THE CINCINNATI TEAM POLICING EXPERIMENT
A SUMMARY REPORT

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THE URBAN INSTITUTE
Police Foundation

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This is a summary report of the Cincinnati Community Sector team policing experiment. A lengthy technical report of the experiment, including the tables, graphs, measurement instruments, and methodology, is scheduled to be available from the Communications Department, Police Foundation, 1909 K Street NW, Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20006.

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FOREWORD

THIS IS THE SUMMARY REPORT of the longest and most elaborate experiment yet to be conducted in an area of American law enforcement. The experiment tested in Cincinnati the feasibility and usefulness of team policing as a strategy for the productive delivery of police services. The results of the experiment are mixed. Reflecting a closely examined slice of policing in one American city, the findings suggest the complexities of trying to institute and maintain major changes in the way the police do their job. The findings also show variations in the results in team policing as the concept is applied on the streets to a greater or lesser degree.

That the Police Foundation chose as one of its major projects an inquiry into team policing reflects the hold which this strategy for police improvement has developed during the past ten years. Experimentation with team policing was a major recommendation of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1967. The next several years saw a growing number of police administrators become persuaded that neighborhood team policing was a promising way to address problems of overcentralization and bureaucratization of police agencies and of an apparently increasing sense of alienation of citizens and the police. By 1974, about 60 agencies had attempted or were employing some version of team policing.

Assaying team policing demanded a well planned and executed experiment with an extensive and thorough evaluation sustained over a

long period of time. Only in this manner could the Foundation and the Cincinnati Police Division learn with confidence whether the Division's version of neighborhood team policing was brought into existence, whether it achieved the postulated effects, whether it was maintained over time, and, if not, why not. The experiment conducted under the name of COMSEC—Community Sector Team Policing—was evaluated by The Urban Institute for the Foundation. The Institute's report represents the culmination of more than a year of program and evaluation design and planning, 30 months (March 1973–September 1975) of extensive data collection from department records and from police officers and citizens, and more than a year of analysis and writing, review and revision to assure accurate interpretation of the results.

The report is rich in information broadly applicable for the nation's police agencies. Neighborhood team policing represents a major departure from traditional, quasi-military style of police organization and management. It presents the potential for better relating modern police activities to crime control and service needs of urban communities and for putting to fuller and more satisfying use the skills, judgment and education of police officers. But team policing also presents new forms of tension between the need for centralized control of police policy and accountability and the need to decentralize problem identification and operational decisionmaking. This report includes full documentation of how neighborhood team policing worked for the benefit of both citizens and police while the strategy was fully in effect in Cincinnati and how and why there was a recentralization of operational decisionmaking and a resulting reduction in the level of benefits received from a reduced version of team policing.

Fully implemented neighborhood team policing rarely has been sustained for long. Experience has shown that it is difficult to do so unless attention is paid to solving the problems team policing presents to middle management. The information in the report about the reasons for recentralization of problem identification and operational decisionmaking in Cincinnati should assist police administrators seeking to maintain neighborhood team policing in dealing more effectively with this issue.

COMSEC initially was fielded with remarkable success. As the report indicates, the process by which innovation is implemented is fully as important, in terms of assuring a full test of any significant

innovation, as the nature of the innovation itself. This lesson warrants and repays the full attention of the chief executive. Much can be learned from the report about implementing major departures from traditional practices. The need for attention to this process is too often ignored by both operational people and evaluators.

Experiments in policing are difficult at best. This one was no exception; both its magnitude and long duration presented additional complications. But the Cincinnati Police Division, by its openness and its professional approach, in partnership with the Police Foundation and The Urban Institute, has demonstrated again that experiments in policing can be done and that the added solid knowledge they produce is well worth it. Only with the assistance of such police agencies can we say that neighborhood team policing can hold benefits and is a reasonable option for change in police organization and practice.

Patrick V. Murphy
President
Police Foundation

PREFACE

THE BASIC QUESTION ADDRESSED IN Cincinnati's team policing experiment was: How can a police agency organize itself to deal more effectively with its primary responsibilities in the coming years? A very common reply is, "team policing." Among the many programs called team policing, the common denominator seemed to be the assignment of a group of officers to patrol a given area. We needed to go much beyond this simplistic statement in order to determine what there is in team policing that generates some hope for the future of policing.

The objectives of police agencies often are described as being prevention of crime, protection of life and property, suppression of criminal activity, apprehension and prosecution of offenders, regulation of non-criminal conduct, and preservation of the public peace. Yet police agencies are not uniformly effective in attaining these objectives. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice pointed this out, and also indicated that we cannot attain these objectives so long as police agencies are expected to struggle with problems without the assistance of the greater community.

The Commission also suggested a solution: team policing. The goals and objectives of the police have stood the test of time. Team policing is designed to recognize that the attainment of these goals cannot be accomplished by the police agency alone. The community, social and other governmental agencies, and society itself all play a role in carrying out the police function.

The aspects of team policing crucial to reducing criminal victimization seem to be consistent assignment, unification of control and responsibility, team decisionmaking power, development of the police officer as a generalist, and communication.

Consistent assignment of an officer to the same area allows the officer to become familiar with that area and its people to a much greater extent than is possible under a system of rotating assignments. Officers tend to develop a proprietary interest in their segments of the community once they recognize that actions they may take today could cause them problems in the future.

Unifying the control, responsibility, and supervision in an area causes police officers' actions to become more consistent, and a consistent high level of service removes a major roadblock to communication.

Coupling a simplified control structure with team decisionmaking power enables the police to develop plans, on the basis of local information, more in keeping with community needs. This approach allows the officers on the street more latitude in dealing with the problems they face. The more consistent performance and greater commitment developed through such a system should create an environment in which police officers and community residents can develop an effective alliance against crime.

Another element of this plan is the development of a generalist officer. A generalist should be capable of delivering the complete spectrum of police services, thus providing more effective delivery of those services. An officer who has had adequate training and experience should be able to carry out all types of investigations, as well as provide the routine services expected of patrol officers.

All of these factors tend to improve communications both within the agency and between its representatives and the community. The current structure of police agencies is a great deterrent to effective communication of information important to the agency. Simplifying the chain of command and responsibility removes the major obstacle to internal communication. The police agency itself must take the first step in improving its relations with the community. Developing stable lines of communication is important in encouraging mutual trust, understanding, and aid between the police and the community.

Providing an officer the opportunity to understand the community; allowing a group of officers to define their own problems,

goals, and policies; developing a generalist notion of policing; and improving communications should improve the outlook of policing in the future. Perhaps none of this discussion is new to any of us. We must continue to look for and test new methods of providing police services. The ever-increasing problems that face us are evidence that we have not yet attained the ultimate goals of policing, and the need to find new solutions will become even more urgent as our society clamors ever more vociferously for better police service.

The Cincinnati Police Division considers itself fortunate to have had the chance to participate in a team policing experiment. Team policing, as its name implies, is more than a new mode of patrol and investigation. Team policing is a new way of thinking insofar as the team, the police agency, and the community are concerned.

As in most experiments of this magnitude, there were successes and failures. But who is to say what is a failure if we can learn from it? As in any innovative design, there was trial and error. The initiation of the Cincinnati Community Sector Team Policing Experiment (COMSEC) was no exception. All levels of the Police Divison quickly became involved in a working lesson in the management of change.

The administrator contemplating institutionalization of team policing must guard against the false premise that this effort will involve only particular areas of the police agency. It will quickly become obvious that a significant change such as team policing will have an impact on other areas of the agency where it is not readily apparent at the outset.

We do not mean to discourage, but rather to enlighten. As the report shows, the administrator and his managers must develop approaches not previously considered, and must engage in risktaking to a greater degree than ever before. In the final analysis, the undertaking is a learning experience for the administrator and management personnel as much as it is for the individual team member.

The Cincinnati Police Division wishes to acknowledge the highly professional and objective evaluation of the experiment by The Urban Institute. We are grateful to the Police Foundation for providing the resources not only to conduct but also to evaluate the experiment on a major scale.

We would like to commend the Police Foundation for its efforts and leadership, not only in making possible such experiments as team

policing, but also in sharing information on the values and weaknesses of innovative programs with the national police community.

Myron J. Leistler
Chief
Cincinnati Police Division

A NOTE ON EVALUATION

THIS EVALUATION REPORT OF THE neighborhood team policing experiment in Cincinnati should interest both methodologists and those concerned with testing the neighborhood team policing concept. The evaluation constitutes a rich source of learning in both spheres.

In retrospect, were this evaluation beginning now rather than in 1971 when planning for the team policing experiment began, it would stress process information more than did this one. The difficulty of interpreting impact measures in so complex a manipulation was somewhat underestimated and the evaluators believed that department records and periodic interviews with officers in the experiment would suffice. Hindsight confirms that additional observation at team management and street policing levels would have added even more explanatory power.

To say this is not to imply that less emphasis should be placed on impact measurement. Even with the efforts that were made, unexpected difficulties complicated the evaluation. Students of survey methodology will be interested to study a case in point, mentioned in this Summary Report and presented at length in the Technical Report, available from the Police Foundation. The repeated victimization surveys of small businesses, conducted under a single survey management, worked well to show the effects of neighborhood team policing in reducing robberies and burglaries of small businesses and in increasing small business reporting of such crimes (this is a hoped for result from neighborhood

team policing when operating as planned). However, the before-and-after household victimization survey comparisons led Urban Institute evaluators to conclude that there remains more to be learned about assuring comparability between survey administrations when they are conducted under different management.

Attention to the problems of impact measurement led to two additional developments to improve measurement methods. One was a test of telephone victimization surveying which showed that representativeness of sample is easily and inexpensively achieved and that reporting of crime experiences is as good as or better than that in face-to-face interviews. The benefits include greater safety to both interviewer and interviewee, higher response rates, and greatly reduced cost.[1]

The other development was exploration and use of a variety of progressively more technically advanced forms of time series analysis to interpret variations in reported crime data. The publication, in preparation, based upon this work provides guides to crime analysts in police and planning agencies and to researchers in the choice of methods best adapted to user purpose.

The series of officer surveys employed in this evaluation should interest both police administrators and researchers. The surveys should be helpful to administrators who want to measure police officer perceptions of their roles and job situations and reactions to changes in them that management wishes to test. The researchers may also wish to look for evidence of the relative validity, reliability, and sensitivity of such measures when applied. It is clear that authors Schwartz and Clarren, in developing these surveys and methods for analysis, made a major contribution toward development of such an important capacity.

Joseph H. Lewis
Director of Evaluation
Police Foundation

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[1] Alfred J. Tuchfarber and William R. Klecka, *Random Digit Dialing: Lowering the Cost of Victimization Surveys* (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1976).

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THE COMMUNITY SECTOR TEAM POLICING Program evaluation was carried out over a period of five years between 1971 and 1976. In that time, hundreds of people in Cincinnati and Washington, D.C., were part of the cooperative effort which made the study possible. Many citizens, business people, and police officers of Cincinnati gave time for interviews. Their interest and their candor are deeply appreciated.

