council. These city council members decide legislative policy and oversee the city bureaus that are responsible for the municipality’s day-to-day functions. The mayor determines which bureaus fall under the purview of each commissioner, including directly under the mayor. Over the years, Portland mayors have often chosen to oversee the PPB, thereby also serving as the PPB commissioner. Mayor Ted Wheeler serves as the current PPB commissioner. The PPB commissioner appoints and supervises a chief of police, can suspend or otherwise discipline PPB employees, and approves administrative rules and regulations. The Portland Fire and Rescue Bureau and Bureau of Emergency Management—which have provided important support to the PPB during responses to demonstrations—are overseen by City Commissioner Jo Ann Hardesty.

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9 Ibid.
The city auditor is responsible for ensuring government accountability and transparency. Within the Office of the City Auditor, the Independent Police Review (IPR) serves as an entity independent from the police bureau that provides oversight of police conduct, practices, and policies with the goal of increasing accountability and public trust.13

The Portland Police Bureau & Police-Community Relations

Staffed by approximately 900 sworn and 255 civilian members, the PPB is the primary law enforcement agency that serves the City of Portland.14 The PPB is led by the police commissioner and chief of police. Chief Charles Lovell serves as the current PPB chief of police.15 Under the chief, a deputy chief oversees PPB’s three branches: operations, investigations, and services. Each branch is led by an assistant chief. Operations includes the PPB’s three geographically arranged patrol precincts, as well as traffic and crowd management incident command. Investigations includes tactical operations units such as the Rapid Response Team, which responds to large protest events, and Crisis Negotiations Team, which has officers that serve as demonstration liaison officers for protest events. Services includes training, records, information technology, and personnel.

The PPB has worked to build relationships with the Portland community. The bureau conducts several outreach efforts to bridge communication between the bureau and the communities they serve, such as through community advisory councils and planned community events and youth activities.16 The PPB regularly shares data on crime, use of force, traffic stops, and other activities.17 In addition to publicly posting their directives, the PPB invites community members to provide feedback on their directives, and has engaged in community surveys to better understand community perceptions of the PPB.18

15 Chief Michael Marshman served as PPB chief during the June 4, 2017, events before retiring on August 25, 2017. Chief Danielle Outlaw served as PPB chief during the August 4, 2018, and August 17, 2019, events before stepping down on December 30, 2019. Chief Jami Resch served as PPB chief from December 31, 2019, to June 8, 2020.

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Figure 1: PPB Organizational Chart in Place During the Review Period*

*Note: Chart displays the divisions and units most discussed in this report as of October 2020. The PPB organizational chart has changed several times over the time period examined by this review. Sources: Communication from PPB deputy chief to the NPF assessment team, received October 12, 2020. See also: PPB Organizational Chart, https://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/article/744538.
Still, Portland has a history of racial tension and challenged police-community relations that many community members have not forgotten. Portland community members have alleged police bias during day-to-day interactions related to race, mental health, and political affiliation. Police actions during some Portland protests have additionally been perceived by some as biased, further undermining PPB efforts to build community trust.

From 2011 to 2012, the United State Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted an investigation into the PPB and found that the PPB showed a pattern and practice of using excessive force against persons with mental illness. Based on these findings, in 2014, the United States and City of Portland formally entered into a settlement agreement to make changes to PPB policies, practices, training, and supervision. Under the agreement, the city agreed to revise its use of force policies, expand crisis intervention training, expedite the investigations of complaints of misconduct, and create a community oversight advisory board. In January 2020, the DOJ found the PPB to be in substantial compliance with the agreement. However, in February, with disagreement from local community groups on the extent of PPB’s compliance, US District Judge Michael Simon delayed ruling on the status of the agreement until 2021.

The Evolution of Protests in Portland

Portland is a frequent center for First Amendment assemblies. In recent years, individuals have exercised their First Amendment rights to protest police accountability, environmental policies, political sentiment, and more. Throughout each of these protests, PPB officers have responded to attempt to protect individuals’ First Amendment rights to protest and uphold public

21 The agreement was filed by the United States and City of Portland in 2012. For more, see: https://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/article/506328
order. Still, during some of these protests, some individuals have engaged in violence, and community members have alleged that PPB officers contributed to the escalation of tensions and used disproportionate levels of force.

On top of these tensions, protests in Portland have evolved in recent years, creating new implications for police planning and response to protests. The 2016 election and 2017 inauguration of President Donald Trump spurred several protests to form in Portland as people from across the political spectrum sought to exercise their First Amendment rights. While most of these events have been peaceful, some of these protests have involved instances of violence. In particular, some protests—including those examined as part of this review—have drawn individuals associated with far-right and anti-fascist ideologies who have demonstrated against and confronted each other in public spaces. The PPB has been challenged to respond to these demonstrations and counter-demonstrations, which are highly political in nature and involve complex dynamics between protestors, counter-protestors, and the police. Throughout these responses, PPB and City of Portland officials have remained aware of other demonstration and counter-demonstration events occurring across the country—including the 2017 protest events in Charlottesville, Virginia that ended with the death of a counter-protestor—and have sought to prevent similar violence in Portland.

Some parts of these demonstrations and counter-demonstrations in Portland have escalated in violence and involved police uses of force. Similar to other Portland protests, community members have alleged that during these demonstrations, some PPB officers have played a role in escalating tensions and used disproportionate levels of force. In addition, community members have alleged that PPB actions, uses of force, and communications during and around these events have been biased—particularly against left-wing and Antifa protestors. Contributing to tensions, in December 2017, the text messages of a PPB lieutenant who served as a police liaison to protest group members, began to be publicly scrutinized for their content. Community members criticized the lieutenant for being too friendly with one far-right protest group, including for discussing the status of warrants for one of the group’s members with another member of the group. While the IPR did not sustain allegations that the lieutenant engaged in potential misconduct through these messages, the allegations and public discourse as well as related

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31 Ibid.
comments by city officials have contributed to damaged community trust in the police and damaged PPB members’ trust in police and city leadership.\textsuperscript{32}

Unique Challenges in Response to Protests in Portland

Portland has unique circumstances within which the PPB must operate to respond to protests, which limit some of the tools available to police compared to similar sized jurisdictions. Most notably, local culture and state law have discouraged the PPB from adopting and using body worn cameras (BWC) during responses to protests. Oregon law prohibits the PPB from collecting information about a person’s political affiliation. Specifically, ORS § 181A.250 states:

“No law enforcement agency . . . may collect or maintain information about the political, religious or social views, associations or activities of any individual, group, association, organization, corporation, business or partnership unless such information directly relates to an investigation of criminal activities, and there are reasonable grounds to suspect the subject of the information is or may be involved in criminal conduct.”\textsuperscript{33}

Thus, while many other jurisdictions rely on BWCs for situational awareness during responses to events, the climate in Portland has restricted or at least discouraged the PPB from using similar methods. Other major city police departments—including the Seattle (WA) Police Department,\textsuperscript{34} Cleveland (OH) Police Department,\textsuperscript{35} Metropolitan (DC) Police Department,\textsuperscript{36} and New York (NY) Police Department\textsuperscript{37}—provide officers with BWCs and enable officers to turn them on during demonstrations under certain conditions such as when officers have probable cause that criminal activity is occurring or when they are engaging in an arrest or use of force. The PPB has begun to develop BWC policies to propose to the Portland City Council for consideration of a BWC


\textsuperscript{33} ORS § 181A.250. Specific information not to be collected or maintained. https://www.oregonlaws.org/ors/181A.250


program. However, the coronavirus (COVID-19) emergency has produced budget impacts that have de-prioritized the city’s BWC pilot project.

In response to the changing nature of protests, Portland officials have also sought to implement restrictions on protests, but some proposals to do so have faced opposition and backlash from community members and groups. In 2018, Mayor Wheeler proposed an ordinance that would have enabled time, place, and manner restrictions to be placed on events involving two or more demonstrating and counter-demonstrating groups with a history of violence toward each other. This ordinance would have enabled the PPB commissioner to designate certain areas for demonstrators and counter-demonstrators to exercise their First Amendment rights in advance, keeping the opposing groups separated in an attempt to reduce opportunities for violence. Some community groups opposed the plan, critiquing the ordinance as an attempt to expand police powers and advocating instead for more law enforcement training on de-escalation and extremist group tactics, among other suggestions. In 2019, then-Chief Danielle Outlaw recommended a law that would bar masks worn by demonstrators to discourage acts of violence, and received strong opposition from community members and groups.

Additionally, the large demonstrations and counter-demonstrations in Portland have garnered strong national media attention, which may have contributed to the size and volatility of these protests. While Portland-area residents regularly organize and participate in many demonstrations and counter-demonstrations, the city has also drawn people from across the United States to protest political causes. Out-of-state residents have organized controversial protests in Portland and the polemic nature of the protests have elevated their media exposure. The national media exposure has also enabled greater scrutiny of the PPB, potentially complicating the complaint process as viewers across the country reach out to the IPR on complaints regarding PPB officer actions seen on the news.

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40 Impact statement for requested council action: authorize the commissioner in charge of the police bureau to order content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations for demonstrations held in the city (ordinance). (2018). Provided by the City of Portland to the NPF assessment team, November 2019.
41 Ibid.
45 NPF assessment team interview with IPR members, September 25, 2019.
Complicating the police response, Portland is part of an interlocal mutual law enforcement assistance agreement that enables the city to receive support from other participating law enforcement agencies. However, some mutual aid agencies have recently limited their response to requests for service within the City of Portland. In 2018, the Washington County Sheriff’s Office formally withdrew from the mutual aid agreement.\textsuperscript{46} A few months later, in July 2019, the Clackamas County Sheriff’s Office formally withdrew from the mutual aid agreement.\textsuperscript{47} Both counties border the City of Portland.

\textsuperscript{46} Communication from city attorney’s office to the NPF assessment team, received October 12, 2020. See also: Martinex, M. (2019, February 15). Washington County Sheriff’s office pulling back resources from Portland police bureau. Fox12 Oregon. \url{https://www.kptv.com/news/washington-county-sheriff-s-office-pulling-back-resources-from-portland/article_120a039a-3193-11e9-ab00-77729c9829e4.html}

\textsuperscript{47} Communication from city attorney’s office to the NPF assessment team, received March 2, 2020.
Incident and Response Descriptions—June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018

The following sections describe the events and responses that occurred on June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018 to serve as context for the analysis sections contained in the report. While the Portland Police Bureau (PPB) regularly responds to hundreds of events each year, from small groups of protesting individuals to mass demonstrations with hundreds of attendees, these two incidents are summarized below are recent examples that captured national attention.

June 4, 2017

The alt-right group Patriot Prayer organized a “Trump Free Speech Rally” at Terry Schrunk Plaza in downtown Portland on June 4, 2017.48 Multiple groups—including Rose City Antifa, Portland United Against Hate, and a group organized by labor unions—organized demonstrations to counter-protest the Patriot Prayer rally.49

Just days before the demonstrations, on May 26, a man who had attended another Patriot Prayer rally in April 2017 began yelling anti-Muslim rhetoric at two Muslim women on a Portland MAX train. Upon being confronted for his language, the man fatally stabbed two men and seriously injured another on the train.50 Despite calls for Patriot Prayer to cancel the June 4 rally, the event was not canceled. Mayor Ted Wheeler also requested the US General Services Administration (GSA), which manages Terry Schrunk Plaza, to revoke their approved permit for the rally but the GSA declined to do so. Since the rally would occur on federal property, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) prepared to respond to the event. The PPB also prepared to respond and leveraged the support of other public safety partners, including the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Department, Oregon State Police (OSP), Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office.51 Portland Fire & Rescue (PF&R) medics were embedded with PPB members to be able to quickly provide medical support.52 The City Attorney’s Office and Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office also supported the response.

The following provides a timeline of the events that occurred on June 4, 2017. All timestamps are approximate, compiled from multiple sources including the Independent Police Review (IPR) report on the demonstrations and media from that day.53

49 Ibid.
52 NPF assessment team interviews with PF&R personnel, September 25, 2019.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12:00 p.m.</td>
<td>Crowds began forming— Rapid Response Team (RRT) squads and Federal Protective Service officers formed lines around Schrunk Plaza in an attempt to separate the opposing demonstrators.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:11 p.m.</td>
<td>The FPS arrested one person at the demonstration.55 PPB continued to tweet about arrests, tweet about items were thrown at officers and other people, and tweet pictures of seized items throughout the afternoon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:22 p.m.</td>
<td>PPB tweeted, “Police working to keep all groups separated. Protesters should stay with their groups, not attempt to cross streets to escalate tensions.”56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:18 p.m.</td>
<td>PPB tweeted, “Balloons with unknown, foul-smelling liquid have been thrown from Chapman Square at officers and people in Terry Schrunk Plaza.”57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:22 p.m.</td>
<td>PPB tweeted, “People in Chapman Square need to move to the northern half of the park to allow larger safety buffer between groups.”58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:24 p.m.</td>
<td>PPB tweeted, “People in Chapman Square have been spotted removing bricks from the bathroom building on the south side of the park.”59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:28 p.m.</td>
<td>PPB tweeted, “People in Chapman Square move to northern half of park to allow larger safety buffer between groups. Crowd given announcements from police.”60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:30 p.m.</td>
<td>PPB cleared Chapman Square, deploying less-lethal munitions.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:51 p.m.</td>
<td>A group of protesters remained in SW Main Street and Lownsdale Square and were declared an unlawful assembly. PPB tweeted, “Crowd in Lownsdale Square continuing to periodically throw projectiles at police officers. Suspects will be arrested if/when possible.”62 Protestors marched northward.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:21 p.m.</td>
<td>PPB officers and OSP troopers detained the protestors who had moved north from Chapman Square to SW 4th Avenue between Morrison and Alder Streets. Three-hundred-eighty-nine (389) people were photographed by PPB field arrest teams. During the mass detention, FPS officers closed Schrunk Plaza.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:20 p.m.</td>
<td>PPB tweeted, “Event at Terry Schrunk Plaza is over, park is empty. City Hall event also over, few people remain.”64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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54 Ibid.
Midday on June 4, 2017, crowds began forming at Terry Schrunk Plaza, Chapman Square, the Edith Green-Wendell Wyatt Federal Building, and Portland City Hall, where the demonstrations and counter-demonstrations were planned. Just before noon, PPB Rapid Response Team (RRT) squads and FPS officers formed lines between Terry Schrunk Plaza and Chapman Square. RRT officers faced north toward the counter-demonstrating group that had gathered there. FPS officers formed a line that faced south toward the demonstrating group. More than 200 PPB officers were present at the events, along with two squads of the Oregon State Police and a squad from the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office. Several hundreds of demonstrators and counter-demonstrators gathered at the events.

Figure 2: Map of June 4, 2017, Event Locations

Source: Esri, USDA FSA, GeoEye, Maxar, CNES/Airbus DS.

During the rally, individuals were verbally hostile towards the opposing group and some occasionally attempted to cross into the opposing protest crowd. Officers intervened to stop

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66 Ibid.
some of these conflicts, seized potential weapons, and arrested and charged some individuals for carrying concealed weapons.  

In the afternoon, PPB reported objects being thrown by individuals in Chapman Square. The PPB broadcast warnings from its sound truck, directing people in Chapman Square to stop throwing objects and move to the north. At around 3:30 p.m., as actions escalated, PPB officers moved to clear the square. PPB reported that dangerous items were thrown at officers from individuals in Chapman Square, including bricks and other projectiles, leading them to respond with less lethal munitions. A group of protesters that had moved to and remained in Southwest Main Street and Lownsdale Square—immediately north of Chapman Square—were declared an unlawful assembly. The IPR report notes that, “Protesters then began to march to the north, but Rapid Response Team squads relocated and blocked the progress of the march at several intersections.”

By 4:21 p.m., a crowd of the protesters had moved a few blocks further north, to SW 4th Avenue between Morrison and Alder Streets, when PPB officers and OSP troopers formed police lines and detained the group. The incident commander, after consulting with a deputy city attorney and member of the Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office, had ordered the group to be detained to investigate disorderly conduct. Over the next hour (approximately), officers processed hundreds of people, including journalists covering the protest, and photographed their identification before release. The PPB photographed 389 people during this time.

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70 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
Outcomes

Community members reported that PPB actions during the response to this event were biased and eroded community trust. Community members have alleged that PPB members exhibited bias by creating a relatively heavy police line that faced counter-demonstrators in Chapman Square rather than the demonstrators in Terry Schrunk Plaza. Community members have also alleged that bias was exhibited through the PPB’s seizure of potential weapons from counter-demonstrators in Chapman Square, as potential weapons of demonstrators in and around Terry Schrunk Plaza were reportedly not confiscated to the same degree. Furthermore, community members alleged that the detention of protestors on 4th Avenue later that day was biased and unlawful. Following the event, then-PPB Chief Mike Marshman reported that the decision to detain the crowd was made to investigate criminal activity as well as to de-escalate the threat of violence between the demonstrating and counter-demonstrating groups. Community members have viewed this reasoning as a biased aim to “protect” the demonstrators at Terry Schrunk Plaza.

77 Ibid.

Preparation for and Responding to Mass Demonstrations and Counter-Demonstrations in Portland, Oregon
Fourteen people were ultimately arrested by police at the demonstrations throughout the afternoon.\(^8^0\) One of the arrestees, who was acquitted of criminal charges, has since filed a lawsuit against the City of Portland, PPB, and OSP officers alleging excessive use of force, mass detention, and arrest.\(^8^1\) This suit remains pending.\(^8^2\) In November 2017, the ACLU of Oregon also filed a class action lawsuit against the City of Portland for the mass detention of protestors.\(^8^3\) In May 2018, the IPR released a review of PPB policies and procedures related to their response to the June 4, 2017 events that included recommendations for police policy, public communication, and documentation.\(^8^4\) Other agencies that supported the PPB response included the PF&R, City Attorney’s Office, Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office, and Portland Parks and Recreation.\(^8^5\)

**August 4, 2018**

The following provides a timeline of the events that occurred on August 4, 2018. All timestamps are approximate, derived from multiple sources including PPB and media reports. Unless otherwise noted, all timestamps were taken from PPB reports from the August 4, 2018, demonstration.\(^8^6\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:30 a.m.</td>
<td>Police resources were highly visible in the area around the planned Patriot Prayer and Proud Boys demonstration in Waterfront Park.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:40 a.m.</td>
<td>Demonstrators and counterdemonstrators began arriving at the park. Officers advised incident command that they were seeing visible weapons, such as sticks, and shields being carried on both sides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:35 a.m.</td>
<td>One group of counterdemonstrators that had gathered at City Hall marched to Waterfront Park, where a skirmish line was established on the East and West sides of SW Naito Parkway.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^8^5\) Ibid.

\(^8^6\) PPB reports from August 4, 2018 provided to the NPF assessment team, November 2019.

Preparing for and Responding to Mass Demonstrations and Counter-Demonstrations in Portland, Oregon
11:46 a.m. As the groups increased verbal hostility toward each other, the incident commander (IC) requested all available officers in the city to respond and requested mutual aid from the Oregon State Police (OSP).\(^87\)

11:55 a.m. PPB tweeted, “Officers have seized multiple items that can be used as weapons and are observing people in helmets and protective padding.”\(^88\)

11:48 a.m. Officers reported that a group within the group of counterdemonstrators had a large reinforced shield behind their banner and were handing out cans and loading an aerosol device that smelled of vinegar. Officers reported additional reinforced banners, helmets and shields inside the counterdemonstrators’ crowd.

12:08 p.m. The organizer of the Patriot Prayer march arrived in Waterfront Park. PPB warned counter-demonstrators not to cross SW Naito Parkway.\(^89\)

12:22 p.m. A water bottle was thrown from the group of counterdemonstrators. PPB worked with the Patriot Prayer march organizer to move the demonstrators into the fenced area to the North of Salmon Springs.

12:24 p.m. A PPB sound truck issued dispersal orders to the counter-demonstrating group.\(^90\)

1:30 p.m. Patriot Prayer began their march southbound through Waterfront Park.

1:45 p.m. A group of counterdemonstrators gathered across from the main body of the Patriot Prayer march. Officers observed weapons in the counterdemonstrator crowd and gave dispersal orders.

1:51 p.m. Officers reported that members of the counter-demonstrator group were vandalizing and damaging police vehicles.