The support of the Police Foundation's Board of Directors, the early and often difficult work of Thomas F. McBride, former staff director of the Foundation, the project management of John Heaphy, an assistant director of the Foundation, and the guidance of Patrick V. Murphy, the Foundation's president, were essential to the program's development and maintenance. A special note of appreciation is due Joseph H. Lewis, the Foundation's director of evaluation. He was ever available, providing the necessary voice of moderation throughout the experiment's long history.

In Cincinnati, the support and acceptance of Henry Sandman, former Public Safety Director and assistant City Manager, and of Police Chiefs Carl Goodin and Myron Leistler, were crucial to the project. Important also were the contributions of Lt. Col. Howard Rogers and the members of the Cincinnati Police Division's Program Management Bureau, especially Dean Watkins, Captain Charles Denham, and Sergeant James Detzel. Program Management Bureau Director Carl Lind was an especially important critic and collaborator. His openness to new ideas,

his eagerness to share his experience, his desire to learn with us, and his appreciation for the role of research in planning continually stimulated our thinking and assisted us throughout the course of the study.

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INTRODUCTION

In the 1960s, the police frequently appeared center stage in American life, and the public often did not like what it saw. Public attention focused increasingly on violence associated with civil rights demonstrations, riots in the cities, and war protests, all of which had led inevitably to encounters between the police and those who took to the streets. Police brutality became an issue, and the police came to be seen as a generally repressive force. Meantime, crime was spiraling upward. Criticism of the police became widespread.

Calls for change in the police came not only from outside but from within the police profession as well. The police themselves were dissatisfied with their ability to deal with crime, demonstrations, and disturbances, and with their overall relations with the communities they served. Many police officials publicly urged reform.

Police departments tried many things, from changes in investigative procedures to sensitivity training for officers, in their efforts to respond to either one or the other of the twin demands facing the police: that they cope with the rising crime rate and that they become more sensitive to their communities. Team policing seemed an answer to both demands.

In essence, team policing decentralizes the delivery of law enforcement services. A team of police officers is permanently assigned to a neighborhood and given responsibility for controlling and delivering

police services to that area. The way neighborhoods are defined, the composition of teams, and the range of services they can provide directly may vary, but team policing almost always attempts to provide officers on the street with increased responsibility (e.g., for investigations as well as patrol) and greater discretion.

Team policing implies that authority will be decentralized in such a way that officers can adapt what they do to the particular requirements of their neighborhoods. Responsiveness to neighborhood desires is expected to produce greater citizen trust in the police, improved police-community relations, and increased cooperation from citizens. This, in turn, is expected to lead to a reduction in crime.

By the late 1960s, team policing was growing increasingly appealing to the police. It embraced traditional police goals—preventing and controlling crime, keeping the peace, and helping people. It endorsed individual officers' initiative and discretion. It encouraged the recruitment of better educated officers by providing a role in which officers could use their education. Moreover, while acknowledging community needs, it left final decisions in the hands of the police.

Two national commissions have recommended consideration of team policing. Experimentation with this method was a major recommendation of the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice: Departments were urged to combine patrol and investigative functions under a unified command to deal flexibly with crime problems in a defined sector. The Commission thought that such a practice might overcome problems engendered by the task specialization that separates officers from each other and from the communities they serve. The President's Commission focused on the positive effects of team policing on police departments themselves; the 1973 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals emphasized the need to strengthen police-community bonds as one means to control crime.

By 1974, at least 60 police departments in the United States, in communities ranging in size from Burnsville, Minnesota (population 20,000), to New York City, had tried team policing in at least part of their jurisdiction.

Early in 1971, Carl Goodin was appointed chief of the Cincinnati Police Division (CPD) and like others, he recognized the need for changes in the CPD's policing techniques. In 1970 planning had begun

in Cincinnati for an experiment particularly intended to improve police-community relations: a form of neighborhood team policing based on the Los Angeles Basic Car Plan. The Cincinnati program, called Community Sector Team Policing (COMSEC), was begun in March 1971. It was the forerunner of a later experiment carried out from 1973 to 1975, which is the subject of this report. The 1971 program had the same name and was conducted in the same part of the city, but substantially less effort was devoted to planning and training. That early version of COMSEC required no substantial organizational changes.

Implementation problems developed during Cincinnati's first attempt at neighborhood team policing. In the district involved, 50 percent of the patrolmen were nominally assigned to small team areas called sectors. The team leaders, usually specialists,[1] had no supervisory responsibility and no mechanisms for coordinating activity. Direction of team members still rested with the lieutenants and sergeants who had districtwide responsibility. As a result, team officers frequently were sent out of their sectors in response to requests for service. Also, the boundaries of the five sectors did not conform to the residents' conception of their neighborhoods.

The first version of COMSEC did not work. The CPD proposed an experiment involving substantial improvement and modification of the earlier program. The Police Foundation agreed to fund the experiment and an independent evaluation by The Urban Institute.

Initially, the experiment and evaluation were to run for 18 months. However, after 18 months, the CPD had decided to expand team policing into other parts of the city, and the evaluation period was extended to 30 months. Thus, the experiment and evaluation lasted from March 1973 until September 1975. Its major goals were to reduce crime and improve police-community relations. An additional major concern of the evaluation was the effect of the experiment on the attitudes and experiences of police officers.

Cincinnati has a population of almost 500,000 persons and an area of 78 square miles. The new team policing experiment was carried out in Police District 1—a 3.7 square mile area with a resident popula-

[1] Equivalent to the detective rank in many police agencies, although used in the CPD for a somewhat broader range of tasks.

tion of about 35,000 where 25 percent of the reported crime in the city occurred. The central business district lying within the area attracts an estimated 250,000 shoppers, tourists, and nonresident workers on weekdays.

District 1 was an attractive experimental area because of its diverse neighborhoods as well as its crime problem. Under team policing, the district was divided into six sectors with a team for each sector. The six sectors included:

- two predominantly black, high-crime, low income residential areas;
- a low income, mixed residential and business area;
- a predominantly white, middle-class residential area;
- a racially mixed (black and Appalachian white), low income, high-crime, largely residential area;
- the central business district.

Team policing in District 1 differed markedly from traditional police practices in Cincinnati. Responsibility for essentially all police services within a given neighborhood was delegated to a team of officers who were rarely reassigned. Traditionally, a separate specialized unit dealt with investigating each major crime category such as burglary, robbery, auto larceny, or fraud, or with other specialized service such as traffic control. Like many of the team policing programs before it, Cincinnati's program included permanent assignment of officers to small geographically and demographically defined neighborhoods. Thus, COMSEC represented a relatively decentralized and autonomous operation, compared with conventional practices. The program stressed informal interaction and increased communications among team members, with special emphasis on unity of supervision, decentralization of decisionmaking to the team level, and unified delivery of all police services (except investigation of homicides). The development of a "generalist" role for officers was encouraged—a role in which they perform both investigative and patrol functions.

Although the idea of team policing seems simple, implementation and management of a team policing program is not simple. Teams had to be given adequate resources to perform the expected range of services and training in new skills and techniques, and new procedures had to be developed. With the shifting of authority to the teams, new roles were required of middle and upper management.

Aware of these difficulties, the Cincinnati Police Division spent nearly two years planning and taking actions in preparation to implement COMSEC. The planning involved extensive use of task forces. For the first time, patrol officers were participants in the planning; consultants were used to develop the necessary technology (e.g., a dispatch system which facilitated the maintenance of each team as a discrete unit); central Program Management Bureau (PMB) was established to coordinate and monitor the requisitioning of equipment, training of officers, development of rules and procedures, and technical research, and to provide budgetary control.

The careful planning for COMSEC bore fruit. In March 1973 nearly all elements of the program were put into practice. Indeed, the apparent ease of implementation may cause some to question whether the elaborate planning and preparation really were necessary. However, the difficulties the department encountered when it expanded team policing to a new area two and a half years later underscores the importance of careful planning.

Unfortunately, COMSEC proved difficult to maintain. Management decisions made during the latter half of the first 18 months eventually, whether purposely or not, undermined the integrity of the program and blurred the distinction between District 1 and the rest of the city. The program drifted away from an emphasis on decentralization and autonomy toward greater control by headquarters. Contrary to the principle that teams would handle all investigations except homicide, vice units were sent into District 1 more and more often; inspectors were also sent in to insure that discipline was maintained; the control of planning was centralized; and operations became more standardized.

MAJOR FINDINGS

Effects of Team Policing in Cincinnati

On the whole, over the 30-month experiment, police-community relations, already quite positive, changed only a little; burglary was reduced, and COMSEC dealt as well with other categories of Part I crime as the centralized style of policing previously the norm in Cincinnati. The patrol officers involved were enthusiastic about team policing as an idea and as a practice, but they grew disenchanted as a result of what many officers perceived as an undercutting of the program by headquarters.

The effects of team policing on crime during the first 18 months were as follows:

- COMSEC was more successful in reducing burglary than policing in other parts of the city, and did as well in controlling other kinds of crime.
- The proportion of small businesses struck by burglary and robbery decreased significantly in District 1 but not elsewhere.
- Small businesses in District 1 reported to the police a larger percentage of crimes which occurred than they had reported before COMSEC.
- With the deterioration of the program and the fall in morale among officers, the victimization rates for businesses in District 1 returned to pre-COMSEC levels. Burglary also appeared to be increasing in District 1 at 30 months, at the end of the evaluation period.

Some of the major findings of the experiment concerning police-community relations were as follows:

- Fewer citizens in District 1 felt "very unsafe" walking in their neighborhoods at night.
- District 1 citizens believed that officers were more likely to arrive when called.
- Citizens and businessmen in District 1 noticed more frequent use of foot patrol, and more of them recognized the officers who worked in their neighborhoods.
- Citizen support for the idea of team policing, which was high before COMSEC, increased under the program.

On the other hand, these expected changes in community relations under COMSEC did *not* occur.

- Citizen satisfaction with police service and belief in the honesty of officers remained high, but it did not increase.
- Citizens in District 1 did not view their neighbors as more cooperative and less hostile toward the police.

Some changes in District 1 officers' jobs and their attitudes toward them also occurred.

- Officers reported positive changes in the breadth of their jobs (task scope), in their independence, and in their influence over decisions, although most of the reported gain in job breadth was lost by 18 months.
- Satisfaction with the amount of freedom available and with supervisors rose after six months, then fell again by the end of 18 months. Satisfaction with work showed a similar pattern.

Changes in officer attitudes were not limited to the COMSEC area. Eighteen months after COMSEC began officers outside District 1 reported a more positive attitude toward their jobs and expressed greater satisfaction with their work and their supervisors. Such changes seemed to be associated with the more flexible management style some district commanders adopted.

During the course of the experiment a number of managers in police headquarters became increasingly ambivalent toward team policing. Although they wanted to be responsive to the community and also to provide their officers with a more satisfying work experience, senior officers feared that with the promised autonomy and reduction in central control, their officers might become less productive or even corrupt. To many senior staff officers, autonomy and control were competing issues. Ultimately, headquarters demonstrated a lack of adherence to a central premise of team policing, namely that officers can be trusted to make decisions and to learn from their mistakes as well as from their successes. In order to provide the autonomy desired for patrol officers under team policing, police managers would need to be able to accommodate the modifications in centralized control that team policing implies.

Cost of Team Policing

Cincinnati spent more money on police services during the experiment than before. Personnel salaries accounted for the overwhelming proportion (80 percent) of the increased cost, yet the real increase in CPD manpower under team policing was actually smaller than police manpower increases during the same period in ten cities of

similar size which relied on orthodox policing. During the planning and experimental phases (1972-1974), overall police expenditures in Cincinnati rose only 4 percent more than the average increase in these ten cities. This suggests that a slightly less ambitious version of team policing than Cincinnati's need cost no more than traditional policing. Additional annual costs considered most closely related to the team policing experiment in Cincinnati were approximately $500,000, about 3 percent of the total CPD budget. For the most part, that money was spent on improving management, research and development, and training capabilities. These new capabilities were applied to divisionwide needs almost immediately after COMSEC was implemented in the field early in 1973, although they had been initiated to support team policing.

Corruption Charges Against CPD Officers

In November 1975, after all the data to be used in evaluating COMSEC had been collected, the *Cincinnati Enquirer*, one of the city's newspapers, received a letter charging that corruption in the CPD extended to high-ranking officers. The anonymous letter purported to represent the views of a group of concerned officers. Within a few days, the new city manager requested that a grand jury be impaneled to investigate the allegations. As a result of subsequent disclosures, Colonel Goodin was relieved as police chief. He and a number of other officers were indicted, tried and convicted, and several high-ranking officers retired. Most of the officers named had been part of the CPD's Vice Investigative Unit.

More than a year after the disclosures, no officer directly associated with team policing had been indicted or even mentioned in regard to the alleged corruption and kickbacks.

Team policing is based, in part, on faith in the integrity of the officer-on-the-street. At its foundation are the assumptions that officers can carry out a broader range of tasks, make decisions for themselves, and provide better services in the process if they are allowed the necessary independence. Nothing in this report casts doubt on these assumptions, and none of the data on which this evaluation is based were affected by events related to the allegations of corruption.

In June 1976, acting police chief Myron Leistler began planning for a "second-generation" form of COMSEC. His hope appeared to be that the strengths of COMSEC, including its demonstrated ability to

provide a more stimulating and rewarding work environment, could be recovered.

Summary

No easy conclusions can be drawn from this report. The findings will serve both advocates and opponents of team policing. What one makes of the findings depends on the assumptions and background one brings to them.

- Those who advocate team policing can point to decreases in burglary and improved police responsiveness to requests for service. Moreover, low morale among officers during the last year of the program can be attributed to management's failure to maintain important aspects of the program—arguably a problem unique to Cincinnati.
- Critics of team policing can point to the financial and human costs of the program, the lack of tangible changes in community relations, and the fear that team policing cannot be maintained for long, even if successfully introduced, given the nature of policing in the United States.
- Those who are undecided will note that team policing is not unattractive and produces results no worse than traditional, centralized forms of policing. But they may wonder whether morale problems are inevitable under team policing, or only the result of one department's judgments and decisions.

What can safely be said about the COMSEC experiment in Cincinnati is that it leaves no reason to believe neighborhood team policing carries the risk of inviting crime or that it is worse than regular police practices in other ways. Rather, it seems that neighborhood team policing could hold benefits and is one reasonable option for change in police organization and practice.

Some specific observations can be drawn from the Cincinnati experience that are generalizable to other police departments interested in team policing.

- Given limited manpower and sectors corresponding to neighborhoods, some COMSEC teams were almost

bound to be understaffed. Efficiency argued for dividing District 1 into just a few teams so as to stretch its complement of supervisors as far as possible, whereas the intimacy and knowledge prized by team policing argued for providing every neighborhood with its own team. Practical considerations—money and manpower—dictate the need for a compromise between efficiency and intimacy in dividing a police district into sectors. Sectors should be large enough so that a supervisor can be on duty at all times.

- The CPD found that COMSEC required centralized services, such as budgeting and information gathering, if the decentralization of decisionmaking was not to lower the quality of police service. Likewise, later field experience demonstrated that teams could not develop an array of alternatives to arrest on their own. Before an officer on the street could exercise discretion and send an alcoholic to a detoxification center, a system for referral and service delivery had to be established. Only a central agency had the wherewithal to do this. In other words, decentralized operations require extensive assistance from the center. There is a need for balance between decentralized and centralized functions.

The remainder of this document contains a brief discussion of the evaluation methods and highlights from the technical report on the effects on police-community relations, on crime, and on officer attitudes and experience.

II. EVALUATION METHODS

THE GOALS OF TEAM POLICING as stated in the Cincinnati Police Division proposal were threefold:

1. Impact goals: To reduce crime and to improve police-community relations.
2. Design goals*: To modify the character of policing in District 1, introducing such components as:
   - redefinition of sector team areas to conform to community perceptions of neighborhood boundaries;
   - realignment of supervisory structure and 24-hour responsibility;
   - permanent assignment of officers to sectors and increased opportunity for face-to-face police-community contact;
   - delegation of authority to provide all police services except homicide investigations;
   - addition of new incentives through job enrichment and provision of additional overtime money;
   - increased recruitment of minorities.

*The complete list of design goals presented in the CPD proposal is in Appendix H to the technical report.

3. Delivery goals: To provide the necessary resources for team policing: officers, equipment, training, reporting systems, and public relations.

The evaluation focused primarily on assessing the effectiveness of team policing in achieving the impact goals specified by the CPD.

There was a division of labor in evaluating team policing. The Urban Institute measured impact, the central issue in this study, and police incentives (including satisfaction), while the CPD measured accomplishment of most internal delivery and design goals. Investigative effectiveness was evaluated jointly.

To measure the impact of COMSEC, a variety of surveys of citizens and police officers were used, as well as police records. Other police records and officer interviews were used to determine the degree to which the division's design and delivery goals were met. Table 1 lists major information sources.

The purpose of impact measurement was to determine whether conditions related to crime, police-community relations, and officer job satisfaction changed during the experiment and, if so, whether the changes were attributable to COMSEC. It was possible, of course, that improvements in District 1 could result from factors other than COMSEC, such as favorable press reports about the police, improved economic conditions, or increased police manpower. The experimental design attempted to rule out these alternative explanations by determining the extent to which the experimental area changed independently of a comparison area. This was done by comparing findings in District 1 with those in the city's other police districts. Unless there was a plausible alternative explanation, effects which occurred only in District 1 were attributed to the experiment.

Information was gathered through surveys of residents, small businesses and police officers at five different times during the 30-month experiment. The five survey "waves" occurred at the beginning of the experiment (the "baseline" survey), and after 6, 12, 18, and 30 months (Table 2).

The evaluation design had to be modified for the 30-month surveys. At 30 months, no arrestees were interviewed, and only those residents and small-business people inside District 1 were questioned. The only population group surveyed both inside and outside the experimental area were police officers.

The change in design was required for several reasons. Most important, the CPD planned to expand COMSEC into two new districts at about the time of the 30-month surveys. It was feared that the expansion plans might influence the citizens in the control area (the remainder of the city), so that evaluators could no longer be confident that changes outside District 1 had no relation to team policing. In other words, so far as citizens were concerned, the rest of Cincinnati could no longer be validly compared with District 1. Second, many more officers in the expansion area had to be added to the officer sample outside District 1 in order to determine the effect of expansion on officers' attitudes. Third, the sample of arrested persons was dropped entirely because of changes in the characteristics of that group.

Because differences disclosed by surveys could have been the result of chance variation rather than the experiment, only differences of a certain magnitude are judged "statistically significant" or, more succinctly, "significant." Significant differences are those large enough that they are unlikely to have occurred by chance more than five times in 100 for the attitude and experience surveys and more than ten times in 100 for the household victimization surveys. "Significant" is not meant to imply an important difference, but only one unlikely to be the result of chance.

To measure the effects of COMSEC on crime, department crime records and commercial and household victimization surveys were used. The problems of relying on reported crime data are well known. Numerical changes in crime records may result from administrative changes in reporting procedures or from police practices, as well as from actual crime changes. Moreover, it has become clear that there is a large body of unreported crimes that never come to the attention of the police because citizens believe that these crimes are not important enough to report or that nothing could be done. Thus, reduction in crime can be masked if citizens increase their reporting of crime. These problems led to the use of victimization surveys to obtain an independent estimate of the level of crime.

To measure the effects of the experiment on police-community relations, attitude and experience surveys were administered to police officers and to three groups of citizens: people who had received service from the police recently; people who had been arrested for relatively minor offenses; and owners and managers of small businesses.

TABLE 1
SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR THE COMSEC EVALUATION

IMPACT DATA			DELIVERY AND DESIGN GOAL DATA
SURVEYS			POLICE RECORDS
Random Sample Type	Survey Type	Basic Type of Administration	
Citizens who received police service	Attitude and experience	Personal	Administrative
Citizens who were arrested	Attitude and experience	Personal	Supply
Commercial establishments	Attitude, experience and victimization	Telephone	Radio dispatch
Household residents	Attitude, experience and victimization	Personal	Officer activity log
Police officers	Attitude and experience	Group administration	Pay and overtime
			Training
			Minority recruitment
			Aided persons reports

CRIME RECORDS	SURVEYS
Weekly crime data Other crime data: arrest, log of case status clearance, unfounded rates	Survey of police officer attitudes and experience
SPECIAL INTERVIEWS	**SPECIAL INTERVIEWS**
Officer survey follow-up Investigators	Special interviews with civilian professionals

The officers' attitude and experience survey was also used to measure the impact of COMSEC on the nature of police officers' work and their satisfaction with it.

The survey samples, locations, and the number of completed interviews in each survey wave are shown in Table 2. Following is a description of sample survey characteristics.

Service Survey

The service survey measured the experience and attitudes toward the police of citizens who had received police service recently. The service sample in each survey was selected at random from three groups consisting of people who, in the previous three months, had either reported a Part I crime; been assisted by the police, usually by being taken to the hospital; or been involved in a family disturbance to which the police had been summoned. An almost entirely new group was interviewed in each survey.

It proved very difficult to locate respondents during the first survey because of missing or incomplete addresses in police records for "family trouble" runs and false or misleading information given by citizens to police. After the first survey, adequate numbers of interviews were obtained by oversampling and by more careful police recordkeeping.

In the last survey no "service" citizens outside the experimental area were interviewed because it was presumed that the plans to expand COMSEC would influence these citizens' replies.

Arrested Survey

The arrested sample, selected at random, consisted primarily of misdemeanants. One-third was drawn from the workhouse (city jail), and the other two-thirds from the city probation office. Typical offenses included traffic violations, drunkenness, simple assault, petty larceny, and failure to provide child support. Interest in the arrested sample was based on known, recent contact with the police. The reasoning was that, if police conduct changed, through time such changes would be reflected in arrestees' responses to the experience and attitude questionnaires. A questionnaire concerning experience and attitudes was administered to arrestees, and all were interviewed in person.