1:53 p.m. RRT advised that members of the counter-demonstrator group were throwing bottles and rocks at them. At the IC’s direction, RRT began to disperse the counter-demonstrator crowd and continue to issue sound truck announcements.

2:27 p.m. The Patriot Prayer group returned to Salmon Springs to wait for their buses to pick them up.

6:15 p.m. The last of the Patriot Prayer group departed Salmon Springs via bus.

In the morning of August 4, 2018, crowds began forming at Waterfront Park and City Hall, where demonstrations and counter-demonstrations were planned. Late that morning, around 11:35 a.m., counter-protesters from City Hall marched to Waterfront Park, joining other counter-demonstrators that were already there. Police formed a line between the opposing protest groups, attempting to keep the groups separated on the East and West sides of SW Naito Parkway.\(^91\) In total, over 200 PPB officers responded over the course of the event, with an

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\(^{87}\) PPB requested mutual aid support from the OSP and other departments during the planning process for the event, but the requests were denied. When PPB made an emergency request for mutual aid to OSP during the event, OSP troopers were sent to assist the response.


\(^{91}\) PPB reports from August 4, 2018, provided by the City of Portland to the NPF assessment team, November 2019.
estimated 1,500 demonstrators and counter-demonstrators participating in assemblies throughout the day.\(^\text{92}\)

During the demonstrations, individuals were verbally hostile towards the opposing group. Officers seized potential weapons and monitored demonstrators in protective padding.\(^\text{93}\) As the crowds continued to grow, PPB made an emergency request for additional mutual aid assistance from the OSP. While earlier requests for support were denied by the OSP and other agencies, OSP troopers were sent to assist the response at this time. However, they could not be deployed in a crowd management situation due to a lack of personal protective equipment.\(^\text{94}\)

*Figure 4: Map of August 4, 2018, Event Locations*

\(^{\text{92}}\) NPF assessment team review of PPB materials related to the August 4, 2018, events. Provided by the City of Portland, November 2019.


\(^{\text{94}}\) NPF assessment team review of PPB materials related to the August 4, 2018, events. Provided by the City of Portland, November 2019.
Preparing for and Responding to Mass Demonstrations and Counter-Demonstrations in Portland, Oregon

The organizer of the demonstrating march arrived in Waterfront Park just after noon and the PPB issued a warning to counter-demonstrators not to cross SW Naito Parkway. By 12:24 p.m., the PPB began issuing dispersal orders to counter-demonstrators, noting that officers observed individuals armed with weapons and that people on the West side of SW Naito Parkway must leave the area moving west. As the PPB reported that items were thrown from the counter-demonstrators toward the other side, the police worked with the demonstrating group to move them north into a fenced area. Groups of the counter-demonstrators also moved north, including in the street, and the PPB ordered people on the street to move to the sidewalk.

Figure 5: Potential Weapons Seized by PPB During the August 4, 2018, Demonstrations

At approximately 1:30 p.m., the demonstrating group began to march southward through Waterfront Park. Some counter-demonstrators gathered across from the main demonstrating group that was marching. PPB officers reported seeing weapons in the group of counter-demonstrators, and the PPB declared the group a civil disturbance and issued more dispersal

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98 PPB reports from August 4, 2018, provided by the City of Portland to the NPF assessment team, November 2019.
orders. Officers began reporting that members of the counter-demonstrating group were damaging police vehicles—possibly with officers inside—and were throwing bottles and rocks at RRT members. The IC directed the RRT to disperse the counter-protest crowd, including through the use of aerial distraction devices, 60 caliber less lethal rounds, rubber ball distraction devices, stinger rounds, 40 mm less lethal impact rounds, and pepper spray. The protest group completed their march around 2:30 p.m. as PPB continued to work to keep the groups separated and attempt to disperse the counter-protest crowd.

Outcomes

As during the June 4, 2017 event, community members have reported that PPB actions during the response on August 4, 2018 were biased and further eroded community trust. Community members have alleged that PPB members exhibited bias through disproportionate uses of force, aimed almost exclusively at the counter-demonstrating group. Community members have reported suffering substantial injuries from PPB munitions deployed during the protest response, including burns, a brain injury, and other wounds. Additionally, following the event, then-PPB Chief Danielle Outlaw made public comments that were critical of the counter-demonstrating group. These comments angered some community members and led some to raise questions about the credibility of the PPB’s internal review of tactics used during the event.

Four people were arrested by police during the demonstrations. PF&R medical personnel treated three people related to the demonstrations. Since the incident, lawsuits have been filed against the city for injuries allegedly received from PPB uses of force during the response to the protest.

100 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
Incident and Response Description—August 17, 2019

A little more than a year after the August 4, 2018, events, the City of Portland once again prepared for large-scale demonstrations and counter-demonstrations. The following describes the events and response that occurred on August 17, 2019, to serve as context for the analysis sections contained in the report.

August 17, 2019

On August 17, 2019, a group of right-wing protestors organized by Proud Boys members, held an “End Domestic Terrorism” rally at Tom McCall Waterfront Park. Rose City Antifa and other groups and individuals organized to counter-protest the rally. No permits were issued for any of the demonstrations.

On May 1, 2019, weeks before the demonstrations, some Patriot Prayer members were involved in a fight with left-wing groups at the Portland bar Cider Riot after largely peaceful May Day demonstrations had occurred earlier that day. After the incident at Cider Riot, the Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office filed criminal charges for felony riot against individuals involved on May 1, including members of Patriot Prayer. PPB arrested several people in connection to the incident in the days before the planned August 17, 2019 demonstrations.

In the weeks leading up to the planned August 17, 2019 demonstrations, PPB collaborated with other mutual aid and public safety agencies to plan for the response to and communication around the demonstrations. Public safety partners included the Bend Police Department, Clackamas County Sheriff’s Office, Eugene Police Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Protective Service, Gresham Police Department, Lake Oswego Police Department, Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office, Oregon State Police, Salem Police Department, Toledo Police Department, University of Oregon Police, US Marshall Service, and Washington County Sheriff’s Office. The City Attorney’s Office, Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office, and U.S. Attorney’s Office also supported the response and were involved in prior planning and messaging. City officials considered, but did not pursue, asking the Governor of Oregon to

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activate the National Guard to support the law enforcement response. Portland Fire & Rescue (PF&R) personnel were again embedded with PPB members to be able to quickly provide medical support. The PPB developed an updated communication plan with local, state, and federal partners to communicate a unified and proactive message in advance of the events that promoted public safety.

The following provides a timeline of the events that occurred on August 17, 2019. All timestamps are approximate, derived from multiple sources including PPB and media reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>August 17, 2019</th>
<th>Demonstration Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:30 a.m.</td>
<td>Demonstrators began arriving downtown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:57 a.m.</td>
<td>A group of demonstrators gathered on Morrison Bridge to cross into Waterfront Park. Police officers initially block the demonstrators from crossing but allow them to pass through.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:15 a.m.</td>
<td>PPB tweets, “Officers have seized weapons from multiple groups, including bear spray, shields, and metal and wooden poles.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:42 a.m.</td>
<td>PPB reopened Hawthorne Bridge to allow a group of demonstrators to cross back to the east of the Willamette River. PPB tweeted, “After the group has concluded crossing the Hawthorne Bridge, the Bridge will be closed again. Police are facilitating this to ensure safety of participants who wanted to leave the demonstration.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:18 p.m.</td>
<td>A group of counter-demonstrators attempted to cross the Hawthorne Bridge, but police blocked the bridge, so the main demonstrating and counter-demonstrating groups remained separated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:32 p.m.</td>
<td>Demonstrators began to leave on buses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:03 p.m.</td>
<td>A group of counter-demonstrators marched eastward on Burnside Bridge, and then southward on Southeast Martin Luther King Boulevard.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Twitter. (2019, August 17). The Oregonian. [https://twitter.com/Oregonian/status/1162909337091827](https://twitter.com/Oregonian/status/1162909337091827)

4:12 p.m. PPB declared a group demonstrating near Pioneer Courthouse Square a civil disturbance and ordered people there to disperse.\(^\text{122}\)

6:30 p.m. Demonstrators had left the area and police were demobilized.\(^\text{123}\)

In the morning on August 17, 2019, counter-demonstrating groups began forming at Waterfront Park, where demonstrations and counter-demonstrations were planned for later that day. Just before 11:00 a.m., PPB enabled a group of demonstrators to cross westward on Morrison Bridge to move into Waterfront Park, where the counter-demonstrating groups had already begun to form.\(^\text{124}\) At 11:42 a.m., after a request for police assistance to leave the area, the PPB enabled a group of demonstrators to cross back to the east over Hawthorne Bridge to facilitate their departure.\(^\text{125}\) The PPB prevented a group of counter-demonstrators from following them across Hawthorne Bridge, thus keeping the main demonstrating and counter-demonstrating groups separated.\(^\text{126}\) While some demonstrators remained in the downtown area that afternoon, members of the largest demonstrating group began to leave on buses at 12:32 p.m.\(^\text{127}\) Some counter-demonstrators would later cross Burnside Bridge to oppose the demonstrating group that had crossed east of the Willamette River earlier, but many had already left.\(^\text{128}\)

In total, over 500 Portland public safety personnel\(^\text{129}\) were assigned over the course of the event, with an estimated 1,200 demonstrators and counter-demonstrators were in attendance at the peak of the protests.\(^\text{130}\)


\(^\text{127}\) Ibid.


\(^\text{129}\) Included police, fire, and emergency medical personnel.

During the demonstrations, officers seized potential weapons and monitored groups as they gathered, reorganized, and moved through the Portland downtown area. One group demonstrating near Pioneer Courthouse Square around 4:15 p.m. was declared a civil disturbance and dispersed. Police were demobilized by 6:30 p.m.

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132 Ibid.
Outcomes

Community members have made allegations that PPB actions during the response to this event were biased and further eroded community trust by enabling one group to cross a bridge but not another. Additionally, many Portland businesses have reported being financially impacted by the event, as potential customers avoided the downtown area. One estimate by the Portland Business Alliance reported that the protest cost Portland businesses at least $3 million in foregone revenue and added expenses.

However, overall, public feedback on the police response has been largely positive. Media reports have credited the PPB for keeping protest groups separated, helping to avoid violent confrontations. Some community members—including from the business community—have reported favorable views of the PPB’s planning and communication leading up to the event. An NPF assessment team member directly observed the events in the field as well as at the

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emergency command center, finding positive advancements in planning, preparation, coordination, and messaging as described in more detail in the following analysis sections.

Thirteen people were arrested in connection to the August 17, 2019 protests.\textsuperscript{137} PF&R medical personnel treated six individuals with minor injuries related to the demonstrations.\textsuperscript{138} No lawsuits related to the police response to the demonstrations have been filed to date.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
Chapter 1. Planning, Preparation, and Training

Planning in advance of large-scale responses to mass demonstrations is crucial to prepare for a variety of potential scenarios. While some demonstrations may arise unexpectedly, leaving little time for city and police officials to plan and prepare for the specific situation, there are steps that local officials can take to maintain a heightened state of preparedness. As part of this preparation, training is necessary to prepare officers to respond to events in accordance with proper department policy and guided by research and best practices from the field. As an NPF after action review of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg (NC) Police Department’s response to demonstrations noted, “Effective and safe management of mass demonstrations—especially mobile demonstrations—relies heavily on maintaining and deploying the necessary civil disturbance equipment at the appropriate times and appropriate levels.” Furthermore, throughout the planning process, both police and city leaders play an important role in facilitating lines of communication and coordination across agencies to establish unified responses, which support their effectiveness.

This chapter examines PPB planning, preparation, and training related to responses to mass demonstrations and concludes with findings and recommendations.

“When violence erupts or threatens a community, it is too late to plan regional responses, purchase necessary equipment, train key personnel, test communication capabilities, and begin to organize for an extended event.”

Improvements in Planning Since 2016

Over recent years, through several responses to a variety of demonstrations, PPB members have learned to inform and refine ongoing planning and preparedness. Moving into 2016, with anticipated protests around the election, the PPB began to bolster their planning capacity, assigning a sergeant with incident management and planning experience to assist in developing and managing the planning process. Since then, PPB has also established a new Demonstration Liaison Team and deepened relationships with the Portland Fire & Rescue Bureau (PF&R), which have supported PPB preparedness for mass demonstration responses (discussed more in Chapter


141 NPF assessment team interview with PPB sergeant, September 25, 2019.
Preparing for and Responding to Mass Demonstrations and Counter-Demonstrations in Portland, Oregon

3); significantly expanded planning and preparation related to public communication (discussed more in Chapter 4); and expanded their internal after action review processes, enabling lessons learned from past responses to inform future planning and preparations (discussed more in Chapter 5).

Investing more in the planning process has enabled PPB to begin to better prepare to meet the scale of protests that frequently occur in Portland. Since first assigning a member to manage planning for demonstration responses, the PPB planning process has continued to expand to begin earlier in advance of anticipated protests and incorporate more internal and external stakeholders to develop more robust plans. As reviews of planning for large-scale security events have found, this type of robust planning and preparation is key to facilitate smooth responses to events. In advance of the 2012 and 2016 Democratic National Convention (DNC), the Charlotte-Mecklenburg (NC) and Philadelphia (PA) Police Departments engaged in significant pre-event planning and coordination between all levels of government and agencies involved. This enabled various stakeholders to provide input on planned operations and facilitated coordination during the event.142

Efforts to invest in PPB planning and preparation to develop a unified and resourced response were evident prior to, during, and after the August 17, 2019 response. During the planning for that response, city leaders collaborated ahead of the planned protests to develop a unified approach to the demonstrations. City leaders framed the event as a citywide issue—not just an issue for the police bureau—which facilitated an increase in resources and planning support from across the city.143 Several city agencies thus contributed to planning for the events, including the City Attorney’s Office and Parks and Recreation. Communication between agencies began early, enabling leaders and public information officers (PIOs) to craft and disseminate unified messaging that articulated expectations of conduct and supported public safety in the weeks leading up to the event.

These messages were reinforced by collaborative actions taken by the PPB and Multnomah County District Attorney’s (MCDA’s) Office to arrest individuals with outstanding warrants known to be planning on participating in the August 17, 2019 protests in the weeks prior to the planned events. During NPF assessment team interviews, one community member described these actions as a political “signal” that communicated what conduct was unacceptable and contributed to a different atmosphere compared to previous mass demonstration responses.144

143 NPF assessment team interview with MCDA’s Office personnel, November 20, 2019.
144 NPF assessment team interview with community member, February 11, 2020.
Pre-existing relationships between the PPB and MCDA’s Office facilitated strong coordination between the organizations to manage these actions.\textsuperscript{145}

Expanding the planning process enabled PPB to further improve their operational plans. The PPB invited Office of Equity and Human Rights (OEHR) staff to provide input on operational plans.\textsuperscript{146} While the OEHR’s role in this was limited by time and staffing constraints, the example highlights the potential for OEHR and other PPB and city staff members who may not typically be involved in planning for these events to provide valuable feedback and additional perspectives. The PPB also communicated with and encouraged feedback from community organizations and private entities in advance of the event, which positively supported the planning process.\textsuperscript{147}

The PPB expanded the number of law enforcement partners they asked for and received assistance for the August 17, 2019 response. Whereas on June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018, the Bureau had four or five law enforcement partners supporting their response. On August 17, 2019, with extensive coordination, PPB was supported by 14 other law enforcement agency representatives. In the weeks prior to the event, then-Chief Danielle Outlaw leveraged relationships with these agencies to receive staffing commitments. Despite aforementioned challenges with mutual aid, these agency leaders ultimately committed to sending staff and supporting the PPB public safety effort.

Thus, on the day of the event, several agencies and entities contributed to the response. Staff from the City Attorney’s Office and MCDA’s Office were available to provide legal guidance. This included teams from the MCDA’s Office who were embedded with PPB mass arrest teams to facilitate the arrest process and ensure legal obligations are followed, should arrests be necessary.\textsuperscript{148} Local garbage collection trucks were used to block streets. As in past mass demonstration responses, Portland Fire & Rescue (PF&R) medical personnel were embedded with PPB squads to be able to respond quickly with any needed medical care. The PPB was able to use the Portland Bureau of Emergency Management’s facility as their emergency command center (ECC), which provided a much more sizable and technologically suitable space for the PPB and their various partners to coordinate, compared to the PPB space used for the June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018 responses.

With so many responding agencies, PPB held an operations briefing in advance of the expected events, which built on lessons from previous briefings and responses and included representatives from all responding agencies. Operations briefings are valuable to ensure representatives from all responding agencies are organized and aware of different parts of the planned response. The briefing for August 17, 2019, was efficient and thorough, including information on special personnel and assignments, and arrest procedures.\textsuperscript{149} Observations of

\textsuperscript{145} NPF assessment team interview with MCDA’s Office personnel, November 20, 2019.
\textsuperscript{146} NPF assessment team interviews with city staff members, November 18, 2019.
\textsuperscript{147} NPF assessment team interview with city commissioner, November 19, 2019.
\textsuperscript{148} NPF assessment team interview with MCDA’s Office personnel, November 20, 2019.
\textsuperscript{149} NPF assessment team on-site observations and material reviews, August 4, 2018, and August 17, 2019.
discussions within PPB and with mutual aid agencies on August 17, 2019, noted emphasis on media relations and maintaining a command presence in the area, and on intervening as soon as possible to violence and arresting those engaging in it.150

Ongoing Challenges

The level of pre-planning, dedication of resources, and external support that occurred for the August 17, 2019 events may be untenable for most future responses to mass demonstrations. The City of Portland and PPB are also challenged to maintain appropriate levels of planning in some notable areas. However, other areas of planning and preparation should be done on an ongoing basis. Continuing to cultivate relationships with other agency leaders and stakeholders—and community partners—would help the PPB to garner support for their public safety efforts before major events.151 Ongoing efforts to prioritize planning and training—including by emphasizing the role that every member of the Bureau plays in ensuring the success of responses to protests—would help to promote the constant importance of preparation for these types of responses.

One major challenge for the city and PPB to plan responses to mass demonstrations is the longstanding practice to overlook the requirement for permits. PPB is not responsible for issuing permits within the City of Portland; the responsibility is with the Portland Parks & Recreation and the Portland Bureau of Transportation. However, issues related to the permitting process affect the PPB. No permits were issued for the demonstrations and counter-demonstrations held on August 4, 2018, nor August 17, 2019.152 During interviews with the NPF assessment team, community members described the existing permitting process as complicated, time consuming, costly, and limited.153 Community members and city officials also recognized that overlooking permits has become part of the culture in Portland, and enforcing the permit requirement would face significant community opposition.154 Still, streamlining the process could help to encourage protest organizers to seek a permit. In 2014, the Citizen Review Committee (CRC), a voluntary review body designed to provide more citizen oversight for the PPB, developed a crowd control workgroup resulting in a report that provided 14 recommendations for PPB to improve its crowd control practices, including a recommendation that the City should explore centralizing and/or

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154 NPF assessment team interviews with community member, November 23, 2019, and city employees, September 24, 2019.
simplifying the permitting process. Since its inception, the Demonstration Liaison Team (DLT) has helped to communicate with protest organizers to inform the needed public safety response (discussed more in Chapter 3). A viable permitting process would facilitate the gathering of basic information to support both the PPB and protest organizers without relying on DLT or other PPB members to pursue this key information.

Staffing shortages—in addition to challenges retaining mutual aid commitments—have also undermined the PPB’s ability to prepare for responses to mass demonstrations. According to the Portland City Budget Office, the PPB had reduced its focus on recruitment and hiring in FY 2012-13 following a hiring freeze, and struggled to restart its process the next few years. In more recent years, the PPB has made improvements in this area through pay incentives and additional support for background processes. In June 2019, in an attempt to further increase recruitment, the PPB announced they were relaxing officer hiring requirements for education, beards, and tattoos. However, as of fiscal year (FY) 2020, the PPB is authorized for 1,001 sworn positions

Permitting Processes

Communicating permitting processes in a centralized manner can help to ease the process for potential applicants, assisting them with accessing necessary information to complete their application and, ultimately, facilitate their exercise of First Amendment rights. Processes to review permit applications should remain robust, involving all relevant agencies including police, fire, public works, and parks and recreation. However, a central system or guide can encourage event organizers to seek a permit and provide an opportunity to clearly communicate possible restrictions that may be placed on such an event. In Houston, Texas, the Mayor’s Office of Special Events accepts all applications for event permits using a City of Houston Park or city street. In San Francisco, California, the San Francisco Entertainment Commission developed a guide to assist event organizers with navigating the permitting process for outdoor special events.