TABLE 2
ADMINISTRATIONS AND SAMPLE SIZES FOR SURVEY WAVES
(Completed Interviews)

Sample and Location	Baseline March 1973	6 Months September 1973	12 Months March 1974	18 Months September 1974	30 Months September 1975
Inside District 1					
Service Sample	210	172	173	156	166
Arrested Sample	108	102	145	148	—
Commercial Sample	80	146	138	154	171
Household Sample	967	—	756*	—	—
Police Officer	106	91	110	105	103
Outside District 1					
Service Sample	89	180	202	170	—
Arrested Sample	201	201	152	169	—
Commercial Sample	97	147	154	168	—
Household Sample	297	—	8,852*	—	—
Police Officer	102	95	98	95	196

*Survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration as part of the National Crime Panel, and results made available to The Urban Institute.

During the first 18 months of COMSEC, the characteristics of the persons arrested for misdemeanors in Cincinnati changed. The opening of a detoxification center in District 1 diverted a number of low-income citizens from the criminal justice system, and a citywide police campaign against drunk drivers resulted in the arrest of an increasing number of middle-class people. Because the misdemeanant arrest population had changed, it was not surveyed at 30 months.

Commercial Survey

The commercial survey consisted of interviews to measure the victimization rates of neighborhood businesses and the experiences and attitudes of business owners and managers. In general, these were small, street-level businesses having frequent contact with the public and police.

The victimization interviewers asked business people if an actual or attempted robbery or burglary had occurred within the past year. Each of the five victimization surveys, therefore, summarized the experiences of a neighborhood's businesses over an entire year. Not surprisingly, it took 12 to 18 months before changes occurred in victimization rates.

During the fifth survey, the businesses outside District 1 were not interviewed because of the expansion of COMSEC into this area.

Household Survey

The general citizen household survey consisted of interviews to measure both victimization rates and experiences and attitudes toward crime and the police. These interviews were administered under Police Foundation auspices only at baseline. The intention was that the data would be compared with results of a Census Bureau survey of victimization experience to be administered 12 months later.[2] It was hoped that comparison of the findings of the two surveys would permit discovery of what effect COMSEC had in its first year on victimization rates.

Both The Urban Institute (baseline) and Census Bureau (12-month) interviews were done in person initially, with follow-up in person or by telephone.

The baseline sample was acutally five separate samples (each with

[2]The Census Bureau victimization survey was sponsored and funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

its own selection ratio). Three of the samples were drawn from team sectors (neighborhoods) in District 1 that held special interest because of their distinctive economic or racial character. The fourth sample was the remainder of District 1, and the fifth—the rest of the city—the comparison area. All five samples were weighted according to the population of their respective areas to allow victimization estimates of District 1 or the entire city to be made.

The baseline survey broke District 1 into neighborhoods in anticipation that the Census Bureau would be able to aggregate its victimization data along the same lines. The Census Bureau agreed to do so, permitting a measure of the change in neighborhoods over a year's time under COMSEC, i.e., a measure of whether team policing worked better in one milieu than another. Although The Urban Institute would have liked to have divided District 1 into neighborhoods in all its surveys, this division was financially feasible only in the case of the household victimization survey, because the Census Bureau, as part of its own series of victimization surveys, bore the cost of that comparison survey. Both victimization surveys inquired about the following crimes: rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, assault, and auto theft. However, the two surveys produced widely different rates for some parts of Cincinnati. The differences seemed too large to be the result of COMSEC's effect on crime and certainly were well beyond differences attributable to sampling error.[3] As a result, the household victimization surveys were not used to reach conclusions about COMSEC's impact on crime.

The explanation for the discrepancy may lie elsewhere. It may be that the definition of "crime" used in Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and victimization surveys permits wide differences of opinion concerning what constitutes a crime, especially in borderline cases. For

[3] Immediately after the Census Bureau completed its survey, a third victimization survey of households was conducted. This was a random digit dialing (RDD) survey. This survey was not necessary to determine victimization rates under COMSEC; it was really a separate experiment carried out to see if telephone interviews could provide reliable (victimization) data. The Urban Institute and the Police Foundation recognized that the Census victimization survey and the RDD provided a chance to compare the accuracy of telephone and in-person surveys at modest cost. The methodology and highly significant findings of the telephone survey are discussed in *Random Digit Dialing: Lowering the Cost of Victimization Surveys,* Alfred J. Tuchfarber and William R. Klecka (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1976).

example, burglary is defined as unlawful entry with intent to commit a felony or theft, including cases where nothing is taken. Who can say for certain whether someone entered or tried to enter and what was the actual intent of the presumed burglar? Likewise with assault: A threat of assault is defined by UCR as an assault. Who can say if assault was actually threatened? The UCR relies on the police; victimization surveys necessarily shift these judgments to the victim or interviewer.

Thus, whether or not a crime has been committed may depend on the individual's perception, especially so in sectors of cities where violence, theft, threats, and the fear of violence or loss are part of people's lives. Some individuals in cities will be the victims of a great many experiences which can be classified as crimes.

In sum, crime, as defined in victimization surveys, is only partially a measure of behavior. The findings also reflect the inferences made by citizens about their surroundings and the interpretations they place on events. The citizen who frequently feels threatened with violence or loss may report many more "victimization incidents" than one who is less concerned or aware.

If these thoughts about UCR definitions of crime are correct, then victimization incidents should be less serious than reported crime and incidents should be associated with individuals and subcultures, not randomly distributed among households. Analysis of the victimization surveys appears to bear out both these hypotheses in the case of Cincinnati.

All this is to say that UCR definitions of crime include a set of variables which are extremely sensitive to individual discretion on the part of citizens, police officers, or trained observers. At least for policy purposes, it might be advisable to redefine crime to establish:

- a minimum level of seriousness, and
- a behavioral definition for all crimes, so that an independent observer would make the same judgment concerning its occurrence and classification.

Police Officer Survey

The police officer surveys measured attitudes toward the community, the nature of their work, and their satisfaction with it. A stratified random sample of officers was taken.

Because there were relatively few sergeants and lieutenants, they were oversampled so that statements about supervisors could be made. Since only 26 lieutenants and sergeants were assigned to District 1, all were included in the District 1 sample for each survey.

Patrol officers and specialists (combined) in District 1 were randomly divided into two groups of approximately 90 each. One group took the first and third surveys, the other the second and fourth surveys. In the fifth survey, patrol officers and specialists were selected at random.

Outside District 1 an equal number of patrol officers, specialists, and supervisors were included in each survey. The supervisors were overrepresented to the same degree in each survey wave. The sample was drawn from Field Operations Bureau (patrol) officers only; investigative specialists were excluded. In the fifth survey, the sample was enlarged to test effects of expansion of COMSEC on the officers affected.

Reported Crime

Weekly crime data for team areas in District 1 and for each of the other districts in Cincinnati were compiled for each UCR Part I crime and for UCR Part II crimes collectively. Data was collected for the 86 weeks before the start of the experiment as well as for 130 weeks after it began. The total period covered was August 1971 through August 1975. Time series analyses were then performed on the data to produce the findings.

The following UCR crimes were analyzed: rape, robbery, assault, aggravated assault, burglary, auto theft, larceny (theft under $50), larceny (theft $50 and over), and total Part II crimes.

The weekly crime data were organized into seven 26-week periods. Two periods covered the year before COMSEC began, March 1972-March 1973. The other five periods covered 30 months under COMSEC, March 1973-August 1975. Differences in average crimes per week for the seven periods were calculated.

Statistics cannot prove that a change in crime was caused by COMSEC. The change could have had other causes: a change in the system of reporting crimes; a change in police practice causing the police to pay more or less attention to certain crimes; or continuation of an economic or demographic trend. All of these possible factors were

considered in weighing whether changes in crime could be attributed to COMSEC. Thus, crime patterns in District 1 were compared both to those in the rest of the city as a whole and to those in each district to see if what was going on in the experimental areas was unique. Likewise, the projection forward of weekly crime data for the 86 weeks before COMSEC made it possible to determine the extent to which any change in crime in District 1 resembled the trend predating COMSEC. Finally, police practices were closely watched.

Because of the modification of COMSEC by headquarters after it had been in operation for a time, the first 18 months of the experiment are regarded as a truer index of COMSEC's capabilities to affect crime than the final 12 months. Thus, the evaluation placed more emphasis on data for the first 18 months than for the last 12. In other words, the undercutting of the program by management was not judged to be inevitable. Of course, those who believe managerial retreat is inevitable for team policing may feel the final 12 months should be weighted more heavily.

Investigative Effectiveness

During the first ten months of COMSEC, the CPD conducted an experiment to compare various methods of organizing investigative activity. Investigative results under team policing were compared with those under two other practices. The three approaches were:

- Centralized investigations—the traditional performance of investigations by specialized units of the Centralized Investigative Section (CIS). Four districts relied on this standard approach.
- Team policing—all team members in District 1 were to participate in investigations, except homicide.
- Decentralized investigations—officers with investigative skills were assigned to District 5 and operated as a specialized unit within it.

Immediately after the investigative experiment, other portions of the Centralized Investigative Section had been decentralized as part of a reorganization of the CPD. When interviewed after the experiment, these decentralized personnel showed markedly different attitudes from officers still assigned to CIS. Consequently, the evaluation describes four models.

The three original models were not completely comparable in either geography, population serviced, or scope of officer responsibility. To some extent this was adjusted for by comparing data for each approach with comparable data for the immediately preceding two-month period in each district just before the experiment.

More crucial, the District 1 "generalist" approach was never fully realized. On most teams, investigations remained the province of a skilled few. The District 1 approach was actually a further decentralization of skilled investigators from the district to the team level. Sector lieutenants came to view team policing as consisting of "generalist teams" composed of officers with specific skills.[4]

Because ten months was not long enough to determine whether one of the approaches was more effective in reducing crime, the experiment instead focused on arrests and clearances as measures of effectiveness in carrying out investigations. A clearance by arrest rate was calculated which was believed to be more realistic than the "clearance rate" normally employed by police.

[4] A Police Foundation study of investigations management in Rochester, New York, based upon use of mixed teams of investigators and patrol officers, showed that the combination teams, using management techniques such as early case screening and closure and management by task, had substantially better investigative performance than the standard centralized detective force. The results are fully reported in Peter B. Bloch and James Bell (The Urban Institute), *Managing Investigations: The Rochester System* (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1976).

III. EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS

IMPACT ON CRIME

The Context

In District 1, modifications to COMSEC procedures and management's unresponsiveness to line officer requests, were interpreted by patrol officers as a loss of support for team policing. The erosion of the program was gradual, beginning about six months after COMSEC's implementation. After 18 months of team policing, COMSEC officers expressed the belief that police managers had returned to pre-COMSEC operations and philosophy, with only the administrative structure of team policing remaining.

Consequently, in analyzing the experimental findings, the last year of the study (between 18 and 30 months after implementation) is believed to be unrepresentative of the impact of a fully functioning team policing program.

Reported Crime

Finding: For burglary there appeared to be compelling evidence that COMSEC was more successful than traditional policing in reducing that crime type.

As Graphs 1, 2, and 3 show, both District 1 and District 7 (which had no team policing) reported a significant decrease in burglary during the first 18 months of COMSEC. During the same period, burglary in

the rest of the city increased. However, the decrease in District 7 was consistent with the pre-COMSEC trend based upon the preceding data, whereas in District 1 burglary declined even more sharply than the trend established before team policing. During the final 12 months, District 1's burglary rate rose, but after 30 months it was still lower than the pre-COMSEC level.

GRAPH 1 BURGLARY IN DISTRICT 1



GRAPH 2 BUGLARY IN DISTRICT 7



GRAPH 3 BURGLARY OUTSIDE DISTRICT 1



Statistics for each of the six team areas in District 1 show that the decline in burglary occurred throughout the district, further suggesting that the decrease in burglary was associated with team policing and not a unique characteristic of a few sectors.

What was it about COMSEC that affected the level of burglary? One hypothesis points to the relative unpredictability of District 1 officers from the perspective of would-be burglars. Duty assignments and types of deployment were far more varied and changed more frequently under COMSEC than under the standard districtwide rotating shift system in the rest of the division. District 1 officers frequently wore old clothes for stakeouts or changed assignments to deal with new problems. Such behavior may have made planned criminal activity, such as burglary, seem more risky in District 1 and, therefore, burglaries were less often attempted.[5]

[5] One might expect certain other crimes, e.g., auto theft or street robbery, to be affected by changes in police behavior. For most of these crimes, however, the frequency of incidents is low and the variation from week to week large. Consequently, changes in these crimes could not be ascertained with confidence. An earlier Police Foundation-sponsored study in San Diego suggested that field interrogation of persons whom patrol officers have reason to believe may have committed or may be about to commit a crime may also reduce burglaries. There is no evidence that COMSEC officers engaged in more field interrogation activity than their counterparts in other parts of Cincinnati. The San Diego experience is reported in John E. Boydstun (System Development Corporation), *San Diego Field Interrogation: Final Report* (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1975).

There was no evidence that any other reported Part I crimes were measurably affected by COMSEC in a positive and independent fashion. Neither rape, assault, nor larceny changed appreciably inside or outside District 1 during the first 18 months of COMSEC. Auto thefts declined in District 1 under COMSEC but not as much as the pre-COMSEC trend predicted. Robberies declined in District 1 during the first 18 months beyond the projected trend but no more so than in the rest of the city. All in all, COMSEC appears to have left its mark only on burglary.

Commercial Victimization

Finding: The commercial victimization survey produced further evidence that COMSEC reduced some crimes.

Burglary and robbery of neighborhood businesses in District 1 declined, as reported in victimization surveys, during the first 18 months of COMSEC, while remaining fairly steady in the rest of the city. However, during the last 12 months, with the erosion of the program, the victimization rate in District 1 returned to its pre-COMSEC level.

GRAPH 4 VICTIMIZATION RATES FOR NEIGHBORHOOD BUSINESSES



*Percentage of businesses reporting one or more victimization incidents (robbery or burglary only).

During COMSEC's first 18 months, there was also a significant increase in the reporting of victimization incidents to police by small businesses within District 1.

GRAPH 5 COMMERCIAL VICTIMIZATION INCIDENTS REPORTED



In summary, during the first 18 months COMSEC succeeded in reducing both residential and small business burglary, while proving no less effective than conventional policing in controlling other kinds of crime.

Investigative Effectiveness

Finding: Team policing, with investigations handled at the team level, produced a higher clearance by arrest rate than either a fully or partly centralized approach.

During the first ten months of COMSEC, three methods of investigation were compared:

- Team policing (District 1)—investigation managed at the team level.
- Partial decentralization (District 5)—investigation managed at the district level.
- Centralization—investigation managed by specialized units of the Centralized Investigative Service (CIS).

Effectiveness was measured by comparing arrest and clearance rates. District 1's clearance by arrest rate was higher than in other districts, largely due to apprehensions made the same day crimes were reported.

TABLE 3
CLEARANCE BY ARREST RATES

Period	District 1	District 5	Remaining Districts
Baseline Period (Jan.-Feb. 1973)	.187	.135	.166
Experimental Period (Mar.-Dec. 1973)	.244	.155	.162

Further, District 1's overall clearance rate was higher than those of other districts.

TABLE 4
CLEARANCE FOR TOTAL PART I CRIMES

District Clearance Rate	District 1	District 5	Districts with CIS
Jan.-Feb. 1973	.305	.347	.412
Mar.-Dec. 1973	.487	.402	.313

Neither of these rates includes arrests where the initial apprehension was made by department store security guards. Including these additional arrests would have made District 1's rates even higher.

District 5 and the districts using the CIS outperformed District 1 in clearing by arrest or other means cases which required investigative follow-up (i.e., cases closed more than 24 hours after the crime was committed).[6] Moreover, investigators tended to prefer the partially

[6]The Rochester teams, referred to in an earlier footnote, increased both initial and follow-up arrests and clearances by arrests, compared with the centralized detective force. The difference in the Rochester team experience with respect to follow-up arrests, compared with the Cincinnati experience, may be the result of additional investigative management techniques, especially management by task, employed in Rochester.

decentralized (District 5) approach over team policing. Team policing gave responsibility for investigation to all team members, including patrol officers.

Impact On Police-Community Relations

Efforts by the police to control crime do not guarantee good relations with the public. When the streets are viewed as dangerous, the police may be blamed; yet, when the streets are considered safe, the police may be thought of as unnecessary. The connection between citizen concern about crime and satisfaction with the police is not a simple one.

COMSEC attempted to improve police-community relations directly. Citizen involvement in and understanding of police work were sought by informing citizens about the operations of the police in their neighborhoods and by encouraging the team to be responsive to community needs and desires.

To determine if COMSEC improved police-community relations, an examination was made not only of citizen and police attitudes toward each other but also of police sensitivity to selected community concerns, changes in citizen fears about crime, and level of citizen participation in crime prevention.

Citizen Attitudes toward the Police

Finding: There was evidence that team policing produced some of the desired changes in citizen fear of crime, attitudes toward police, and citizen satisfaction with police service.

In general, residents of District 1 were favorably disposed to team policing in the abstract; it was described to them in a questionnaire as "A police program where the police are regularly assigned to small areas in the hope that they will get to know the people and understand their problems." But only one resident in eight of those asked was aware COMSEC (by name) was actually operating in the neighborhood, despite heavy press coverage and a strong public relations effort by the CPD. Thus, it is unlikely that residents' predisposition to support the idea of team policing would have resulted in a more favorable attitude toward the police in District 1.

On the other hand, neighborhood business people in District 1 were not only favorable to the idea of team policing but nearly half of those sampled were aware it was functioning in the streets around them. Presumably, then, their support of COMSEC in principle did affect their attitude toward police officers in District 1 and contributed to better police-community relations.

Beyond this, of course, the actual operation of team policing was expected to change the experiences and attitudes of the citizens in District 1. The evaluation measured "citizen trust and identity with the police" by surveying people who had received police service, arrested people, and neighborhood business people about four interrelated sets of attitudes:

- concern about crime,
- satisfaction with police service,
- belief in police integrity, and
- view of officers as part of the neighborhood.

Concern about Crime

Among District 1 residents who had received direct police service, the proportion who felt very unsafe walking in their neighborhood at night declined during the first 18 months of COMSEC. No significant improvement occurred in the rest of Cincinnati.

GRAPH 6 FEEL *VERY UNSAFE* WALKING IN NEIGHBORHOOD AT NIGHT
(Service Sample)



In addition, during the same period, District 1 residents grew less fearful of traveling within the city. The decrease in fear in the rest of the city was less pronounced.

GRAPH 7 AREAS OF CINCINNATI AVOIDED BECAUSE OF FEAR OF CRIME
(Service Plus Arrested Samples)



Satisfaction with Police Service

A high level of overall satisfaction with police service prevailed both inside and outside District 1 before COMSEC and continued throughout the 30 months. Neighborhood business people were especially satisfied with the police.

One component of police service as reported by citizens did improve under COMSEC. Citizens in District 1 who had received direct police service reported that the occasions when the police failed to arrive when called were fewer after team policing began.

GRAPH 8 DID THE POLICE EVER FAIL TO ARRIVE?



Belief in Police Integrity and Courtesy

Citizen attitudes toward police integrity—belief in the honesty, impartiality, and courtesy of the police—were quite favorable throughout the city before COMSEC and generally remained the same under the program.

View of Officers as Part of Neighborhood

Increased informal citizen-police contact is believed to be one way of improving police-community relations. Trust and mutual understanding are expected to grow from these contacts. Thus, it was important to determine not only how visible under COMSEC the police were to citizens but also how often citizens spoke informally with the police.

Citizens did observe changes in police behavior under COMSEC. Those who had received direct police service noted much greater use of foot patrols.

GRAPH 9 SAW POLICE OFFICER WALKING IN NEIGHBORHOOD
Service Sample



Likewise, more residents and business people recognized the officers who worked in their neighborhood, presumably as a result of the consistent assignment of officers to the same neighborhoods under COMSEC.

GRAPH 10 SAW SAME POLICE OFFICERS IN NEIGHBORHOOD

a. Service Sample



b. Commercial Sample



However, these changes did not produce one of the desired effects: the amount of informal contact between residents and officers in District 1 as reported by citizens did not significantly increase.

Citizen Cooperation in Crime Prevention

Finding: The only aspect of citizen cooperation in crime prevention which improved during the experiment was that more neighborhood business people reported burglaries and robberies to the police.

Under COMSEC, the proportion of business people who reported burglaries or robberies of their establishment to the police when they occurred rose from 65 to 90 percent. (Outside District 1 the reporting level hovered close to 90 percent during this period.)

There is no indication that the general residents' predisposition to report crime was altered by the COMSEC program.

Proprietary Interest of Police in the Public (First 18 months)

Finding: There were only a few signs that officers were beginning to develop a proprietary interest in the citizens of District 1 during the COMSEC program.

Because a central aim of neighborhood team policing is to instill in officers a proprietary interest in the safety and welfare of the people they serve, officers were permanently assigned to neighborhood teams within District 1. The extent to which COMSEC officers developed such a sense of responsibility was determined through survey questions which examined:

- the attitudes of officers toward the poor, who comprised a large proportion of District 1's population;
- the reported ability of officers to recognize neighborhood residents;
- support for and development of alternatives to arrest, consistent with neighborhood needs.

Despite 40 hours of human relations training for all COMSEC officers before the program began, their attitudes toward the poor (at least 60 percent of whom in District 1 were black people) did not change significantly during the experiment. Based on attitude survey results, about half the officers continued to regard poverty as proof of lack of character.

The ability of officers to recognize people in their district was seen as one indication of the development of a proprietary interest in people. After working under COMSEC, the proportion of officers who felt they and their colleagues recognized most neighborhood people more than doubled. No such change occurred in the rest of the city.