Staffing shortages have strained the PPB’s ability to dedicate staff to plan for and respond to demonstrations and other events. The full-time planning sergeant assigned to manage planning in 2016 conducts planning for emergency management, incident management (including demonstrations), and special events. Limited staffing creates challenges for dedicating training time for staff from line officers on the Mobile Field Force (MFF) to potential incident commanders, as training time for protest responses competes with training time for other important policing areas. Short staffing also places strain on the first responders staffing the MFF and Rapid Response Teams (RRT), which are crucial to demonstration responses.

**Mobile Field Force and Rapid Response Team**

**Mobile Field Force**

MFF is comprised of sworn officers who are organized into squads and deployed for crowd management.\footnote{Portland Police Bureau. (2017, August 30). 0635.10 crowd management/crowd control. \href{https://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/article/649358}{https://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/article/649358}} MFF squads are generally organized to have 11 officers led by one sergeant. Patrol officers—particularly from Central Precinct where most events occur—comprise the majority of the MFF. During interviews, the NPF assessment team heard reports that many of Central Precinct’s line officers apply to participate in MFF since they already frequently respond to small-scale events in the precinct, and since they are likely to become involved regardless, volunteering enables them to avoid some unexpected scheduling challenges.\footnote{NPF assessment team interview with PPB officers, November 19, 2019.}
While MFF members are provided training during roll call, they do not receive formalized training beyond their initial training as new hires. Likewise, MFF members are not allocated significant levels of personal protective equipment (PPE). All new PPB officer hires do receive extensive training before being sworn in, to include training on crowd control. PPB trainees receive 16-weeks of basic training with the State of Oregon Department of Public Safety Standards and Training followed by 12-weeks of advanced academy training specific to the PPB. Advanced academy training covers crowd control and MFF basic formations and tactics to prepare officers as MFF members. This MFF training has evolved over the years, from a full-day training on formations and tactics to a training that provides a more balanced overview of MFF tactics and crowd dynamics. All PPB officers also receive training on use of force and crisis intervention, which help officers to develop knowledge and skills important during crowd management situations. During mass demonstration responses, MFF members are provided a helmet, baton, and gas mask.

The Importance of First-Line Supervision

First-line supervisors play a key role in translating the department’s vision and goals to line-level officers, holding their officers accountable, looking after their officers’ safety and wellness, and providing hands on management of critical incidents. With appropriate span of management, first-line supervisors can mentor their supervisees and promote positive cultural change within their organization. Sergeants in the Oakland, California, Police Department are required to attend 40 hours of continual police training that typically covers use-of-force options and updates on key issues such as crowd management. The Boston, Massachusetts, Police Department requires supervisors to come in an hour before planned special events to attend briefs that reiterate their mission and review information to be shared with the line-level officers.


MFF sergeants and lieutenants do not receive in-service training on crowd management nor MFF tactics and operations. These sergeants and lieutenants are vital as specially trained supervisors are essential to keeping situations from evolving into violence, focusing on de-escalation as well as keeping their officers safe. Training specific to supervisors gives supervisors a clear sense of their roles and responsibilities during large-scale security events, including their role to ensure

166 NPF assessment team interview with PPB commander, November 18, 2019.
168 NPF assessment team interview with PPB member, November 19, 2019.

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that tactics are adequately and appropriately implemented by subordinate staff. Additionally, enabling sergeants to periodically train with officers—who they may oversee during a real response—may help to provide and instill greater confidence in the officers’ attitudes, tactics, and team development.

Without the requisite training, equipment, supervision, and expectations, MFF members are currently limited in their roles to respond during mass demonstrations. Expanding this role, with the appropriate support, would reduce the PPB’s reliance on the short-staffed RRT for crowd management activities. The change would improve the skillset of MFF members in crowd management and de-escalation to be able to flexibly respond to more types of situations during mass demonstration events and develop confidence among command staff in their ability to handle such situations. The change would also encourage a shift in mindset to emphasize throughout the bureau that every PPB member has an important role in supporting the public safety mission during demonstration responses.

**Rapid Response Team**

RRT is comprised of sworn officers who are specially trained to respond to emergency management situations, including crowd management. RRT members are important to quickly respond to tense situations that may erupt during some protests. Being a part of the RRT is an auxiliary duty that officers can begin to qualify for with two years of experience as a PPB officer including field training. During responses to mass demonstrations, RRT is organized into squads of RRT members. Platoon leaders oversee two squads and the RRT commander oversees all RRT operations. The RRT commander reports to the crowd management incident commander (CMIC) who is responsible for managing the entirety of PPB’s immediate response to the demonstration.

On top of the MFF and other training that all PPB officers receive, PPB officers that join RRT are provided additional specialized in-service training on crowd management, among other emergency management and incident response training. The RRT generally conducts two team training sessions per year. Training includes scenario-based exercises, including lessons on the proper use of munitions that might be deployed during crowd management situations. RRT has also conducted training with interagency partners.

RRT has been challenged with limited internal support, creating difficulties with morale and retention beyond the initial 18-month commitment. As of November 2019, an RRT member

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172 NPF assessment team focus group with RRT members, September 25, 2019.

173 Ibid.
reported that the unit was authorized to have 82 members but had 17 vacancies—a vacancy rate of over 20 percent.\textsuperscript{174} RRT does not offer members additional pay like other specialty units. Additionally, given the nature of the work, RRT members have been frequently named in lawsuits following demonstrations that involve police uses of force. RRT members have reported that this limits the ability for them to be able to be promoted or qualify as instructors, which discourages RRT members from remaining on the team and may dissuade others who may be well-suited to the job from attempting to join.\textsuperscript{175} With only one full-time lieutenant who is responsible for managing both RRT and the Canine Unit, the RRT thus additionally lacks sufficient oversight, management, and planning support.\textsuperscript{176}

MFF and RRT staffing and training is important to deploy members most effectively and appropriately—in the interest of both officer and community safety and wellness. Currently, with limited staffing, RRT members staffing event responses are not provided relief.\textsuperscript{177} Officer fatigue can impede mental and physical health and has been linked to decreases in work performance.\textsuperscript{178} Officer fatigue has also been linked to negative communication during citizen encounters as well as increased racial bias in use of force decisionmaking situations.\textsuperscript{179} Supporting their wellness can help to prepare responding officers to de-escalate situations and develop community relations.\textsuperscript{180}

RRT call out procedures have also created challenges in planning. When RRT is requested for an event in advance, individual members are able to notify supervisors that they will be unavailable. While enabling RRT members to decline participating in an event for any reason may be beneficial for RRT members, this leaves RRT leadership and PPB command unsure of how many members they might have available for quickly developing events.

RRT members are provided hard body armor as well as a helmet with a face shield, baton, gas mask, and gloves, and are in the process of exploring alternative gear aimed at supporting a de-escalating presence. As in other communities across the United States, Portland community members have reported that the image of officers wearing body armor contributes to escalating

\textsuperscript{174} NPF assessment team interview with RRT member, November 18, 2019.
\textsuperscript{175} NPF assessment team focus group with RRT members, September 25, 2019.
\textsuperscript{176} NPF assessment team interview with RRT member, November 18, 2019.
\textsuperscript{177} NPF assessment team interview with RRT member, November 18, 2019.
tensions during responses to protests.\textsuperscript{181} As the President’s Task Force on 21\textsuperscript{st} Century Policing outlined, certain equipment that gives the appearance of military operations can contribute to undermining community trust.\textsuperscript{182} Recognizing this challenge in balancing these considerations, the PPB has begun to test personal protective gear with the RRT that can be worn under uniforms to present a less-militarized image while retaining a level of comfort and protection.

\textit{Figure 8: RRT Personal Protective Gear}

\textit{Note: The gear on the right of the photo is the current body armor. The gear on the left of the photo is the alternative gear RRT is in the process of exploring.}

\section*{Findings and Recommendations}

\textbf{Finding 1.1: City-wide planning and support for unified responses to mass demonstration events has bolstered PPB preparation, making their public safety responses more collaborative, resourced, and effective.} The PPB has substantively increased its level of planning over recent years, and collaboration with other city agencies, which has had a noticeable positive impact on messaging and public perception, the level of preparedness of responding officers, the level of mutual aid support, and, ultimately, outcomes during some responses to protest events. In particular, PPB and citywide planning significantly increased for the response on August 17, 2019 in comparison with the June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018 events. PPB and city leadership framed the response as a citywide issue and responded with a unified message, coordinating resources from across city agencies and attaining the support of community groups and local, state, and


federal public safety partners to further create a unified front and elevate messages in the interest of public safety. Not every response will require a large-scale response from the city or PPB. However, given the frequency and scale of demonstrations in Portland, strong preparation to the extent possible is critical for responding to demonstrations at an appropriate level with the appropriate stakeholders.

**Recommendation 1.1.1: City and PPB leaders and stakeholders should continue to collaborate on citywide planning and preparation for responses to mass demonstrations.** Citywide collaboration and coordination are necessary to ensure that responding units are supported—including equipped, trained, and staffed—to be able to respond appropriately to a variety of situations that could occur during a mass demonstration event.\(^{183}\) Citywide strategies should be developed ahead of time with the flexibility to be quickly scaled up for escalating situations, and be informed by lessons learned from past event responses in Portland and other locales throughout the US and internationally. Planning does not necessarily have to be heavily resource-intensive and can involve examining ways to leverage available resources and collaborations to cost-effectively and efficiently manage future responses. As an after-action review of the Minneapolis response to demonstrations in 2015 found, “Planning and training for responses to civil disturbances and critical incidents should include elected and appointed officials, law enforcement, other public safety agencies (fire, EMS, emergency management), other relevant government agencies (e.g. Corporation counsel, finance, public works), and non-government and private sector organizations (Red Cross, utility companies, business improvement districts, neighborhood councils, etc.) as appropriate.”\(^{184}\)

**Recommendation 1.1.2: City and PPB leaders should continue to build strong working relationships and present united citywide messaging in advance, during, and following demonstrations.** As the August 17, 2019 response exhibited, unified planning and messaging is valuable to jointly communicate public safety expectations, issues, and updates to the public. Messages should promote public safety and support individuals’ ability to practice their First Amendment rights. Such unified leadership signals to the public the importance that Portland leaders place on their public safety and First Amendment rights. Unified responses also support officer morale by providing direct support for and signaling appreciation for the PPB’s important response efforts.

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**Recommendation 1.1.3:** City and PPB leaders should continue to conduct joint tabletop exercises and debriefings with all partners to further their understanding of roles and responsibilities during demonstration responses. Regular exercises and debriefings would continue to strengthen collaboration and build on lessons learned from past event responses.

**Recommendation 1.1.4:** PPB leadership should prioritize planning, preparation, management, and training for mass demonstration responses. As part of this, support for the Rapid Response Team (RRT), Mobile Field Force (MFF), and other PPB members and units—including those in communications, intelligence, and logistics—that serve key roles in planning for and responding to demonstrations would strengthen the effectiveness of the PPB’s overall ability to appropriately respond to these events. Emphasizing the value and benefit of units like RRT and MFF should internally elevate and draw attention to their critical demonstration planning and response roles. Additionally, while specific members and units lead the planning for and response to demonstrations, PPB leaders must stress that every PPB member has an important role in supporting the public safety mission during demonstration responses.

**Recommendation 1.1.5:** The PPB should establish a planning team that includes training, equipment, communications, logistics, and intelligence stakeholders to ensure plans receive the necessary attention to detail in these areas. Identifying personnel to focus on specific areas of the plan is valuable to avoid the burnout of a single planner.

**Recommendation 1.1.6:** The PPB planning structure for mass demonstration responses should include a robust intelligence component that assesses demonstrations occurring in the region and across the country that have potential impacts for Portland. Some demonstrations that occur in Portland are not specific to local issues but are rather related to national and global movements and issues. Monitoring information from such events in other areas would support PPB planning—not to target specific ideologies, groups, or individuals, but with a goal to gain insights into the events to inform public safety response planning in Portland.

**Finding 1.2:** The PPB struggles to attain and plan for mutual aid support for responses to mass demonstrations. In advance of the August 17, 2019 response, then-PPB Chief Danielle Outlaw leveraged relationships with other law enforcement partners to receive mutual aid commitments. Fourteen other local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies ultimately supported the PPB’s response. However, this level of mutual aid support for PPB demonstration responses is uncommon and a lack of firm commitments to providing mutual aid support has challenged PPB planning for these events.

**Recommendation 1.2.1:** City and PPB leaders must continue to build strong working relationships with other law enforcement partners. The City of Portland’s unique and legal and political climate has discouraged some nearby law enforcement agencies from
engaging in mutual aid support.\textsuperscript{185} Mutual aid support is a valuable resource for public safety responses to large scale events, particularly those that have the potential for destruction and violence.

\textbf{Recommendation 1.2.2:} To increase potential opportunities for support, the PPB should re-engage area agencies on barriers to lending mutual aid and consider revisions to mutual aid agreements. Specific details on the levels of support and duty responsibilities, including provisions regarding personnel, training, and equipment, should be clearly documented or updated within mutual aid agreements. For example, to avoid issues with varying laws, training, and standard operating procedures, the PPB may clarify that participating mutual aid members will be assigned to traffic control, back-up for PPB patrol officers responding to calls for service, or other duties that support the overall demonstration response, without inserting officers from other jurisdictions inside areas with direct contact with demonstrators. These specifications would allow for stronger commitments toward PPB planning efforts. Joint training requirements would also ensure mutual aid members are familiar with each other’s procedures in advance of a response.\textsuperscript{186} Planning for the level of mutual aid support attained on August 17, 2019 is not feasible for responses to all demonstrations but is a key option to strengthen responses to expected large-scale events.

\textbf{Recommendation 1.2.3:} The PPB should proactively conduct situational awareness scans on which mutual aid departments are willing to offer support, and the types of support for PPB demonstration responses. Advanced notice to plan for a demonstration response is not always available, but, supplementing Recommendation 1.2.2, ongoing communication with and awareness of available mutual aid resources can ease the PPB’s preparation for these unexpected events.

\textbf{Finding 1.3:} The City of Portland’s First Amendment assembly permitting process is complicated for prospective applicants and city officials to understand. Additionally, Portland has a long history and culture of overlooking the permit requirement for such assemblies. As a result, many protest organizers do not apply for permits.

\textbf{Recommendation 1.3.1:} The City of Portland should examine ways to streamline the permitting process, encouraging community members to seek permits as part of planned demonstrations as a way to support their safety and resources needs. A 2014 CRC workgroup report on crowd control similarly recommended that the PPB and/or City of Portland should explore centralizing and/or simplifying this permitting process.\textsuperscript{187}

\textsuperscript{185} Communication from city attorney’s office to the NPF assessment team, received October 12, 2020. See also: Martinex, M. (2019, February 15). Washington County Sheriff’s office pulling back resources from Portland police bureau. Fox12 Oregon. \url{https://www.kptv.com/news/washington-county-sheriff-s-office-pulling-back-resources-from-portland/article_120a039a-3193-11e9-ab00-77729c9829e4.html}

\textsuperscript{186} Police Executive Research Forum. (2018). \textit{The police response to mass demonstrations}.

\textsuperscript{187} Citizens Review Committee. (2014, September). \textit{Crowd control and the Portland police}.
While the city and PPB should continue to recognize that not every group will seek a permit prior to a planned assembly, they should attempt to facilitate community members’ abilities to apply for one. A viable permitting process would allow PPB to gather some basic and valuable information on events to support the planning process, both for protest organizers and the PPB. The process should be clearly approached, not as an intelligence gathering process, but as a benefit for organizers to ensure their safety and resource needs. The process would also provide PPB an opportunity to establish lines of communication early on and facilitate professional relationships between the organizers and the PPB.

**Finding 1.4:** Staffing shortages have created sworn vacancies at all levels of the PPB, which has limited the PPB’s resourcing to prepare for responses to mass demonstrations. As of fiscal year 2020, the PPB is authorized 1,001 sworn officers but has approximately 100 sworn vacancies. This vacancy rate was expected to increase over the next year due to anticipated retirements. Additionally, amidst the impacts of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, the City of Portland has initiated a city hiring freeze and the PPB is in discussions with labor unions regarding potential pay freezes. PPB staffing challenges have reportedly hurt officer morale, prevented officers from receiving shift relief, and limited the availability of dedicated staff time to train and plan for future protest responses.

**Recommendation 1.4.1:** The PPB should continue to prioritize and support ongoing recruitment efforts to bolster sworn staffing. Sustained vacancies place strain on officers and units planning for and responding to events, in addition to challenges handling day-to-day calls for service and dedicating time for community engagement.

**Recommendation 1.4.2:** The PPB should expand the role of MFF during PPB demonstration responses—with requisite increases in training and equipment—to prepare more officers to handle various aspects of demonstration responses. Expanding the role of MFF would reduce the PPB’s reliance on the already short-staffed RRT and enable RRT members to focus more on rapid crowd management as needed, while MFF members are able to more flexibly manage various crowd management responsibilities.

**Finding 1.5:** MFF members do not receive formalized MFF training after leaving the advanced academy and receive limited personal protective equipment (PPE) for their mass demonstration responses. While MFF members are provided training during roll call, they do not receive formal training on responding to First Amendment assemblies as part of in-service training. Elevating the prioritization of this training and support for the personnel managing related training could enhance the preparedness and flexibility of MFF members to support crowd management responses. Furthermore, in addition to increasing the skillsets of MFF...

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190 NPF assessment team interviews with PPB members, September 25, 2019 and November 18, 2019.
members, regular training would increase the confidence of command personnel in MFF’s abilities to handle a variety of event responses. MFF members are issued some PPE including a helmet, gas mask, and baton, but are not issued levels of protective gear similar to RRT.¹⁹¹

**Recommendation 1.5.1:** The PPB should develop and provide additional formalized training for MFF teams as part of in-service training. MFF members respond to many protests every year. Their training on the latest PPB directives, policies, potential threats and procedures, based on national best practices related to crowd management, particularly given the evolving nature of protests in Portland, is essential to facilitate public safety during mass demonstrations. For example, during this review, it was relayed to the NPF assessment team that a lack of experience with crowd events led one MFF team to leave their vehicles unattended during the August 4, 2018 event. These vehicles were later vandalized by some protestors, prompting officers to use force to disperse this crowd.

**Recommendation 1.5.2:** Additional formalized training for MFF members should include a focus on developing their skillset in crowd management and de-escalation to be able to respond to a variety of mass demonstration situations. Improving the skill levels of MFF members would expand their capacity to intervene in tense situations. An enhanced MFF could decrease the need for scarce additional resources.

**Recommendation 1.5.3:** The PPB must provide specialized training for MFF sergeants and lieutenants to better prepare them to manage their MFF teams. This specialized training, provided on a regular basis, is necessary to prepare MFF sergeants and lieutenants for their critical supervision role during responses to demonstrations. The training should focus on both platoon and squad integrity and allow for multiple squads to train together. Understanding these roles and responsibilities would be even more important should MFF members be expected to play a greater role in crowd management.

**Recommendation 1.5.4:** The PPB should examine areas to incorporate community members into formalized training on crowd management and de-escalation. Following demonstrations in 2016, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg (NC) Police Department collaborated with community members to develop Constructive Conversation Team (CCT) training.¹⁹² CCT training includes exercises with Charlotte community members to enable trainees to practice de-escalation skills in protest scenarios.

**Recommendation 1.5.5:** MFF members should be provided additional PPE for officer safety during responses to protests. Some NPF assessment team interviewees noted that protester tactics and equipment during some recent protests have evolved, creating

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¹⁹¹ NPF assessment team interview with PPB commander, November 19, 2019.
concerns for public and officer safety. Particularly should the PPB move toward directing MFF officers to engage in more levels of responses to protests, additional equipment and training will be necessary. As RRT members continue to test new forms of “soft” protective gear that can be worn inside of their uniforms and avoid militaristic or aggressive tones, the PPB should consider expanding the availability of this gear to MFF members.