However, while residents in District 1 felt that COMSEC officers had grown a little better able to recognize neighborhood people, residents citywide gained the same impression; thus it was not attributable to COMSEC alone.

GRAPH 11 POLICE RECOGNIZE MOST NEIGHBORHOOD RESIDENTS
Patrol Officer Sample



Plans were made to permit COMSEC officers encountering problems such as drunkenness or family fights to refer people directly to social, health, or welfare agencies rather than to arrest citizens for minor infractions. However, practical problems made referrals difficult. Eventually, a detoxification program was implemented which took direct referrals of alcoholics from COMSEC officers. Officers supported the detoxification program, and arrests for drunkenness fell by 60 percent in District 1.[7]

Police Sensitivity to Community Concerns

Finding: COMSEC officers moved no closer to the views of citizens on selected issues of community concern.

Major confrontations or ill feeling which sometimes develop between police and citizens often arise from polarizing incidents, where disagreement has become chronic as much from misunderstanding as from an honest difference of opinion. Citizens and police were surveyed regarding three issues of apparent community concern: drug use, recruitment of black officers, and civilian review boards. However, there were no signs that COMSEC officers grew more accepting of the community's views concerning these issues.

[7] During the COMSEC evaluation, use of the detoxification center for diversion of arrests was available only to District 1 officers.

- At the start of COMSEC, officers felt even more strongly than citizens that hard drug use was a serious problem in the district. Officers did not modify their views during the experiment.
- Support for recruitment of black officers among District 1 officers dropped sharply after the start of COMSEC, perhaps because more blacks were actually being added to District 1. Support also declined among neighborhood business people and arrested persons but became stronger among citizens who received police service.
- Citizen desire for an increased role in setting police policy through such mechanisms as a civilian review board became even stronger during COMSEC but was steadfastly opposed just as strongly by police officers.

GRAPH 12 TOO FEW BLACKS IN POLICE DEPARTMENT
Patrol Officer Sample



Police-Community Relations after 30 Months

Finding: Compared to the first 18 months of team policing, some favorable trends continued but, on the other hand, citizens less often noticed officers providing service and felt they had less influence with the police.

As mentioned, the evaluation design was modified for the 30-month surveys. No arrestees were interviewed, and only residents and small businesses inside District 1 were surveyed.

Compared to the first 18 months under COMSEC, those citizens who had received direct police service displayed a number of positive changes after 30 months in their relations with the police, a continuation of earlier trends.

- They felt safer walking in their neighborhoods at night.
- They saw crime as less influential in their lives.
- They felt fewer improvements in police service were needed.

On the negative side, the service sample less often noticed the police providing service in the neighborhood and felt they had less influence with the police.

Neighborhood business people had a somewhat lower regard for COMSEC police after 30 months than during the first 18. They were less satisfied with police service, found the police more apt not to respond to a call for service, and described the police as somewhat less honest.

As for COMSEC officers themselves, their views of District 1 citizens did not change after 30 months, except that they did rate residents as less cooperative in each of four respects—reporting crimes, helping identify criminals, appearing in court if requested, and taking action when juveniles got out of hand—than they had been earlier under COMSEC.

All in all, the only clear change in police-community relations to emerge after 30 months is that COMSEC officers were more distant from the community, both in their views and in their anticipated reaction to community requests, based on officer attitude survey results.

COMSEC may have had an effect on whites different from that on blacks. The aggregate scores of white residents on the citizen hostility scale are very different from those of blacks. While the hostility of blacks toward the police did not change significantly during the experiment, the hostility of whites declined, leveled off, and then rose.

GRAPH 13 CITIZEN HOSTILITY
(Service Sample, District 1)



Aggregated scores on the cooperation scale also indicated a different pattern for whites and blacks. While cooperation reported by whites declined and then tapered off, cooperation reported by blacks, relatively low initially, improved and then leveled off.

GRAPH 14 CITIZEN COOPERATION
(Service Sample, District 1)



While it would be tempting to ascribe to COMSEC changes in attitude toward cooperation by blacks, the study does not provide

sufficient comparative evidence about attitudes on this point of blacks outside District 1 to establish this as fact. It may be that the change is attributable to a general shift in attitude indicating a relatively greater acceptance of the police by the black community in Cincinnati following the harsh criticism of the police during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

On the other hand, white attitudes toward the police seem tied to COMSEC. The hostility scale was greatest among white residents before COMSEC and at 30 months when the program was at its weakest. It was lowest during the period when the program was more flexibly interpreted, when officers felt they had more autonomy, and when the experiment was more satisfying to officers.

After 30 months, the sensitivity of COMSEC officers to issues of citizen concern was also low compared to the first 18 months of COMSEC. While officers moved closer to citizen appraisals of the seriousness of the hard drug problem, the gap widened between officers and citizens on the need both to recruit more black officers and to establish civilian review boards. These findings, however, should be seen in the context of the changes noted earlier, which were occurring within the CPD. Officers viewed the CPD's return to central control as a return to "business as usual." Given the loss of morale and growing doubt concerning management's intent, the officers' lack of responsiveness to the community is not surprising.

Impact On Job Enrichment

Finding: Positive changes were reported by officers in job breadth, independence, and influence over decisions, although most of the gain in job breadth reportedly was lost by 18 to 30 months. Some aspects of job satisfaction rose initially but all fell by 18 months.

COMSEC sought to enrich the job of police officers and provide greater satisfaction. The CPD expected that more satisfied officers would tend to be more effective as well. COMSEC, as planned, was to allow team members to participate more actively in decisionmaking, to enjoy expanded responsibility, and to maintain increased authority and freedom of action.

Under COMSEC, decisionmaking was to be decentralized. Teams were to have the broad discretion and responsibility for decisions normally reserved for officials at district and bureau level. Moreover,

patrol officers and specialists were to participate actively in team problem-solving and decisionmaking, to help set team goals, and to engage in a broader range of police activities than previously authorized.

Officers were interviewed periodically to see to what extent various aspects of their jobs changed during the experiment.

As intended, under COMSEC officers reported they had a greater range of responsibilities and tasks; their jobs became broader during the first 12 months of COMSEC, although by 18 months there was less difference in the reported scope of tasks compared to the baseline period. Outside District 1, there was virtually no change.

GRAPH 15 TASK SCOPE



The independence officers felt also increased under COMSEC. This was also the case throughout the CPD. It seems that the division-wide decentralization of tactical patrol, traffic units, and some investigators within the CPD just before COMSEC began and then the decentralization of burglary investigators 12 to 18 months later resulted in officers throughout the CPD feeling more autonomous.

During the first 18 months of COMSEC, District 1 officers also felt they were more able to influence decisions affecting them. These changes were maintained throughout the 30-month experiment. One year after the start of COMSEC, similar increases in influence were

GRAPH 16 INDEPENDENCE



noted outside District 1, apparently owing to the CPD reorganization efforts mentioned above. It seems that many officers began to anticipate a divisionwide conversion to team policing. The divisionwide decentralization apparently resulted in patrol officers throughout the CPD gaining a larger role in decisionmaking.

GRAPH 17 INFLUENCE



The CPD believed active participation in the accomplishment of COMSEC's "impact goals"—reduction of crime and improvement in police-community relations—would produce greater job satisfaction among officers. Officers therefore were asked how successful they believed they had been in accomplishing these impact goals.

COMSEC officers' confidence that they were doing a good job in reducing crime and in improving police-community relations rose during the first year. Later, as COMSEC deteriorated, officers reported an erosion of their effectiveness. During the first year, COMSEC officers were more confident they were accomplishing CPD goals than officers elsewhere in the CPD. However, while COMSEC officers subsequently reported less and less belief in their success, officers elsewhere reported more and more. By the end of 30 months, COMSEC and non-COMSEC officers rated their success the same.

GRAPH 18 SUCCESS IN REDUCING CRIME



The survey data showed no clear connection between COMSEC and increased job satisfaction. Various measures of satisfaction were used. In general, at baseline, COMSEC officers did report greater satisfaction than officers elsewhere. However, the improvements were not sustained, and by 18 months marked decreases in satisfaction were reported.

GRAPH 19 SUCCESS IMPROVING POLICE/COMMUNITY RELATIONS



A representative example of the tests for job satisfaction was the PE (person-environment) fit scale. A low score in the scale indicates a large difference between what officers were *able* to do and what they *wanted* to do. The COMSEC pattern on the PE fit scale resembled that on several other job satisfaction scales. Under COMSEC, officers at first enjoyed greater correspondence between what they hoped for and what they were able to do. However, by 18 months, the "fit" had returned to the level measured during the baseline period.

GRAPH 20 PE FIT SCALE



Some of the reasons for the deterioration in officers' satisfaction with their jobs following their initial enrichment are known. After each wave of interviews, the evaluators held meetings with District 1 super-

visors to discuss progress and problems under COMSEC. After the 18-month surveys, the evaluators held meetings with all ranks. These exchanges provided insight into how the headquarters actions that undermined COMSEC had contributed to the decreased autonomy, perceived influence, and satisfaction of officers.

With decentralization of decisionmaking under COMSEC, some problems still required decisions by higher authority (e.g., reallocation of personnel between teams). These decisions often were not made, a fact that COMSEC officers saw as evidence of management's lack of interest and support for the program.

In addition, management took some steps which circumscribed the autonomy of COMSEC personnel. The vice squad operated with increasing freedom in District 1. Division standards in dress and behavior became the excuse for management to resume central control. Team leaders lost their authority to put officers in old clothes for stakeouts or plainclothes for investigations, and they lost much of the discretion in handling citizen complaints. In addition, team leaders felt that the increasing demands on them and on their sergeants to perform district- or division-level work reduced their effectiveness as team supervisors.

COMSEC personnel also felt shortchanged in manpower. After an initial increase in assigned strength in District 1, manpower levels under COMSEC remained essentially constant during the experiment. At the same time, manpower in other districts continued to increase noticeably.

The greatest problem for COMSEC was the divisionwide adoption of Management by Objectives (MBO). MBO became a means through which headquarters imposed standardized demands for increasingly rigid levels of measurable activity. COMSEC officers found that their MBO plans were continually returned until they included all CPD priorities. Perhaps inadvertently, MBO helped to destroy the autonomy of team policing and to recentralize control of the police. COMSEC personnel saw MBO as violating their autonomy, frustrating participative management on teams, stressing unimportant activities, and moreover, as requiring time-consuming paperwork of the supervisors.

Most COMSEC officers became increasingly skeptical of management's intentions toward the program over the 30 months. Two events in particular occurred after the first 18 months. First, the concerns COMSEC officers had expressed at the meeting following the 18-month

interviews had been transmitted to Chief Goodin and his staff. The chief met with them to discuss these problems, but he did not reverse any of the decisions to which they objected. Second, just before the 30-month survey, 40 percent of the sergeants in District 1 were transferred to other districts, with inadequate explanation of the transfers. Some officers reasoned that the reassignments were to facilitate the expansion of COMSEC by seeding other districts with sergeants experienced in team policing. However, most officers saw the move as just another effort by the division to return to "business as usual" in District 1.