Recommendation 1.5.6: Each precinct should be required to maintain a percentage of trained MFF officers to prevent over-reliance on a limited number of officers. During interviews, the NPF assessment team heard reports that many of Central Precinct’s line officers apply to participate in MFF because, with the majority of major protest events taking place within their precinct’s boundaries, they believe they are going to be involved regardless. By volunteering to participating in MFF, they are able to avoid some unexpected scheduling challenges. Re-evaluating how event responses are staffed such as by increasing the number of officers participating in MFF from other precincts would reduce strain on a limited number of officers and increase experience among MFF members from all precincts.

Finding 1.6: The PPB’s RRT has lacked internal support, which affects their ability to recruit, retain, support morale, and train officers in the unit. RRT members are essential to rapidly respond to tense situations that may erupt during protests. As of November 2019, the unit was authorized to have 82 members but had 17 vacancies—a vacancy rate of over 20 percent. With only one full-time lieutenant who is responsible for managing both RRT and the Canine Unit, the RRT unit has also lacked sufficient oversight, management, and planning support. The RRT unit has been effective during past responses to demonstrations to address emerging public safety situations. At the same time, continued staffing limitations and lack of internal support affect the unit’s potential to recruit, retain, and train on emerging promising practices, deploy units most effectively, and address officer fatigue. Additionally, when RRT is requested for an event, individual RRT members can decline the particular event. This leaves RRT leadership and PPB command unsure of how many members they might have available for quickly developing events.

Recommendation 1.6.1: The PPB should develop and resource a recruitment and retention strategy for the RRT unit. The strategy should address challenges to RRT officer morale, such as the frequent inability to become eligible for promotion as an RRT member given that members are frequently the subject of lawsuits and use of force complaints.

Recommendation 1.6.2: The PPB should conduct joint trainings with MFF and RRT to create flexibility across these specialty response units. Joint trainings can provide teaching opportunities to further develop the skillsets of MFF members while providing

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193 NPF assessment team interview with Multnomah County and City of Portland employees, September 24, 2019 and November 20, 2019.
194 NPF assessment team interview with RRT member, November 18, 2019.
195 NPF assessment team interview with RRT member, November 18, 2019.
RRT with additional recruiting opportunities. Qualified, multi-trained MFF members could be pulled in to fulfill more resource gaps for an event, particularly as not every event will require the activation or deployment of RRT.

Recommendation 1.6.3: The PPB should develop RRT scenario training for other bureau and city partners to participate. The training should include crowd management incident commanders (CMICs), public information officers (PIOs), city officials, and employees with the Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office, City Attorney’s Office, and other agencies like the Portland Public Works Bureaus that frequently support protest responses. These employees should attend to build understanding of the training and tactics, and positive relationships with RRT members in advance of event responses.

Finding 1.7: The RRT is exploring alternative personal protective gear (PPE) that is effective for officer safety but does not add to a militaristic tone during responses to protests. The availability and use of properly fitting body armor is essential for officer safety during responses to mass demonstrations. Law enforcement agencies, while prioritizing officer safety, must carefully consider the balance between the need for protection and the image presented by officers clad in PPE.

Recommendation 1.7.1: The PPB should continue to explore protective gear that provides the appearance of a “soft” uniform while retaining a degree of comfort and protection. As of May 2020, the PPB has issued each RRT member additional PPE that provides comfort and protection and will be used for their deployments to respond to mass demonstrations. The team is in the process of testing the equipment during summer temperatures to ensure the equipment is appropriate for full time use.

Finding 1.8: The PPB has not designated a safety officer during past responses. Safety officers are important to monitor the health and safety of emergency responder personnel during responses to incidents, including protests.

Recommendation 1.8.1: The PPB should assign a safety officer during all critical events to ensure physical and mental health issues are addressed. Monitoring and providing resources for officer safety and wellness during and after protests is important to support

196 NPF assessment team interview with RRT member, November 18, 2019.
198 Communication from PPB lieutenant to NPF assessment team, May 27, 2020.
199 NPF assessment team interview with PPB member, November 18, 2019.
their wellbeing. The physical and emotional toll that long deployments under stressful conditions can have on officers can also impact health, judgement, and performance.\textsuperscript{201}

Recommendation 1.8: The PPB should develop guidelines regarding the provision of mental health and other services to the officers assigned to critical incidents, and to their families, particularly if the events are prolonged or violent.\textsuperscript{202}

Recommendation 1.8.3: Pre-incident briefings of officers should include a health and safety briefing, the requirement for rest and nourishment, and a reminder to officers to bring along any medications that they may need to take during long shifts.\textsuperscript{203}

Finding 1.9: PPB members are currently not issued body worn cameras (BWCs). BWCs can be beneficial tools to ensure officer accountability, transparency, and protection from unfounded claims.\textsuperscript{204} Other jurisdictions have used BWCs to record verbal and physical exchanges between demonstrators and police, protecting all parties from false accusations.\textsuperscript{205} The NPF assessment team recognizes that current legislation and Portland City ordinances discourage the use of BWCs during incidents of mass demonstrations, and that, with the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, budget constraints have de-prioritized the city’s BWC pilot project.\textsuperscript{206}

Recommendation 1.9.1: The PPB should continue to consider ways in which adopting BWCs or other video technology such as drones or fixed cameras could benefit responses to mass demonstrations. PPB should re-engage city and community stakeholders to collaboratively develop plans, policies, and procedures for a BWC pilot program. The PPB has begun to develop BWC policies to propose to the Portland City Council.\textsuperscript{207} PPB should consider funding opportunities such as through the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) BWC Policy and Implementation Program should grant funding be offered in 2021.\textsuperscript{208}

Finding 1.10: The Multnomah County District Attorney’s (MCDA) Office and PPB have developed strong relationships that have better prepared the department to respond to protests. With the majority of the MCDA’s Office’s work related to cases generated in the City of

\textsuperscript{201} Institute for Intergovernmental Research. (2015). *After action assessment of the police response to the August 2014 demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri*.


\textsuperscript{203} Institute for Intergovernmental Research. (2015). *After action assessment of the police response to the August 2014 demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri*.


\textsuperscript{206} Bernstein. (2020, April 15). Body cameras for Portland police put on the back burner again—this time because of coronavirus.


\textsuperscript{208} Body-Worn Camera Toolkit. (n.d.). Funding. [https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/bwc/topics-funding.html](https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/bwc/topics-funding.html)
Portland, the PPB and MCDA’s Office have established effective relationships that have bolstered planning for large-scale demonstration responses. In advance of the August 17, 2019 response, the MCDA’s Office planned and facilitated the arrests of several individuals with outstanding warrants who were involved in violent behavior in recent events and were known to be planning on participating in the upcoming protests. Arresting these individuals in advance of the August 17, 2019 demonstrations, may have helped to defuse tensions that may otherwise have contributed to violence during the demonstrations. Additionally, during past demonstration responses, teams of staff from the MCDA’s Office have been embedded with PPB arrest teams. This has supported the timely and lawful collection of information from arrestees.209

**Recommendation 1.10.1:** The MCDA’s Office and PPB should continue to collaborate during and in advance of responses to protests. Continuing to cultivate these relationships is imperative to facilitate collaborative responses to public safety issues.

**Finding 1.11:** In planning for the response to the August 17, 2019 events, the PPB made efforts to include the Office of Equity and Human Rights (OEHR) to review operational plans. OEHR personnel were invited to review operational plans and provide feedback into how operations may affect or be perceived by various groups. While OEHR interviewees told the team that they would like to participate more in the future, strides were made.

**Recommendation 1.11.1:** The PPB should explore enhancing OEHR’s involvement in the development of operational plans. Involving OEHR earlier when possible would allow for more time to coordinate language and processes into wider planning.

**Recommendation 1.11.2:** The city and PPB should consider how the OEHR could be deployed during events to monitor both police and crowd interactions, police tactics and responses, and better support the planning and preparation process.

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209 NPF assessment team interview with MCDA’s Office personnel, November 20, 2019.
Chapter 2. Incident Command

Planning and training for any mass demonstration or critical incident must involve preparation for incident command. A well-planned, unified command center and process—particularly one based on National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS) principles—is valuable to facilitate coordination between responding agencies for responses to major events.210

This chapter explores PPB’s incident command structure for responses to mass demonstrations and concludes with findings and recommendations.

“Regardless of the size, complexity, or scope of the incident, effective command and coordination—using flexible and standard processes and systems—helps save lives and stabilize the situation.”211

Incident Command

During responses to major demonstrations, the PPB appoints a crowd management incident commander (CMIC) who is responsible for managing the demonstration, including the related planning and tactical response.212 The CMIC has the authority to activate the RRT and authorize the deployment of riot control agents or special impact munitions when developing the Incident Action Plan (IAP) to summarize the overall strategy of the response. In accordance with NIMS principles, the CMIC designates staff to manage sections of the incident command structure, including operations, planning, logistics, and finance.213

As PPB has strengthened their planning processes over recent years, the bureau has improved on their use of incident command principles during responses to mass demonstrations. This was particularly evident during the August 17, 2019 response compared to the June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018 responses as evidenced by the unified command center established for the 2019 response.


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In preparation and during the August 2019 events, the NPF team was provided access to all relevant PPB locations, staff, and necessary documents. The NPF observed the briefing of the many agencies involved, which provided guidance and direction to internal PPB staff as well as assisting agencies. The team also witnessed briefings, which provided appropriate guidance, roles, responsibilities, and direction.

The staffing of the EOC on August 17, 2019 was appropriate and the logistics were well planned. Incident command positions were appropriately filled, and allied agency representation was present. It was clear having observed the incident command center used previously, that the use of a much larger and more technologically resourced alternative space as the event EOC was essential. This facility floor plan and technology allowed the Incident Commander and staff to anticipate, respond, and ultimately prevent injuries and property damage.

Over recent years, with improvements in planning prior to mass demonstrations, the PPB has filled more ICS positions during event responses. Still, not every ICS position is regularly filled. In recent large-scale demonstrations, the ICS has not designated a safety officer, which is important to monitor the health and safety of emergency responder personnel.214

Specialized incident command training has also contributed to improved preparedness. In recent years, the PPB has developed specialized training for lieutenants to prepare them for incident command. This PPB training is conducted in two tracks to prepare lieutenants to assume incident command for either critical incident or crowd management situations. Following CMIC training, lieutenants selected for this training shadow CMICs and are assigned as a deputy CMIC before assuming the CMIC position for an event.215 Ideally, this promising structure enables future

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214 NPF assessment team interview with PPB member, November 18, 2019.
215 NPF assessment team interview with PPB commander, August 7, 2019.
CMICs to grow familiar with the role, become specialized in crowd management planning and strategies, and establish relationships with other ICS stakeholders prior to assuming command themselves.

However, challenges retaining planned CMIC and deputy CMICs have restricted the number of trained CMICs that the PPB has available at any given time. With limited internal value placed on crowd management-focused roles, among other important considerations, well-suited future commanders may be shying away from CMIC training and other crowd management positions.216 To some in PPB, pursuing CMIC or other crowd management roles is seen as a potential career ender.217

Similarly, the NPF assessment team heard reports that some PPB supervisors and commanders do not fully engage with the offered ICS training, or attend on an infrequent basis. Some may show up at the training—technically in attendance—but leave for periods of time during the training.218 Ensuring that every member of the bureau understands NIMS and ICS principles, recognizes their value, and practices them on a regular basis would further strengthen the PPB’s preparation for demonstration responses of any size.219

Findings and Recommendations

Finding 2.1: The PPB improved their use of Incident Command System (ICS) principles during the August 17, 2019 response compared to the responses on June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018.

Recommendation 2.1.1: The PPB should continue to support and build their ICS program to better prepare the Bureau for mass demonstration responses. Using ICS principles to manage everyday situations can also help city officials and police bureau members to practice established protocols and training.220

Finding 2.2: The PPB does not fully staff incident management positions as recommended under the ICS structure. During responses to past protest events, the PPB has had recurrent vacancies in important ICS positions that may hamper their response. For example, the PPB has not designated a safety officer during past responses as noted in Finding 1.8.221

Recommendation 2.2.1: The PPB should assign staff to oversee each of the designated ICS areas during responses to protests. Those selected personnel should build teams within their disciplines to plan for lines of succession, develop expertise, and establish relationships with other key stakeholders. These assignments should follow the planning

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216 NPF assessment team interview with PPB commander, November 19, 2019
217 NPF assessment team interview with PPB officers, November 18-19, 2019.
218 NPF assessment team interviews with PPB members, November 18-20, 2019.
221 NPF assessment team interview with PPB member, November 18, 2019.
process whereby those who oversaw a particular role in planning is the same person who sits in the ICS.

Finding 2.3: The PPB has implemented specialized incident command training for planned designated commanders for critical incidents and crowd management. Recognizing the different skillsets and training required for each role, PPB has developed incident command training to better prepare current and future PPB incident commanders for managing these events. However, some NPF assessment team interviewees acknowledged that turnover and challenges associated with the position have limited the pool of PPB leaders trained as crowd management incident commanders (CMIC).

Recommendation 2.3.1: The PPB should expand their CMIC training to more PPB members to ensure the bureau retains members that can assume the CMIC position at any time. CMIC training was initially limited to planned CMICs and their deputy CMICs. However, these positions have historically had frequent turnover. To ensure the bureau always has trained CMICs, this training should be expanded to more members. The PPB should also consider cross training commanders to help fill in gaps.

Finding 2.4: Some PPB supervisors and commanders do not prioritize ICS training. Some supervisors and commanders reportedly do not fully engage with the offered in-depth training or attend on an infrequent basis.

Recommendation 2.4.1: PPB should increase the frequency of department-wide ICS training both formally and informally via roll call trainings, online videos, tabletop exercises, etc. MFF and RRT members are well aware of challenges and updates, but other officers and command-level employees do not have the same exposure.

Recommendation 2.4.2: PPB should increase accountability measures of training to ensure that all levels meet minimum qualitative training standards. The importance of crowd management training and preparation should be reinforced by the chief through the ranks, emphasizing the role every PPB member has in supporting the public safety mission during demonstration responses as noted in Recommendation 1.1.4. The training lieutenant must be able to ensure that in addition to line level officers, command level officers have complete training. Tying promotions to related training measures may be one option to underscore the value of this training.

Recommendation 2.4.3: City of Portland officials should consider participating in ICS training. Having all city personnel, including command staff and elected officials, complete ICS training helps to ensure that personnel at all jurisdictional levels and across disciplines can function effectively together during an incident. As an after-action
review of the response to protests in Ferguson recommended, NIMS awareness training for elected officials and staff underscores the importance of command and control.\textsuperscript{224}

Finding 2.5: Space used as PPB’s emergency command center (ECC) does not provide sufficient space and resources to manage the response to a mass demonstration. The use of appropriately sized, secured facilities with the necessary technology are critical to assist the incident commander and supporting staff with managing large events. During the response to the August 17, 2019 events, the PPB used a larger location as their ECC through local collaborations.

Recommendation 2.5.1: PPB should continue to use the larger location as the EOC for future events. The NPF team noted that the coordination center offered the necessary security, space, technology, and logistics support to manage large crowd events.

Recommendation 2.5.2: In the event that the larger facility is unavailable, the PPB should consider other properties and spaces to operate the ECC that provide the physical and technological capacity to serve ECC needs. The PPB should consider existing properties or newer buildings to convert into an ECC. As a suitable space is identified, the ECC should be set up so that PPB and city stakeholders who may be participating in events can become familiar with equipment, technology, and other ECC resources used to manage events.

\textsuperscript{224} Institute for Intergovernmental Research. (2015). \textit{After action assessment of the police response to the August 2014 demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri}.
Chapter 3. Policies, Protocols, and Strategies

Law enforcement policies, protocols, and strategies—reinforced through training—guide agency operations and officer actions as members strive to meet their mission to serve and protect. Ensuring that these policies, protocols, and strategies are sound, reflect their community’s values, and are understood and reinforced throughout the agency is thus imperative.

This chapter explores PPB’s policies, protocols, and strategies for responses to mass demonstrations and concludes with findings and recommendations.

“If police are to carry out their responsibilities according to established policies, these policies must be reflective of community values and . . . need to be clearly articulated to the community . . . so police will have credibility with residents and the people can have faith that their guardians are always acting in their best interests.”

Crowd Management

PPB directives 635.10 (crowd management/crowd control), 1010.00 (use of force), and 1020.00 (weapons administration) provide the foundation for PPB responses to mass demonstrations. Directive 635.10 guides PPB operations for crowd management and crowd control situations, outlining key roles and responsibilities and describes when and how the PPB may disperse a crowd to reasonably protect public safety and restore peace and order.226 The directive promisingly emphasizes a focus on crowd management, rather than crowd control, and the use of tactics with the intent to de-escalate the situation.227 Directives 1010.00 and 1020.00 additionally govern use of force and weapons administration, including in-crowd management and crowd control situations.

The PPB has made some changes to their directives over recent years and regularly encourages the public to provide feedback on the directives. City and PPB stakeholders have also met with community groups and members to discuss changes to the directives. Incorporating the community voices into the policy revision and strategy development process can assist agencies in ensuring the policies and strategies reflect community values. As a U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services report highlighted, creating community advisory

227 Ibid.
panels and engaging in discussions with them to gain input and feedback on department strategies can bolster community relations and trust.\textsuperscript{228}

Still, several community members reported to the NPF assessment team that their feedback on the directives and related aspects of police tactics and operations felt ignored or dismissed. The PPB has declined to adopt recommendations from community members and groups on some relatively minor changes that may help to address community concerns, such as to further underscore de-escalation within the preamble of directive 635.10.\textsuperscript{229} Independent Police Review (IPR), Citizens Review Committee (CRC), and other community members indicated that they believed some community members have grown frustrated with their open feedback being dismissed, the long police complaint process, and the limited changes that have resulted from the open feedback and complaint processes. This has reportedly prompted some individuals to turn to lawsuits to pursue change.\textsuperscript{230}

Additionally, while the IPR recommended that PPB develop a policy on mass detention and arrests following the June 4, 2017 response, the PPB currently does not have such a directive or standard operating procedure.\textsuperscript{231} PPB directive 635.10 does include language guiding the activation of a mass arrest team during responses to crowd control situations.\textsuperscript{232} When possible, law enforcement organizations should avoid mass detentions and arrests in favor of more differentiated responses. Conducting differentiated responses by focusing arrests on individuals who are engaging in violence enables police to continue to facilitate the peaceful and lawful activities of other protestors exercising their First Amendment rights.\textsuperscript{233} However, preparing further guidance on mass detentions and arrests is still necessary should such action be required.

Furthermore, PPB directives 635.10, 1010.00, and 1020.00 are unclear regarding which members or teams are responsible for carrying and deploying special munitions. In accordance with best practices, directive 635.10 does state that “weapons shall only be used at the direction of the CMIC or designee and when avenues of escape (i.e., clear path or route) are available to the crowd.”\textsuperscript{234} However, the members or teams responsible for the potential deployment are unclear. While some MFF members carry OC spray during responses to demonstrations, others do not as they are issued on a voluntary basis.\textsuperscript{235}


\textsuperscript{230} NPF assessment team interviews with Citizen Review Committee and Independent Police Review members, and Portland community members, September 24-26, and November 23, 2019.


\textsuperscript{232} Portland Police Bureau. (2017, August 30). 0635.10 crowd management/crowd control.


\textsuperscript{234} Portland Police Bureau. (2017, August 30). 0635.10 crowd management/crowd control.

\textsuperscript{235} NPF assessment team interview with MFF officers, November 20, 2019.
Preparing for and Responding to Mass Demonstrations and Counter-Demonstrations in Portland, Oregon

Bike Squads During Mass Demonstration Responses
The strategic use of bicycles during responses to mass demonstrations can support public safety while avoiding community perceptions of militaristic crowd management. PPB and city officials reported that bikes were used more during the August 17, 2019, response but have been less consistently used during responses to other protest events.

During the 2016 Presidential Nominating Conventions, the Cleveland Division of Police (CPD) and Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) strategically deployed bicycle units in the pre-planned demonstration sites and along designated parade routes. These units were effective in providing rapid and tactical, yet non-militaristic approaches to crowd management; to cordoning off restricted pedestrian routes; and diverting traffic. Some of the PPB bicycle officers engaged in conversations with demonstrators and used their bikes to more easily distribute water during the excessive heat. Officers also used their bicycles as temporary barricades to isolate demonstrators who were inciting violence, and to separate protest groups.