After 30 months, many officers had come to believe that headquarters was no longer serious about team policing. Their frustrations were summed up by a sergeant in District 1 in response to an open-ended question in the 30-month survey:

> COMSEC has coordination problems, someone is always changing hours, doing what they want without notifying anyone . . . nobody gives a damn anymore. As a sergeant, you just beat your head against a wall. . . . The pride is gone from the department. The attitude is, "Milk the big federally funded COMSEC cow as long as it is here."[8] MBO is the biggest parasite of all--it sucks the life blood of the department. It will cripple the supervision and eventually no one will have time for anything.

Yet, despite everything, officer support for COMSEC as a *full-fledged* program remained. Apparently officers distinguished between COMSEC during its first year and the program as it evolved afterwards. At one meeting, officers remarked that they wished COMSEC could return to "the way it was at the start" and several expressed the desire to transfer into the districts slated as the next territory for team policing. One commented, "At least we'll have it good for a while."

Interviews indicated that even after 30 months, COMSEC officers had more freedom and influence in making decisions than other CPD personnel. Compared to its first months, COMSEC had deteriorated and no longer met their high expectations, yet they continued to endorse the COMSEC they had once known.

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[8] COMSEC never received federal funds, but, because the Police Foundation is located in Washington, D.C., some officers associated it with the federal government.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

BESIDES MEASURING THE IMPACT OF COMSEC, the evaluation sought to answer two other fundamental questions:

- To what extent did management provide the resources and organizational changes promised COMSEC in its funding proposal (i.e., formal as opposed to informal support)?
- Was team policing actually implemented (practiced)?

If team policing was not actually set in motion in the field, then whatever changes occurred in District 1 would have to be ascribed to something else. As for management's importance, COMSEC could do little about crime, community relations, or officers' jobs unless headquarters provided the wherewithal for a concerted effort. Without headquarters assistance, the program would be an empty shell.

MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

The CPD committed itself to staffing and equipping COMSEC and to making policy and administrative changes in support of the program. It was exceptionally successful in most areas in carrying out its plans.

Program Management Bureau

The chief instrument of management support for COMSEC was the Program Management Bureau. Created to serve COMSEC, it grew to

a staff of 40, of whom 25 were civilians. Its work was wide ranging: planning and research, fiscal and budgetary matters, legal work, reforms in the processing of people through the criminal justice system, coordination of professional and technical assistance, monitoring division activities, and property management.

Operational Guidelines

In order to help team members and supervisors put the idea of team policing into practice, the CPD proposed to establish team policing guidelines. The job of doing so—determining what officers would do and how they would do it—was given to a 15-member task force, all of whom were slated for COMSEC assignments. It included officers of every rank represented on sector teams, including patrol officers. The task force worked full-time for four months. It had a free hand in developing the guidelines; it was to ignore division policies. After the guidelines were drafted, they were turned over to management for modification and approval. The outcome was a revised manual of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for District 1.

The CPD also proposed to involve District 1 citizens in much of COMSEC planning. To demonstrate police interest in opening channels of communication, officers appeared at community meetings and spoke with almost 100 people representing community organizations or businesses. Citizen views about desired police services, locations for meetings, neighborhood boundaries, etc., were solicited.

Information

The CPD committed itself to obtaining better information on the handling of citizen calls for police assistance. Its purpose was twofold: to contribute to COMSEC's effectiveness and to assist those monitoring and evaluating the experiment.

The CPD realized that effective use of sector teams would require more timely and accurate information than was available concerning the place and time of origin of citizen calls; the sector the responding officers came from; response time; service time; and the breakdown of offenses and arrests by sector.

Steps were therefore taken to improve various parts of the information recording system. As early as 1971, in connection with the first version of COMSEC, the CPD had made police reporting areas

smaller to provide for more specific analysis of crime trends and thus permit more effective deployment of officers. The smaller reporting areas enabled calculation of offenses for specific sectors in District 1. To keep track of offenses and all other calls for service, the communications (dispatch) section instituted an automatic card punching system, which designated type of call, location, response time, service time, and responding unit. Information on the number and type of offenses, arrests, and closure status was tabulated by the records section. Data from these two sources were then entered on tape at a regional computer center. The center, in turn, identified data by sector and provided it to District 1 on a weekly basis rather than on the standard 28-day cycle.

The result was that users reported substantial improvement in the accuracy of offense and arrest statistics. However, other data were still rated unreliable.

Dispatch

Improvements in the communications (dispatch) section were also planned to enable it to serve COMSEC adequately. Its responsibilities were: insuring as far as possible that citizen calls were answered by officers from the same sector; providing prompt service, especially in emergencies; and making the best use of COMSEC's mix of walking and automobile patrols. Communications personnel faced a challenge, for there would be more officers and radios in District 1 under COMSEC, resulting in more radio traffic, and the officers would be performing a wider range of activities than before.

Among the innovations made in the communications section were a separate radio channel for District 1, use of a four-digit code to identify all units in District 1, separation of the functions of operator and dispatcher, and establishment of a procedure to give urgent citizen calls priority.

The communications section did its job well. All the sectors in District 1 were able to reach their target of responding to 90 percent of calls for service originating in their own area. Furthermore, according to citizen surveys, District 1 matched the rest of the division in response time and in the proportion of calls actually answered, the latter representing a marked improvement over pre-COMSEC performance.

Specialized Units

Insofar as possible, COMSEC officers were to provide all police services within District 1 except for homicide investigations. However, management anticipated that COMSEC would need the assistance of other specialized, centralized units besides homicide (e.g., vice, youth aid, criminal investigations, and narcotics) from time to time, and proposed to arrange for such support under the following conditions:

- when delay would ruin the case,
- when District 1 was the base for buying or selling drugs,
- when District 1 requested support,
- when an offer of aid was accepted, and
- when ordered by the chief.

Cooperation between specialized units and COMSEC teams usually developed informally between individuals; information was also shared formally through CPD reports. The prevailing feeling on both sides, however, was that there was little cooperation, except when personal relationships developed. More specific procedures for joint action were clearly needed.

Recruitment of Black Officers

The COMSEC plan reflected the longstanding demand of the black community in Cincinnati for more black officers in the CPD. This demand was strong in District 1, where 61 percent of the population was black. The COMSEC plan called for noticeably increased representation of blacks among those in uniform throughout the division. The CPD felt that adding a substantial number of black officers would improve the image of the police and police-community relations in District 1 and in other parts of the city.

The results of the CPD's recruiting efforts were impressive. Recruiting began in 1973. During the previous six years, blacks made up only about five percent of all recruits, and there were almost no black cadets. By comparison, in the four officer recruit classes between 1972 and 1974 the proportion of blacks jumped to 20 percent; of the 243 recruits who graduated, 48 were black; and of the 104 cadets who joined the division in this period, 14 percent were black where there had

been none before. Overall, the proportion of black officers in the CPD rose from five percent in 1971 to eight percent in 1974. District 1 shared in this increase.

Manpower

The COMSEC design called for avoiding any large boost in overall manpower in District 1, for this would have raised the possibility that any changes seen in District 1 were the result of more personnel rather than of team policing itself. Evaluation would be even more difficult if manpower rose in District 1 without commensurate increases in the rest of Cincinnati.

Assigned strength in District 1 almost doubled (from 123 to 222) at the outset of COMSEC, but *effective* strength rose only 15 percent (from 197 to 226) in the program's first 18 months. Effective strength includes not only the patrol officers assigned to a district but a proportion of the officers in special units (e.g., traffic, criminal investigations), calculated according to how much of their time these units spent working in that district. Whereas the equivalent of 74 special unit officers served District 1 full time before COMSEC, almost none served it during the program.

Not only was there little increase in effective strength within District 1, but the increase in the rest of the city was greater. Two divisionwide reorganizations redistributed personnel and equipment throughout the CPD's six districts. By the end of COMSEC's first year, effective strength in non-COMSEC districts had risen five percent more than in District 1. Therefore, comparative changes which occurred between District 1 and the remainder of the city during COMSEC cannot be dismissed as the effect of more manpower in District 1.

Equipment

Nor could changes in District 1 be attributed to more equipment. Only in the number of personal radios per officer did District 1 have an advantage over other districts. The ratio of officers per police car was virtually identical throughout the city. The division did not receive all the equipment it wanted for COMSEC, but the CPD was satisfied it got the essential items.

Training

As planned, COMSEC officers received comprehensive training. After 40 hours of orientation training before COMSEC began, they received training intermittently throughout the experiment. Two training experts, renamed "learning managers," were hired to work directly with the teams. They talked with team leaders to determine team training needs, and designed and helped conduct remedial work or training for newly identified requirements. Such subjects as investigative skills, surveillance, drugs, and bad checks were covered. In 1973–1974, 50 special training programs were held, which provided altogether an average of 64 hours training per officer.

Although team leaders made some criticisms of the relevance, level, and quality of the training during COMSEC, in general they spoke well of it. They said their training requests were always met, and one team leader described the chief advantage of such training as its flexibility.Team leaders could specify what training was needed, who should be trained, and what hours would suit team members' schedules.

Surveys showed that COMSEC officers themselves felt their training as a whole was "somewhat better" than other CPD training and that it had left them "well prepared" for the problems in District 1.

Rewards

In addition to greater autonomy and influence on the job, financial rewards were planned for COMSEC personnel to heighten their morale and interest. These were built-in overtime pay and the prospect of higher pay levels in the future, based on performance and assignment.

It turned out that the new pay system was not totally established because of the obstacles to and complexities of such a change, but some success was achieved with overtime pay. During the first year of COMSEC, District 1 officers received considerably more overtime pay than other CPD officers. In all, they averaged $1,000 to $2,000 apiece for team and community meetings and special training sessions. However, after the first year, COMSEC officers lost their advantage in overtime pay as additional overtime money was made available throughout the division.

As mentioned earlier, District 1 officers had the incentives of more authority, responsibility, and influence during the first six months

of COMSEC. After that time, paperwork, and division and districtwide duties imposed on their supervisors, interfered with these reforms and officers grew dissatisfied.

Conclusion

All in all, management was remarkably proficient in living up to its plans and in providing COMSEC with the things it needed from a practical standpoint. Even when management later moved toward re-imposing central control over District 1, its material support of COMSEC never wavered.

POLICING IN DISTRICT 1

Team policing in Cincinnati was designed to differ from standard policing there, not only in field operations but in certain administrative respects. The question whether team policing was actually put into practice in District 1 can be answered by comparing the components of the plan for District 1, both operational and administrative, with what actually developed there.

Sector Boundaries

The CI plan called for dividing District 1 into sectors in conformity with 'ents' perceptions of their neighborhood boundaries. The CPD asked citizens what they considered their neighborhoods to be and then created six team sectors, each corresponding closely to a neighborhood.