PPB members have used some controversial tactics that have unintentionally escalated tensions during protests and deepened community mistrust.236 Force—including the deployment of less lethal weapons—was used against groups of counter-demonstrators on June 4, 2017, August 4, 2018, and August 17, 2019. Particularly on June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018, community members have argued that these uses of force, without adequate communication from PPB, represented responses that were disproportionate in magnitude and favored one demonstrating group over another.237

Community members have also viewed PPB actions as lacking consistency in enforcement, which have further fueled community perceptions of bias. On June 4, 2017, PPB officers confiscated items and held a line that faced toward the counter-demonstrating group—not toward the demonstrating group, as Federal Protective Service officers were focused on managing the demonstrating group.238 Still, in the absence of stronger counter-messaging, perceptions that

237 Ibid.
these actions were biased have endured. On August 17, 2019, PPB allowed a demonstrating group to cross a bridge but did not allow a counter-demonstrating group to do the same. While this action was appropriate to keep the oppositional groups separated in the interest of public safety, ongoing resentment for the discrepancy underscores a general lack of communication that unnecessarily affects community trust in the police and stresses the importance of clear public messaging (discussed more in Chapter 4).

**Special Units**

**Demonstration Liaison Teams**

In 2019, the PPB Crisis Negotiation Team (CNT) began a promising formal Demonstration Liaison Team (DLT) program that builds on lessons learned and best practices from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s (RCMP) liaison officer program. Prior to establishing the program, some CNT members visited the RCMP to attend their liaison officer training. Upon returning, these members developed a formal liaison officer training tailored for PPB members, which includes primers on the ideologies of frequently protesting groups in Portland, procedures for communication with protesters, and guidance on what should and should not be documented to comply with legal restrictions and reduce perceptions of bias. The DLT program also incorporates lessons learned from community concerns regarding the former liaison officer role, adding measures to reduce perceptions of biased relationships with protest groups. Members are directed to seek to build short-term rapport with protest organizers, but individual members do not maintain communication or build long-term relationships with protest group members over time.

The DLT was first deployed on a large scale for the August 17, 2019 events, playing an instrumental role in liaising between protest groups and the PPB. The PPB publicly shared information on the demonstration liaison officers (DLOs) the day before the event, clarifying that the team’s intent is “to assist event organizers in planning a safe event for participants, Portland community members, and businesses.” As DLOs interviewed by the NPF assessment team recognized, their role is distinct from intelligence gathering; while DLOs might seek information from event organizers such as they expected size of the group to help inform the appropriate police response, their focus is on working with organizers to plan for safe events. Additionally,

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240 NPF assessment team interviews with Portland community members, November 19, 2019, and January 9, 2019.

241 NPF assessment team interview with DLT members, September 25, 2019.


243 NPF assessment team interview with DLT members, September 25, 2019.
similarly to the RCMP liaisons, PPB DLOs were provided distinct uniforms to wear during the protest events to make them easy for participants to identify and make contact.244

![DLO Uniform](image)

**Figure 9: DLO Uniform.**


**Embedded Portland Fire & Rescue Personnel**

With changes in protest dynamics surrounding the 2016 election, PPB and Portland Fire & Rescue (PF&R) personnel recognized a growing need to ensure members of the public had quick access to emergency medical services (EMS) during protests.245 The bureaus decided to begin embedding PF&R medical personnel with PPB RRT squads to be able to quickly respond to medical needs in the warm and hot protest zone. This promising model enables PF&R medics to be able to quickly provide assistance to sick or injured protestors, without waiting for emergency medical vehicles to move through the crowd to the patient. Establishing these working relationships, emphasized through joint training and practice, may support relations between the PPB and PF&R.

Embedded PF&R personnel responded to the June 4, 2017, August 4, 2018, and August 17, 2019 demonstrations, treating individuals injured during the protests. As of September 2019, the team had 12 PF&R medical personnel with emergency medical technician basic certifications who serve on the team as an auxiliary duty.246 Firefighters who are dual sworn are ineligible to participate in this role to retain a clear line between roles and responsibilities for law enforcement and medical care during a demonstration response.247

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244 Portland Police Bureau. (2019, August 16). PPB provides further information regarding anticipated demonstrations on August 17th (photo). For more, see: http://bc.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=23&languageId=1&contentId=52682
246 NPF assessment team interviews with PF&R personnel, September 25, 2019.
247 NPF assessment team interviews with PF&R personnel, September 25, 2019.
Findings and Recommendations

Finding 3.1: Some of the tactics that the PPB has used during past events to attempt to protect public and officer safety have unintentionally escalated tensions with the crowd. Community members have reported that PPB responses to protests have been disproportionate. In particular, community members have alleged that PPB uses of force caused several injuries and munitions were inappropriately used during the August 4, 2018 event. These responses—which have appeared disproportionate in magnitude—have escalated tensions during events and deepened community mistrust in the police.

Recommendation 3.1.1: The PPB should clarify which techniques should be appropriately used for separating groups and re-establishing order. To the extent possible, these tactics should be communicated to the public. The tactics should be regularly tested and trained in order for officers to develop the skillsets needed to identify and anticipate crowd responses. Uses of force that appear disproportionate in magnitude can have the unintended consequence of escalating instead of decreasing tensions in a crowd. A crowd management plan should clearly define the city’s overall political, strategic, and tactical response framework for reacting to protests that develop beyond ‘routine’ events. Tiered intervention and response strategies, codified in policy, should be consistent with the challenges posed by demonstrators, recognizing the department’s priority to value and preserve human life, with a strategic goal of de-escalation, containment, prevention of further escalation, and officer safety.

Recommendation 3.1.2: The PPB should seek to develop greater use of non-enforcement tactics such as bike squads when feasible. The PPB does not regularly use bike officers as part of their overall crowd management strategies. The PPB should re-evaluate how to best utilize bike officers/units in their overall crowd management strategies, when the situation remains safe for bicycle officers to be exposed with minimal PPE, such as by establishing MFF bike squads within precincts that can be activated and deployed. Bicycle officers can be a valuable resource to manage mass demonstrations, through their ability to respond to public safety issues while appearing less intimidating than other officers. Bicycles can also be used to form mobile barriers.

253 Ibid.
Finding 3.2: The PPB directive 635.10 (crowd management/crowd control) is generally consistent with promising practices surrounding police response to First Amendment assemblies and mass demonstrations. At the same time, the PPB has declined to adopt some recommendations from community members and groups on updates to the directive that may additionally address community concerns.\(^{254}\)

**Recommendation 3.2.1:** The PPB should further emphasize de-escalation within directive 635.10. Portland community members and groups have provided suggested changes to directive 635.10 to emphasize de-escalation, including the recommendation to revise the preamble of the directive to include more language on de-escalation.\(^{255}\) While directive 1010.00 (use of force) includes additional information on de-escalation, incorporating consistent language to directive 635.10 would address community input.

**Recommendation 3.2.2:** The PPB should continue to review and incorporate national and international promising practices and lessons learned in future policy updates and related trainings and preparations for large-scale events. Continuing to consider and make reasonable updates to directives based on feedback from community members will also support PPB community engagement and trust-building with the community it serves.

Finding 3.3: The PPB does not have a mass detention and arrest directive or standard operating procedure. During the response to the June 4, 2017 event, the PPB enacted the mass detention of a crowd that was declared a civil disturbance. The PPB directive 635.10 (crowd management/crowd control) does provide provisions for activating mass arrest teams and notes that members “may be justified in detaining individuals engaged in civil disturbance after providing a lawful order to disperse followed by a reasonable opportunity to comply with that order.”\(^{256}\) However, the directive also does not detail the circumstances under which officers can institute mass detentions and arrests.

**Recommendation 3.3.1:** The PPB should develop a mass detention and arrest directive. As the Independent Police Review’s policy review of the PPB response to the June 4, 2017 demonstrations recommended, the PPB should develop a written policy and amend the crowd control policy to detail when officers can engage in mass detentions and arrests.\(^{257}\) Major cities—especially those that tend to have many mass demonstrations—should have policies and standard operating procedures for all aspects of law enforcement during such demonstrations. Within the policy, PPB should identify non-patrol units that

\(^{254}\) NPF assessment team interviews with community members, September 24, 2019 and November 23, 2019.


operate as arrest processing teams. These teams should train on the policy and procedures and be equipped with protective gear as appropriate.

**Recommendation 3.3.2:** The MCDA’s Office, PPB, and City Attorney’s Office should continue to develop field booking plans that can easily be stood up during large scale events. Pre-determined booking plans can help avoid having several arrestees standing around creating potential flash points for crowds.

**Recommendation 3.3.3:** The PPB should take immediate and appropriate action in response to criminal acts to protect all persons (e.g., demonstrators, observers, members of the public, law enforcement personnel) and property. While enacting a mass arrest might be lawful depending on the circumstances, law enforcement organizations should avoid detaining and arresting substantial numbers of persons when reasonably possible in the interest of public safety. As a review of the Metropolitan (DC) Police Department’s response to the 2017 presidential inauguration found, law enforcement agencies should prioritize immediate actions to maintain public safety over engaging in mass arrests.\(^{258}\)

**Finding 3.4:** The PPB directives 635.10 (crowd management/crowd control), 1010.00 (use of force), and 1020.00 (weapons administration) do not identify the members or teams responsible for carrying and deploying special munitions.

**Recommendation 3.4.1:** The PPB should clarify policies for deploying special munitions in their bureau directives and training. IAPs should also account for all potential munitions under their standard rules of engagement for the use of force. MFF must be included in certain munition training and deployment in conjunction with Recommendation 1.4.2.

**Finding 3.5:** The PPB has developed a Demonstration Liaison Team (DLT) whose officers (DLOs) are responsible for liaising with event organizers to support the public safety of events. The role of the DLOs is not intended for intelligence gathering, but rather to establish two-way communication between event organizers, protesters, and police to further public safety. The DLOs clearly understand their focus on working with organizers to enable community members to practice their First Amendment rights, while ensuring public safety.

**Recommendation 3.5.1:** Planned PPB communications in advance of protest events should continue to remind the public of the DLT’s roles and responsibilities. The PPB rebranded the DLT in advance of the August 17, 2019 event, clearly publicizing their roles, responsibilities, and uniform to distinguish them from other officers during protest events. When possible, continuing to share this information and be transparent about the

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program will assist the DLT in establishing community trust and connecting with event organizers.

**Recommendation 3.5.2:** The PPB should ensure information about the DLT’s roles and responsibilities are shared with all bureau members—and other agencies as appropriate. During the operations briefing prior to the response on August 17, 2019, PPB leaders briefed all responding agencies on the DLT. The PPB should continue to include this information in briefings and ensure CMICs and other PPB leaders understand the DLT mission. DLTs should also be merged into both MFF and RRT training exercises. Additionally, introducing the DLO program to officers during roll call may help other officers to understand DLO roles and serve as a potential recruiting opportunity.

**Recommendation 3.5.3:** The PPB should continue to support the demonstration liaison program, ensuring that all members of the Crisis Negotiation Team (CNT) are able to participate in the training. Responses of PPB members of DLT is overwhelmingly positive as responding officers recognize the importance of their role. The bureau should also consider expanding the training to other interested members as appropriate.

**Finding 3.6:** PF&R medical personnel are embedded with PPB squads during responses to mass demonstrations. During past responses to protests these embedded EMTs have attended to community members during demonstrations, including for blunt force injuries and pepper spray.

**Recommendation 3.6.1:** The City of Portland should continue to support the arrangement for PF&R medical personnel to be embedded with PPB during responses to events. Embedded EMTs have been valuable to be able to quickly tend to injuries and may help to support interagency relations and communication. PF&R and PPB should continue to engage in joint-training and tabletop exercises to ensure their coordination remains strong.

**Recommendation 3.6.2:** When possible in advance of protest events, the PF&R and PPB should consider clearly publicizing the roles, responsibilities, and uniform of these embedded EMTs to distinguish them from other first responders.

**Finding 3.7:** The PPB does not regularly track metrics related to demonstration responses.

**Recommendation 3.7.1:** The PPB should track metrics related to demonstration responses, including the number of demonstrations that occur each month and reported citizen injuries from events. The city and PPB do track some metrics such as complaints and charges related to mass demonstration events. Expanding tracking processes to include numbers of demonstrations and reported citizen injuries related to events may help to inform city and PPB budget considerations, underscoring the number of responses PPB officers are expected to respond to and be prepared for.
Chapter 4. Public Communication and Messaging

Clear communication with protestors during any demonstration response is key for police agencies to facilitate protestor and officer actions toward public safety outcomes and expectations. Additionally, communication, collaboration, and partnerships among elected officials, public safety leaders, other government agencies, and at time private sector and community organizations is valuable to develop a unified, effective response.259

This chapter explores PPB’s public communication processes and strategies for responses to mass demonstrations and concludes with findings and recommendations.

“Good communication does not mean that you have to speak in perfectly formed sentences and paragraphs. It isn’t about slickness. Simple and clear go a long way.”260

Communication Strategy

Clear communication prior to, during, and after mass demonstration events is key to establishing mutual expectations for, and respect between, protestors and responding officers. The August 17, 2019 response was PPB’s first mass demonstration response to include a proactive communications strategy that effectively coordinated with agencies citywide. In interviews with the NPF assessment team, several PPB and community members noted this change—acknowledging the PPB’s positive steps toward proactive communication while remaining wary of communication deficits identified during the June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018 responses.261

June 4, 2017, and August 4, 2018

The PPB has sound trucks with loudspeakers and microphones that can be used to make announcements and communicate with the public while circulating through events.262 For large-scale, pre-planned events, announcements are drafted and reviewed by both the PPB and City Attorney’s Office, which is valuable to ensure the communication is lawful and clear. However, several community members who attended demonstrations on June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018 have purported that PPB loudspeaker directions were ineffective. Some described them as unclear in their content, explaining that a directive to “clear the area” might be clearly


262 NPF assessment team interviews with community members, November 23, 2019.
understood by some, but others may wonder what constitutes “the area.”263 Others described conflicting messaging, explaining that officers may issue two or three different commands to people.264 Others reported that the messages did not provide enough time to comply before protestors ordered to disperse were met with force.265

Many also alluded to the fact that messages are conveyed not only through the PPB’s leadership or public information officer (PIO) but also through the words and actions of every PPB member. One community member reported that they have seen some line officers communicating unprofessionally during demonstration responses.266 Another community member perceived the PPB as focusing too much on crowd control tactics and not enough on an unbiased communications strategy.267 As protestors and other community members viewed PPB members as using disproportionate levels of force against some demonstrating groups on August 4, 2018 and during other events, these actions reinforced perceptions of police bias and eroded community trust.

Planning and preparation for communications for the June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018 responses were largely coordinated by the crowd management incident commander (CMIC) for each event. The CMIC coordinated messaging with the PPB communications unit, which would push out information to the community largely through social media. Various government agencies independently managed their own communication, which sometimes led to conflicting messaging.268

**August 17, 2019**

Recognizing the need to develop a collaborative, unified communications plan, the PPB began planning for a Joint Information Center (JIC) for the August 17, 2019 response. As defined by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Incident Management (NIMS) guidelines, JICs serve as a central location where key communication personnel from multiple responding agencies convene to develop clear, consistent, and coordinated public messaging.269 Knowing that they needed to be proactive and coordinated on messaging, the PPB hosted several meetings to develop and maintain a unified communications strategy with communication partners at the other city and public safety agencies that would be assisting with the response. Partners included the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Attorney’s office, Federal Protective Service (FPS), Portland Mayor’s Office, Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office (MCDA), Portland Fire & Rescue, Portland Parks & Recreation, TriMet, Portland Bureau of

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263 NPF assessment team interview with Citizens Review Committee member, September 24, 2019.
264 NPF assessment team interview with Portland community member, November 23, 2019.
265 NPF assessment team interview with Portland community member, September 24, 2019.
266 NPF assessment team interview with Portland community member, November 23, 2019.
Preparing for and Responding to Mass Demonstrations and Counter-Demonstrations in Portland, Oregon.\textsuperscript{270} Representatives from these organizations met three times a week in the weeks leading up to the response. The PPB PIO also developed a media strategy and outlined the various tasks required to operationalize it with the partner agencies.

The following timeline outlines major communications activities that the PPB, City of Portland, and other JIC stakeholders engaged in leading up to, during, and following the August 17, 2019, demonstrations.\textsuperscript{271}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 22</td>
<td>PPB began organizing the JIC for the anticipated August 17, 2019, events.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 31</td>
<td>The JIC began to meet once a week.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 2</td>
<td>PPB issued a press release regarding planning for the anticipated August 17, 2019, events.</td>
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<td>August 5</td>
<td>Mayor Ted Wheeler and Chief Danielle Outlaw had media interviews.</td>
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<td>August 7</td>
<td>The PPB PIO met with local travel and business community partners about the communication plan.</td>
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<td>August 8</td>
<td>A podcast with Chief Outlaw discussing the demonstrations was released.</td>
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<td>August 9</td>
<td>PPB held a media education panel to discuss PPB resources and deployment techniques.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 13</td>
<td>PPB issued a press release regarding community preparation, which included a map of other events that would be occurring in the area.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 14</td>
<td>The city held a press conference, led by Mayor Wheeler. PPB issued the first of several press released on warrants for arrests made related to the fight that had occurred at Cider Riot on May 1, 2019.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 15</td>
<td>PPB released a podcast and video on crowd management planning and preparation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 16</td>
<td>PPB held a press conference with local and national media and issued a press release about the demonstrations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 17</td>
<td>Demonstrations and counter-demonstrations occurred in Portland. That morning, PPB released a video on Twitter of the crowd management incident commander’s objectives. PPB continued to issue frequent video updates on social media throughout the day. Mayor Wheeler and Chief Outlaw held a press conference at the end of the day.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 18</td>
<td>PPB issued a press release on arrests from the August 17, 2019, events.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 22</td>
<td>Members of the JIC held a debrief.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 30</td>
<td>PPB issued two more press releases about two arrests related to the August 17, 2019, events.</td>
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In early August 2019, Portland Mayor Ted Wheeler and then-PPB Chief Danielle Outlaw both gave multiple media interviews. Internally, the PPB PIO gathered information from various PPB units and the PF&R on what they wished the public knew about mass demonstration responses.272 This information informed an educational panel that occurred eight days prior to the response. The panel event invited local and national media outlets to attend, enabling the PPB an opportunity to push out the information that they wanted the public to be aware of as well as an opportunity to answer questions from the media outlets. To counter some of the negative media at the time that was focused on violence that could potentially occur during the protests, the PPB, in cooperation with Portland Business Alliance, developed and released a map and alternative list of activities happening in Portland. Neighborhood Response Team (NRT) officers also reached out to areas that would be directly impacted by the protests, making sure they had their contact information.273

In addition to coordinating pushing information out prior to the event and on August 17, 2019, the team was supported by a volunteer Virtual Operations Support Team (VOST). The VOST team—managed by the Oregon Office of Emergency Management—scoured open-source public social media and online forums to identify areas of misinformation.274 This allowed PPB and their partners to more quickly identify and counteract misinformation with official messages and redirect readers to accurate information.

Concurrently, agencies worked together to clear warrants related to violence in prior events. Information on the arrests was shared in the media to reinforce to the public that violence would not be tolerated with the upcoming event. The NPF assessment team heard in several interviews in and outside of PPB, that they felt that these arrests reduced the potential violence.275 It was reported that following the announcements on the arrests, one group decided not to attend the event altogether.276

Individually, PPB partners conducted and coordinated their own media statements and social media posts, however their various communications generally fit within the overall strategy. The JIC released several updates in the final days leading up to the event along with a press conference the morning prior to the event.277 The morning of the event, the crowd management incident commander emphasized the event objectives via video through Twitter and YouTube.278

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274 Oregon VOST. https://oregonvost.com
The PIO unit released several videos throughout the day providing updates on affected areas and the public safety responses.\textsuperscript{279}

At the conclusion of the events on August 17, Mayor Wheeler and Chief Outlaw held a press conference sharing preliminary outcomes and a summary of event impacts.\textsuperscript{280} This was followed over the coming days with press releases regarding arrests related to the demonstrations. On August 22, less than a week after the events, members of the JIC held a debrief on their response to the demonstrations.

**Findings and Recommendations**

**Finding 4.1: PPB loudspeaker directions to disperse may not have been sufficiently clear for protesters to understand.** Many dispersal announcements are drafted and reviewed by PPB and the City Attorney’s Office prior to planned large-scale protests.\textsuperscript{281} This collaboration and pre-planning is valuable to facilitate important and lawful communications during a protest event. At the same time, in interviews with the NPF assessment team, several community members who attended demonstrations on June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018 noted that PPB’s directions to protestors delivered over loudspeakers were not loud enough for everyone to hear, were unclear in their content, contributed to conflicting messaging, or did not provide enough time to comply.\textsuperscript{282}

**Recommendation 4.1.1:** The City of Portland and PPB should ensure that directions to disperse are clear and specify how and where protesters may move. Consistent and well-communicated instruction that fully considers how protestors can comply with directions is necessary to facilitate their compliance.

**Recommendation 4.1.2:** When large-scale actions must be taken in response to a protest, the City of Portland and PPB should consider communicating their reasoning behind the change in behavior. Community members interviewed by the NPF assessment team noted instances where they believed PPB appeared to instigate uses of force suddenly and without reason.\textsuperscript{283} While PPB would explain later that the actions were in response to force used against them, clearly communicating this reasoning in real-time over the loudspeakers and/or social media would help to ease community concerns and foster mutual trust and understanding, counter misperception and rumors, and support PPB efforts to tell its own narrative.

https://www.youtube.com/user/portlandpolice/videos


\textsuperscript{281} NPF assessment team interviews with city staff members, September 24, 2019.

\textsuperscript{282} NPF assessment team interviews with community members, September 24 and November 23, 2019.

\textsuperscript{283} NPF assessment team interviews with community members, September 24 and November 23, 2019.
Recommendation 4.1.3: The PPB should clarify verbal dispersal order procedures in their Directives Manual to ensure consistency across event responses when possible, and update training accordingly. The PPB should clarify how many times the verbal dispersal should be made before the follow-up action is taken.

Recommendation 4.1.4: Law enforcement agencies should develop an accepted audio recording of a warning that less-lethal weapons, such as tear gas, are about to be deployed in advance of a critical incident. As described by an after-action review of the response to protests in Ferguson, this warning can be replayed over the public address system to ensure that correct and consistent information is provided.284

Finding 4.2: Public information messaging improved in advance of the August 17, 2019 events, with the PPB developing and executing a communication strategy that accounted for public outreach pre-, during, and post-event. The strategy also incorporated coordination with the PIOs of other city and partner agencies and gained the buy-in of city leaders.

Recommendation 4.2.1: The PPB should continue to develop collaborative communication plans in advance of expected mass demonstrations. Ongoing efforts to communicate with demonstrators and other community members—before, during, and after events—is valuable to relay peaceful intentions and support de-escalation during otherwise tense situations.285

Recommendation 4.2.3: The PPB should continue to bolster its social media presence and communication as it relates to mass demonstrations, ensuring that they are sharing important information and responding to community questions before, during, and after the events. Social media can be a valuable means of communicating with all demonstrators, particularly during demonstrations that do not have clearly identified organizers.286

Recommendation 4.2.4: The PPB Communications Unit should consider including representatives from the Office of Equity and Human Rights in event planning. The PPB and City of Portland have struggled with perceptions of being biased towards one group or another. This may be the result of lack of information given beforehand, or not responding publicly post event, or a combination of both. Getting this office’s feedback may improve the effectiveness of the language used to communicate with the public prior to an event as well as during and post-event.

Finding 4.3: Coordination and collaboration between agency representatives at the Joint Information Center (JIC) was strong during the response to the August 17, 2019 protests as an integral part of the Incident Command Structure.

Recommendation 4.3.1: The PPB should continue to use a JIC for managing public information during future mass demonstration responses. Having a JIC with key communication personnel from multiple responding agencies is valuable to develop coordinated public messaging, as recommended under NIMS guidelines.²⁸⁷

Recommendation 4.3.2: The PPB should ensure that the JIC has sufficient working spaces and technology to facilitate JIC operations.

Recommendation 4.3.3: PPB communication staff should continue to attend NIMS/ICS and JIC training. Training on NIMS/ICS, the importance of a JIC, and managing a JIC are valuable areas for the PPB communication staff to be comfortable with to manage the public information process. Communication staff should also be included—or continue to be included—in tabletop and other training exercises as noted in Recommendation 1.1.3.

Chapter 5. After Action Review Process

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Incident Management System (NIMS) recommends conducting after action reviews (AARs) following emergency training exercises and incidents to identify improvements and assign responsibility for ensuring improvements are implemented. Regularly conducting AARs enables organizations to create and promote cultures of learning, where lessons from past experiences help organizations to build on promising practices and avoid repeating challenges to enhance the organization and the field.

This chapter reviews PPB’s AAR process for reviewing responses to mass demonstrations and concludes with findings and recommendations.

“By honestly reflecting on past experiences, organizations can anticipate emerging challenges, incorporate promising practices, and work collaboratively to evolve and prepare for future events.”

Mass Demonstration AARs

Alongside advances in planning and preparation for mass demonstration responses, the PPB has revised their AAR process for reviewing these events over recent years. PPB uses a formal AAR process that is organized by the planning sergeant and incorporates feedback from various parts of the ICS structure including planning, operations, and finance. Supervisors review the feedback and add their input on lessons learned. The process initially adapted AAR forms meant to review uses of force. Recognizing the need to adjust these forms to more appropriately and comprehensively capture lessons from demonstration responses, the PPB is in the process of adjusting these forms. Enhancements to and standardization of these forms will assist the PPB to more systematically gather input and track progress over time.

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291 NPF assessment team interview with PPB member, September 24, 2019.
292 NPF assessment team interview with PPB member, September 24, 2019.

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Engaging Stakeholders in a Comprehensive After Action Review

Incorporating the input of multiple stakeholders from various perspectives into an AAR process is valuable to gathering a 360-degree view of the response, identify gaps, and acknowledge and address challenges. As appropriate for the goals and scope of the AAR, stakeholders may include first responders, mutual aid or co-responders, organizational leaders from the department or departments involved in the response, medical staff, elected officials, community or nongovernmental organizations, witnesses, and subject matter experts.

In addition to encouraging a more comprehensive examination of the response, including various stakeholders—such as community members—in the process can assist the agency leading the review to instigate honest conversation between stakeholders on what occurred during the incident, why the incident unfolded the way it did, and what lessons can be learned. Honest reflection and learning from these experiences help organizations to build on promising practices and avoid repeating challenges to enhance the organization and the field. Identification of key stakeholders during this phase of the review can also help the organization to identify the people that the AAR findings should be communicated back to, as well as the people that the organization will need to collaborate with to implement lessons learned and recommendations.


As the PPB continues to develop their AAR process for demonstrations, incorporating feedback processes for other internal stakeholders, partner agencies, and community members would strengthen the process.

Finally, as a U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services-funded guidebook on conducting AARs, which was written by the NPF, notes, “an AAR does not achieve its intended purpose until the lessons learned and recommendations have been incorporated back into the organization or jurisdiction.”293 Ensuring lessons are communicated back to all PPB members—and other stakeholders—is valuable to alert them to necessary changes in policy, processes, and training. Without a feedback loop, some PPB members have reported limited confidence in the existing AAR process for mass demonstration responses.294 Developing this communication loop would reinforce cultures of learning, communicating to PPB and other stakeholders that their input is valued and is contributing to positive organizational change.

294 NPF assessment team interview with RRT members, September 25, 2019.
Findings and Recommendations

Finding 5.1: Over recent years, the PPB has improved their after action review (AAR) process following responses to mass demonstrations. Meanwhile, AARs have been inconsistently completed and lack a standard format.

Recommendation 5.1.1: The PPB should continue to improve upon their AAR process, including by adjusting pre-set forms for the uniqueness of protest responses. The PPB initially adapted use of force AAR forms to complete their protest AARs and is in the process of further adjusting their AAR forms.\(^{295}\) Completing this process will assist the PPB in more appropriately capturing lessons learned and in creating a standard format for demonstration AARs going forward. Additionally, the COPS Office offers a free, one-hour eLearning course on after action review and reporting processes—developed by the Virginia Center for Policing Innovation (VCPI)—which is meant to support all levels of police practitioners as they enhance their AAR processes.\(^{296}\)

Recommendation 5.1.2: The PPB should ensure they are incorporating lessons learned from ICS documentation and AARs back into relevant policies, SOPs and training. Practical experiences can be used to inform relevant training, updates to the PPB ICS/CMIC structure, and responses to future events. As the NPF guidebook on conducting AARs recommends, agencies should develop a timeline with actionable steps to implement recommendations and assign responsibility for implementing recommendations to members.\(^{297}\) PPB ensure that expectations regarding roles and responsibilities for completing and reviewing reports, participating in debriefings, and following through on identified lessons learned are clearly assigned and articulated to members.

Finding 5.2: AARs of responses to mass demonstrations are limited to the planning for and public safety response to the events. Reviews of responses thus do not consider lessons learned related to other areas of the response like public information, or potential input from community members or public safety partner agencies.

Recommendation 5.2.1: The PPB should consider expanding their AAR process for mass demonstration responses to include other areas of the response like public information as well as reviews of collaborations with city stakeholders and other response partners. The process should invite participation from stakeholders at other city agencies, public safety response partners, and other PPB units and offices, however these are not widely shared with each other. Including these stakeholders in a central AAR process would help to comprehensively identify lessons learned from mass demonstration responses.

\(^{295}\) NPF assessment team interview with PPB member, September 24, 2019.
\(^{297}\) National Police Foundation. (2020). How to conduct an after action review.
**Recommendation 5.2.2:** The PPB should create processes for community members and members of other responding agencies to provide feedback on the PPB response. For example, after an event, the DLT could be used to reach out to event organizers for their feedback. This format should include a response mechanism so that the PPB can respond publicly to feedback as needed.

**Finding 5.3:** Lessons learned from the AAR process are not consistently communicated back to PPB members at all levels. Communicating lessons learned back through the bureau encourages members to anticipate changes or change their behavior in accordance with lessons learned as necessary. The communication also supports the bureau’s culture of learning by demonstrating practical outcomes of the AAR process.

**Recommendation 5.3.1:** The PPB should explore ways to communicate AAR lessons learned back to bureau members. Such communication may include department-wide emails or roll call sessions that report on lessons learned.

**Recommendation 5.3.2:** The PPB should explore ways to communicate AAR lessons learned back to the community. An appropriate synopsis of the AAR released to the public could help demonstrate PPBs commitment to public safety and willingness to accept public and other feedback through an acknowledgement of lessons learned.
Conclusion

The City of Portland and Portland Police Bureau (PPB) have made advances in planning and collaboration in recent years that has enhanced their ability to prepare for and respond to mass demonstrations. Their response to the August 17, 2019, events in particular showcases promising advances in advanced planning, coordination between agencies, and public messaging compared to some past demonstrations. Ensuring that planning, preparation, management, and training for mass demonstration responses is and remains prioritized by the city and PPB will be valuable to best support public safety and protestors’ First Amendment rights. Likewise, cultivating police-community relations and establishing clear and consistent communication with demonstrators and other community members—before, during, and after events—is vital to establish mutual expectations and respect between demonstrators and police in the interest of public safety.

Ongoing attention to preparation for mass demonstration responses and cultivating police-community relations is particularly important considering the frequency of protests and other events that regularly occur in Portland. Demonstrations in Portland and across the country following a police shooting in Minneapolis on May 25, 2020, have again called stark attention to and raised questions regarding police responses to mass demonstrations, among other critical public safety issues. While the August 17, 2019, response still had challenges that should continue to be evaluated and incorporated in training and preparation, the collaborative efforts appeared to have reduced potential conflicts within a major event. The level at which the City of Portland collaborates on and responds to current protests could have far reaching impacts. As PPB and other city leaders take steps toward reevaluating public safety priorities, implementing the recommendations contained in this report and other after action reviews will further improve police responses to mass demonstrations.

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Appendix A: Findings and Recommendations

Planning, Preparation, and Training

Finding 1.1: City-wide planning and support for unified responses to mass demonstration events has bolstered PPB preparation, making their public safety responses more collaborative, resourced, and effective. The PPB has substantively increased its level of planning over recent years, and collaboration with other city agencies, which has had a noticeable positive impact on messaging and public perception, the level of preparedness of responding officers, the level of mutual aid support, and, ultimately, outcomes during some responses to protest events. In particular, PPB and citywide planning significantly increased for the response on August 17, 2019 in comparison with the June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018 events. PPB and city leadership framed the response as a citywide issue and responded with a unified message, coordinating resources from across city agencies and attaining the support of community groups and local, state, and federal public safety partners to further create a unified front and elevate messages in the interest of public safety. Not every response will require a large-scale response from the city or PPB. However, given the frequency and scale of demonstrations in Portland, strong preparation to the extent possible is critical for responding to demonstrations at an appropriate level with the appropriate stakeholders.

Recommendation 1.1.1: City and PPB leaders and stakeholders should continue to collaborate on citywide planning and preparation for responses to mass demonstrations. Citywide collaboration and coordination are necessary to ensure that responding units are supported—including equipped, trained, and staffed—to be able to respond appropriately to a variety of situations that could occur during a mass demonstration event. Citywide strategies should be developed ahead of time with the flexibility to be quickly scaled up for escalating situations, and be informed by lessons learned from past event responses in Portland and other locales throughout the US and internationally. Planning does not necessarily have to be heavily resource-intensive and can involve examining ways to leverage available resources and collaborations to cost-effectively and efficiently manage future responses. As an after-action review of the Minneapolis response to demonstrations in 2015 found, “Planning and training for responses to civil disturbances and critical incidents should include elected and appointed officials, law enforcement, other public safety agencies (fire, EMS, emergency management), other relevant government agencies (e.g. Corporation counsel, finance, public works), and non-government and private sector organizations (Red Cross, utility companies, business improvement districts, neighborhood councils, etc.) as appropriate.”

Recommendation 1.1.2: City and PPB leaders should continue to build strong working relationships and present united citywide messaging in advance, during, and following demonstrations. As the August 17, 2019 response exhibited, unified planning and messaging is valuable to jointly communicate public safety expectations, issues, and updates to the public. Messages should promote public safety and support individuals’ ability to practice their First Amendment rights. Such unified leadership signals to the public the importance that Portland leaders place on their public safety and First Amendment rights. Unified responses also support officer morale by providing direct support for and signaling appreciation for the PPB’s important response efforts.

Recommendation 1.1.3: City and PPB leaders should continue to conduct joint tabletop exercises and debriefings with all partners to further their understanding of roles and responsibilities during demonstration responses. Regular exercises and debriefings would continue to strengthen collaboration and build on lessons learned from past event responses.

Recommendation 1.1.4: PPB leadership should prioritize planning, preparation, management, and training for mass demonstration responses. As part of this, support for the Rapid Response Team (RRT), Mobile Field Force (MFF), and other PPB members and units—including those in communications, intelligence, and logistics—that serve key roles in planning for and responding to demonstrations would strengthen the effectiveness of the PPB’s overall ability to appropriately respond to these events. Emphasizing the value and benefit of units like RRT and MFF should internally elevate and draw attention to their critical demonstration planning and response roles. Additionally, while specific members and units lead the planning for and response to demonstrations, PPB leaders must stress that every PPB member has an important role in supporting the public safety mission during demonstration responses.

Recommendation 1.1.5: The PPB should establish a planning team that includes training, equipment, communications, logistics, and intelligence stakeholders to ensure plans receive the necessary attention to detail in these areas. Identifying personnel to focus on specific areas of the plan is valuable to avoid the burnout of a single planner.

Recommendation 1.1.6: The PPB planning structure for mass demonstration responses should include a robust intelligence component that assesses demonstrations occurring in the region and across the country that have potential impacts for Portland. Some demonstrations that occur in Portland are not specific to local issues but are rather related to national and global movements and issues. Monitoring information from such events in other areas would support PPB planning—not to target specific ideologies,

groups, or individuals, but with a goal to gain insights into the events to inform public safety response planning in Portland.

**Finding 1.2: The PPB struggles to attain and plan for mutual aid support for responses to mass demonstrations.** In advance of the August 17, 2019 response, then-PPB Chief Danielle Outlaw leveraged relationships with other law enforcement partners to receive mutual aid commitments. Fourteen other local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies ultimately supported the PPB’s response. However, this level of mutual aid support for PPB demonstration responses is uncommon and a lack of firm commitments to providing mutual aid support has challenged PPB planning for these events.

**Recommendation 1.2.1: City and PPB leaders must continue to build strong working relationships with other law enforcement partners.** The City of Portland’s unique and legal and political climate has discouraged some nearby law enforcement agencies from engaging in mutual aid support.\(^{301}\) Mutual aid support is a valuable resource for public safety responses to large scale events, particularly those that have the potential for destruction and violence.

**Recommendation 1.2.2: To increase potential opportunities for support, the PPB should re-engage area agencies on barriers to lending mutual aid and consider revisions to mutual aid agreements.** Specific details on the levels of support and duty responsibilities, including provisions regarding personnel, training, and equipment, should be clearly documented or updated within mutual aid agreements. For example, to avoid issues with varying laws, training, and standard operating procedures, the PPB may clarify that participating mutual aid members will be assigned to traffic control, back-up for PPB patrol officers responding to calls for service, or other duties that support the overall demonstration response, without inserting officers from other jurisdictions inside areas with direct contact with demonstrators. These specifications would allow for stronger commitments toward PPB planning efforts. Joint training requirements would also ensure mutual aid members are familiar with each other’s procedures in advance of a response.\(^{302}\) Planning for the level of mutual aid support attained on August 17, 2019 is not feasible for responses to all demonstrations but is a key option to strengthen responses to expected large-scale events.

**Recommendation 1.2.3: The PPB should proactively conduct situational awareness scans on which mutual aid departments are willing to offer support, and the types of support for PPB demonstration responses.** Advanced notice to plan for a demonstration response is not always available, but, supplementing Recommendation 1.2.2, ongoing

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communication with and awareness of available mutual aid resources can ease the PPB’s preparation for these unexpected events.

Finding 1.3: The City of Portland’s First Amendment assembly permitting process is complicated for prospective applicants and city officials to understand. Additionally, Portland has a long history and culture of overlooking the permit requirement for such assemblies. As a result, many protest organizers do not apply for permits.

Recommendation 1.3.1: The City of Portland should examine ways to streamline the permitting process, encouraging community members to seek permits as part of planned demonstrations as a way to support their safety and resources needs. A 2014 CRC workgroup report on crowd control similarly recommended that the PPB and/or City of Portland should explore centralizing and/or simplifying this permitting process.\(^{303}\) While the city and PPB should continue to recognize that not every group will seek a permit prior to a planned assembly, they should attempt to facilitate community members’ abilities to apply for one. A viable permitting process would allow PPB to gather some basic and valuable information on events to support the planning process, both for protest organizers and the PPB. The process should be clearly approached, not as an intelligence gathering process, but as a benefit for organizers to ensure their safety and resource needs. The process would also provide PPB an opportunity to establish lines of communication early on and facilitate professional relationships between the organizers and the PPB.

Finding 1.4: Staffing shortages have created sworn vacancies at all levels of the PPB, which has limited the PPB’s resourcing to prepare for responses to mass demonstrations. As of fiscal year 2020, the PPB is authorized 1,001 sworn officers but has approximately 100 sworn vacancies. This vacancy rate was expected to increase over the next year due to anticipated retirements.\(^{304}\) Additionally, amidst the impacts of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, the City of Portland has initiated a city hiring freeze and the PPB is in discussions with labor unions regarding potential pay freezes.\(^{305}\) PPB staffing challenges have reportedly hurt officer morale, prevented officers from receiving shift relief, and limited the availability of dedicated staff time to train and plan for future protest responses.\(^{306}\)

Recommendation 1.4.1: The PPB should continue to prioritize and support ongoing recruitment efforts to bolster sworn staffing. Sustained vacancies place strain on officers

\(^{306}\) NPF assessment team interviews with PPB members, September 25, 2019 and November 18, 2019.
and units planning for and responding to events, in addition to challenges handling day-to-day calls for service and dedicating time for community engagement.