Although this sector alignment was accomplished, by the end of 18 months of COMSEC it became clear that the police in District 1 were spread too thin. There were too many neighborhoods to cover each one adequately with a separate team if an adequate level of supervision were to be maintained. For example, the neighborhood (sector) with the lowest demand for service was assigned a team of 16 officers, one-half to one-third the number assigned to other sectors. It turned out that 16 officers were simply not enough to police that neighborhood, because a regular supervisor could not be available at all times. Consideration was given to combining that neighborhood with another adjacent or to combining some of the supervisory duties on different teams, for the CPD did not have the funds to recruit more officers to bolster the understaffed teams.

Permanent Assignment

As planned, officers were assigned to COMSEC: They were not volunteers, although most had been working in District 1 before COMSEC. The COMSEC plan called for keeping officers in District 1 and on the same team (i.e., in the same neighborhood), for the entire experiment. In other districts, by comparison, many officers normally were shifted from one assignment to another within a district or to other districts. Permanent assignment would enable officers and citizens to recognize each other and presumably would promote frequent and friendly contact. The CPD did succeed in maintaining long-term assignments. Of the officers assigned to COMSEC at the beginning, 86 percent were still in District 1 18 months later, including all the original lieutenants and virtually all the original sergeants. Moreover, officers generally remained on their original team.

Complete Police Service

Plans called for sector teams to provide nearly all police services to their neighborhoods except homicide investigations (i.e., response to service calls, traffic control, vice and drug law enforcement, and complete investigations of crimes).

The ideal method for accomplishing this comprehensive service was to develop generalist officers capable of dealing with all aspects of police work. However, despite fairly extensive training, generalist officers did not fully develop. Partially because of the low level of activity in some sectors, officers did not have enough opportunity to employ a wide variety of skills. There was not enough call for some police functions, such as the investigation of certain crimes, to allow all officers to master them. In addition, the teams did not completely abandon the tradition of specialization among officers. In the early months of COMSEC officers had a chance to try various functions, but gradually they fell into a more limited range of activities reflecting their aptitudes and interests and their sectors' needs.

Nonetheless, the teams themselves were quite successful in developing a wide range of skills and in providing complete police services. They rarely called on special police units for assistance.

Enlarged Authority and Responsibility

As planned, under COMSEC patrol officers had enlarged authority and responsibility. For example, they could choose to close cases at an early date when they had no investigative leads. Most important, they were given the authority to make direct referrals of individuals to social agencies when doing so seemed more appropriate than arrest or inaction. Officers expressed a willingness to make referrals, but specific complementary procedures developed by referral agencies were established in only a few cases. Consequently, the practice never took hold and eventually it fell into disuse. The reasons cited for the decline in referrals included: officers were unfamiliar with the available services, many agencies were closed during the hours when they were most needed, agencies often lacked vacancies for new clients, and officers were not informed of the results of their referrals.

Referral did work in the case of alcoholism, however. In COMSEC's first year an Alcohol Detoxification Center was opened in Cincinnati, largely through the efforts of the CPD's criminal justice unit. It provided medical treatment, counseling, and referral to other agencies, and represented an alternative to arrest and incarceration. During its first year of operation, COMSEC officers referred 64 percent of all drunkenness incidents in District 1 to it. Significantly, the center was open 24 hours a day, referral procedures were simple and quick, and officers received follow-up reports on each person they referred.

The CPD planned to establish a referral unit in 1975 to link patrol officers and service agencies. However, a tightened city budget and the prospect of cuts in police manpower discouraged the project.

Participative Management

The COMSEC design called for autonomous teams headed by a lieutenant. Team leaders were to have considerable discretion in deploying officers and equipment and in choosing tactics. For their part, patrol officers were to have a major part in making team decisions. The team meeting was to be the major mechanism for group decision-making and consensus, because duty hours spread over a 24-hour period and special assignments limited day-to-day contact among team members.

Patrol officers could participate in the management of their teams in other ways as well—by making suggestions and offering ideas, reporting conditions on the street, and acting as team leader when no sergeant was on duty. No doubt those officers who found their team leader receptive and encouraging did more of these things.

Initially, patrol officers were rather frequently consulted by their superiors about job decisions, job problems, and other matters. However, as time wore on, officers felt team autonomy and participative management were seriously undermined. The number of team meetings was reduced and the meetings became *pro forma* in their eyes. Restrictions on choice of weapons and wearing of old clothes were imposed by management as part of a retreat to standard districtwide policies.

Supervision

The new supervisory alignment planned for COMSEC was fully achieved. Under the traditional shift system, a lieutenant and three sergeants supervised an entire district for an eight-hour shift. Under COMSEC, a lieutenant and usually three sergeants were responsible for one *team* on a *24*-hour basis. On teams, the same patrol officers and sergeant regularly worked the same shift; thus the individual patrol officer was not accountable to more than one sergeant at a time. By contrast, under the traditional system, a patrol officer frequently was responsible to two or even three sergeants. The COMSEC supervisory alignment avoided fragmented authority and insured a team's round-the-clock responsibility for its sector.

The chief problem with this arrangement was that so few supervisors precluded having a supervisor always on duty in the sector. At the times when a supervisor was not on duty a patrol officer served as Acting Team Leader (ATL), but this device did not work very well. The ATLs lacked clearly established duties and authority and received inadequate training and no extra pay. Some patrol officers felt uncomfortable in this position and were unwilling to discipline fellow officers.

The other supervisory problem was the amount of time that came to be required of team lieutenants and sergeants for districtwide supervisory duties. In order that officers of rank be in command of the district at all times, team sergeants alternated in filling a district duty officer position evenings, nights, and weekends. Likewise, team lieutenants rotated in serving as District Inspector from 8:00 P.M. to 4:00

A.M. seven days a week. Filling these positions consumed much of the time sergeants and lieutenants could otherwise have devoted to running their sectors.

Crime Analysis Specialists

The COMSEC plan included the decentralization of crime analysis to the team level. Because teams were responsible for every crime except homicide, each team was to have its own analyst, or "collator," to gather, evaluate, and disseminate information.

The planners, however, could not decide just where the collators should focus their efforts. Consequently, at different periods of COMSEC, collators concentrated on different jobs—clerk and record-keeper, investigative consultant, and crime data analyst. Eventually, they were deprived of any investigative role by management. At the end of 18 months they were doing three things about equally: gathering and distributing information, analyzing and reporting information, and recordkeeping.

Team lieutenants and sergeants cited three major services provided by collators:

- Regular reports, which helped them decide where to deploy personnel and to monitor the activity of their officers. For example, auto accident information reports identified those officers who were not writing citations at the scene of accidents.

- Special reports, made when team leaders noted an increase in, or concentration of, a particular type of crime. For example, three sectors found thefts from autos a problem. Each requested a special intelligence report on the location and time of auto thefts and the articles taken, and then put a detail on the problem. The results were good in every case.
- Data collection and record management. These duties saved team members paperwork and avoided duplicate effort.

The weaknesses of collators were in establishing a reliable criminal data base and in developing methods of predicting crime. Part of

their problem was the initial weakness of the data—which, in large measure, was improved through their efforts—and their basic initial lack of technical training in data analysis.

Summary

In most respects the plans for team policing were actually put into practice in District 1, if only for a number of months in some instances.

V. EXPANSION

WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMSEC, the CPD expressed its intention to spread team policing to other parts of Cincinnati. This expansion was seen as requiring additional police manpower. In September 1975, with COMSEC in its thirtieth month, the CPD was on the verge of introducing team policing into District 3 and just a few months away from phasing it into District 5. As an epilogue to the evaluation of the COMSEC experiment itself, the preparation for expansion of team policing into these two districts was studied.

The purpose of examining the expansion was to see if the strikingly positive initial effects of team policing on officers' attitudes toward their work would be repeated. Could high officer job satisfaction be counted on at the inauguration of team policing every time? Or was its occurrence in District 1 the result of the unique character of the district or of the CPD attention given to planning for COMSEC?

The initial expansion of team policing, in September 1975, was to be into District 3, which covered the western portion of Cincinnati. District 3 was somewhat isolated from the rest of the city by a railroad line and an industrial area, spanned by several highway viaducts. District 3 had the reputation, perhaps because of its relative isolation, of being a maverick—out of step with the rest of the CPD. A sharp rise in crime, especially burglary, had occurred there in 1972-1973. A new commander had taken over in January 1974.

Team policing was to come to District 5 in the fall of 1975. District 5 had already received attention as an experimental area. At the time that COMSEC began in District 1, a decentralized investigative model had been put into operation in District 5; under the District 5 model, invesigators were assigned to the district rather than to a central unit.

Districts 3 and 5 were less densely populated than District 1. The largest team sector of District 3 covered an area larger than all of District 1. Both Districts 3 and 5 had identifiable black communities, but these constituted a small proportion of the total district population, unlike District 1. District 3 included a fairly large Appalachian population, while District 5 contained the University of Cincinnati and the surrounding university community.

In September 1975, in conjunction with the 30-month COMSEC survey, officers in Districts 3 and 5 were interviewed to determine their job attitudes just before the implementation of team policing. The attitudes of 56 officers in District 3 and 44 officers in District 5 were compared to those of 100 officers in District 1 and to a total of 100 officers from the remaining districts in the city, 4, 6, and 7.

Officers in District 5 showed more favorable attitudes toward their jobs than officers in either District 1 or Districts 4, 6, and 7. A much lower proportion of District 5 officers reported they had found their jobs particularly frustrating at times in the previous six months. In addition, District 5 officers held more favorable views of team policing and gave themselves a higher rating in improving police-community relations.

District 3 officers told a very different tale. They expressed the lowest satisfaction levels for officers in the division. They saw their own suggestions and ideas as less important to the effectiveness of their units than did officers elsewhere.

On the other hand, District 3 officers held somewhat more positive beliefs about team policing than their counterparts in District 1 or Districts 4, 6, and 7, and rated themselves more successful at improving police-community relations.

A direct comparison of officers in the two expansion districts showed that District 3 officers felt they had less influence over decisions affecting their jobs and scored considerably lower on various job satisfaction scales.

In sum, with the implementation of team policing, officers in one district displayed relatively positive attitudes toward their jobs while those in another district displayed a relatively negative outlook. The implementation of a team policing program does not automatically result in positive attitudes and satisfaction concerning work.

During informal discussions, officers suggested several reasons for the poor morale in District 3 as reported in the survey.

First, unlike the planning task force in District 1, which was made up of many young, newly promoted, highly motivated officers interested in innovation, the District 3 task force consisted of more experienced, streetwise officers with experience as investigators. They looked on innovations such as team policing with a more skeptical eye.

Second, the District 3 task force was instructed by the division to be innovative and not to worry about existing division constraints in developing team policing guidelines. However, the task force's first set of major recommendations—on investigations and manpower allocation—were rejected. The CPD headquarters considered these recommendations unrealistic and self-serving. Warranted or not, the task force lost its trust in the planning process and in the CPD's good faith. The members came to believe that they were being told to copy District 1's program. Their growing sense of betrayal and frustration spread to other officers in the district.

The evaluation documents not only the successful implementation of neighborhood team policing in 1973 but a relatively unsuccessful attempt in 1975.

It appears that planning to implement the expansion of neighborhood team policing may require a level of management care, attention, and commitment not far different from that necessary to introduce it in the first place.