**Recommendation 1.4.2:** The PPB should expand the role of MFF during PPB demonstration responses—with requisite increases in training and equipment—to prepare more officers to handle various aspects of demonstration responses. Expanding the role of MFF would reduce the PPB’s reliance on the already short-staffed RRT and enable RRT members to focus more on rapid crowd management as needed, while MFF members are able to more flexibly manage various crowd management responsibilities.

**Finding 1.5:** MFF members do not receive formalized MFF training after leaving the advanced academy and receive limited personal protective equipment (PPE) for their mass demonstration responses. While MFF members are provided training during roll call, they do not receive formal training on responding to First Amendment assemblies as part of in-service training. Elevating the prioritization of this training and support for the personnel managing related training could enhance the preparedness and flexibility of MFF members to support crowd management responses. Furthermore, in addition to increasing the skillsets of MFF members, regular training would increase the confidence of command personnel in MFF’s abilities to handle a variety of event responses. MFF members are issued some PPE including a helmet, gas mask, and baton, but are not issued levels of protective gear similar to RRT.  

**Recommendation 1.5.1:** The PPB should develop and provide additional formalized training for MFF teams as part of in-service training. MFF members respond to many protests every year. Their training on the latest PPB directives, policies, potential threats and procedures, based on national best practices related to crowd management, particularly given the evolving nature of protests in Portland, is essential to facilitate public safety during mass demonstrations. For example, during this review, it was relayed to the NPF assessment team that a lack of experience with crowd events led one MFF team to leave their vehicles unattended during the August 4, 2018 event. These vehicles were later vandalized by some protestors, prompting officers to use force to disperse this crowd.

**Recommendation 1.5.2:** Additional formalized training for MFF members should include a focus on developing their skillset in crowd management and de-escalation to be able to respond to a variety of mass demonstration situations. Improving the skill levels of MFF members would expand their capacity to intervene in tense situations. An enhanced MFF could decrease the need for scarce additional resources.

**Recommendation 1.5.3:** The PPB must provide specialized training for MFF sergeants and lieutenants to better prepare them to manage their MFF teams. This specialized training, provided on a regular basis, is necessary to prepare MFF sergeants and

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307 NPF assessment team interview with PPB commander, November 19, 2019.
lieutenants for their critical supervision role during responses to demonstrations. The training should focus on both platoon and squad integrity and allow for multiple squads to train together. Understanding these roles and responsibilities would be even more important should MFF members be expected to play a greater role in crowd management.

**Recommendation 1.5.4**: The PPB should examine areas to incorporate community members into formalized training on crowd management and de-escalation. Following demonstrations in 2016, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg (NC) Police Department collaborated with community members to develop Constructive Conversation Team (CCT) training. CCT training includes exercises with Charlotte community members to enable trainees to practice de-escalation skills in protest scenarios.

**Recommendation 1.5.5**: MFF members should be provided additional PPE for officer safety during responses to protests. Some NPF assessment team interviewees noted that protester tactics and equipment during some recent protests have evolved, creating concerns for public and officer safety. Particularly should the PPB move toward directing MFF officers to engage in more levels of responses to protests, additional equipment and training will be necessary. As RRT members continue to test new forms of “soft” protective gear that can be worn inside of their uniforms and avoid militaristic or aggressive tones, the PPB should consider expanding the availability of this gear to MFF members.

**Recommendation 1.5.6**: Each precinct should be required to maintain a percentage of trained MFF officers to prevent over-reliance on a limited number of officers. During interviews, the NPF assessment team heard reports that many of Central Precinct’s line officers apply to participate in MFF because, with the majority of major protest events taking place within their precinct’s boundaries, they believe they are going to be involved regardless. By volunteering to participating in MFF, they are able to avoid some unexpected scheduling challenges. Re-evaluating how event responses are staffed such as by increasing the number of officers participating in MFF from other precincts would reduce strain on a limited number of officers and increase experience among MFF members from all precincts.

**Finding 1.6**: The PPB’s RRT has lacked internal support, which affects their ability to recruit, retain, support morale, and train officers in the unit. RRT members are essential to rapidly respond to tense situations that may erupt during protests. As of November 2019, the unit was authorized to have 82 members but had 17 vacancies—a vacancy rate of over 20 percent. With only one full-time lieutenant who is responsible for managing both RRT and the Canine Unit, the

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309 NPF assessment team interview with Multnomah County and City of Portland employees, September 24, 2019 and November 20, 2019.
310 NPF assessment team interview with RRT member, November 18, 2019.
RRT unit has also lacked sufficient oversight, management, and planning support.\(^{311}\) The RRT unit has been effective during past responses to demonstrations to address emerging public safety situations. At the same time, continued staffing limitations and lack of internal support affect the unit’s potential to recruit, retain, and train on emerging promising practices, deploy units most effectively, and address officer fatigue. Additionally, when RRT is requested for an event, individual RRT members can decline the particular event. This leaves RRT leadership and PPB command unsure of how many members they might have available for quickly developing events.

**Recommendation 1.6.1:** The PPB should develop and resource a recruitment and retention strategy for the RRT unit. The strategy should address challenges to RRT officer morale, such as the frequent inability to become eligible for promotion as an RRT member given that members are frequently the subject of lawsuits and use of force complaints.

**Recommendation 1.6.2:** The PPB should conduct joint trainings with MFF and RRT to create flexibility across these specialty response units. Joint trainings can provide teaching opportunities to further develop the skillsets of MFF members while providing RRT with additional recruiting opportunities. Qualified, multi-trained MFF members could be pulled in to fulfill more resource gaps for an event, particularly as not every event will require the activation or deployment of RRT.

**Recommendation 1.6.3:** The PPB should develop RRT scenario training for other bureau and city partners to participate. The training should include crowd management incident commanders (CMICs), public information officers (PIOs), city officials, and employees with the Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office, City Attorney’s Office, and other agencies like the Portland Public Works Bureaus that frequently support protest responses. These employees should attend to build understanding of the training and tactics, and positive relationships with RRT members in advance of event responses.

**Finding 1.7:** The RRT is exploring alternative personal protective gear (PPE) that is effective for officer safety but does not add to a militaristic tone during responses to protests.\(^{312}\) The availability and use of properly fitting body armor is essential for officer safety during responses to mass demonstrations. Law enforcement agencies, while prioritizing officer safety, must carefully consider the balance between the need for protection and the image presented by officers clad in PPE.\(^{313}\)

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\(^{311}\) NPF assessment team interview with RRT member, November 18, 2019.

\(^{312}\) NPF assessment team interview with RRT member, November 18, 2019.


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**Recommendation 1.7.1:** The PPB should continue to explore protective gear that provides the appearance of a “soft” uniform while retaining a degree of comfort and protection. As of May 2020, the PPB has issued each RRT member additional PPE that provides comfort and protection and will be used for their deployments to respond to mass demonstrations. The team is in the process of testing the equipment during summer temperatures to ensure the equipment is appropriate for full time use.314

**Finding 1.8:** The PPB has not designated a safety officer during past responses.315 Safety officers are important to monitor the health and safety of emergency responder personnel during responses to incidents, including protests.316

**Recommendation 1.8.1:** The PPB should assign a safety officer during all critical events to ensure physical and mental health issues are addressed. Monitoring and providing resources for officer safety and wellness during and after protests is important to support their wellbeing. The physical and emotional toll that long deployments under stressful conditions can have on officers can also impact health, judgement, and performance.317

**Recommendation 1.8.2:** The PPB should develop guidelines regarding the provision of mental health and other services to the officers assigned to critical incidents, and to their families, particularly if the events are prolonged or violent.318

**Recommendation 1.8.3:** Pre-incident briefings of officers should include a health and safety briefing, the requirement for rest and nourishment, and a reminder to officers to bring along any medications that they may need to take during long shifts.319

**Finding 1.9:** PPB members are currently not issued body worn cameras (BWCs). BWCs can be beneficial tools to ensure officer accountability, transparency, and protection from unfounded claims.320 Other jurisdictions have used BWCs to record verbal and physical exchanges between demonstrators and police, protecting all parties from false accusations.321 The NPF assessment team recognizes that current legislation and Portland City ordinances discourage the use of BWCs.

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315 NPF assessment team interview with PPB member, November 18, 2019.
during incidents of mass demonstrations, and that, with the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, budget constraints have de-prioritized the city’s BWC pilot project.322

Recommendation 1.9.1: The PPB should continue to consider ways in which adopting BWCs or other video technology such as drones or fixed cameras could benefit responses to mass demonstrations. PPB should re-engage city and community stakeholders to collaboratively develop plans, policies, and procedures for a BWC pilot program. The PPB has begun to develop BWC polices to propose to the Portland City Council.323 PPB should consider funding opportunities such as through the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) BWC Policy and Implementation Program should grant funding be offered in 2021.324

Finding 1.10: The Multnomah County District Attorney’s (MCDA) Office and PPB have developed strong relationships that have better prepared the department to respond to protests. With the majority of the MCDA’s Office’s work related to cases generated in the City of Portland, the PPB and MCDA’s Office have established effective relationships that have bolstered planning for large-scale demonstration responses. In advance of the August 17, 2019 response, the MCDA’s Office planned and facilitated the arrests of several individuals with outstanding warrants who were involved in violent behavior in recent events and were known to be planning on participating in the upcoming protests. Arresting these individuals in advance of the August 17, 2019 demonstrations, may have helped to defuse tensions that may otherwise have contributed to violence during the demonstrations. Additionally, during past demonstration responses, teams of staff from the MCDA’s Office have been embedded with PPB arrest teams. This has supported the timely and lawful collection of information from arrestees.325

Recommendation 1.10.1: The MCDA’s Office and PPB should continue to collaborate during and in advance of responses to protests. Continuing to cultivate these relationships is imperative to facilitate collaborative responses to public safety issues.

Finding 1.11: In planning for the response to the August 17, 2019 events, the PPB made efforts to include the Office of Equity and Human Rights (OEHR) to review operational plans. OEHR personnel were invited to review operational plans and provide feedback into how operations may affect or be perceived by various groups. While OEHR interviewees told the team that they would like to participate more in the future, strides were made.

322 Bernstein. (2020, April 15). Body cameras for Portland police put on the back burner again—this time because of coronavirus.
325 NPF assessment team interview with MCDA’s Office personnel, November 20, 2019.
Recommendation 1.11.1: The PPB should explore enhancing OEHR’s involvement in the development of operational plans. Involving OEHR earlier when possible would allow for more time to coordinate language and processes into wider planning.

Recommendation 1.11.2: The city and PPB should consider how the OEHR could be deployed during events to monitor both police and crowd interactions, police tactics and responses, and better support the planning and preparation process.

Incident Command

Finding 2.1: The PPB improved their use of Incident Command System (ICS) principles during the August 17, 2019 response compared to the responses on June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018.

Recommendation 2.1.1: The PPB should continue to support and build their ICS program to better prepare the Bureau for mass demonstration responses. Using ICS principles to manage everyday situations can also help city officials and police bureau members to practice established protocols and training.326

Finding 2.2: The PPB does not fully staff incident management positions as recommended under the ICS structure. During responses to past protest events, the PPB has had recurrent vacancies in important ICS positions that may hamper their response. For example, the PPB has not designated a safety officer during past responses as noted in Finding 1.8.327

Recommendation 2.2.1: The PPB should assign staff to oversee each of the designated ICS areas during responses to protests. Those selected personnel should build teams within their disciplines to plan for lines of succession, develop expertise, and establish relationships with other key stakeholders. These assignments should follow the planning process whereby those who oversaw a particular role in planning is the same person who sits in the ICS.

Finding 2.3: The PPB has implemented specialized incident command training for planned designated commanders for critical incidents and crowd management. Recognizing the different skillsets and training required for each role, PPB has developed incident command training to better prepare current and future PPB incident commanders for managing these events. However, some NPF assessment team interviewees acknowledged that turnover and challenges associated with the position have limited the pool of PPB leaders trained as crowd management incident commanders (CMIC).328

327 NPF assessment team interview with PPB member, November 18, 2019.
328 NPF assessment team interviews with PPB members, November 18-19, 2019.
Recommendation 2.3.1: The PPB should expand their CMIC training to more PPB members to ensure the bureau retains members that can assume the CMIC position at any time. CMIC training was initially limited to planned CMICs and their deputy CMICs. However, these positions have historically had frequent turnover. To ensure the bureau always has trained CMICs, this training should be expanded to more members. The PPB should also consider cross training commanders to help fill in gaps.

Finding 2.4: Some PPB supervisors and commanders do not prioritize ICS training. Some supervisors and commanders reportedly do not fully engage with the offered in-depth training or attend on an infrequent basis.

Recommendation 2.4.1: PPB should increase the frequency of department-wide ICS training both formally and informally via roll call trainings, online videos, tabletop exercises, etc. MFF and RRT members are well aware of challenges and updates, but other officers and command-level employees do not have the same exposure.

Recommendation 2.4.2: PPB should increase accountability measures of training to ensure that all levels meet minimum qualitative training standards. The importance of crowd management training and preparation should be reinforced by the chief through the ranks, emphasizing the role every PPB member has in supporting the public safety mission during demonstration responses as noted in Recommendation 1.1.4. The training lieutenant must be able to ensure that in addition to line level officers, command level officers have complete training. Tying promotions to related training measures may be one option to underscore the value of this training.

Recommendation 2.4.3: City of Portland officials should consider participating in ICS training. Having all city personnel, including command staff and elected officials, complete ICS training helps to ensure that personnel at all jurisdictional levels and across disciplines can function effectively together during an incident. As an after-action review of the response to protests in Ferguson recommended, NIMS awareness training for elected officials and staff underscores the importance of command and control.

Finding 2.5: Space used as PPB’s emergency command center (ECC) does not provide sufficient space and resources to manage the response to a mass demonstration. The use of appropriately sized, secured facilities with the necessary technology are critical to assist the incident commander and supporting staff with managing large events. During the response to the August 17, 2019 events, the PPB used a larger location as their ECC through local collaborations.

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Recommendation 2.5.1: PPB should continue to use the larger location as the EOC for future events. The NPF team noted that the coordination center offered the necessary security, space, technology, and logistics support to manage large crowd events.

Recommendation 2.5.2: In the event that the larger facility is unavailable, the PPB should consider other properties and spaces to operate the ECC that provide the physical and technological capacity to serve ECC needs. The PPB should consider existing properties or newer buildings to convert into an ECC. As a suitable space is identified, the ECC should be set up so that PPB and city stakeholders who may be participating in events can become familiar with equipment, technology, and other ECC resources used to manage events.

Policies, Protocols, and Strategies

Finding 3.1: Some of the tactics that the PPB has used during past events to attempt to protect public and officer safety have unintentionally escalated tensions with the crowd. Community members have reported that PPB responses to protests have been disproportionate. In particular, community members have alleged that PPB uses of force caused several injuries and munitions were inappropriately used during the August 4, 2018 event. These responses—which have appeared disproportionate in magnitude—have escalated tensions during events and deepened community mistrust in the police.

Recommendation 3.1.1: The PPB should clarify which techniques should be appropriately used for separating groups and re-establishing order. To the extent possible, these tactics should be communicated to the public. The tactics should be regularly tested and trained in order for officers to develop the skillsets needed to identify and anticipate crowd responses. Uses of force that appear disproportionate in magnitude can have the unintended consequence of escalating instead of decreasing tensions in a crowd. A crowd management plan should clearly define the city’s overall political, strategic, and tactical response framework for reacting to protests that develop beyond ‘routine’ events. Tiered intervention and response strategies, codified in policy, should be consistent with the challenges posed by demonstrators, recognizing the department’s priority to value and preserve human life, with a strategic goal of de-escalation, containment, prevention of further escalation, and officer safety.

Recommendation 3.1.2: The PPB should seek to develop greater use of non-enforcement tactics such as bike squads when feasible. The PPB does not regularly use bike officers as part of their overall crowd management strategies. The PPB should re-evaluate how to best utilize bike officers/units in their overall crowd management

331 NPF assessment team interviews with community members, September 24, 2019, and November 23, 2019.
strategies, when the situation remains safe for bicycle officers to be exposed with minimal PPE, such as by establishing MFF bike squads within precincts that can be activated and deployed. Bicycle officers can be a valuable resource to manage mass demonstrations, through their ability to respond to public safety issues while appearing less intimidating than other officers. Bicycles can also be used to form mobile barriers.

Finding 3.2: The PPB directive 635.10 (crowd management/crowd control) is generally consistent with promising practices surrounding police response to First Amendment assemblies and mass demonstrations. At the same time, the PPB has declined to adopt some recommendations from community members and groups on updates to the directive that may additionally address community concerns.

Recommendation 3.2.1: The PPB should further emphasize de-escalation within directive 635.10. Portland community members and groups have provided suggested changes to directive 635.10 to emphasize de-escalation, including the recommendation to revise the preamble of the directive to include more language on de-escalation. While directive 1010.00 (use of force) includes additional information on de-escalation, incorporating consistent language to directive 635.10 would address community input.

Recommendation 3.2.2: The PPB should continue to review and incorporate national and international promising practices and lessons learned in future policy updates and related trainings and preparations for large-scale events. Continuing to consider and make reasonable updates to directives based on feedback from community members will also support PPB community engagement and trust-building with the community it serves.

Finding 3.3: The PPB does not have a mass detention and arrest directive or standard operating procedure. During the response to the June 4, 2017 event, the PPB enacted the mass detention of a crowd that was declared a civil disturbance. The PPB directive 635.10 (crowd management/crowd control) does provide provisions for activating mass arrest teams and notes that members “may be justified in detaining individuals engaged in civil disturbance after providing a lawful order to disperse followed by a reasonable opportunity to comply with that order.” However, the directive also does not detail the circumstances under which officers can institute mass detentions and arrests.

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336 Ibid.
Recommendation 3.3.1: The PPB should develop a mass detention and arrest directive. As the Independent Police Review’s policy review of the PPB response to the June 4, 2017 demonstrations recommended, the PPB should develop a written policy and amend the crowd control policy to detail when officers can engage in mass detentions and arrests. Major cities—especially those that tend to have many mass demonstrations—should have policies and standard operating procedures for all aspects of law enforcement during such demonstrations. Within the policy, PPB should identify non-patrol units that operate as arrest processing teams. These teams should train on the policy and procedures and be equipped with protective gear as appropriate.

Recommendation 3.3.2: The MCDA’s Office, PPB, and City Attorney’s Office should continue to develop field booking plans that can easily be stood up during large scale events. Pre-determined booking plans can help avoid having several arrestees standing around creating potential flash points for crowds.

Recommendation 3.3.3: The PPB should take immediate and appropriate action in response to criminal acts to protect all persons (e.g., demonstrators, observers, members of the public, law enforcement personnel) and property. While enacting a mass arrest might be lawful depending on the circumstances, law enforcement organizations should avoid detaining and arresting substantial numbers of persons when reasonably possible in the interest of public safety. As a review of the Metropolitan (DC) Police Department’s response to the 2017 presidential inauguration found, law enforcement agencies should prioritize immediate actions to maintain public safety over engaging in mass arrests.

Finding 3.4: The PPB directives 635.10 (crowd management/crowd control), 1010.00 (use of force), and 1020.00 (weapons administration) do not identify the members or teams responsible for carrying and deploying special munitions.

Recommendation 3.4.1: The PPB should clarify policies for deploying special munitions in their bureau directives and training. IAPs should also account for all potential munitions under their standard rules of engagement for the use of force. MFF must be included in certain munition training and deployment in conjunction with Recommendation 1.4.2.

Finding 3.5: The PPB has developed a Demonstration Liaison Team (DLT) whose officers (DLOs) are responsible for liaising with event organizers to support the public safety of events. The role of the DLOs is not intended for intelligence gathering, but rather to establish two-way communication between event organizers, protesters, and police to further public safety. The

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DLOs clearly understand their focus on working with organizers to enable community members to practice their First Amendment rights, while ensuring public safety.

**Recommendation 3.5.1:** Planned PPB communications in advance of protest events should continue to remind the public of the DLT’s roles and responsibilities. The PPB rebranded the DLT in advance of the August 17, 2019 event, clearly publicizing their roles, responsibilities, and uniform to distinguish them from other officers during protest events. When possible, continuing to share this information and be transparent about the program will assist the DLT in establishing community trust and connecting with event organizers.

**Recommendation 3.5.2:** The PPB should ensure information about the DLT’s roles and responsibilities are shared with all bureau members—and other agencies as appropriate. During the operations briefing prior to the response on August 17, 2019, PPB leaders briefed all responding agencies on the DLT. The PPB should continue to include this information in briefings and ensure CMICs and other PPB leaders understand the DLT mission. DLTs should also be merged into both MFF and RRT training exercises. Additionally, introducing the DLO program to officers during roll call may help other officers to understand DLO roles and serve as a potential recruiting opportunity.

**Recommendation 3.5.3:** The PPB should continue to support the demonstration liaison program, ensuring that all members of the Crisis Negotiation Team (CNT) are able to participate in the training. Responses of PPB members of DLT is overwhelmingly positive as responding officers recognize the importance of their role. The bureau should also consider expanding the training to other interested members as appropriate.

**Finding 3.6:** PF&R medical personnel are embedded with PPB squads during responses to mass demonstrations. During past responses to protests these embedded EMTs have attended to community members during demonstrations, including for blunt force injuries and pepper spray.

**Recommendation 3.6.1:** The City of Portland should continue to support the arrangement for PF&R medical personnel to be embedded with PPB during responses to events. Embedded EMTs have been valuable to be able to quickly tend to injuries and may help to support interagency relations and communication. PF&R and PPB should continue to engage in joint-training and tabletop exercises to ensure their coordination remains strong.

**Recommendation 3.6.2:** When possible in advance of protest events, the PF&R and PPB should consider clearly publicizing the roles, responsibilities, and uniform of these embedded EMTs to distinguish them from other first responders.

**Finding 3.7:** The PPB does not regularly track metrics related to demonstration responses.
Recommendation 3.7.1: The PPB should track metrics related to demonstration responses, including the number of demonstrations that occur each month and reported citizen injuries from events. The city and PPB do track some metrics such as complaints and charges related to mass demonstration events. Expanding tracking processes to include numbers of demonstrations and reported citizen injuries related to events may help to inform city and PPB budget considerations, underscoring the number of responses PPB officers are expected to respond to and be prepared for.

Public Communication and Messaging

Finding 4.1: PPB loudspeaker directions to disperse may not have been sufficiently clear for protesters to understand. Many dispersal announcements are drafted and reviewed by PPB and the City Attorney’s Office prior to planned large-scale protests.\textsuperscript{342} This collaboration and pre-planning is valuable to facilitate important and lawful communications during a protest event. At the same time, in interviews with the NPF assessment team, several community members who attended demonstrations on June 4, 2017 and August 4, 2018 noted that PPB’s directions to protestors delivered over loudspeakers were not loud enough for everyone to hear, were unclear in their content, contributed to conflicting messaging, or did not provide enough time to comply.\textsuperscript{343}

Recommendation 4.1.1: The City of Portland and PPB should ensure that directions to disperse are clear and specify how and where protestors may move. Consistent and well-communicated instruction that fully considers how protestors can comply with directions is necessary to facilitate their compliance.

Recommendation 4.1.2: When large-scale actions must be taken in response to a protest, the City of Portland and PPB should consider communicating their reasoning behind the change in behavior. Community members interviewed by the NPF assessment team noted instances where they believed PPB appeared to instigate uses of force suddenly and without reason.\textsuperscript{344} While PPB would explain later that the actions were in response to force used against them, clearly communicating this reasoning in real-time over the loudspeakers and/or social media would help to ease community concerns and foster mutual trust and understanding, counter misperception and rumors, and support PPB efforts to tell its own narrative.

Recommendation 4.1.3: The PPB should clarify verbal dispersal order procedures in their Directives Manual to ensure consistency across event responses when possible, and update training accordingly. The PPB should clarify how many times the verbal dispersal should be made before the follow-up action is taken.

\textsuperscript{342} NPF assessment team interviews with city staff members, September 24, 2019.
\textsuperscript{343} NPF assessment team interviews with community members, September 24 and November 23, 2019.
\textsuperscript{344} NPF assessment team interviews with community members, September 24 and November 23, 2019.
Recommendation 4.1.4: Law enforcement agencies should develop an accepted audio recording of a warning that less-lethal weapons, such as tear gas, are about to be deployed in advance of a critical incident. As described by an after-action review of the response to protests in Ferguson, this warning can be replayed over the public address system to ensure that correct and consistent information is provided.³⁴⁵

Finding 4.2: Public information messaging improved in advance of the August 17, 2019 events, with the PPB developing and executing a communication strategy that accounted for public outreach pre-, during, and post-event. The strategy also incorporated coordination with the PIOs of other city and partner agencies and gained the buy-in of city leaders.

Recommendation 4.2.1: The PPB should continue to develop collaborative communication plans in advance of expected mass demonstrations. Ongoing efforts to communicate with demonstrators and other community members—before, during, and after events—is valuable to relay peaceful intentions and support de-escalation during otherwise tense situations.³⁴⁶

Recommendation 4.2.3: The PPB should continue to bolster its social media presence and communication as it relates to mass demonstrations, ensuring that they are sharing important information and responding to community questions before, during, and after the events. Social media can be a valuable means of communicating with all demonstrators, particularly during demonstrations that do not have clearly identified organizers.³⁴⁷

Recommendation 4.2.4: The PPB Communications Unit should consider including representatives from the Office of Equity and Human Rights in event planning. The PPB and City of Portland have struggled with perceptions of being biased towards one group or another. This may be the result of lack of information given beforehand, or not responding publicly post event, or a combination of both. Getting this office’s feedback may improve the effectiveness of the language used to communicate with the public prior to an event as well as during and post-event.

Finding 4.3: Coordination and collaboration between agency representatives at the Joint Information Center (JIC) was strong during the response to the August 17, 2019 protests as an integral part of the Incident Command Structure.


Preparing for and Responding to Mass Demonstrations and Counter-Demonstrations in Portland, Oregon
**Recommendation 4.3.1: The PPB should continue to use a JIC for managing public information during future mass demonstration responses.** Having a JIC with key communication personnel from multiple responding agencies is valuable to develop coordinated public messaging, as recommended under NIMS guidelines.³⁴⁸

**Recommendation 4.3.2: The PPB should ensure that the JIC has sufficient working spaces and technology to facilitate JIC operations.**

**Recommendation 4.3.3: PPB communication staff should continue to attend NIMS/ICS and JIC training.** Training on NIMS/ICS, the importance of a JIC, and managing a JIC are valuable areas for the PPB communication staff to be comfortable with to manage the public information process. Communication staff should also be included—or continue to be included—in tabletop and other training exercises as noted in Recommendation 1.1.3.

**After Action Review Process**

**Finding 5.1: Over recent years, the PPB has improved their after action review (AAR) process following responses to mass demonstrations.** Meanwhile, AARs have been inconsistently completed and lack a standard format.

**Recommendation 5.1.1: The PPB should continue to improve upon their AAR process, including by adjusting pre-set forms for the uniqueness of protest responses.** The PPB initially adapted use of force AAR forms to complete their protest AARs and is in the process of further adjusting their AAR forms.³⁴⁹ Completing this process will assist the PPB in more appropriately capturing lessons learned and in creating a standard format for demonstration AARs going forward. Additionally, the COPS Office offers a free, one-hour eLearning course on after action review and reporting processes—developed by the Virginia Center for Policing Innovation (VCPI)—which is meant to support all levels of police practitioners as they enhance their AAR processes.³⁵⁰

**Recommendation 5.1.2: The PPB should ensure they are incorporating lessons learned from ICS documentation and AARs back into relevant policies, SOPs and training.** Practical experiences can be used to inform relevant training, updates to the PPB ICS/CMIC structure, and responses to future events. As the NPF guidebook on conducting AARs recommends, agencies should develop a timeline with actionable steps to implement recommendations and assign responsibility for implementing

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³⁴⁹ NPF assessment team interview with PPB member, September 24, 2019.

PPB ensure that expectations regarding roles and responsibilities for completing and reviewing reports, participating in debriefings, and following through on identified lessons learned are clearly assigned and articulated to members.

**Finding 5.2: AARs of responses to mass demonstrations are limited to the planning for and public safety response to the events.** Reviews of responses thus do not consider lessons learned related to other areas of the response like public information, or potential input from community members or public safety partner agencies.

**Recommendation 5.2.1:** The PPB should consider expanding their AAR process for mass demonstration responses to include other areas of the response like public information as well as reviews of collaborations with city stakeholders and other response partners. The process should invite participation from stakeholders at other city agencies, public safety response partners, and other PPB units and offices, however these are not widely shared with each other. Including these stakeholders in a central AAR process would help to comprehensively identify lessons learned from mass demonstration responses.

**Recommendation 5.2.2:** The PPB should create processes for community members and members of other responding agencies to provide feedback on the PPB response. For example, after an event, the DLT could be used to reach out to event organizers for their feedback. This format should include a response mechanism so that the PPB can respond publicly to feedback as needed.

**Finding 5.3: Lessons learned from the AAR process are not consistently communicated back to PPB members at all levels.** Communicating lessons learned back through the bureau encourages members to anticipate changes or change their behavior in accordance with lessons learned as necessary. The communication also supports the bureau’s culture of learning by demonstrating practical outcomes of the AAR process.

**Recommendation 5.3.1:** The PPB should explore ways to communicate AAR lessons learned back to bureau members. Such communication may include department-wide emails or roll call sessions that report on lessons learned.

**Recommendation 5.3.2:** The PPB should explore ways to communicate AAR lessons learned back to the community. An appropriate synopsis of the AAR released to the public could help demonstrate PPBs commitment to public safety and willingness to accept public and other feedback through an acknowledgement of lessons learned.

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Appendix B: Detailed Methodology

At the request of the City of Portland, the National Police Foundation (NPF) created an assessment team to conduct an independent assessment of the Portland Police Bureau’s (PPB) response to mass demonstrations. The NPF assessment team, comprising subject matter experts in law enforcement leadership, operations, decision-making, tactics, and planning for mass demonstrations, developed a comprehensive methodology to thoroughly review and assess PPB’s response to mass demonstrations.

The assessment approach involved four means of information gathering and collection: (1) open source media review, (2) on-site data collection, (3) resource material review, and (4) off-site data collection and research. Each method is described in more detail in the sections that follow.

Open Source Media Review

Throughout the life of the assessment, NPF staff collected, reviewed, and referenced open source information. The team has read dozens of newspaper and magazine articles, watched videos, and more. This research has provided context for the interviews and other research conducted in relation to PPB’s response to mass demonstrations.

On-site Data Collection

The NPF assessment team conducted five site visits: August 8, 2019, August 17, 2019, September 23-26, 2019, November 18-20, 2019, and November 23, 2019. During these site visits, the assessment team conducted semi-structured interviews and focus groups with law enforcement members, local officials, and community members. The assessment team also conducted phone interviews and engaged in ride-alongs with PPB members.

More than 90 individuals were interviewed during these site visits and phone interviews, including the following:

*Portland Police Bureau*

- Commissioner/Mayor
- Chief (former)
- Command Staff members
- Incident Commanders
- Rapid Response Team members
- Mobile Field Force members
- Union representatives
City of Portland

- City Commissioner
- Mayor Policy Advisors
- Portland Fire and Rescue Bureau members
- Independent Police Review
- City Attorney
- U.S. Attorney

Community Groups

- Albina Ministerial Alliance
- American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon
- Citizens Review Committee
- Council on American-Islamic Relations
- Portland Committee on Community-Engaged Policing
- Portland Copwatch
- Oregon Justice Resource Center
- League of Women Voters
- Western States Center

Additionally, during the August 17, 2019 visit, a member of the NPF assessment team was able to directly observe the PPB’s preparation and response to the August 17, 2019 mass demonstrations.

Resource Material Review

The NPF assessment team collected and reviewed available PPB reports, data, audio and video, and after action reviews from the June 4, 2017, August 4, 2018, and August 17, 2019 incidents. In addition, the PPB provided policies, procedures, training documents relevant to their response to mass demonstrations and First Amendment assemblies. Each resource was reviewed to better understand the bureau’s response to demonstrations. Materials reviewed included the following:

- Directives and standard operating procedures
- Training information
- Communication plans
- Community complaints
- Community reports

The NPF assessment team had access and reviewed confidential information and documentation provided by the City of Portland and PPB as part of this review. Some documentation has been
protected under a non-disclosure agreement and are not referenced in the body of the report. The team also reviewed open source media articles, news clips, and relevant social media, video, and audio from the June 4, 2017, August 4, 2018, and August 17, 2019 incidents.

**Off-site Data Collection and Research**

In addition to the information collected from the City of Portland and to ground the independent assessment in national standards, model policies, and recognized promising practices, the NPF assessment team researched and reviewed scholarship on law enforcement response to mass demonstrations and First Amendment assemblies—in and out of the United States. The team conducted relevant research in other areas published by researchers from academia and from organizations including the following:

- US Department of Justice
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- International Association of Chiefs of Police
- Police Executive Research Forum
- National Police Foundation

**Analysis**

The NPF assessment team used the totality of the information collected to conduct a gap analysis, which focused on identifying key areas to develop a set of recommendations for the PPB, City of Portland, and the larger public safety field.
Appendix C: About the Assessment Team

Rick Braziel, Chief (Ret.), served as Chief of the Sacramento Police Department (SPD) from 2008 until his retirement in December 2012. A 33-year veteran of the SPD, including 18 years as a member of the executive leadership team, he held a variety of ranks. As Deputy Chief, his assignments included the Office of Operations, Office of Investigations, Office of Technical Services, and the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Services. As Chief of Police, Braziel refocused the SPD mission, including redesign of crime reduction strategies, deployment, and resources resulting in the reduction of Part I crime by 21% while reducing department staffing by 28%. Under his leadership, the SPD increased transparency and community involvement through the creation of a Police Advisory Committee, Interfaith Leaders Council, Youth Advisory Committee, town hall meetings, online citizen surveys, and a redesigned website with interactive features. Braziel conducts organization assessments and critical incident reviews. He was the lead investigator in the review of the police response to Christopher Dorner and was a member of a team reviewing the riots in Ferguson, Missouri and the St. Louis County Police Collaborative Reform Initiative. Rick also completed a review of the Stockton Police response to the Bank of the West robbery and hostage taking and the review of the December 2, 2015 terrorists attack in San Bernardino. He was formerly the Inspector General for Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, conducts organizational assessments and leadership training for public safety agencies, and serves as Vice Chair on California’s Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

Francine Tournour served as the City of Sacramento Director of the Office of Public Safety Accountability (OPSA) from 2008 to 2019. She joined OPSA in 2006 as Deputy Director. Francine holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Criminal Justice from Madonna University in Michigan and a Master’s in Emergency Management from CSU Long Beach. OPSA assists the public during the complaint process against public safety employees and adds additional transparency and accountability to the Police and Fire Departments regarding the complaint process, policies, procedures and practices. The office accepts, audits, and provides an independent review of complaints involving public safety employees. Francine was instrumental in the creation of the newly developed Sacramento Community Police Commission, which is tasked with making policy recommendations to the City Council regarding the Sacramento Police Department, to ensure they are bias free.

Hassan Aden, Chief (Ret.), served as Chief of Police of the Greenville Police Department in Greenville, North Carolina. Aden serves as the federal monitor overseeing the consent decree monitoring team in Cleveland and as the deputy monitor in Baltimore. Until late 2015, he was the Director of the Research and Programs Directorate of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), where he directly oversaw the day-to-day management of operational programs and research projects aimed at advancing professional police services. He served for 26 years at the Alexandria Police Department in Alexandria, Virginia, rising to the rank of Deputy Chief until his retirement in 2012. Chief Aden is a former commissioner of the governing board of CALEA. He currently serves on the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine’s Committee Preparing for and Responding to Mass Demonstrations and Counter-Demonstrations in Portland, Oregon
on Law and Justice, working with the world’s top criminologists, economists, and other academics on law and justice issues. Chief Aden testified in front of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing regarding multiple areas impacting American policing. Among other academic credentials, he holds a Master of Public Administration from American University in Washington, DC.

**Rodney Monroe, Chief (Ret.),** has over 37 years of law enforcement experience serving in various positions and overseeing a vast array of specialized commands, including handling of large events and mass demonstrations. He has 12 years of senior executive level experience as the chief of police for the Cities of Macon, Georgia; Richmond, Virginia; and Charlotte, North Carolina. Chief Monroe has extensive experience in organizing communities and developing meaningful partnerships with youth, residents, businesses, and faith-based organizations with a common goal of reducing crime, improving the quality of life, and reducing citizens’ fear level. He also has experience in planning, organizing, and managing major special events and criminal investigations, involving multiple federal and local law enforcement agencies including the FBI, United States Secret Service, DEA, ATF, and United States Capitol Police. Chief Monroe has extensive experience in managing and assessing responses to mass demonstrations. During his time at the Metropolitan Police Department, he coordinated and managed the 1995 Million-Man March and the 1997 Presidential Inauguration. During his tenure with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, Chief Monroe was responsible for the safety of the Democratic National Convention, as well as managing occupier groups throughout the city. In 2015, Chief Monroe testified in front of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing on the issue of Mass Demonstrations.

**Jennifer Zeunik, Director of State and Local Programs,** provides strategic oversight to the organization’s portfolio of programs focused on providing services and resources to state and local law enforcement agencies. She served on the project management team, providing oversight and administrative management of the project. She also served as a writer, editor, and quality control manager on the report. Ms. Zeunik has 20 years of public sector and nonprofit project management experience, working closely with all levels of government. In her career, Ms. Zeunik has provided strategic management expertise to international, federal, state, and local criminal justice and non-profit clients focused on justice policy research, business development activities, program management, strategic planning, training and technical assistance management. She has served as a lead writer on numerous published reports throughout her career, including the *IACP National Policy Summit on Community-Police Relations: Advancing a Culture of Cohesion and Trust* report as well as the COPS Office–funded Police Foundation Orlando Pulse nightclub critical incident review, *Rescue, Response, and Resilience*; the San Bernardino terrorist shooting critical incident review, *Bringing Calm to Chaos*; and, *Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of the St. Louis County Police Department*.

**Rebecca Benson, Senior Project Associate,** gathered and reviewed relevant policy and procedural information, provided policy analysis support for this engagement, and contributed to the final report. With the National Police Foundation, Ms. Benson also provides technical
assistance on law enforcement policies, procedures and practices as part of collaborative reform projects as well as programs focused on community collaboration and engagement, law enforcement and mental health partnerships, and data collection and analysis. Prior to NPF, she served as a Crime and Intelligence Analyst with the Olympic Division at the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) providing analytical support with the creation of new area boundaries, mapping and documenting community resources, activities and special locations as well as personnel resources and shift schedules. She also assisted in the development of community collaborations with neighboring jurisdictions. Ms. Benson began her law enforcement career with the Boston Police Department. Within the Office of the Police Commissioner, she served as a Program Manager on several community and youth projects including the development of the Boston Reentry Initiative that brought public safety, community and social service providers, and faith-based partners together to coordinate and increase effectiveness of resources.

Joyce Iwashita, Project Associate, provided overall project support, both on- and off-site, serving as a document reviewer, writer, and editor on the report. Ms. Iwashita joined the Police Foundation in March 2016 and supports the day-to-day project management of numerous projects across various topic areas. She has supported numerous NPF Training and Technical Assistance projects to include incident reviews and organizational assessment work. Ms. Iwashita has served as a team member, writer, and editor for National Police Foundation after action reviews including: Recovering and Moving Forward: Lessons Learned and Recommendations Following the Shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School and Independent Review of Security Issues at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center. A Harry S. Truman Scholar, Ms. Iwashita received her B.A. in Economics from Lewis & Clark College and received her M.A. in Security Studies with a concentration in Technology and Security from Georgetown University.
Appendix D: About the National Police Foundation

The National Police Foundation (NPF) is a non-partisan and non-membership 501(c)(3) organization dedicated to advancing the impact and delivery of police services through reforms and enhancements guided by innovation and science. For the last 50 years, the Foundation has led the development of research on all aspects of policing and leads the way in promoting and sharing evidence-based practices and innovation among law enforcement. The Foundation works with communities across the U.S. and internationally to provide research, training, and technical assistance relating to community engagement and problem solving, promoting safety and healthy organizations and officers, the reduction and prevention of violence, and equitable and fair justice for all. For more information, please visit the National Police Foundation website at www.policefoundation.org.